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TAXATION THROUGH TIME: AN INTERTEMPORAL ASSESSMENT OF THE 
TAXATION OF HUMAN CAPITAL IN ATLANTIC CANADA∗ 
 
 
We examine the (dis)incentive effects created by the respective tax systems to 
invest in human capital in Atlantic Canada and compare this to a select group of 
provinces from the rest of Canada. While findings show a steady decline in 
effective tax rates through the years, thereby creating an incentive effect to invest 
in post-secondary education, disproportionately higher rate gap differentials in 
the Atlantic Provinces, on average, combined with negative comparative statics 
reveal a somewhat different undertone. The counterproductive nature of the 
competing policies effectively nullifies any status quo argument for education or 
tax policy in the Atlantic Provinces, when compared to their brethren. The 
graduate retention rebate provides some solace to the narrative in helping to 
alleviate early tax burdens and equalize returns, but is difficult to claim 





The goal of this paper is to assess the (dis)incentive effects created by the provincial tax systems 
for human capital investment in Atlantic Canada. Our test subjects are university graduates, but 
we note that such methodology could be applied to any level or subset of the population that 
possess human capital deemed scarce and productive, in the economic sense. We do not purport 
to suggest that university graduates are more important in the economic well being of an 
economy than, say, skilled trades or college graduates, e.g., and encourage one to think of our 
case as a subset of a larger sample of possibilities. Our presumption, like our goal, is simple; 
namely, an empirical investigation of incentivizing the tax system in Atlantic Canada remains an 
unexplored possibility for strategic policy implementation to retain and recruit scarce resources in 
the market for human capital. We use the impact on effective tax rates (ETRs) and rates of return 
as our policy litmus test and explore by empirical and simulation analysis the unilateral 
exploitation of a select number of provincial tax systems. Some may claim that this work puts the 
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proverbial cart before the horse, as it were, since to attract workers a province needs the requisite 
infrastructure and such may not be currently present at the appropriate level(s) to warrant an 
increase in the supply of skilled labour. To that end, we suggest that a more accurate assessment 
(or, at least, a plausible alternative) might be akin to a “chicken or the egg” argument; namely, 
which comes first? We leave this debate up to the interested reader for now, and focus on 
establishing the empirics of the analysis in an effort to add the requisite fodder for a more 
informed discussion.  
 
While previous research has examined the disincentive effects created by the tax system for, e.g., 
university and college graduates (see, for instance, Burbidge et al., 2012), the current study is 
differentiated in a number of key ways. First, the level of detail contained within Kevin 
Milligan’s 2012 Canadian Tax and Credit Simulator (CTaCS) allows us to model investment 
decisions for the provinces in question for an extended period of time (1962-2012), which other 
studies have simply not done. The focus on creating a comparative advantage for human capital 
investment in Atlantic Canada also distinguishes this work from its predecessors, since much of 
the previous research is confined to Ontario as the provincial counterfactual (e.g. Collins and 
Davies, 2004, 2005a/b). Research that has considered provincial implications for human capital 
taxation, such as Collins (2008) and Burbidge et al. (2012), have done so by means of an 
aggregated snapshot of one or two years. The use of the CTaCS database ensures that all of the 
idiosyncratic deductions are accounted for in determining the full treatment that the tax system 
implies for the respective provinces. For instance, we account for items such as the graduate tax 
credit and graduate retention rebates, whereas previous studies stopped short of examining these 
aspects. Finally, as means to illustrate the impact of the graduated rate structure on human capital 
investment, the CTaCS database affords a number of simulation opportunities to examine the 
implications of having an individual graduate earn at various quantiles over their lifecycle. To 
provide a degree of semblance with previous studies and add further fodder for discussion we 
also use earnings data from the 2006 Census for our empirical analysis.  
 
Findings show that tax systems in the Atlantic Provinces tend to create additional disincentive 
effects, when compared to non-Atlantic; Nova Scotia and PEI have a particularly ominous 
outlook for taxation of human capital over the last 50 years in that their treatment remains 
comparatively poor, when examined in relation to other provinces in our study. Of course, this 
does not imply that the tax treatment of human capital has not become more favorable, when 
compared to, say, its treatment in 1962; indeed it has. What it is meant to imply is that when 
compared with what other provinces have done in terms of tax policy, these two, in particular, 
consistently find themselves at the highest end of the effective tax rate spectrum, which is a rather 
unenviable position.  
 
In addition, we find an interesting dichotomy in our bilateral comparison of Nova Scotia and 
Ontario graduates. In particular, items such as the graduate tax credit and the more recent 
graduate retention rebate go some way to reversing the disincentive effect associated with the 
higher rate structures in Nova Scotia, returning both males and females to an after-tax return 
comparable to their Ontario counterparts. Of course, the design of the graduate retention rebate 
was not to reimburse individuals to a point of return neutrality, if you will. It was designed as an 
incentive to remain in or to potentially relocate to the respective province. In this regard, the 
current policy appears somewhat unsuccessful in its mandate.   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide some motivation and 
a primer on relevant tax implications. We follow this with a discussion of the methodology used 
to assess the tax (dis)incentive effects for human capital investment. Our results follow and, 
finally, we conclude with some remarks and avenues for future research.   
 
 
Motivation and Primer 
 
Taxation has changed remarkably from the time of Carter (Figure 1). Provincial governments 
have largely followed the lead of the federal government, by first applying a tax on tax approach 
to collecting revenue before migrating to the tax on net income approach used today (see 
Appendix for a detailed look at the Atlantic Provinces). Deductions have increased and surtaxes 




Federal Tax Rates, 1962-2012 
 
 
                                Source: Kevin Milligan’s 2012 CTaCS database 
 
 
During this time the corporate income tax has also undergone its own transformation, starting out 
at greater than 2.5 times where it currently sits (15% Federal rate). What is more is that the 
corporate rate has experienced a far greater reduction over the last fifty years, than the personal 
income tax. The result is the appearance of an increasing rate gap, since the early nineties; the 
corporate rate has fallen by approximately 46%, while the top personal rate has remained 


































































































Federal Rate Gap, 1962-2012 
 
             Sources: Authors’ calculations, CTaCS database and Collins and Edgar (forthcoming) 
 
 
Within the provincial landscape there are issues of inequity, as expected, but the rate gap still 
persists for all but one province; that being Newfoundland. It is also worth pointing out that only 
Nova Scotia finds itself in a position of having a rate gap anywhere close to the federal one, on 
any measurement (see, the gap for small businesses, Table 2). The issue is, unfortunately, 
systematic of a larger problem. As authors have pointed out, for many countries the combination 
of imperfectly mobile physical capital and international tax competition has resulted in diverging 
corporate and personal rates (See, Head and Krever, 2009). Vertical equity and social policy 
being espoused as reason why the personal rates remain so high and create the all too familiar 
incentive compatibility problem for corporations where income shifting and tax avoidance, 
through corporate retentions, are concerned. The flip side to this inequity is that human capital is 




Federal and Provincial Rate Gap, 2013 
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Where human capital is concerned, this classic treatment of corporate income tax on inbound 
investment, at rates lower than the highest personal income tax rate, creates a hold-up problem of 
sorts, where the government must collect the necessary revenue from alternative sources to fund 
social policy. The notion is to collect it by means of tax on personal income. The problem is that 
human capital is, to a large extent, mobile. And it is this mobility that has policymakers searching 
for viable alternatives to stem the flow of their best and brightest.  
 
Using the tax system as a means capitalize on the externalities wrought by an economy that is 
high in human capital is something that has recently started to take shape. For instance, many 
provinces now provide a graduate retention supplement or rebate for those relocating or holding 
permanent residency after graduating from an approved institution. We perform an assessment of 
one such program below (for Nova Scotia), but suffice it to say, that the piecemeal approach with 
which such enactment has occurred, while creating (perhaps) a comparative advantage for some 
provinces, falls dramatically short in making any kind of substantial impact on the decisions of 
graduates to relocate. The inertia from relocating would have to be sufficiently weak (be that 
through, say, increased opportunities, money, etc.), for the current format of the policy to even 
enter the decision-making of recent graduates. Anecdotally, the policy appears more akin to a 
graduation gift, of sorts, for remaining where one already intended, since it does little in the way 





Our examination of the disincentive effects of taxation on human capital investment uses the 
effective tax rate methodology of Collins and Davies (2004). Briefly, the methodology is 
predicated on the notion that the proportional reduction in after-tax internal rates of return, which 
manifest as a result of the inherent tax structure, will permit a snapshot of how much influence 
the latter exerts on lifetime earnings. The greater the effective tax rate, the larger the disincentive 
effect to invest in that particular locale. Results are typically treated as a steady state due to 
limited empirical observations. While we maintain this assumption in order to provide some 
semblance with previous empirical studies, we also extend the analysis to take into account 
associated year effects.  
 
Our earnings profiles are generated from the quantile regression of Burbidge et al. (2012), who 
use quartic polynomials in age, and the interested reader is directed to their study for a complete 
assessment. We limited ourselves to median earners for this study, but note that any quantile of 
the distribution could theoretically be assessed. To ensure consistency across the provinces in 
terms of tax treatment, the counterfactual earnings profile of the median university graduate is 
used. We recognize that this may bias the results insofar as earnings capacity differs, thereby 
permitting a bracket creep, of sorts. Our methodology is designed to confine our results to tax 
implications in a comparative statics environment, since our focus is on the idiosyncratic nature 
of the respective tax systems and not the magnitude of the earnings differential, should one exist.  
 






Canadian Tax and Credit Simulator (CTaCS) Analysis 
 
Using Kevin Milligan’s 2012 CTaCS database, we perform a comparative statics exercise on the 
provinces listed in Table 3. The experiment is designed as a worst-case scenario of disincentive 
effects associated with the respective tax systems, since it places each graduate at the top rate 
upon graduation and keeps them there over their working lifetime. We start by ensuring the same 
before tax rate of return in each of the years listed, and then run a simulation program (in SAS) 
that applies all tax and education credits available to determine after-tax rates of return. The 




ETRs by Province, CTaCS Simulation, 1962-2012 
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As is evident from Table 3, the situation of the top earners has progressively gotten better over 
the years. This outcome is largely due to a reduction in the progressivity of the personal income 
tax system, as opposed to by design, where education policy is concerned; the resulting benefit, in 
other words, is simply a positive externality of a tax system undergoing refinement. Fortunately, 
many deductions specifically earmarked for education start to appear in latter years and this, in 
turn, helps to alleviate the burden otherwise imposed by personal income tax.  
 
PEI and Nova Scotia are amongst those that create the largest disincentive effect, while British 
Columbia and Alberta find themselves at the opposite end. Upon first blush it may appear that the 
rates are somewhat similar in magnitude, but consider the analysis in Figure 2. It continues with 
the steady state assumption of Table 3, but provides comparison via a benchmark (Nova Scotia) 
to afford a different look at the relative numbers. The other provinces are listed relative to their 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Alternatively, Table 12, Burbidge et al. (2012) contains a list of all relevant 2006 cost and tax parameters.  !
ETR valuation to the benchmark. So, for example, a graduate in Alberta in 2012, assuming a 
steady state, would find him/herself benefiting from a 25% reduction in taxation of returns to 
post-secondary education, when compared to Nova Scotia. As the figure clearly indicates, the 
situation for graduates, while favorable when viewed over the last fifty years, is somewhat less so
if one is located in the Atlantic Provinces, especially Nova Scotia and PEI.  
Figure 2 
Proportional ETR Comparative Statics Analysis, CTaCS Simulation, 1962-2012  








(')*! (')$! ('$*! ('$$! ('&*! ('&$! (''*! (''$! *""*! *""$! *"(*!
+,-.! /01! +2! +3! 4+5! 6-36! 37!
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Empirical Analysis 
The empirical analysis uses the tax system and associated education deductions in 2006 to derive 
after-tax earnings profiles of median male and female university graduates. For this paper, we 
explore the case of Ontario and Nova Scotia and assess the effects therein, but note that any 
provincial comparison is viable. In the case of Ontario this implies a three bracket system (6.05%, 
9.15%, and 11.16%), compared to Nova Scotia’s four (8.79%, 14.95%, 16.67% and 17.50%), 
with associated income thresholds of $34,758 and $69,517, and $29,590, $59,180 and $93,000, 
respectively. Basic personal amounts are $8,377 for Ontario, credited at 6.05%, with a textbook 
credit of $451. For Nova Scotia, comparable amounts are $7,231, 8.79% and $200. Direct costs 
are $5,160 for tuition and $729 for additional fees in Ontario. In Nova Scotia, these costs are 
$6,571 and $572, respectively. Other expenses are assumed to be $1,000, for both provinces.  
The first two columns of Tables 4 and 5 represent our base case, for males and females, 
respectively, for Ontario and Nova Scotia and are computed via the numbers reported above. The 
remaining columns in our Nova Scotia case, if you will, are dealing with the added education 
benefit associated with the (previously in place) graduate tax credit (GTC) and (current) graduate 
retention rebate (GRR). For the base case, these deductions were withheld in computing the 
impact of the provincial tax system in an effort to make it more analogous to the Ontario 
treatment. The subsequent columns add these deductions back to examine the impact on incentive 
effects. We present sensitivity analysis around the GTC by eliminating the tax burden completely 
in the graduation year (GTC-All Tax). The experiment is designed, in part, to show the 
idiosyncratic nature of policy changes on males and females; note that the difference means very 





Base Case GTC GTC- All Tax GRR (6yr)
Before-Tax IRR 17.9             17.1 17.1 17.1 17.1
After-Tax IRR 16.7             15.5 15.7 15.9 16.6
ETR 6.9              9.4 8.5 7.1 3.0
Source: Authors' calculations





The results show that the GRR is far better at reducing the disincentive effects associated with the 
tax system and investing in human capital, than the previous GTC. The findings also highlight 
idiosyncrasies with respect to the inequitable treatment of the tax system that are always present. 
In this case, though, the numbers are particularly interesting, especially insofar as the current 





Base Case GTC GTC- All Tax GRR (6yr)
Before-Tax IRR 22.0             20.8 20.8 20.8 20.8
After-Tax IRR 21.1             19.6 19.9 19.9 21.0
ETR 4.2              5.5 4.4 4.3 -0.9
Source: Authors' calculations
Nova Scotia




That is, despite differentiations in earnings (and the associated premiums) that result in higher 
rates of returns for females over males, a GRR of six year returns both of these median graduates 
to a(n) (approximately) similar after-tax rate of return, when compared to their Ontario 
counterparts. This is a rather magnanimous result and one that would seem to support a narrative 
of pro-retention (not necessarily, recruitment) policy. Unfortunately, when migration implications 
are modeled, this result falls apart somewhat (see Table 6).  
 
Table 6 shows that the impact for those in Nova Scotia considering a move to Ontario are 
exacerbated due to the less progressive system; in this case, graduates in Nova Scotia are 
effectively being subsidized due to the differential tax treatment, to migrate. Combine this with 
any realized increase in compensation over the median graduate as a result of being located in 
Ontario and the magnitude of the difference increases further. Note that the reverse holds, as well, 






The current policy also creates an incentive effect for graduates, who ultimately desire to remain 
in Nova Scotia, to seek education outside of the province, since in 2006 Nova Scotia had the 
highest tuition of any Canadian province (see, e.g., Table 12, Burbidge et al, 2012). Going to 
school out-of-province would effectively increase the rate of return due to the realized decrease in 
outflows associated with obtaining the education. Furthermore, once opportunity costs of 
migration are taken into consideration, Table 6 shows that the retention and recruitment aspects 
of the GRR policy appear moot, given the resulting lifecycle windfall from leaving. As such, the 
policy in place seems more akin to rewarding those who had no intention of going anywhere, for 
staying.  
 
Taken as a whole, there appears to be an incentive compatibility problem brewing in education 
and tax policy in Nova Scotia, particularly, if as is often espoused, such policies are designed 
with retention and recruitment in mind (see, e.g., CCH's Provincial Tax News, no. 5, October 
2011). Consider the fact that the cost of the GRR in its first year (2009) was approximately 
$3.9m, compared to the cost of the GTC of $1.4m (NS Dept of Finance, Overview of the Nova 
Scotia Tax System, April 2011), then the implications of forgoing additional revenues take on a 
rather sinister feel, assuming no subsequent inflow from out of province has resulted; when 
considered in conjunction with the funding cuts of post secondary institutions in the province, the 
incumbent policies appear even more stark.  
 
The above notwithstanding, the creation of the GRR is without a doubt one of the more 
innovative features in reducing the disincentive effect associated with the tax system in terms of 
human capital investment. The impact on post-graduate earnings is the key to its success and this 
is the most important thing to keep in mind when any revamping or further changes are to be 
considered. It is the impact of the tax system on the earnings lifecycle after graduation that 
matters; that is, after the human capital has been acquired, and not while the individual is in 
school. While it is true that education and textbook amounts lower ETRs, what has a far greater 
impact is reducing the tax burden after graduation. Provinces would be better served at reducing 
tax-based incentives of individuals while they are in school and focus more on alleviating the 
burden when they enter the marketplace. In this respect, we offer the following policy 








Table 7 effectively deregulates tuition to the tune of $10,000 per year in 2006. Not surprisingly 
there is a noticeable impact on rates of return, but note the marginal impact on ETRs when no 
graduate retention rebate (GRR) is being offered. Again, the illustration is meant to show that 
anything done to students while they are in university pales in comparison to how they are treated 
post-graduation. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 attest to this latter fact. Despite the approximately 
50% increase in tuition in 2006 terms, a graduate retention rebate of 14 years would effectively 
nullify the front loaded expense by returning the individual to the same after-tax return of 15.5%. 
In other words, a total increase in tuition of approximately $7,000 realized over four years would 
effectively be eliminated by a tax reduction of $35,000 spread out over 14 years; ignoring time 
value of money, which would effectively lower the foregone amount.  
 
Assuming part-time students represent a third of full-time, then there were roughly 37,300 FTE 
university students in Nova Scotia in 2006.2 With each of these students paying an extra $3,500 
that equates to roughly $130.6m. If, and it is a big if, the GRR for 2009 is indicative of the 
approximate yearly cost to run the program then the outflow would be roughly $56m for the 14 
years, ignoring time value of money and any growth in program expenses. In this case 
universities could essentially pay for the added costs, if you will, associated with the lengthening 
of the GRR program by means of their increased revenue and still have a substantial amount left 
over to fund their institution’s mandate. Note that if there were a substantial increase in uptake 
beyond the revenue received upfront, it would necessarily imply an influx of human capital to the 
province that would translate into additional revenue from personal income taxes, sales taxes, 




&!!See,!http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/090311/t090311a3-eng.htm [accessed July 17, 2013].!
Concluding Remarks 
 
We have attempted to shed light on the relative (dis)incentive effects created by the provincial tax 
systems for the Atlantic Provinces. While recent measures, such as the graduate retention rebate, 
go some way in mitigating years of relatively high disincentive effects in relation to provinces 
outside of the region, they still do not do enough to impact migration incentives to any real 
extent. The current system in Nova Scotia also creates additional returns for graduates to receive 
their education outside of the province and return home, as opposed to promoting in-province 
education, which is rather vexing. Whether or not other this trend persists for the other provinces 
in Atlantic Canada is a recommendation for further research; likewise for other educational 
providers besides universities.  
 
Furthermore, while increases in tuition are often espoused as unfairly credit constraining (or 
handicapping) future graduates, there is an argument in favor of deregulating tuition in 
conjunction with mitigating tax burdens upon graduation for a realized benefit. Of course, we 
recognize that our return-based approach does not fully encompass the credit issue. Nor does it 
model the subsequent changes in (opportunity and real) costs in tax revenue and expenditures that 
would manifest. As such, we would once again encourage more research in this important area to 
determine the overall impact.  
 
Finally, while our counterfactual was to make median graduates as well off in an after-tax sense, 
other measures, outside of monetary ones, are also relevant to recent graduates in terms of their 
migration decisions (such as proximity to family and friends, job opportunities, etc.). Whether or 
not such characteristics override monetary ones would require a rather extensive framework to 
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The tables below represent the evolution of tax rates within the respective provinces for the years 
1962-2012. As conveyed above, the rates mimic the federal ones, if you will, up until 2000, when 
there was a switch from the tax on tax approach to a tax on net income one. The Tables are 
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ANALYSE DES ENJEUX FISCAUX  
Les gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux font face à des dettes accumulées et des déficits 
importants et doivent tenter de rééquilibrer leurs budgets soit par une augmentation des revenus 
ou une diminution des dépenses. Dans ce travail, nous avons fais l’analyse de l’assiette fiscale de 
la province du Nouveau-Brunswick pour identifier les enjeux fiscaux et mieux comprendre les 
contraintes au redressement des finances publiques. 
Le cas de la province du Nouveau-Brunswick 
L’économie mondiale fait présentement face à des défis majeurs et plusieurs pays, dont la Grèce, 
ont dû ou devront adopter des mesures draconiennes pour équilibrer leurs budgets et rétablir les 
finances publiques. Le Canada  a réussi à date à s’en sortir  mais les gouvernements, tant fédéral 
que provinciaux font face à dettes accumulées et des déficits importants. Ils doivent donc tenter 
de  rééquilibrer leurs budgets soit par une augmentation des revenus ou une diminution des 
dépenses.  
L’objectif de ce travail est d’analyser l’assiette fiscale de la province du Nouveau Brunswick afin 
d’identifier les enjeux fiscaux et de mieux comprendre les contraintes au redressement des 
finances publiques.  Pour y parvenir, une analyse du budget de la province et des revenus des 
contribuables sera effectuée afin d’identifier en premier lieu, les sources de revenu provinciales 
et, en deuxième lieu l’apport de chacun des contribuables à l’assiette fiscale selon les différentes 
catégories de revenu.  L’ensemble de ces analyses permettront de mieux comprendre les marges 
de manœuvre disponibles relativement à l’impôt sur le revenu des particuliers dans 
l’augmentation des revenus.  A cette fin,  les données les plus récentes publiées par la province du 
Nouveau Brunswick ainsi que les données de Statistique Canada disponibles à la date de l’étude 
seront utilisées 
Le plan de cet article est le suivant : la première partie de l’article aborde la situation fiscale 
actuelle de la province du Nouveau-Brunswick en termes de dépenses et de revenus. A cet effet, 
les recettes de la province seront analysées. La deuxième partie portera sur l’analyse des revenus 
et des impôts personnels payés par les contribuables de cette province. Le tout sera suivi par une 
conclusion. 
Situation fiscale du N-B en 2012-2013   
Tel que démontré au graphique 1, la province du Nouveau-Brunswick, tout comme les autres 
provinces canadiennes, fait face à une augmentation vertigineuse des dépenses. Même en 
essayant de contrôler les dépenses, la province fait face à un déficit de 182,9 M$ pour l’année 
2012-2013, et la tendance se maintiendra pour les prochaines années si des mesures ne sont pas 
prises pour corriger la situation. En plus de la rationalisation des dépenses, la Province doit aussi 
faire une analyse de ses sources de revenus pour balancer le budget. La prochaine section va 
présenter les différentes sources de revenu de la Province. 
 
Source : Ministère des finances, Province du Nouveau Brunswick, Budget 2012-2013 
Tel que présenté au graphique 2, les recettes provinciales proviennent de deux sources 
principales : les recettes de provenance interne qui sont évaluées à 4 986 millions de dollars 
(62,20%) et les paiements de transferts fédéraux qui représentent des recettes de 3 027 millions de 
dollars ou 37,8% des recettes provinciales. Ensemble, ces deux sources de revenu devraient 
atteindre 8 013 millions de dollars pour l’année financière 2012-2013.   
 
Source : ministère des Finances, Province du Nouveau Brunswick, Budget 2012-2013 
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Les recettes de provenance interne (graphique 3) comprennent les recettes fiscales (taxes et 
impôts, 74 %), les produits de placement (6 %), les ventes de biens et services (7 %), les licences 
et permis (3 %), les redevances découlant des ressources naturelles (2 %) et les recettes provenant 
des loteries et des jeux (3 %).   
 
Source : Ministère des Finances, Province du Nouveau Brunswick, Budget 2012-2013 
Le graphique 4 présente la source des taxes et impôts qui représentent la grande partie des 
recettes internes pour un total de 3 664 millions de dollars, soit 74 % des recettes totales. Les 
principales sources provenant de l’impôt sur le revenu des particuliers (36%), la taxe de vente 
harmonisée (TVH) (31%), l’impôt foncier (13%), la taxe sur l’essence et les carburants (7%), 
l’impôt sur le revenu des corporations (6%), la taxe sur le tabac (4%), et d’autres recettes (3%).  
 









Recettes de provenance interne 
Budget 2012-2013 
 Taxes et impôts 3664,71 M$
Produits de placements
304,15 M$
Vente de biens et services
329,08 M$
Licences et permis 144,59 M$
Redevances 119,66 M$









Sources de recettes fiscales 
Budget 2012-2013 
Impôts sur le revenu des
particuliers 1317 M$
Taxe de vente harmonisée
1135 M$
Impôts fonciers 469 M$
Taxes sur l'essence 247 M$
Tel qu’indiqué précédemment, la deuxième source de recettes pour la province du Nouveau 
Brunswick provient des paiements de transferts fédéraux (3027 M$) dont la péréquation, le 
transfert canadien en matière de santé, le transfert canadien en matière de programmes sociaux, et 
les subventions conditionnelles. Le graphique 5 présente la distribution de ces transferts fédéraux 
à la province du Nouveau Brunswick. Tel que démontré dans le graphique, le programme de 
péréquation fédéral est la principale source de recette de la province, qui est  évalué à 1 598 
millions de dollars, soit 19,9% des recettes totales de la province ou 53% des transferts fédéraux. 
La péréquation est un transfert inconditionnel du gouvernement fédéral et est de loin le plus 
important programme de transferts fédéraux à la province. Le but du programme de péréquation 
est de relever, à une norme établie, la capacité de générer des recettes par habitant des provinces 
bénéficiaires, dans le but d’offrir des services publics comparables à travers le Canada et de 
permettre un taux d’imposition comparable à tous les citoyens. 
Les deux autres programmes de transfert fédéral sont le transfert canadien en matière de santé 
(637 M$) et le programme de transfert canadien en matière de programmes sociaux (257 M$) qui 
représentent respectivement 21% et 8% des transferts fédéraux en environs 11% des recettes de la 
province pour l’année 2012-2013. Ces recettes appuient les soins de santé, l’enseignement post 
secondaire, l’aide sociale et les services sociaux et autres programmes délivrés par la province. 
Les subventions conditionnelles du Canada représentent 535 millions de dollars, soit 18% des 
transferts fédéraux. 
 
Source : Ministère des Finances, Province du Nouveau Brunswick, Budget 2012-2013. 
L’analyse des recettes de la province du Nouveau Brunswick a démontré que les transferts 
fédéraux représentent 38% des recettes provinciales, et que les impôts sur le revenu des 
particuliers (1 317 M$) et la taxe de vente harmonisée (1 135 M$) représentent les deux 
principales sources de revenu interne, soit 49% des recettes de provenance interne ou 67% des 
taxes et impôts. Il est aussi important de noter que la taxe sur l’essence, les impôts sur le revenu 
des corporations ainsi que les taxes sur le tabac ne représentent que 7%, 6% et 4% des taxes et 
impôts respectivement.      
Péréquation 
1598  M$ 
53% 
Santé 637 M$ 
21% 
Programmes 
sociaux   
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Paiements de transferts fédéraux 
 Budget 2012-2013 
Analyse -  impôt sur le revenu des particuliers 
Dans la section précédente nous avons démontré que l’impôt sur le revenu des particuliers 
représente la première source de recettes de provenance  interne de la province. Dans la partie qui 
suit, nous allons faire une analyse des revenus et des impôts payés par les contribuables  de la 
province du Nouveau Brunswick. Au besoin, nous comparerons ces données avec celles du 
Canada et d’autres provinces. A cet effet, le tableau 1 présente les impôts directs en provenance 
des particuliers pour la province du Nouveau Brunswick tant au niveau fédéral que provincial 
pour la période  2001 à 2009. Les données démontrent que l’impôt direct des particuliers tant au 
niveau provincial que fédéral de la période de 2001 à 2009 a augmenté de 11,65% au fédéral 
(1785 M$ vs 1577 M$) et de 26% au provincial (1248 M$ vs 923 M$).  Pour la province du 
Nouveau Brunswick, nous pouvons observer une diminution des impôts des individus pour 
l’année 2009 par rapport à 2008, ce qui pourrait s’expliquer par la diminution des taux d’impôt au 
Nouveau Brunswick au cours de cette période. Il faut aussi signaler que les impôts prévus par la 
province du Nouveau Brunswick pour l’année 2012 à 2013 (1 317 M$) sont inférieurs au niveau 
de 2008 (1 339 M$), ce qui semble donner raison aux personnes qui,  à l’époque,  estimaient que 
la province n’avait pas la capacité financière  de réduire les taux d’impôts des individus. Il est à 
remarquer que la province a rétabli, lors du dernier budget en 2013,   les taux d’impôts comme ils 
l’étaient il y a quelques années.  
 
Tableau 1 
Impôts directs  des particuliers pour la province du Nouveau-Brunswick 
(CANSIM 384-0006) de 2001 à 2009 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Total impôts directs 
(particuliers) (M$) 2,500 2,480 2,494 2,613 2,713 2,766 3,000 3,202 3,033 
Fédéral (M$) 1,577 1,514 1,527 1,599 1,634 1,636 1,742 1,863 1,785 
Provincial (M$) 923 966 967 1,014 1,079 1,130 1,258 1,339 1,248 
 
Le tableau 2 fait ressortir le nombre de contribuables   de la province du Nouveau Brunswick 
selon  les différentes catégories de revenu. Les contribuables  représentent les personnes qui ont 
produit une déclaration d’impôt pour la période de référence et qui étaient vivants à la fin de 
l’année.  On observe  une légère augmentation du nombre de contribuables au cours des années; il 
y avait 591 500 déclarants en 2010, comparativement à 574 070 déclarants pour 2005, soit une 
augmentation de 3%. Par contre, le nombre de contribuables  a diminué  pendant les 10 dernières 
années. Les statistiques montrent une variation négative ou nulle du nombre de résidents pendant 
la période de 2001 à 2010.  
En comparaison, les statistiques canadiennes (tableau 3) montrent une progression (variation en 
pourcentage depuis 5 ans) plus grande du nombre de contribuables  pendant cette période soit une 
progression  qui varie entre 6% et 10% comparativement à une progression de 3% à 6% pour la 
province du Nouveau Brunswick (tableau 2).  Il en est de même pour la progression du nombre de 
canadiens  qui varie de 4% à 5% pendant cette période comparativement à la province du 
Nouveau Brunswick qui montre une variation négative pendant plusieurs périodes de 5 ans.  
Le tableau 2 présente aussi le pourcentage de déclarants avec un revenu supérieur à un certain 
seuil. À titre d’exemple, pour l’année 2010, 3% des déclarants du Nouveau Brunswick avaient un 
revenu total supérieur à 100 000$, 8% un revenu total supérieur à 75 000$, 20% un revenu 
supérieur à 50 000$, 37% supérieurs à 35 000$, 53% supérieurs à25 000 et 74% supérieurs à 
15 000$. Quoique le pourcentage d’individus dans les catégories de revenus supérieures a 
légèrement augmenté pendant ces 10 dernières années, le pourcentage de déclarants dans des 
catégories supérieures est largement inférieur aux statistiques canadiennes (tableau 3) avec 6% 
des répondants avec un revenu total de 100 000$ et plus, et 12% avec un revenu de 75 000$ et 
plus.  De plus, bien que le revenu médian des déclarants du N.B. est passé de 19 000$ en 2001 à 
26 610$ en 2010 (tableau 2), soit une augmentation de 28,6%, il est quand même 9% inférieur à 
celui des canadiens qui est de  29 250 $ en 2010 (tableau 3). 
Une autre statistique alarmante pour la province du Nouveau Brunswick est  le pourcentage de 
déclarants qui ont reçu de l’assurance emploi qui est toujours supérieur (presque le double) aux 
statistiques canadiennes et cela pour chacune des années soit de 2001 à 2009. A titre d’exemple, 
en 2010, au N.B. il était de  26% comparativement à 15% pour le Canada.   
Nous pouvons aussi nous poser des questions sur la contribution fiscale des mieux nantis. A cet 
effet, les tableaux 4 et 5 présentent la part des revenus ainsi que la part de l’impôt sur le revenu 
par quintile. Les contribuables sont classifiés en 5 quintiles représentant chacun la part des 
revenus de 20% des contribuables.  Ainsi le dernier quintile représente la part des contribuables 
avec le revenu le plus élevé soit celle entre 80% et 100% . Il en est de même pour la classification 
de la part de l’impôt sur le revenu payée par les contribuables où chacun des 5 quintiles 
représente 20%  des contributions en impôt des déclarants. Cette analyse se fera pour 2 types de 
familles économiques, soit une famille de deux personnes ou plus (tableau 4), ainsi que pour les 
personnes seules (tableau 5). 
Le tableau 4-A présente la part du revenu en pourcentage d’une famille économique de deux 
personnes ou plus pour la province du Nouveau Brunswick. À titre d’exemple, pour l’année 2011, 
les déclarants dans le quintile supérieur gagnent 46% des revenus, tandis que la part du  revenu 
des déclarants dans le quintile inférieur gagne  2,2% des revenus. Le quatrième quintile gagne 
25,8% des revenus, le troisième quintile, 16,5%, et le deuxième quintile, 9,5%. En combinant ces 
quintiles, les 40% des plus hauts salariés gagnent 71,8% (25,8% + 46%) des revenus.  Ces 
pourcentages de la part des revenus par les différentes catégories de revenu ont peu changés 
pendant les années 2001 à 2011.   
Le tableau 4-B présente leur part de l’impôt sur le revenu par quintile.  Pour 2011, les déclarants 
dans le quintile supérieur contribuent 55% de l’impôt sur le revenu, tandis que la contribution à 
l’impôt sur le revenu des déclarants dans le quintile inférieur est de 0,08%. À titre de 
comparaison, en combinant ces quintiles, les 40% des déclarants les plus imposés contribuent 
79,8% (24,8% + 55%) de l’impôt sur le revenu, ou pour résumer, 40% des familles contribuent 
80% à l’impôt sur le revenu et le reste des cotisants, soit 60% des familles contribuent environs 
20% aux recettes fiscales relié à l’impôt sur le revenu.  
Le tableau 5-A présente la part du revenu en pourcentage d’une personne seule pour la province 
du Nouveau Brunswick. À titre d’exemple, pour l’année 2011, les déclarants dans le quintile 
supérieur gagnent 52,3% des revenus, tandis que la part du  revenu des déclarants dans le quintile 
inférieur est  0% des revenus. Le quatrième quintile gagne 27,3% des revenus, etc. En combinant 
ces quintiles, les 40% des cotisants avec les revenus plus élevés gagnent 79,6% (27,3%  + 52,3%) 
des revenus et les 60% des déclarants avec les plus bas revenus gagnent 20,4% des revenus.      
Le tableau 5-B présente leur part de l’impôt sur le revenu par quintile.  Pour 2011, les déclarants 
dans le quintile supérieur contribuent 60,5% de l’impôt sur le revenu, tandis que la contribution à 
l’impôt sur le revenu des déclarants dans le quintile inférieur est de 1,9%. À titre de comparaison, 
en combinant ces quintiles, les 40% des déclarants les plus imposés contribuent 87,2%  (26,7% + 
60,5%) à  l’impôt sur le revenu, tandis que 60% des déclarants les plus pauvres contribuent 
12,8% à l’impôt sur le revenu. Les statistiques démontrent que de 2001 à 2011, la part du revenu 
du quintile supérieur ainsi que sa part de l’impôt diminue au cours des années.   
De façon générale, ces tableaux démontrent que les mieux nantis paient une proportion d’impôt 
supérieur à leur part de revenu, ce qui peut s’expliquer par le fait que nous avons un système 
d’impôt progressif, et que le taux d’impôt augmente avec l’augmentation des revenus. De plus, 
les personnes seules payent un pourcentage plus élevé que des déclarants d’une famille 
économique de deux personnes ou plus.  
Par contre, il y a lieu de comparer la contribution à l’impôt des déclarants du Nouveau Brunswick 
par rapport à l’Atlantique ainsi que le Canada. Pour simplifier l’analyse nous comparerons 
uniquement les déclarants dans le quintile supérieur parce que tel que démontré, les déclarants 
dans les quantiles inférieurs paient peu d’impôt et socialement il serait plus acceptable d’analyser 
davantage la contribution des mieux nantis. Notre analyse se fera pour deux types de familles 
économiques, les familles de deux personnes et plus, et pour les personnes seules. 
Le tableau 4c présente l’impôt moyen sur le revenu pour les familles économiques de deux 
personnes ou plus dans le quintile supérieur. Pour l’année 2011, les familles dans le quintile 
supérieur payaient un impôt moyen de 30,700$ comparativement à 34,300$ pour l’Atlantique et 
de 44,200$ pour le Canada. Les déclarants du Nouveau-Brunswick ont aussi un impôt moyen 
pendant les années 2001 à 2011. Le tableau 4d présente le taux implicite d’impôt pour ces mêmes 
familles. Pour 2011, les familles dans le quintile supérieur avaient un taux implicite d’impôt de 
19,5% comparativement à 20,7% pour l’Atlantique et 21,9% pour le Canada. 
L’analyse du taux moyen d’impôt sur le revenu et du taux implicite d’impôt pour une personne 
seule présente des résultats similaires pour les déclarants du Nouveau-Brunswick. Les résultats 
sont présentés aux tableaux 5c et 5d. Un déclarant seul du Nouveau-Brunswick paye un impôt 
moyen de 11,400$ comparativement à 12,900$ pour l’Atlantique et de 18,600$ pour le Canada. 
Le taux implicite d’impôt est de 17,8%, de 19,0% et de 21,6% respectivement, démontant que 
pour 2011, ainsi que pour les années de l’étude, un déclarant seul du Nouveau-Brunswick, avait 
un taux implicite d’impôt inférieur que l’Atlantique ainsi que le Canada.  
L’impôt moyen sur le revenu ainsi que le taux implicite d’impôt inférieur pour les déclarants du 
Nouveau-Brunswick dans le quintile supérieur peut s’expliquer en partie parce qu’ils ont des 
revenus inférieurs que ceux de l’Atlantique ainsi que du Canada.  Le taux d’imposition pourrait 
être une autre raison. Le tableau 6 présente le taux d’imposition provincial et le taux combiné 
(provincial et fédéral) pour les provinces et territoires canadiens pour 2011. La première colonne 
présente le taux marginal provincial, la deuxième colonne le taux combiné (provincial et fédéral), 
la troisième colonne représente le taux marginal pour un gain en capital et les deux dernières le 
taux d’imposition pour les dividendes déterminés et non déterminés. Le tableau 6 démontre que le 
taux provincial pour le Nouveau Brunswick était de 14,3% (43,30% combiné), soit le septième  
plus bas taux provincial après le Québec (24 %, 48,22% combiné), la Nouvelle Écosse (21%, 
50% combiné), le Manitoba (17,4%, 46,4% combiné), l’Île du Prince Édouard (16,7%, 47,37% 
combiné), la Saskatchewan (15%, 44% combiné), et la Colombie Britannique (14,7%, 43,7% 
combiné). Ce taux d’imposition moindre de la province du Nouveau Brunswick pourrait ajouter à 
l’explication du taux implicite d’impôt du Nouveau Brunswick. 1 
Les tableaux 7 et 8 présentent le revenu moyen par quintile pour le Nouveau Brunswick, 
l’Atlantique, ainsi que le Canada pour une famille économique de deux personnes ou plus et pour 
une personne seule pour les années 2001 à 2011. Le tableau 7-A démontre que, pour l’année 
2011, le revenu moyen pour les familles dans le quintile supérieur était de 152 500$ 
comparativement à 7 300$ pour le quintile inférieur ce qui démontre une large disparité dans le 
revenu des familles, même s’il y a eu progression du revenu moyen pendant ces années, à raison 
de 31% pour le quintile inférieur (7300$ vs 5000$) et de 11% pour le quintile supérieur (152500$ 
vs 135 700$) pour une famille économique de deux personnes.   Par contre, même si le 
pourcentage d’augmentation du revenu moyen est supérieur pour le quintile inférieur par rapport 
au quintile supérieur, la différence absolue est troublante avec une augmentation du revenu de 
2300$ pendant 10 ans pour les moins fortunés comparativement à 16800$ pour le quintile 
supérieur. 
Le tableau 7-B et 7-C présente le revenu moyen par quintile pour l’Atlantique ainsi que le 
Canada.  Les statistiques démontrent que le revenu moyen du quartile supérieur pour 2011 en 
Atlantique était supérieur de 5% (152 500$ vs 160 600$) à celui du Nouveau-Brunswick, et de 
23% (152500$ vs 198 000$) pour le Canada. L’ensemble des déclarants du Nouveau Brunswick 
ont un revenu moindre qu’ailleurs au pays, et ce pendant la période étudiée. 
Il en est de même pour les statistiques pour une personne seule tel que démontré au tableau 8. Le 
tableau 8-A démontre que, pour l’année 2011, le revenu moyen pour les personnes seules dans le 
quintile supérieur était de 61 000$ comparativement à un revenu moyen nul pour le quintile 
inférieur ce qui démontre encore une grande disparité au niveau des individus. Le tableau 8-B et 
8-C démontrent que le revenu moyen du quintile supérieur pour 2011 en Atlantique était 
supérieur de 6% à celui du Nouveau-Brunswick, et de 27% pour le Canada. L’ensemble des 
déclarants seuls du Nouveau Brunswick ont un revenu moyen moindre qu’ailleurs au pays, et ce 
pendant la période étudiée. Les statistique des tableaux 7 et 8 démontrent donc que les familles 
ainsi que les individus du Nouveau Brunswick ont un revenu moyen inférieur à celui des familles 
                                                             
1 Nous tenons à mettre en garde le lecteur que le système fiscal canadien en plus d’utiliser des taux 
d’imposition progressifs utilise des crédits non remboursable qui peuvent différer d’une province à 
l’autre, et une comparaison uniquement du taux marginal d’impôt ne donne pas un portrait fidèle du 
fardeau fiscal pour un individu. Il faudrait faire une analyse cas par cas pour évaluer adéquatement la 
situation fiscale d’un contribuable, d’où l’utilisation d’une moyenne par quintile. 
 
et des individus du Canada et de l’Atlantique ce qui limite la capacité de la province d’augmenter 
les recettes provenant de l’impôt sur le revenu des particuliers.   
Conclusion 
La première réaction dans les discours populaires est d’augmenter les impôts des plus riches, 
parce que chaque contribuable juge qu’il paye trop d’impôts. Il suffit d’aller prendre un café dans 
un café populaire pour entendre tout le monde sa lamenter à l’effet qu’ils sont trop imposés, et 
même que le gouvernement les égorge, pour utiliser leurs expressions. L’analyse des données a 
démontré que la province du Nouveau-Brunswick est dans une situation précaire pour augmenter 
les recettes fiscales par l’entremise de l’impôt sur le revenu, environs 40% des contribuables de la 
province payent déjà au-delà de 80% des impôts. Les capacités d’imposition sont aussi limitées 
parce que 47% des déclarants ont un revenu inférieur à 25 000 $, et le revenu moyen est inférieur 
à l’ensemble du Canada ainsi que de l’Atlantique.  Du coté des recettes, le Nouveau-Brunswick 
est très dépendant des transferts fédéraux représentant 38% des recettes provinciales et la position 
du Fédéral de diminuer les transferts relié à la santé pourra avoir un impact sur le budget de la 
province. Peut-être la stratégie de diminuer les impôts personnels dans le but d’attirer plus de 
personnes ou d’entreprises n’a pas porté ses fruits, mais l’augmentation des taux ne saura pas 
redresser à elle seule la situation fiscale de la province.  
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Nombre de déclarants par catégorie de revenu pour la province du Nouveau-Brunswick 
de 2001 à 2010 (CANSIM 111-0004) 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Nombre de 
déclarants 565 410 567 700 569 690 572 490 574 070 575 060 580 740 585 060 589 060 591 500 
Variation en % 
depuis 5 ans 6 6 5 4 3 2 2 3 3 3 
Résidents 739 160 739 930 737 990 737 800 730 570 729 840 730 630 732 390 735 680 737 220 
Variation en % 
depuis 5 ans -1 0 0 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 0 
Pourcentage avec un revenu total : 
-15 000 $ et plus 60 62 63 65 66 69 71 72 73 74 
-25 000 $ et plus 38 40 41 43 44 46 49 51 52 53 
-35 000 $ et plus 23 24 25 26 28 30 32 35 35 37 
-50 000 $ et plus 10 11 12 13 14 16 17 19 20 20 
-75 000 $ et plus 3 3 4 4 4 5 6 7 7 8 
-100 000 $ et 
plus 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 
Revenu médian 19 000 19 700 20 300 21 000 21 800 22 900 24 270 25 350 25 890 26 610 
Revenu médian 
(indice canadien) 84,1 85,3 86,0 86,1 85,8 86,4 86,8 87,7 89,8 91,0 
Pourcentage 
avec assurance-





Nombre de déclarants par catégorie de revenu pour le Canada 
de 2001 à 2010 (CANSIM 111-0004) 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Nombre de 
déclarants 22 804 290 22 967 720 23 267 830 23 624 530 23 951 820 24 258 900 24 623 550 24 986 960 25 244 320 25 484 240 
Variation en % 
depuis 5 ans 10 9 9 8 8 6     
Canadiens 30 228 420 30 465 870 30 695 230 31 041 180 31 099 150 31 492 030 31 772 910 32 124 240 32 425 050 32 700 430 
Variation en % 
depuis 5 ans 5 5 5 5 4 4     
Pourcentage avec un revenu total : 
-15 000 $ et plus 65 66 67 68 69 71 73 74 74 74 
-25 000 $ et plus 46 47 48 49 51 52 54 56 55 56 
-35 000 $ et plus 31 32 33 35 36 38 40 42 42 43 
-50 000 $ et plus 17 18 19 20 21 23 25 26 26 27 
-75 000 $ et plus 6 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 12 12 
-100 000 $ et 
plus 3 3 3 3 4 4 5 5 5 6 
Revenu médian 22 600 23 100 23 600 24 400 25 400 26 500 27 960 28 920 28 840 29 250 
Revenu médian 
(indice canadien) 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Pourcentage 
avec assurance-






Part du revenu (pourcentage) d’une famille économique deux personnes ou plus pour la province du Nouveau-Brunswick (202-0701) 
de 2001 à 2011 (CANSIM 202-0701) 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 Quintile inférieur 1,7 1,7 1,7 1,9 1,8 2,0 2,1 2,3 2,2 2,4 2,2 
 Deuxième quintile 9,5 9,2 9,3 9,5 9,2 9,4 9,1 9,7 9,3 9,4 9,5 
 Troisième quintile 17,0 17,0 16,7 16,5 16,6 16,2 16,4 17,3 16,6 17,0 16,5 
 Quatrième quintile 25,5 25,8 25,2 25,4 25,7 25,4 25,5 25,8 25,8 25,6 25,8 
 Quintile supérieur 46,4 46,2 47,1 46,7 46,8 47,0 46,9 44,9 46,0 45,6 46,0 
  
B 
Part de l’impôt sur le revenu d’une famille économique deux personnes ou plus pour la province du Nouveau-Brunswick (202-0501) 
de 2001 à 2011 (CANSIM 202-0501) 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 Quintile inférieur 1,1 0,9 1,5 1,3 1,9 1,4 1,1 0,8 0,8 4,2 0,8 
 Deuxième quintile 6,7 6,3 6,5 6,8 6,3 6,2 5,5 6,5 4,8 4,9 6,3 
 Troisième quintile 14,5 14,7 14,1 14,4 13,4 12,9 12,7 13,8 13,3 14,1 13,1 
 Quatrième quintile 24,0 24,2 23,3 23,0 24,0 24,4 23,8 25,0 25,6 23,9 24,8 
 Quintile supérieur 53,8 53,9 54,5 54,5 54,4 55,0 56,8 54,0 55,5 52,8 55,0 
   
C 
Impôt moyen sur le revenu d’une famille de deux personnes ou plus dans le quintile supérieur pour le Nouveau-Brunswick,  
les provinces de l’Atlantique et le Canada pour la période de 2001 à 2011 (CANSIM 202-0501) 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 Nouveau-Brunswick 30 200 30 100 31 300 31 400 28 900 30 300 31 900 30 200 30 700 30 000 30 700 
 Atlantique 31 100 31 900 30 300 30 800 31 600 33 200 34 400 34 700 33 700 33 900 34 300 
 Canada 42 900 42 500 41 700 43 100 42 300 42 600 43 700 46 200 43 200 43 200 44 200 
             
D 
Taux implicite d’impôt sur le revenu (pourcentage) d’une famille de deux personnes ou plus dans le quintile supérieur pour le  
Nouveau-Brunswick, les provinces de l’Atlantique et le Canada pour la période de 2001 à 2011 (CANSIM 202-0501) 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 Nouveau-Brunswick 21,6 21,5 22,0 21,7 20,5 20,8 21,0 20,7 19,8 19,5 19,5 
 Atlantique 21,9 22,1 21,7 21,7 21,5 21,8 21,9 21,9 20,7 20,8 20,7 




Part du revenu (pourcentage) pour une personne seule pour la province du Nouveau-Brunswick 
de 2001 à 2011 (CANSIM 202-0701) 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 Quintile inférieur 0,0 0,0 -0,3 -0,1 -0,1 0,0 0,0 -0,7 -0,4 -0,1 0,0 
 Deuxième quintile 2,8 2,3 1,9 2,6 3,1 3,3 4,2 3,0 4,4 3,9 5,2 
 Troisième quintile 10,4 11,4 11,9 13,3 12,4 13,3 13,9 12,9 14,5 14,4 15,2 
 Quatrième quintile 22,9 26,1 27,5 27,4 27,9 27,6 25,6 26,9 26,7 26,1 27,3 
 Quintile supérieur 63,9 60,2 58,9 56,8 56,6 55,7 56,4 57,9 54,8 55,8 52,3 
  
B 
Part de l’impôt sur le revenu d’une personne seule pour la province du Nouveau-Brunswick 
de 2001 à 2011 (CANSIM 202-0501) 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 Quintile inférieur 2,9 0,4 0,5 0,5 0,6 3,4 0,4 0,0 0,0 1,5 1,9 
 Deuxième quintile 1,2 2,6 1,9 3,0 1,5 1,5 2,8 1,0 2,0 1,7 3,0 
 Troisième quintile 5,4 6,3 7,9 9,5 6,8 7,7 7,3 7,2 10,0 7,4 8,0 
 Quatrième quintile 17,3 20,6 22,3 22,7 24,4 23,7 20,7 22,5 24,0 22,9 26,7 
 Quintile supérieur 73,2 70,0 67,3 64,3 66,7 63,7 68,7 69,2 64,1 66,5 60,5 
             
C 
Impôt moyen sur le revenu pour une personne seule dans le quintile supérieur pour le Nouveau-Brunswick,  
les provinces de l’Atlantique et le Canada pour la période de 2001 à 2011 (CANSIM 202-0501) 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 Nouveau-Brunswick 17 000 11 400 11 100 10 300 11 100 11 800 14 100 15 100 12 100 13 400 11 400 
 Atlantique 14 000 12 000 14 000 13 000 12 800 13 100 14 400 15 200 13 200 14 200 12 900 
 Canada 18 500 18 600 20 100 19 600 19 900 21 200 21 100 19 500 19 600 21 500 18 600 
             
D 
Taux implicite d’impôt sur le revenu (pourcentage) pour une personne seule dans le quintile supérieur pour le  
Nouveau-Brunswick, les provinces de l’Atlantique et le Canada pour la période de 2001 à 2011 (CANSIM 202-0501) 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 Nouveau-Brunswick 23,6 20,0 19,6 19,1 18,9 19,8 20,8 21,7 18,1 19,8 17,8 
 Atlantique 22,0 20,6 22,0 20,8 20,6 20,6 21,0 21,8 19,1 20,4 19,0 
 Canada 22,9 22,8 23,6 23,3 23,0 23,3 23,1 21,8 21,6 23,0 21,6 
 
Tableau 6 
Taux d’imposition combinés (fédéral et provincial/territorial) maximaux - 2011 
Province/Territoire 
Taux provincial/ 





Alberta 10,00 % 39,00 % 19,50 % 17,72 % 27,71 % 
Colombie-Britannique 14,70 43,70 21,85 23,91 33,71 
Île-du-Prince-Édouard 16,70 47,37 23,69 27,33 41,17 
Manitoba 17,40 46,40 23,20 26,74 39,19 
Nouveau-Brunswick 14,30 43,30 21,65 20,96 30,83 
Nouvelle-Écosse 21,00 50,00 25,00 34,85 36,21 
Nunavut 11,50 40,50 20,25 25,72 28,96 
Ontario 11,16 46,41 23,20 28,19 32,57 
Québec 24,00 48,22 24,11 31,85 36,35 
Saskatchewan 15,00 44,00 22,00 23,36 32,08 
Terre-Neuve-et-Labrador 13,30 42,30 21,15 20,96 29,96 
Territoires-du-Nord-Ouest 14,05 43,05 21,53 21,31 29,65 









Revenu moyen pour une famille économique de deux personnes ou plus (CANSIM 202-0701) 
de 2001 à 2011 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
A Nouveau-Brunswick 
 Quintile inférieur* 5 000 4 900 4 900 5 800 5 200 6 100 6 700 7 300 7 100 7 900 7 300 
 Deuxième quintile 27 800 27 000 27 500 28 400 27 000 28 400 28 500 30 700 30 300 30 900 31 400 
 Troisième quintile 49 600 49 800 49 000 49 600 48 600 48 900 51 500 54 900 54 400 56 300 54 600 
 Quatrième quintile 74 500 75 300 74 300 76 300 75 400 76 800 80 200 82 000 84 400 84 400 85 400 
 Quintile supérieur 135 700 135 100 138 600 140 500 137 400 141 800 147 300 142 700 150 400 150 600 152 500 
             
B Provinces de l’Atlantique 
 Quintile inférieur 4 500 4 600 4 500 5 300 6 100 6 900 7 300 7 100 6 800 6 800 7 700 
 Deuxième quintile 25 400 25 800 25 900 27 700 27 900 29 400 30 100 30 500 29 900 30 300 32 500 
 Troisième quintile 48 000 48 200 47 700 49 400 49 500 51 100 53 300 53 800 53 500 54 800 57 000 
 Quatrième quintile 74 500 75 000 74 600 76 300 76 200 78 400 82 000 82 800 85 100 85 700 89 100 
 Quintile supérieur 137 100 139 800 135 400 137 300 142 600 147 600 152 100 154 300 157 100 158 600 160 600 
             
C Canada            
 Quintile inférieur 9 500 9 800 9 900 10 300 10 600 11 600 12 400 11 700 10 500 10 400 11 500 
 Deuxième quintile 37 400 37 300 37 000 37 600 38 700 40 000 41 300 41 100 38 700 38 600 40 500 
 Troisième quintile 63 500 62 800 62 800 63 800 64 700 66 000 67 800 68 700 66 900 67 000 68 500 
 Quatrième quintile 93 200 93 200 93 000 94 600 96 600 97 800 100 900 102 000 100 800 101 100 103 600 





Revenu moyen (dollars) pour une personne seule (CANSIM 202-0701) 
de 2001 à 2011 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
A Nouveau-Brunswick 
 Quintile inférieur 0 0 -300 -100 -100 0 0 -800 -500 -200 0 
 Deuxième quintile 3 000 2 000 1 800 2 300 3 100 3 500 4 800 3 500 5 100 4 500 6 100 
 Troisième quintile 11 300 10 100 10 900 11 900 12 400 13 900 16 100 14 700 16 900 16 800 17 700 
 Quatrième quintile 24 700 23 300 25 100 24 600 27 700 28 800 29 600 30 800 31 100 30 400 31 900 
 Quintile supérieur 68 900 53 700 53 800 51 100 56 300 58 100 65 400 66 200 63 900 64 900 61 000 
             
B Provinces de l’Atlantique 
 Quintile inférieur -300 0 -100 -200 -300 -100 -100 -300 -200 -100 0 
 Deuxième quintile 2 500 2 300 1 900 2 100 2 900 3 600 4 300 3 500 4 000 3 400 4 000 
 Troisième quintile 11 200 12 000 11 900 11 800 13 000 13 800 15 300 14 300 15 800 15 300 16 100 
 Quatrième quintile 25 100 26 300 27 100 26 400 28 800 29 900 30 000 30 800 31 300 31 800 31 700 
 Quintile supérieur 60 600 54 900 61 100 59 300 59 500 61 500 65 300 67 500 66 700 67 300 65 200 
             
C Canada            
 Quintile inférieur -200 -100 0 0 0 100 200 200 0 0 0 
 Deuxième quintile 6 000 6 700 6 800 7 100 7 200 7 800 8 300 8 400 8 100 7 400 7 200 
 Troisième quintile 19 100 20 000 19 800 20 100 20 300 20 900 22 100 22 700 22 100 21 900 21 000 
 Quatrième quintile 36 900 37 300 37 800 38 000 38 500 39 600 40 300 41 900 41 200 40 900 39 100 
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THE QUANTITATIVE-QUALITATIVE DEBATE:  
ADD TEMPORALITY AND STIR 
 
The quantitative-qualitative debate in Management and Organizational Studies 
has been of interest to scholars over the years. However, temporality seems to be 
absent from the discussion. This paper reviews the debate and its epistemological 
and methodological foundations. The paper supports the idea that research 
methods are different in degree and different in kind but that, fundamentally, 
research is neither quantitative nor qualitative. Despite the overwhelming 
incidence of studies that use stand-alone quantitative research methods, the paper 
concludes that it is doubtful such studies can effectively deal with the temporality 




‘Time has no being since the future is not yet, the past is no longer, 
and the present does not remain.’ (Ricoeur, 1984, p. 7) 
 
 The 2013 Atlantic Schools of Business Conference (Business in Time) calls for papers 
that reflect upon the discourse of time. The theme of temporality resonates strongly with social 
scientists who are concerned with the validity of their production. For quantitative researchers, 
‘history’ is an epistemological threat that events occurring concurrently with treatment could 
cause the observed effect (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2001). Qualitative researchers tend to see 
time and history in quite a different light, viewing these as situated, for example purporting that 
knowledge is “influenced by its temporality” (Weatherbee & Durepos, 2010, p. 18). The 
dominance of the quantitative paradigm probably means that qualitative researchers will find it 
difficult to “get by without some (sometimes even quite substantial) knowledge of quantitative 
methods and methodological standards, whereas in several disciplines there is no immediate need 
for quantitative researchers to ‘bother’ much with qualitative methods” (Fielding & Schreier, 
2001, p. 2). Across research traditions, respondents cannot be totally isolated from outside 
influences, resulting in knowledge production processes that have to make validity assumptions 
about ways of knowing. One important cluster of assumptions relate to temporality. 
  
 As a recurring theme in the academic literature, some scholars have claimed that research 
is fundamentally neither quantitative nor qualitative, or at least that these traditions are not 
incompatible with each other (e.g., Howe, 1988; Kritzer, 1996; Madill & Gough, 2008; Nash, 
2002). The rhetoric of the quantitative-qualitative debate covers a wide gap. Some scholars 
suggest that all research methods share fundamental similarities while others insist that various 
research methods are worlds apart. What seems to be missing in the debates is the notion of time. 
Organizational studies often conceptualize time and history as a knowledge-building process 
 
(although the conceptualization may not be specifically recognized) which passes through a linear 
series of events (Aminzade, 1992; Griffin, 1992; Munslow, 2010). There may also be an implied 
assumption “that meaning is carried through time” (Cunliffe, Luhman, & Boje, 2004, p. 261). In 
Management and Organizational Studies there is an increasing call for a historical perspective 
(e.g., Clark & Rowlinson, 2004). Temporality is a ubiquitous ingredient, often taken as known 
even though it can be seen as either an objective or subjective concept. Temporality should be 
explicitly considered as researchers try to make sense of their methods and results. 
 
 In this paper, I engage with the quantitative-qualitative debate by adding the notion of 
temporality which has been nearly absent from the discussion to date. Most historians assign 
particular importance to the explanatory role of time (Griffin, 1992) and organizational 
researchers (along with historical sociologists) have censured their discipline for tending to ignore 
time and history when studying the social (Aminzade, 1992). They may do this “either by 
studying the correlates of outcomes rather than the character of temporally connected events or by 
treating events as surface manifestations of large-scale and long-term processes of change” 
(Aminzade, 1992, p. 456). It seems in order, then, to ask the following question: 
 
How does consideration of temporality shed light on the interdependence of 
quantitative and qualitative research?  
 
This paper argues that, fundamentally, research is neither quantitative nor qualitative; however, 
research methods can be shown to be rather different in degree and different in kind. Although the 
paper is predicated on the notion that quantitative and qualitative studies are more similar than 
different, a case can be made that qualitative considerations are always needed to take account of 
temporality. Therefore, despite the overwhelming incidence of studies that use stand-alone 
quantitative research methods, it is doubtful that such studies effectively deal with the temporality 
of social variables without adding qualitative enquiry. This paper proceeds as follows: first, I 
introduce the quantitative-qualitative debate; second, the similarities and differences of these 
research traditions are discussed; third, philosophical foundations are explored from the point of 
view of temporality; finally, I comment on the methodological strand of the debate and conclude 
that adding temporality to the quantitative-qualitative debate suggests that quantitative research 
cannot go-it-alone in explaining organizational society. 
 
The quantitative-qualitative debate 
 
 At the outset, the following clarification of the two keys terms is offered (although these 
brief definitions are by no means unproblematic). By quantitative I refer to the mainstream search 
for ‘explanation’ based on statistical modes of processing data (especially numeric data) and 
generally attempting to follow practices of the natural sciences. By qualitative I refer to 
methodological approaches that rely on nonquantitative (or nonstatistical) modes of processing 
data in a search for ‘understanding’ that is based on social construction of knowledge. Abov  I 
speak of ‘debate’ in the singular but hasten to acknowledge that for at least the past 50 years the 
academic literature has debated various contests between quantitative and qualitative issues. For 
example there has been extensive debate (in a variety of fora) over the relative merits of different 
modes of research. Aldrich (1988, p. 19) refers to the antagonists in these disputes as ‘paradigm 
 
warriors’. Even within categories there is debate. For example, Kidder and Fine (1987) have 
ascribed two meanings to qualitative: the big Q and the small q. Qualitative work with a big Q 
consists of an evolving set of questions without a structured design. Qualitative work with a small 
q includes open-ended questions in a survey that has structure. There is also the compatibility 
debate (see Fielding & Schreier, 2001; Howe, 1988) that discusses whether quantitative and 
qualitative research is similar in temperament at either the level of epistemology or practice. This 
is the conversation that I wish to enter, bringing along with me the notion of temporality.  
 
 Research is considered to be a craft, requiring soft skills such as creativity and adept use 
of language. In qualitative research the “messy, random and creative elements” (P. Prasad, 2005, 
p. 6) give many of its traditions a distinctive artistic character. In quantitative research there is 
also tremendous scope for crafting, including the selection and implementation of analytic tools 
such as factor analysis, multidimensional scaling, multivariate analysis, etc., that provide “all 
sorts of opportunities for ‘playing’ with the data” (Kritzer, 1996, p. 24). Sometimes this creatively 
reveals unexpected patterns over time. Donna Haraway (1994), a poststructuralist writer, 
compares this possibility to the game of cat’s cradle where research colleagues can build-up 
knotted string patterns and pass along some unexpected results. This can be done after playing 
with the data over different time(s) and space(s).  
 
 Quantitative and qualitative – these terms are sometimes used in odd contexts and, as 
indicated above, some scholars see the two as not very different from each other. It is instructive 
that chemists (ultra functionalists) use the term “qualitative analysis” when determining what a 
chemical is made of – really a search for the inner constitution of the chemical. Time is often 
specifically considered in chemistry experiments. For example, “stochastic time evolution” is 
used to study the behavior of chemical molecules; however, in looking at the reactions “it is not at 
all obvious just how we should go about using [hypotheses] to calculate this temporal behavior” 
(Rotermund, Engel, Kordesch, & Ertl, 1990, p. 2343). Time is also problematic in Management 
and Organizational Studies where it is often reduced to the status of a bystander (although 
perhaps not an innocent bystander), for example as one of many independent variables in a 
multivariate regression analysis. The idea ‘that quantitative and qualitative research is essentially 
the same thing’ can be practically shown by looking at some typical research questions. Surely, 
research questions are at the core of academic activity. For example:  
 
Qualitative researchers in the area of Critical Management Studies address questions such as:   
 
• What is the source of organizational power? 
• How does management control the workplace? 
• How do employees resist organizational change? 
 
Quantitative researchers in the area of Organizational Behaviour ask questions such as: 
 
• What causes firm financial performance? 
• What are the moderating effects of gender on a particular outcome? 
• What are the relationships among variables? 
 
 
These research questions would be dressed-up differently by the two types of researchers but the 
basic nature of such questions is shared among research traditions, i.e., the quest for knowledge 
about individuals and organizations. Here is the important point; the above research questions 
could be easily swapped among researchers of different research traditions and still be of 
academic interest. There is an excellent story of the principle of the drunkard's search (Howe, 
1988); a drunkard was searching under a street lamp for his house key, which he had dropped 
some distance away. Asked why he didn't look where he had dropped it, he replied, "It's lighter 
here!" Those who insist that quantitative and qualitative research is incompatible, like the 
drunkard's search, call more attention to how to look for something, rather than focusing on the 
more important questions of where the evidence might be and why it is being looked for. 
 
 Research questions can be framed as differences in kind or differences in degree. This 
provokes an important discussion. However, I don’t see these differences as mutually exclusive. 
People tend to put too much emphasis on polar extremes; for example, seeing categorical 
measurement as strictly qualitative and continuous measurement as only quantitative. In 
organizational behaviour research we often hear of the dichotomy between introverts and 
extraverts, but there probably is no pure form of these when temporality is considered. Susan 
Cain gave a lecture (TED Talks, 2012) on introverts and extroverts, saying that any differences 
fall along a continuum and movement along the continuum is possible. When temporality is 
considered, after a while it may become apparent that a big enough shift in the ‘difference of 
degree’ starts to look more and more like a ‘difference in kind’. 
 
Similarities and differences 
 
 This paper is predicated on the notion that quantitative and qualitative studies are more 
similar than different. However, there would be no shortage of opponents to this view, including 
on methodological grounds. Comparisons of methods are often presented as conflicting 
approaches, and the conflict has fostered paradigm segregation among academic communities 
(discussed in the next section). Practical matters also contribute to the dichotomy. Computer 
software is usually packaged to appeal to separate interests. For example, atlas.ti is designed for 
qualitative analysis (and marketed that way) and SPSS for quantitative analysis. The quantitative-
qualitative contest is often characterized as numbers versus words, respectively. This dichotomy 
is sometimes presupposed, as in many statistics textbooks. For example, Zikmund et al. (2010, p. 
134) state that the quantitative versus qualitative debate [emphasis added] is “largely a 
superfluous argument in either direction” but then subsequent text material is partitioned into 
those two categories. Discourse in the literature sometimes exhibits a combative tone; 
quantitative researchers who claim to value statistical significance over "navel gazing" and 
qualitative researchers who prefer situated knowledge to "number crunching" (Kidder & Fine, 
1987, p. 57). Such comments not only declare preferences but also a distrust of the work of 
others. Nash (2002, p. 409) laments such “ruptures… for the terms 'qualitative' and 'quantitative' 
are not semantic antonyms, and continues to inhibit principled attempts to develop integrated 
'numbers and narratives' models”. Narrative is not about numbers versus words but is a story of 
social phenomena as temporally ordered and the story is subject to retelling (Abbott, 1992). 
 
 
 Those who profess that various research modes share fundamental similarities would 
likely admit that the look and feel of different research traditions is sometimes worlds apart. The 
following excerpts from actual research results from management journals illustrate the point: 
 
• #1a: “Organizational commitment remains significant when controlling for trust, 
consistent with the hypothesis, that trust only partially mediates the relationship between 
perceived organizational support and organizational commitment.”  
- (Whitener, 2001, p. 527) 
 
• #1b: "Table 2 presents means, standard deviations, and correlations. Turnover averaged 
18.36% per year, and the logarithm of the productivity averaged 12.05, or annual sales 
of $171,099 per employee. The mean q was .46 and the gross rate of return was 5.10%.” 




• #2a: “Implications for the management theorist as they pertain to a more fragile tone for 
“doing history” include the acknowledgement of history as multiple socially constructed 
interpretations of the past.” 
- (Durepos, Helms Mills, & Mills, 2008, p. 116) 
 
• #2b: “It means both building and destroying machines, identities, categories, 
relationships, space stories. Though both are bound in the spiral dance, I would rather 
be a cyborg than a goddess.” 
- (Haraway, 2006, p. 147) 
 
It may be difficult to articulate all the subtle differences between quantitative and qualitative 
research, although (as illustrated in the above “look and feel” examples) we can easily recognize 
the difference when we see it. The positivist results reported in #1a and 1b have a different tone 
than the interpretivist results in #2a and 2b. Even in these examples, both ‘kinds’ of researchers 
construct arguments based on the data that were collected and are aware that alternative 
explanations may exist.  
 
 The central role of interpretation in qualitative research is well documented. But most 
quantitative data in social science are also constructed through subtle interpretation (Kritzer, 
1996). For example, the administering of questionnaires to human respondents builds-in 
interpretation by design. The researcher makes judgment calls in the process of writing survey 
questions, constructing scales, applying codes, and deciding whether all the data will count as an 
acceptable response. When and how to delete data is open to alternative approaches such as 
listwise deletion or pairwise deletion (or no deletion!) From a historical perspective, the important 
point is that much research data is considered to be irrelevant or even harmful to the analysis. In 
qualitative research using time as a historical construct, Burke (2012) refers to the possibility of 
losing knowledges and what Burke (p. 147) calls “collective forgetting”.  This raises the question 
as to how possible is it to demonstrate what counts as knowledge when versions of ‘the truth’ 
change over time. The processes of knowledge-losing also include destroying and hiding 
 
knowledges, for example the practice of public organizations to hold private “in camera” 
meetings. Burke (2012) gives a historical summary of political hiding in the economic domain, 
for example the routine classifying of ‘official secrets’ in 50-year dormancy rules. Burke also 
discusses issues of censorship throughout a 250 year period and the modern use of ‘firewalls’ to 
block access to computer networks, for the sake of security. Knowledge loss is certain to remain a 
temporal consideration in both quantitative and qualitative research. 
 
Philosophical foundations and paradigms 
 
 At the centre of the quantitative-qualitative debate is a philosophical discussion. 
Unfortunately much of the attention drawn to methodological divergence derives from a tendency 
for philosophical and technical issues to be treated simultaneously and occasionally to be 
confused (Bryman, 1984). Assumptions about the nature of social science are elaborated in a 
seminal (albeit somewhat outdated) book by Burrell & Morgan (1979, hereafter B&M). With my 
apologies to the authors for crudely summarizing their richly decorated arguments into one-
sentence strands of thought, the following chart outlines alternative approaches to assumptions 
about the essence of the phenomena under investigation (ontology) and assumptions about the 
grounds of knowledge (epistemology).  
 
 
B&M articulate a subjectivist-objectivist dimension that makes evident the assumptions that 
qualitative and quantitative researchers use. Ontologically, qualitative research employs 
interpretive sociology and implies a nominalist stance, understanding reality as socially-
constructed through words, behaviours, texts and other symbolic resources. Such a constructivist 
attitude suggests that ‘the world’ is real only to the extent that we make it so. Different 
researchers may constitute different social worlds since there can be many ‘realities’. 
Poststructuralism (e.g., Foucault, 1982) deepens the exploration of reality by emphasizing 
discontinuity, complexity and randomness of events. On the other hand, realism implies a world 
 
‘out there’ which can be known by social scientists. Social phenomena are treated as concrete and 
external to the individual. Realist ontology has been (and still is) the dominant framework for the 
study of organizations. Researchers within this functionalist sociology are concerned to provide 
explanations for the status quo and social order. The approach is pragmatic and problem oriented. 
This brief explanation oversimplifies the philosophical elements of ontology (and ignores B&M’s 
second dimension – the sociology of regulation and radical change). The basic difference for 
purposes of this paper is that subjectivist researchers tend to see reality as being different things 
for different people; on the other hand, once objectivist researchers find reality, they should all 
find the same thing. In terms of epistemology, qualitative research tends to be anti-positivist, and 
quantitative research is closely tied to positivism. This has important implications for how 
research is actually carried out. It is usual for qualitative researchers to attempt to see the social 
world from the point of view of the actors, and reflexively seeing themselves as implicated in 
their own research. Quantitative researchers tend to inquire from the outside, looking for causal 
relationships and generalizability. 
 
 The subjective-objective distinction also involves aspects of temporality including pace, 
duration, cycle, and trajectory (Aminzade, 1992). Functionalists usually measure objective time, 
based on fixed points of view and calculated as a factor of the rotation of the earth on its axis. 
However, “sociologists of time insist on the subjective features of time, its nonlinearity and social 
malleability” (Aminzade, 1992, p. 470). Quantitative studies have mostly focused on the 
materiality of time, and how it can objectively structure social action. However, “in the realm of 
psychological experience, quantifying units of time is a considerably clumsier operation. It is this 
usually imprecise psychological clock, as opposed to the time on one’s watch, that creates the 
perception of duration that people experience” (Cunliffe et al., 2004, p. 266). These objective and 
subjective positions are reflected in research viewpoints. How we conceive of time has a major 
influence upon our ideas of process. Objectivist researchers usually seek generalizability, i.e., 
they do not limit their inferences to the contexts of time and space from which their data were 
drawn. Indeed, they extensively document how their samples are representative of a greater 
population, even if the research occurs at only one point in time and/or in one place (Griffin, 
1992). The mainstream concern is to interrogate variables with statistical tools to show causal 
outcomes. Often the only temporal criterion for inferring a cause and effect relationship is that the 
presumed cause must precede the effect. However, one important criticism is that quasi-
experiments merely provide a black box view of causality, especially where the actors in a 
particular treatment may vary in their experience of the temporal flow of events. 
 
 B&M (1979) argue that all social theorists are situated in a particular paradigm which 
defines (a limited range of) intellectual territory. There is room for variations within each 
paradigm although the four paradigms described by B&M are claimed to be mutually exclusive. 
This view is not accepted by everyone. In practice, researchers mix quantitative and qualitative 
data and “so-called quantitative studies are pregnant with (ontologically) qualitative concepts” 
(Howe, 1988, p. 15). Logic informs all academic research, whether it is hypothetico-deduction 
associated with many quantitative studies or the sensemaking associated with qualitative work. 
Sometimes the appeal to logic takes the form normally presented by the positivist view of natural 
science, with its insistence on hypotheses, verifiability, generalizability and other trappings of the 
‘scientific method’. As indicated above, positivistic epistemology has gained prominence, and 
 
other research methodologies that fail to comply with such a standard are dismissed as 
unscientific. The paradigm disputes take a toll on qualitative researchers who sense a practical 
need to be accepted by the positivist mainstream (for example, to achieve tenure or promotion in 
university appointment processes). Prasad (2005, p. 4) refers to this as “positivist anxiety”. 
Another useful term is “qualitative positivism” (A. Prasad & Prasad, 2002, p.6) which describes 
research employing qualitative methods such as interviews, observation, participant observation, 
ethnography, etc. within positivist assumptions about the nature of social reality.  
 
 What counts as evidence is partially determined by the ontological and epistemological 
context in which management ideas develop. But research divisions do not split only along the 
qualitative-quantitative divide. There is a large amount of competition within paradigms, for 
example B&M segments the interpretive paradigm into four parts: solipsism, phenomenology, 
phenomenological sociology and hermeneutics. It seems that the various proponents do not speak 
directly to those favouring another paradigm, except to attempt to discredit. The framework of 
B&M does not recognize that well-established traditions such as phenomenology and feminism 
transcend disciplinary boundaries. Also, more recent intellectual schools of thought such as 
poststructuralism (e.g., actor-network theory) were not considered in the B&M framework. The 
paradigm conflict that exists in the academic literature has much of its basis in the 
similarities/differences of methods typically cast as quantitative or qualitative. It is not likely that 
positivist organizational theory will heavily integrate subjectivist views within the ‘normal 
science’ stream. The meta-theoretical assumptions that underpin different paradigms are complex 
(Moran-Ellis et al., 2006) but there is a call in social science for greater use of multiple study 
methods to increase the credibility and validity of reported results. This opens-up the question of 
how researchers deal with the qualitative-quantitative divide in their data sources and methods, 
which I now turn to in the next section. 
 
Methodology as a strand of the debate 
 
 B&M (1979) propose that a further strand of debate centres on the methodological 
assumptions used in social science. B&M use the subjectivist-objectivist dichotomy for this line 
of argument. The main points of discussion, as they relate to the quantitative-qualitative divide, 
are outlined in the following chart (again, crudely summarized from the work of B&M): 
 
If qualitative researchers in the subjectivist mode make a commitment to the epistemological 
principles of social science research discussed earlier in this paper, then research methods must 
facilitate an inside view that considers time. For example, unstructured interviewing is a 
technique that enables first-hand knowledge and immersion in the flow of organizational 
activities, since the participants themselves help structure the ‘data’ by talking openly. In this 
mode, they do not choose from predetermined alternative answers or Likert scales. The researcher 
has to engage with histories (and other stories) and be concerned not only with what is told, but 
also the temporality and assembly of what is told. History in Management and Organizational 
Studies usually assumes an objectivist stance – a knowable past reality. Such methodology looks 
for “truth [which is] achieved through referential correspondence between the ‘facts’ and the past 
– where past and history are synonymous. However, the past and referent history are of 
ontologically different status” (Weatherbee, 2012, p. 205). The process of data analysis, whether 
the data are quantitative or qualitative, involves an interaction between the analyst and the data. 
Choices are made at every step of the research process, from the choice of research approach 
(e.g., taking a deductive approach), the formulation of the research question (e.g., assuming 
reality is external and objective), and the interpretation of the data (e.g., using SPSS to calculate 
the statistical significance of relationships). This raises the question of personal values of the 
researcher and understanding of potential moderating effects of time. 
 
 This paper advocates the use of qualitative methods to surface knowledge about temporal 
aspects of organizing. The idea is illustrated by briefly outlining a few frequently used qualitative 
research methods; ethnography, structured observation and text analysis:  
 
(1) Ethnography involves immersion in the research setting for an extended period of time. It 
enables engagement with temporal concepts such as pace and duration. Pace refers to the number 
of events per segment of time, and duration is elapsed time for a given occurrence or sequence 
(Aminzade, 1992). Other temporal concepts such as trajectory and cycles (Aminzade, 1992, p. 
459) “suggest a more qualitative understanding of time, involving pattern or direction”. Cycles 
relate to repetitive occurrences that define a sequence, and trajectory refers to accumulation and 
possible trending. Taking account of organizational events requires careful study of history, 
which may be impossible to fathom without qualitative inquiry. Failure to study history 
diminishes our ability to understand organizational changes. We need an inside view of how fast, 
as well as how far, people are prepared to puncture social boundaries (Aminzade, 1992).  
 
(2) Structured observation employs rules for observing behaviour and the recording of field notes. 
The word ‘observation’ may seem uncomplicated but as pointed-out by Burke (2012, p. 35) it is 
not “just another word for ‘looking’ - and the practice may seem timeless, whether we think of 
travellers, healers or stargazers… I should like to draw attention to the historicity of observation, 
including not only the increasingly rapid rise of aids to observation but also a growing awareness 
of the problems raised by the practice." In quantitative research, both the ‘structure’ and the 
‘observation’ in structured observation would likely be seen as problematic, i.e., interference by 
the researcher. However, this qualitative method sheds considerable light on situated temporality. 
 
(3) Text analysis is the study of language, such as discourse, conversation, written work and a 
host of other phenomena treated as text (e.g., videos, music, advertising, etc.). History text reveals 
 
the constraints and effects of narration with respect to “the timing of the history text through the 
narrative distortion of duration.... [which is] most apparent when the historian speeds up or slows 
down its passage within the narrative in relation to the events told” (Munslow, 2010, p. 163). As 
researchers narrate their findings there is an unavoidable temporal distortion. There is a tendency 
within the quantitative tradition to completely ignore this, especially since analysis of text may be 
characterized as unscientific. 
 
 As indicated above, research methods share some fundamental similarities. Recognition 
of this helps us to remain hopeful for a greater coalescence. Currently, qualitative methods are 
sometimes used in quantitative research, albeit with different focus. On balance, though, it should 
be noted that anti-positivist (or postpositivist) researchers primarily engage with qualitative 
methods, and positivists emphasize quantification in the collection and analysis of data. However, 
the words versus numbers comparison is inadequate to explain how types of research are carried 
out. A case can be made that qualitative and quantitative research has a mutually beneficial 
relationship – for example, qualitative work can assist quantitative research by building a 
theoretical base, helping to explain survey responses, interpreting statistical results, and by 
providing case studies. However, sometimes security issues requiring anonymity (from the point 
of view of the organization being studied) may result in history being neglected or disguised. 
Anonymous respondents are often statistically claimed to be a general case and ‘timeless’ rather 
than actors in “some particular historically situated organizational and occupational world 
existing at the time of the study” (Clark & Rowlinson, 2004, p. 345). Positivist researchers need 
not rely only upon quantitative approaches to learn the whole story. For example, interviews can 
be carried-out which are then analyzed with statistical software. Qualitative studies can also be 
used as exploratory work to form the basis for the next quantitative phase of the research project. 
Also, as proposed in this paper, qualitative work can help the quantitative researcher to 
understand the temporality inherent in the research platform. 
 
 The discussion in this paper leads to a consideration of how quantitative and qualitative 
methods might benefit from each other’s strengths. The literature has a robust discussion of this 
idea under terms like “mixed methods” and “triangulation”. One indication of the importance of 
this idea is the recent (2007) establishment of the Journal of Mixed Methods Research which is 
devoted to the subject. Bryman et al. (2011) reconcile the ontological and epistemological 
assumptions discussed earlier, with the broader concept of ‘world views’ that are either positivist 
or postpositivist. This reconciliation promotes the opinion that there is no inherent incompatibility 
between methods and opens-up several lines of possibility such as the following three aspects: 
 
(1) Triangulation – this can take any of several approaches (Fielding & Schreier, 2001). 
Triangulation can mean the mutual validation of results obtained by different methods 
(cross-checking) or triangulation as a means toward obtaining a more complete analysis, 
and triangulation “in its original trigonometrical sense, indicating that a combination of 
methods is necessary in order to gain any (not necessarily a fuller) picture of the relevant 
phenomenon at all” (Fielding & Schreier, 2001, p. 5). 
 
(2) Quantitative research that facilitates qualitative research – for example, the results of 
statistical analysis may help screen large numbers of people in an area of research interest 
 
to determine who should be qualitatively interviewed. The most important point, here, is 
that items under study (for example, various demographic issues, historical issues, natural 
mood states, peer effects, timing issues, etc.) transcend any particular research method. 
 
(3) Qualitative research that facilitates quantitative research – for example, this can include 
an open-ended approach to developing hypothesis, or providing deep context to help 
design questionnaires and determine an approach to administering the questionnaires (for 
example, subjectively understanding what an experiment ‘means’ to the participant at 
various point in time, or how historical writings influence the opinions held by research 
informants).  
 
 Shadish, Cook & Campbell (2001) state that qualitative traditions can uncover site-
specific threats to the all-important requirement of internal validity. Threats to internal validity 
are reasons why inferences that the relationship between variables is causal may be incorrect. 
Identifying validity threats is always context specific and includes several time-related threats. 
For example, ambiguous temporal precedence is the lack of clarity about which variable occurred 
first. This may result in confusion about which variable is the cause and which is the effect. Also, 
we need to be aware that some causation is bidirectional, for example incarceration that causes 
criminal behaviour that causes another incarceration. History (in the lexicon of statistics) is the 
threat that events occurring at the same time as the treatment could cause the observed effect. For 
example, an observed effect might be due to an event that takes place between the pre and post-
test such as may be the case if a subject in a self-efficacy study was offered an attractive position 
by another employer. Maturation is the threat that naturally occurring changes over time could be 
confused with a treatment effect. People change and events occur naturally over time, and the 
ways they change may have implications for the dependent variable. For example, the perceptions 
of people may change as they grow older, experience new things, get hungrier or stronger, etc. 
Another threat related to time is attrition which is the threat that some subjects withdraw from the 
treatment before it is completed, e.g., if a high pressure treatment is administered, causing only 
resolute people to remain in the group. Another time sensitive threat is t s ingwhich is the threat 
that exposure to a test can affect scores on subsequent exposures, which can be confused with a 
treatment effect. Some subjects may become sensitized to the aims of a test. For example, 
familiarity with a test may enhance performance because items are remembered; or (as I 
personally know) in a weight-loss experiment, weighing someone may cause the person to try to 
lose weight prior to the next weighing. With all the above known (temporal) threats to statistical 
validity, quantitative researchers would do well to embrace the epistemology and methodology of 




 In this paper, I have been speaking as though research can be neatly described as either 
qualitative or quantitative. However, I do not wish to convey the idea that qualitative research is a 
well defined, homogeneous area of study – the situation is far from coherent. Although the field is 
sometimes defined in the negative (as not quantitative), the wide array of qualitative research 
traditions has been described as a “fuzzy set” (Madill & Gough, 2008, p. 254) of methods 
clustered in different ways, with “a dazzling array of methodological choices… and a complex 
 
amalgamation of metaphors, paradigms, techniques and procedures that are primarily united by 
their nonstatistical orientation” (P. Prasad, 2005, p. 3). The same can be said of the quantitative 
category. There are a huge number of alterative approaches all under the umbrella of positivism. 
Even within categories, numerous options exist. For example, within the category of multiple 
regression, one can address research questions with various assumptions around temporality by 
using either standard multiple regression, sequential regression or stepwise regression. If the 
researcher makes the judgment that data are nested (for example, students nested in classes which 
are nested in schools which are nested in district school authorities) then hierarchical linear 
modelling is a further option with its own set of temporal assumptions.  
 
 To adequately deal with my research question, I have run the risk of reifying the 
quantitative-qualitative divide as a punctuated dichotomy. However, it is worth noting that even 
in methods traditionally viewed as qualitative, the distinction is not always clear. Numerically-
aided phenomenology is one example. I particularly enjoyed the following quote from Fielding & 
Schreier (2001, p. 43): "even in this type of (postmodern) ethnography, practitioners recognise 
that all methods impose perspectives on reality by the type of data that they collect, and each 
tends to reveal something slightly different about the same 'symbolic' reality". This turns 
postmodernism upon itself. Postmodernism is an ultra-subjectivist research tradition that is 
characterized by pluralism, fragmentation and a fair amount of whimsical rhetoric. Surely there is 
room in that tradition (and other traditions) to usefully add quantitative pieces to the mix. 
 
 Objectivist conceptions of temporality imply that research subjects all experience time in 
the same way. This may be seen as a necessary assumption to underpin efforts at generalizability. 
Subjectivists on the other hand (applying qualitative techniques) understand the passage of time 
from the point of view of the experience of it. Augustine argued that time is experienced 
subjectively, existing only “in retrospection, in the moment, and in anticipation… time has no 
extension other than our immediate experience of it; thus, the measurement of time is only 
possible as the human mind stores sense perceptions in memory” (Cunliffe et al., 2004, p. 269). 
This is a similar sentiment to the quote from Ricoeur (1984) used as the opening for this paper. I 
believe that mixed methods and triangulation help researchers to be more effective and approach 
their data with healthy scepticism with regard to temporality. Obviously, it is most helpful when 
social science does not attempt to ‘prove’ hypotheses while ignoring temporal evidence (as in 
Alice in Wonderland; verdict first, evidence later). The art of research is enhanced by 
interrelating data from different sources with imagination, and by identifying interesting problems 
and good study methods. Concern for the validity of research is common in all research 
traditions. We all want to get it right, even if we have to acknowledge that there may be different 
versions of what is right. Shadish, Cook & Campbell (2001, p. 478) express the view that 
qualitative researchers strongly accept the need for validity, and state that the similarity of 
fundamental research values “are surprisingly more common than some portrayals in the 
qualitative-quantitative debates suggest and because they demonstrate an underlying unity of 
interest in producing valid knowledge that we believe is widely shared by most social scientists”. 
 
 I will end by referring to what Kritzer (1996, p. 25) calls “the pleasure of the statistical 
text”. The idea of research as a source of pleasure should be recognized explicitly. Kritzer says 
that research has a puzzle-like quality: “we do not want it to be too easy (because it will become 
 
boring), but we do want to have a chance of reaching something resembling closure.”  The 
chances of this are far greater if one accepts that all research methods share some fundamental 
similarities, and contribute valuable temporal insights. Kritzer says that data are fun, sometimes 
confirming what we know; or as in the earlier mentioned cat’s cradle remark from Donna 
Haraway, research can also deliver some serious surprises. Consideration of temporality has the 
potential to deliver creative exploration of the quantitative-qualitative debate. As researchers we 
struggle to explain the past. Our explanations are “another act of interpretation in a different time 
and space” (Cunliffe et al., 2004, p. 275). We stand to make a greater contribution to 
Management and Organizational Studies with temporality shedding light on the interdependence 
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The following paper presents an analysis of ontological politics through the 
development of the Museum of Industry, one of the 27 Nova Scotia Museums in 
the province of Nova Scotia, Canada, and the struggles between actors to achieve 







1986-1998, 12 years: That was the amount time that passed between the first 
developments of the Nova Scotia Museum of Industry [NSMOI] and its final completion. This 
timeline spans three major museum hiring processes, two director changes, two closure threats 
and one major change in ownership - from provincial control to private interests and  then, 13 
months later, back again to the Province. From this emerged a differentiation in vision regarding 
(a) what the purpose of the museum of industry should be and (b) how the museum should arrive 
at that state. These conflict/resolution relationships were navigated through the mobilisation of 
human and nonhuman actors, that is, through politics, and revolved around the multiple ways in 
which the museum was enacted in varying sets of practices. 
 
 
The following paper tells a story of ontological politics (Mol, 1998). It is a story of the 
development of the Museum of Industry, looking primarily at the development of the museum 
under the two most influential actors – first, the province of Nova Scotia, and second, the Friends 
of the Nova Scotia Museum of Industry society [FNSMOI Society]. The former conceived the 
idea of the museum from a failing industrial base in Nova Scotia. They saw the museum as an 
outlet for education and heritage and valued the preservation of an older way of doing things. The 
latter planned to run the museum as a world-class interactive site, seeing museum etiquette and 
theory as primarily an unimportant barrier, but more importantly, envisioned the museum as a 
visitor attraction and a sustainable business model. This story details the struggle (politics) 
between the two to enact their visions of interpretation that would ultimately shape the Province’s 
history. 
                                                      
1This project would not have been possible without the support of the StFX Summer Student Research 
Internship Program, a component of the St. Francis Xavier University Strategic Research Plan. 
I use a combination of postmodern historiography and actor-network theory (ANT) to 
engage the past. As such, I will follow the actor’s involved in the development of the museum 
and its change in focus through the years, and more importantly, the politics of those changes. 
This paper proceeds in three sections: In the first section, I unpack the literature which informed 
my findings; next, I explain my methodology and the data collection procedure; and finally, I 
share the findings that came from my examination of ontological politics at the Museum of 







The “Historic Turn” in Management and Organizational History (M&OH) 
 
 
Akin to the scientist slant of Taylor prevalent in the 1960s, Organizational Studies had 
largely been dominated by a scientific approach. This has meant that many theoretical 
developments have essentially ignored the socio-cultural factors that contextualize their research 
(Üsdiken and Keiser, 2004). However, a push led by Zald in 1993 challenged and changed the 
field by calling for the reconceptualization to a humanistic as well as socialistic study. Coming 
from within that framework, scholars in the sphere of Management and Organizational History 
have, in recent years, claimed there is need for a “historic turn” in organizational theory (Booth 
and Rowlinson, 2006; Durepos and Mills, 2010). Such considerations are especially relevant to 
understanding the state and purpose of the NSMOI where the historical precedents and 
vision/motivations are pertinent to the development process. However, there has been 
considerable scholarly discussion regarding to what extent history should be added back into 
organizational theory – to which three approaches have been posited. First, the supplementarist 
position, which adheres to the view of organization theory as a social scientistic study, and 
merely adds history as another contextual variable, alongside other variables such as national 
culture (Booth and Rowlinson, 2006). Second is the integrationist approach, best summed up by 
Zald’s call for a focus on the ‘intersection’ and the ‘conjoining’ of historical analysis and the 
study of particular organizational forms and processes (Zald 1993: 520). An integrationist seek  
to enrich organization theory by developing links with the humanities, including history, literary 
theory and philosophy, without completely abandoning a social scientist orientation (Kieser, 
2004: 619). The final approach, which most resembles the one utilized herein, is the 
reorientationalist approach. This approach is bred from the larger movement to postmodernism by 
seeing the social science-based approaches as problematic just as the natural sciences are (Kieser, 
2004). This is done by problematizing the base of understanding –this is part of a larger and 
fundamental re-direction in organizational studies away from the social sciences (Üsdiken and 
Kieser, 2004: 324). In this sense, we consider historical (past) events as context and process, not 
as a variable. This postmodern approach to history is akin to the work of Jenkins (2003), which I 






In the following paper, I address history from a postmodern lens (Prasad, 2005) in line with 
the writings of Keith Jenkins and other postmodern historiographers. This approach to history 
assumes the epistemological construction of all knowledge. History then, is a very different thing 
from “the past” – it is positioned and constructed with ideologies and interests. Thus, Jenkins 
asserts that every history holds within itself an implicit philosophy of history (Jenkins, 2003, 25). 
Using this conception of history with the NSMOI in mind, the interpretation of artifacts, the way 
in which they are presented, even the very choices of what pieces of the collection to exhibit are a 
piece of analysis. We therein assert that there is no real, objective truth. The consequence of this 
approach is that it allows for a critical analysis, and the possible reappraisal of the metanarratives 
involved a “history” of “the past” This sort of analysis can be used to authenticate the final 
consumer’s experience. As Hewison states, (1987:47) “the question then is not whether or not we 
should preserve the past, but what kind of past we have chosen to preserve, and what that has 
done to our present.” Because the context of this study is the museum, I now turn to a review of 






The way in which the past is depicted as “history” at museums has caused scholars 
increasingly to see the institutional study as a “fertile theoretical field” (MacDonald, 1996: 6) in 
that they “as staging grounds (Annison, 1986) for many questions which are also at the hearts of 
debates in social and cultural studies” (Macdonald, 1996:2-3).  Particularly to anthropology and 
sociology, museums, as Richard Handler (1988) notes, turn culture into an object - giving it’s 
own reality via objects and their interpretations (Macdonald, 1996). It is in this construction of 
culture that many scholars have revealed cultural assumptions and political motivations in the 
analysis of museum collections (Hewison, 1987). However, critical studies of museum exhibition 
are problematic in that, as Gordon Fyfe notes, “in many cases the analyst’s reading is not 
acknowledged as a particular interest positioned act of interpretation.” (Macdonald, 1996: 4-5) 
Indeed, Macdonald notes of the museum studies scholars that “...all seem to share a conviction 
that much of the older theorizing of museums is too mono-dimensional and insufficiently 
nuanced to account for the space specificity or the complexity of the museum” (Macdonald, 
1996: 4). Herein lay the two-fold reason ANT is well-suited for museum studies. First, it overtly 
presents the author’s problematization, thereby avoiding the unreflexive attitude Fyfe (1995) 
refers to, and secondly, it applies a broad based semiotic approach to analysis that grants it the 
necessary tools to decipher complexity in the sense referred to by Macdonald (1996). This 
theoretical “fit” with actor-network theory has produced well developed studies on topics such as 
the linguistic development of heterogeneity) (Hetherington, 1999) as well as social memory using 
museums) (Urry, 1996). In the case of the Nova Scotia Museum of Industry, it will be a tale of 









Actor-network theory materialized in the social studies of science and technology literature 
in the late 1980s and early 1990’and evolved primarily from the work of Bruno Latour (1987, 
1988), Michel Callon (1986) and later John Law (1999). As it is widely called today, “ANT” can 
not be summed up simply and quickly.  
 
The actor-network. The essential subject of analysis in actor-network theory, the actor-network, 
can be derived quite basically, as a network built from the relations between actors. First, 
however, what is an actor? As stated by Mol, “An actor does things. It, he, she, acts.” (Mol, 2010: 
255). An actor is any element which bends space around itself, makes other elements dependent 
upon itself and translates their will into the language of its own (Callon and Latour, 1981: 289). 
“Common examples of actors include humans, collectives of humans, texts, graphical 
representations, and technical artifacts.” (Mol, 2010: 257) 
 
 
The concept of an actor-network can be explained plainly by an analogy: when going 
about doing your business, for example, driving your car, there are a lot of things that influence 
how you do it. “For instance, when driving a car, you are influenced by traffic regulations, prior 
driving experience and the car's manoeuvring abilities... All of these factors (or actors) are 
related, or connected, to how you act. You do not go about doing your business in a total vacuum 
but rather under the influence of a wide range of surrounding actors” (Hanseth, 1998). Therefore, 
the act of driving and all the influencing factors must be considered together, in totality. An act 
must be linked with all of its influences - this is exactly the utility provided by the term actor-
network. The theoretical difference of an actor-network, however, is that the elements in it, the 
links, can be both of technical and non-technical origin. To use the cited analogy, it is not only 
the car’s capacity to drive, but also the rules of the road and your driving training. There, ANT 
unearths and analyzes the heterogeneous nature of actor networks. “The crucial analytical move 
made by actor network writers is this: the suggestion that the social is nothing other than 
patterned networks of heterogeneous materials.” (Law 1992: 381) This is a radical claim because 
we are saying the “social” also includes any other material, from any different source, 
(heterogeneous) not simply humans. For example, look at the material world the live in – the text 
we read as written by an author is reliant upon the printing press, the postal system, even perhaps 
the computer it was written on. Actor-network writers suggest that these networks shape reality 
itself. (Law 1992) 
 
 
In practice, each new study not only stands within the ANT-tradition, but also relates to 
wider discussions about the topic it explores. One text may be in dialogue with epistemology, the 
next with aesthetics, etc. (Mol, 2010: 262). In particular, I explore the ontological politics behind 
the development of a multimillion dollar museum and its programming using actor-network 
theory. This, I will argue, involves the translation of actors’ interests. 
 
 
Translation. Actors, as stated earlier, have interests.  They seek to align the interests of other 
actors with their own in an attempt to form a network with a uniform way of seeing and therefore 
doing (Callon and Latour, 1981). Translation is the process that leads to the formation of an actor-
network, it is in this process that an actor-network is created. It should be noted, however, that 
there is no “creator” of any actor-network, but a network of actors that interact and struggle in the 
creation of a network (Callon and Latour, 1981). As Callon (1986) stated, this process of interest 
alignment (translation), has four parts, or moments. “Although these can occur in any order, often 
overlap, and are rarely clear in the moment” (Callon, 1986: 224). 
 
 
1) Problematization: The first moment of translation pertains to a focal actor that defines 
identities and interests of other actors, making them consistent with its own interests, and 
establishes themselves as an obligatory passage point [OPP]. In doing so, they render 
themselves indispensable to the process of translation (Callon, 1986). The OPP is a situation 
that has to occur in order for all the actors to satisfy the interests that have been attributed to 
them by the focal actor. 
 
 
2) Interessement: The second moment of translation involves a process of convincing other 
actors to accept the definition that the focal actor imposes and stabilizing their identity to fit 
the problematization. This is called interessement – the alignment of interests to the focal 
actor (Callon, 1986). 
 
 
3) Enrolment: Enrolment is the moment that another actor accepts their interests as defined 
by the focal actor. “If consensus is achieved, the margins of manoeuvre of each entity will 
then be tightly delimited” (Callon, 1986). This is not a permanency, but a momentary state, 
that can be extended and lasting or only achieved momentarily. 
 
 
4) Punctuation: Through deconstruction, ANT helps us to see that the actor-networks we 
usually perceive to be static and concrete (organizations, institutions, etc), are dynamic and 
always in flux. However, to keep from endless complexity, we often draw on networks that 
act as one, therefore concealing all the politics of those actors crucial to their formation. ANT 
scholars refer to these as punctualized resources. By continuing to draw on them as a whole, 









In the process of translation, the underlying politics of actor-networks construct reality. 
Therefore, when we look back at the course of interest-alignment and power associations, we can 
see interests enacted by actors as they struggle to define what it is that becomes real. The term 
used to describe this process is ontological politics (Mol, 1998; Alcadipani and Hassard, 2010). 
Using the language of ANT, by studying the power relations between actor-networks, we can see 
how history was shape, how things could have been different (Mol 1998). Reality is thus 
manipulated by these political actors and the expressions of their interests (Mol, 2010). “The goal 
of ANT research is to describe the process through which diverse actor-networks came to produce 
and sustain ontology [reality]” (Bonner et al, 2009: 87). In the case of the NSMOI, I will describe 
the politics that underlie the struggle over how to “see” – or what would become the reality, of 
the NSMOI. This involves two primary actors: first, the provincial government of Nova Scotia 
and second, the Friends of the Nova Scotia Museum of Industry Society. 
 
 
Using ANT to “Do” History 
 
 
Recent Management and Organizational History (M&OH) literature has featured a call for 
further use of history in research data collection. Notably, some scholars have chosen ANT to 
answer this call. (Holmstrom and Stalder, 2001; Durepos and Mills, 2008) For example, Bonner 
et al (2009) use ANT to conduct an investigation of the release of personal motor vehicle records. 
They do this by following the government’s enactments of the so-called “balance” of information 
privacy/information freedom and how this has continually pushed in the direction of institutions 
rather than individuals (Bonner et al, 2009). Furthermore, Bruce and Nylands 2011 use ANT in 
their examination of the rise of the Human Relations School and the translation of interests over 
time. In the marriage of ANT and history, we have further seen the use of historical analysis 
applied to museums due to their geoproximal simplicity as a site of history (Hetherington, 1999). 
The same method will be featured in the research to follow: examining the history of the 
development of the Nova Scotia Museum of Industry as a site of ontological politics – where the 
existence of a multiplicity of versions of the past has serious consequences in the overall 






Archival Visits. Three data collection days were logged at the Nova Scotia Museum Library 
Archive in Halifax, Nova Scotia on May 23rd, June 6th, and June 13th in which over 300 data sets 
were collected and analyzed, averaging 8 documents each. 
 
 
Interviews. Interview protocols were constructed and two interviews were held with retired 
employees of the NSM complex. A snowball sampling method was used by which our archival 
data collection acted as initial respondents. Our “respondents [were] obtained from information 
provided by the initial respondent” (Zikmund, 2003: 741). The interviews were transcribed 
verbatim and entered into the database. 
 
 
Web Searches. Furthermore, web searches were conducted using the name of the 27 museums 
that currently make up the Nova Scotia Museum Complex (of which the NSMOI is now a part). 
These searches queried the names of the 27 museums in their respective local newspapers, 
national news media sources (CBC & the Globe and Mail) and Google. This was done to 
document critical events as well as gauge media’s depiction of the museums and to find the 
perceptions of the sites in Nova Scotia and Canada. Relevant articles were saved in PDF format 




A Tale of Ontological Politics at the Nova Scotia Museum of Industry 
 
 
Interest Translation in the Development of the Museum of Industry 
 
Central to ANT is the idea that individual actors struggle to enact their own interests via 
mobilizing the support of others (Law, 1999). In the case of the NSMOI, the development of the 
museum brought together very different actors and thus entirely different interests and 
motivations. What was agreed upon by these actor-networks? They wanted a museum. However, 
what the museum was to look like, and how it was to be performed – that was up to focal actor: 
the one who took the lead in the struggle, who translated others’ interests and enrolled others in 
their plan. In the story of the story of the NSMOI, the focal actor would be a group of individuals 
who would come to be known as the Friends of the Nova Scotia Museum of Industry Society. 
 
 
This section of the paper is organized as follows: we begin by establishing the 
background and punctualization of the primary actor-networks involved in the shaping of the 
Nova Scotia Museum of Industry. This includes the Nova Scotia Museum Complex [NSM], local 
business associations, the nearby citizen population and finally the Society. Following this, by 
invoking ANT, particularly Callon’s constructivist sociology of translation (Callon, 1986), I will 
demonstrate how the Friends Society, in a time of financial hardship in Museum development, 
asserted themselves as the only possible option to continue operation, making themselves an 
obligatory passage point [OPP] and thus becoming the focal actor. They arranged to use the 
decommissioning or “mothballing” funds to open the museum and had plans to make it “world 
class” (FNSMOI Society, 1993a). In doing this, they told every other actor-network what they 
wanted to hear, therein translating other’s interests into their language. With this, actor-networks 
were enrolled in their identities and the Society was granted ownership of the museum. 
 
Next, I will discuss the differential in museum vision and enactments between actors, 
leading to a fatal rift in the enrolment, a second OPP and ultimately failed translation. Before I 
delve into the translation, I will first introduce the primary actor-networks that had an effect on 
the Nova Scotia Museum of Industry, and how their interests became punctuated (singular). 
 
Interests of the Nova Scotia museum complex. The Nova Scotia Museum Complex [NSM], 
with as many as 25 separate Provincial museums under its wing, (MacIsaac, 1994) was formally 
presented with the proposal for the establishment of a Museum of Transportation and Technology 
(many minor name changes were considered in its development) in 1974 by a group of 
businessmen in Pictou County who “noticed that the machinery and effects of these industrial 
activities and the railway were disappearing. They approached the Board of Governors of the 
Nova Scotia Museum to request a museum be built dedicated to Nova Scotia’s industrial and 
transportation heritage” (The Nova Scotia Museum, 2013). In 1982, following several studies, the 
planning committee decided the need to begin physically compiling the artifacts already obtained, 
now valued at over 3 million dollars (Frame, 1982a). They also agreed to commission an 
industrial researcher to continue to compile the collection (Frame, 1982b) which led to the hiring 
of the museum’s first curator in 1986 and the sod-turning of donated lands in May of 1988 (The 
Nova Scotia Museum, 2013). 
 
 
The planning committee did this with the mandate to justify and store items that are 
otherwise “in danger of destruction or irreversible damage if not taken into custody” (Frame, 
1982b).This focus on the collection continued throughout the early 1990’s when basic building 
construction was completed and is visible in the mandate of the Museum of Industry, which was 
to “to collect, preserve, research and interpret the industrial history of Nova Scotia” (Stevenson, 
1993a). This can also be seen in their decision to hire primarily professional staff for 
preservation, whereas work such as exhibit development was contracted out (Stevenson, 1993a). 
Nonetheless, as the newly elected Liberal government enacted province wide spending cuts, 
museum development was severely impeded and the NSM was forced to consider “mothballing” 
the museum. This means using the remaining operating money to close the museum until more 
operating and capital funding could be found (MacDonald, 1993). As one can expect, there was a 
serious backlash from the general public and pressure was put on the NSM and its government 
counterparts to avoid closure. Evidence of the backlash is seen in the wealth of news articles 
published in late 1993 with evocative titles such as “One thoughtless chop” (Ryan, 1993). Some 
articles went so far as saying “It [the museum] is in danger of never opening and becoming a 
singularly ironic monument to failure” (McDougal, 1993) and even single out political actors: 
“How can Education Minister John MacEachern, who represents the working people of Glace 
Bay, so indifferently discard the heritage of his own riding?” (Ryan, 1993). The political parties 
involved, including the Nova Scotia Museum Complex itself, had interests in the museum being 
opened. They wanted it to be a facility for preservation in memory of an older way, but, 
primarily, they wanted the museum to stay on track to open as scheduled, (Ryan, 1993), not to 
close. They were looking for answers. 
 
 
Interests of nearby businesses and trade associations. Tourism was and continues to be a 
primary industry and economic driver in Nova Scotia. In the name of increases in tourist numbers 
and spending, local businesses had interests also intertwined in the opening of the Museum of 
Industry. Included in the media firestorm in late 1993 regarding the museum’s closure was the 
Pictou County Tourists Association president talking about the impact of closure, saying “to shut 
down the museum project so close to completion is ludicrous” (Taylor, 1993). Other associations 
who either sent letters to the premier or otherwise spoke out include the Pictou County 
Development Commission, Pictou County Chamber of Commerce, Stellarton Downtown 
Business Association, Pictou Business Improvement District Commission, New Glasgow 
Waterfront Development company and others (Stevenson et al, 1993). These interests for an open 
museum were fired by an economic impact study commissioned in October, 1993, saying the 
museum would see 100,000 visitors in its first year, with a future potential of 150,000 – of which 
70% would come from outside Pictou County and 30% from outside Nova Scotia (Doane 
Raymond Company, 1993). Thus, businesses were interested in the necessity of accommodation, 
food service, goods purchase and other spending from the tens of thousands of possible visitors. 
They wanted to see a museum open - one that would attract as many people as possible, at that. In 
an economy of decline, they too, were looking for answers. 
 
 
The interests of the nearby citizenry: donors, employees, families and others. With the 
government having invested over 17 million dollars at the time of closure talks, (Taylor, 1993) 
the looming threat of job loss from museum-preparation and lost opportunity from visitor 
spending, the general public simply wanted to see the museum opened. This can be seem in the 
abundance of letters to members of parliament, news articles, radio interviews and more 
regarding the possible closure of the museum (Unknown, 1993) and the degree of anger in their 
prose. There were also rumours of plans to “disperse irreplaceable artifacts and sell the building”, 
as stated in a news article, that obviously gave cause to a wave of fear and anger amongst the 
donor community (Ryan, 1993). The greater community of Nova Scotia residents were looking 
for answers or, better yet, a solution to the funding dilemma in the opening of the NSMOI. They 
wanted a museum open with their friends’, families’ and neighbours’ heirlooms, but most of all, 
they wanted an open museum - that is exactly what the Friends Society would offer. 
 
 
The interests of the focal actor: the friends of the Nova Scotia museum of industry society. 
In late 1993, when the Nova Scotia Museum had to consider mothballing the NSMOI due to 
government cuts, a society known as the Friends of the Nova Scotia Museum of Industry came 
forward as a concerned collective of businessmen and political candidates, with a shared interest 
to save the museum – a black-boxed actor-network (FSNMOI Society, 1993b). However, this 
complete conceptualization of the Society hides all the actor struggles that brought it to this 
punctualized point. On the official website for the NSMOI, it states that in 1974, a Pictou County 
group of businessmen presented the BOG with a “proposal to study the establishment of a 
museum of transportation and technology in Nova Scotia” (The Nova Scotia Museum, 2013). 
However, in the history written in 1993 by the director of the NSM at the time, Candace 
Stevenson, wrote to the minister saying “the concept...evolved as a result of discussions between 
the Board of Governors of the Nova Scotia Museum and Mr. William Sobey...in 1974, Mr. Sobey 
offered the Province 5.5 acres of land as the site of an industrial museum” (Stevenson, 1993a). 
Why does this matter, one might ask? Mr. Sobey’s son, Donald, who finalized the land 
transaction with the Nova Scotia Museum, was the President of the Society (FNSMOI Society). 
Indeed, in 1993, when the Friend’s offer came forward, it was initially referred to internally as the 
“Donald Sobey Plan” (Stevenson, 1993b). The real conceptualization of the Museum can be 
found in William Sobey’s speech at the sod-turning (he was such an important actor in 
development he delivered the sod-turning speech) in 1988: “It was ten years ago that I first 
approached Lynton Martin in his office when he was director of the NSM. I suggested that I 
would like to see a mining museum built in Stellarton and that I was prepared to provide an 
excellent site of suitable size for that purpose. Mr. Martin replied, I’m afraid, Mr. Sobey, I cannot 
become very excited over a Miner’s Museum for Stellarton as we have a Miner’s Museum in 
Glace Bay. However, if you wished to excite me, why don’t we discuss a Museum of 
Transportation and Industrial Technology?” (FNSMOI Society, 1993b). 
 
 
          After William Sobey’s death in 1989, his sons Donald and Frank (especially Donald) 
continued their father’s vision in a generally passive fashion throughout museum development. 
This was of course only until 1993, when provincial budget cuts left the possibility of closure 
(FNSMOI Society, 1993c). On September 9, 1993, Donald Sobey and a group of town mayors 
and leading Nova Scotia business owners agreed that “the group would pursue the development 
of a plan to maintain the operations of the Nova Scotia Museum”, looking to use “...a society [as] 
the vehicle for the development of the plan” (FNSMOI Society, 1993d). Thus the Society was 
created, with the Sobey family interests, to open a museum. They subsequently created a 
management plan, business plan and market strategy to sustain the museum (FNSMOI Society, 
1993b). When they went public with their heroic message in 1993, headlines beamed with titles 
such as “Business leaders aim to save museum”, (Graham, 1993), calling the Society an 
“interested group of corporate and municipal officials” (White, 1993). By deconstructing the 
Society interests, we get a different picture than the way they were presented at the time. 
 
 
          Furthermore, the society’s vision was different from that of all the other actors – they saw 
the museum as being a “world class institution”, (MacLellan, 1994) but more importantly a 
business, with revenues and expenses and profits. They were the first to conceptualize the 
museum with a souvenir shop and food outlets (FNSMOI Society, 1994b), calling their museum a 
“highly commercialized operation which is highly marketable and capable of substantial revenue 
generation” (FNSMOI Society, 1993e). Through the very presentation of a business, marketing 
and management plan, one can see the interests involved in the Sobey (Society) vision. Most 
notably, one can notice the interest differential in a memo written from the Society in their search 
for a loan near the end of their tenure (as we will find) in which they state that “Funding the five 
year road to self-sufficiency is difficult for both the Society and the Government, however, a 
sustainable museum will pay dividends for many years to come” (Murray, 1995). Their vision 
had to do with money, not artifacts or people. Nonetheless, the public message forwarded by the 
society was exactly the message the relevant actor-networks wanted to hear – they would open a 
world class museum using minimal funds. And in this, they would set themselves as an obligatory 
passage point (Callon, 1986). 
Moments of Translation 
 
 
The society problematizes the museum plan. In a time when the museum was slated to close, 
the Society presented their intent in a management plan with cost alternatives to the “options” the 
NSM has – either mothball the museum or levy an annually decreasing operating subsidy (less 
than the cost of decommissioning) to the Friends, who will be given control to operate the 
museum (FNSMOI Society, 1993a). With this, it would seem the only way to keep the museum 
open, that is, to have the outcome that all actor-networks are looking for, was to follow their plan, 
thus making themselves indispensable to the situation. This situated them, as Callon (1986) 
would remark, as an obligatory passage point. 
 
 
Interessement: the society tells everyone what they want to hear - in their language. 
Aligning the interests of the relevant actor-networks is known as interessement in Michel 
Callon’s (1986) sociology of translation. It is, at this point, worth reviewing the interests of the 
involved actor-networks in the museum. First, the NSM Complex wanted an open museum and 
one that preserves the past; the business community was looking for a museum of grandeur to 
bring in maximum tourists; lastly, the public desired an open museum for economic gain, social 
gain, political gain and the like. To them, the Friends proposal of a “world class” museum, 
opened using only mothball money, seemed the perfect solution (FNSMOI Society, 1993a). The 
Society publicly “intend[ed] to work with the Nova Scotia Government, municipalities, 
corporations, and the general public for the efficient and cost effective management and operation 
of this extensive facility” (White, 1993). The actor-networks were ready to help because after all, 
this represented the alignment of their interests – this was what they wanted, and according to the 




Enrolment and mobilization: resources needed - after all, this is what you wanted: As the 
relevant actor-networks accepted their roles, the Society was able to control and manage the 
museum as they saw fit because of the actor-networks they had persuaded to accept the roles 
attributed to them. When the interest-aligned actor-networks accept their identities that the focal 
actor attributes them, these actor’s are “enrolled” in their plan – this is the third step in Callon’s 
(1986) translation process. The Society had now successfully enrolled the networks: if they need 
money, the NSM gave it to them, if they needed volunteers, the public was willing to help, if they 
needed support, businesses were willing to pitch in their help. After all, these were the roles they 
accepted because this is what they wanted and they were told this was the way to achieve it. T  
focal actor has them enrolled.  
 
 
Thus the Society’s conceptualization of the museum, with the language of world-class 
commercialization and business knowledge was adopted and used by the other actor-networks in 
different settings (LeBlanc, 1995). As these roles were accepted and enacted, the identities are 




A second problematization: rising from the conflict of interest. This enrolled development 
continued for months until a problem occurred. As mentioned above, there was discontinuity 
between how the NSM and the FNSMOIS envisioned the actualization of the museum: to the 
NSM, it was to be a place of heritage; to the Society, a sustainable business model. The problem 
was not in that the Society did not see the Nova Scotia Museum’s interests (realistic heritage 
preservation) as important or vice-versa, but rather that the two parties had conflicting primary 
interests. In early 1996, as the Society is now struggling to run the museum on their anaemic 
budget (MacEachern, 1996), two problems with the Friend’s enactment of the NSMOI were 
brought to the NSM: one, that the catalogued records for thousands of artifacts do not exist, 
(Jardine, 1996) and second, that the museum had cut the last of it’s professional staff (Stevenson, 
1996a) despite the fact that artifacts continued to be worn, damaged and repaired (Baillie, 1996). 
For the first matter, this went to show the importance differential discussed earlier. “I felt 
compelled to write this memo as there have been times when I have been dismayed at the lack of 
attention the collection has received...” writes a previous Registrar, “the direct management of the 
collection was placed on the back burner [under the Friend’s management]” (Jardine, 1996). Yet 
as we know, the Province’s number one agenda, indeed the reason for the conceptualization of 
this museum, was the collection (The Nova Scotia Museum, 2013). As for the second matter, that 
of the collection’s preservation, the executive director of the museum, Candace Stevenson, takes 
a hard line on the issue, and in doing so illustrates the NSM interest in the collection. She then 
writes a letter to the Society’s director saying, 
 
“We must therefore consider the collection to be static at this time i.e. no additions to it, 
no restoration work, no loans, no use of items except as they are now used/displayed – 
unless or until I have been consulted” (Stevenson, 1996a) and in a letter to the Province 
regarding future funding, she says “they will receive no funding unless they hire someone 
with museum experience as a director or curator. Furthermore, they cannot hire anyone 
without someone from the NSM on the hiring boards” (Stevenson, 1996b). 
 




Failed enrolment: not simply a financial partner - loss of trust, loss of museum: As the 
Society struggled to maintain the enrolment of the NSM, they were also dealing with the inability 
to gather funding to continue to run and develop the museum (MacEachern, 1996). They were 
unable to receive the significant private funding they wanted because, according to them, they 
need a solid footing, a financial promise from the Province, before investors were willing to bite 
(Sobey, 1996). At this point in 1996, according to the Friends, “they are in year 2 of a 5 year plan 
to make a World Class Museum. They will require additional monies from the Government in 
order to get to the end of the 5 years and have a World Class Museum” (Jolly, 1995). The latter 




However, now frustrated and trying to translate the Society’s interests, the NSM 
responded by disallowing the loan without more documentation, the Executive Director going as 
far as saying “I am increasingly concerned that the Board [of the Society] has no idea of where 
they want to go with this institution or what a museum really is” (Stevenson, 1996b). In a 
following memorandum sent from the NSM, a fourth option is presented to the Province which 
reads: “choose to run the Museum again as a directly-managed museum in the Nova Scotia 
Museum System” (MacEachern, 1996). The initial problematization of the Society had finally 
been disrupted, the enrolment now a failure with the most important actor-network involved. In 
June of 1996, the NSM was granted permission to resume direct management of the museum, 
thus ending the direct involvement and soon, the existence, of the Friends of the Nova Scotia 
Museum of Industry Society (Province of Nova Scotia, 1996). One year following this, in 
retrospective, the NSM Director now in charge of the NSMOI Candace Stevenson writes in a 
letter to a local MP stated that “as you know, we’ve spent the better part of this fiscal year 




Conclusion: The Struggle to Sustain Ontology 
 
 
A Case of Ontological Politics 
 
 
Tracing the history of the NSMOI illustrates a case of politics and, more specifically, a 
case of ontological politics. This case demonstrates that history is always subject to and an 
outcome of politics. Actors were engaged in struggles over how to see the museum and also the 
history that it is dedicated to commemorating. This shows the flexibility of history, wherein 
actors struggle to enact their particular vision the museum and the history that it is dedicated to 
commemorating – the museum could have looked different, a different history could have been 
told. In the Friend’s control of the museum, the Society dictated the development of exhibits and, 
concurrently, the interpretation of them as well. As stated by a retired NSM senior staff member,  
 
“We used to get a car and drive up there to Stellarton and stay there for a night or two, sit 
down with John Hault (past NSMOI Director) and sort of talk about the shape of the 
exhibits. It was a planning kind of thing... we were trying to plan exhibits, that was our 
mandate... We tried to have some input into the shaping of the museum; I don’t think we 
were entirely successful” [italics added] (Interviewee, 2013). 
 
Through the museum's punctuation, the politics of actors (as they struggled over how to see 
the past) are concealed and the current (extant version of) interpretation stands in as the dominant 
authoritative history, as if their is one uniform version of the past. As stated on the museum 
website, the Nova Scotia Museum of Industry tells the story [italics added] of work and workers” 
(The Nova Scotia Museum, 2013).Yet as we can see from our analysis, “the” history is really just 
“a” history. There are other histories that could have been told and a different museum that could 
have been established. Ontological politics is the process by which actors shape reality – history 
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FIFTY SHADES OF PLAY: MONOPOLY™ AND THE SPIRIT OF 
CAPITALISM 
 
While the recent trend towards the ‘gamification’ of business and organization is forging 
a new intersectionality between play and games with work and organization, play and 
games as a subject of research within the MOS literature is limited.  While games, as a 
sub-domain of play, have been an area of study it is normatively approached from a 
narrow and instrumental perspective.  This paper takes an historical look at the 
intersectionality of games and work from a historical and socio-cultural perspective.  
ANTi-History is first used to re-assemble a history of the board game Monopoly™.  A 
mediological analysis is then used to investigate the material, ideational, and ideological 
elements of board games in general and to surface the relationship of Monopoly™ and its 




While play has long been historically recognized as a key and distinguishing feature 
unique to human civilization, play did not become a focus of serious scholarly interest until the 
middle of the twentieth-century (Malaby, 2007).  At that time Huizinga argued that play, along 
with cognition and tool-use, lay at the very core of modernity and was therefore a central 
characteristic of the cultural development of the West (Huizinga, 1949).1  However, despite this 
penetrating observation, in the intervening years since play has been predominantly viewed 
simply as a leisure activity.  An activity or sphere of life (Moss Kanter, 1997) somehow separate 
from daily life (Caillois, 2001; Huizinga, 1949) and standing apart from work and organization in 
(Dandridge, 1986; Rhodes & Parker, 2008).  As a consequence the general study of play has 
rarely been granted the legitimacy of serious independent scholarly or intellectual endeavor 
(Pisac, 2013).  Rather, when it has been considered at all within mainstream social science, play 
has been a relatively minor and secondary subject of study.  Similarly, g mes as a form of play 
have also largely avoided any comprehensive scientific investigation.2 
 
Most cultural-anthropological research on play and games conceptualizes these activities 
in one of two ways; first as a material practice defined in terms of the productivity of its 
activities, and second, play as an activity which is purely symbolic in nature.  In the former 
approach play is positioned as non-productive or a wasteful use of one’s time (Caillois, 2001).  
Latterly, play as a symbolic, ceremonial, or ritual cultural activity is viewed as being largely 
                                                          
1 Huizinga analytically distinguishes both Homo Sapiens (Man the Thinker) and Homo Faber (Man the Maker) from Homo Ludens 
(Man the Player). 
2 The terms play and game remain ambiguously and multiply defined across the social science literature.  In its modern instantiation 
play seems to be defined more so by what it is not (e.g. it is not work, it is non-productive) rather than what it is.  Similarly, the term 
game tends to be viewed as a structured (e.g., rule or domain bounded) form of play. 
representationalist in nature.  Representations which are then relegated to a secondary status of 
other more primary or culturally meaningful activities (Geertz, 1972).3  It has been these two 
dichotomous approaches which have dominated the theoretical and methodological study of play 
for the last half-century (Malaby, 2009).  However, this circumstance is now changing and the 
relatively recent explosive growth of gaming as a leisure activity within late twentieth-century 
popular culture has acted as a catalyst for renewed practitioner and scholarly interest.4  With his 
recent attention there has been calls for counter-debate to the classic view that everyday life and 
play are separate and distinct spheres (Beck & Wade, 2004; Kane, 2004). 
 
As a result there has been increasing attention paid to the intersectionality of games with 
organizations and work.5  The fundamental assumptions which have pre-figured the cultural roles 
and functions of play and the separation of work and play into non-commensurable spheres are 
being rethought (Malaby, 2007; McGonigal, 2011).  Play and games are now being actively 
discussed within the popular business press as businesses ‘gamify’ themselves in order to attract 
and engage with an electronically connected and globalized society (see, for example Belsky, 
2012; Chatfield, 2010; Edery & Mollick, 2010; McGonigal, 2011; Sullivan, 2011).  But, despite 
the recent re-emergence and renewal of play and games as pan-life-world constructs, the study of 
games still remains largely absent in the management and organizational studies (MOS) 
literature.  A review of MOS work over the last fifty years demonstrates little variance with the 
normative pattern of relative absence of interest in the study of play.  While research involving 
games has a greater presence than that of play, this research may be seen to approach its subject 
from one of three orientations; instrumentally, pedagogically, or linguistically. 
 
The instrumental or utilitarian  literature is historically founded in the efficiency 
imperatives of scientific management (Taylor, 1911) and the administrative necessity for complex 
organization wide decision making.  A combined approach which arose out of the operational 
research initiatives taking place in the United States during the Second World War (Boulden, 
1970; Swan, 1950-1952).  This is the oldest and most developed stream in MOS (see for example 
Cangelosi, 1965) and the research is derived from these economic, mathematical/probabilistic, 
and game theoretic foundations (Mirowski; Scrieber, 1958; Swan, 1950-1952; von Neuman & 
Morgenstern, 1944).  The primary aim of this research has been to explore the utilitarian potential 
of games, models, and simulations in their employment as predictive decision aids in production 
and manufacturing (Goetz, 1959) and for organizational decision making; primarily executive or 
managerial (Lewin & Weber, 1969). 
 
Closely related to the instrumental treatment of games has been the investigation of their 
application for pedagogical purposes (see for example Leemkuil & de Jong, 2012; Neuhauser, 
                                                          
3 These are the two primary, but it may be argued both dichotomous and reductionist, perspectives from which play and games are 
conceptualized.  In the case of the former, play and games were assumed as either non-work or non-productive activities (see Caillois, 
2001); and in the case of the latter, as representative of cultural processes of meaning-making (see for example Geertz, 1972). 
4 For example, the advent of the concept of ‘gamification’ or the use of game or game-like elements with productivity applications on 
the World Wide Web or in mobile applications for business (Zichermann & Cunningham, 2011).  While games and game theory have 
long been used in business and management education, i.e. business games or simulations for decision making or for experiential 
training and education, there has been an increased focus on their potential due to the extensive penetration of computers in the 
educational systems and the evolution of the world wide web and distance or web-enabled learning (Kapp, 2012). 
5 Two signals of the ‘sea change’ in the study of play and games have been the formation and publication of several new journals 
including Game Studies (2001) and Games and Culture (2006). 
1976).  This literature is grounded in cognitive and behavioural learning perspectives, i.e., the use 
of play and games for experiential training and education for students or practitioners of 
management (Wolfe, 1973).6  While the concept of play and games as a sociocultural and 
performative activity is most closely approached by this literature  (see for example Kark, 2011) 
the aims of much of this research are still largely aligned with those found in the instrumental 
stream.  That is, games employed as a utilitarian tool for managerial or organizational purposes.  
 
Finally, in the linguistic frame to play and games, the terms and concepts are employed 
somewhat differently than those of the culturally defined activities referred to by Huizinga.  Here, 
these terms are conceptually employed to study both the nature of language and its use at work 
(i.e., language-games).  The language-games approach to play comes at these practices from a 
postmodern/post-structural basis (c.f. Lyotard, 1984; Wittgenstein, 1965).  Relatedly, in terms of 
language use, the terms play and game(s) are also commonly used metaphors.  While the former 
tends to focus on language as political rhetoric, e.g., the jargon surrounding business and markets 
(Rindova, Becerra, & Contardo, 2004), the latter is employed to draw social parallels from the 
domain of play and games so as to  highlight certain aspects of phenomena  in business and 
organizations.  The use of play and game as metaphors is quite prevalent in both the academic 
and practitioner literatures.  Examples include; organizational governance and leadership games 
(Westphal, 1998), the game of internal organizational politics (Donnellon, Gray, & Bougon, 
1986), or to describe the normative rules-of-the-game for career advancement in occupations of 
professions (Prasad, 2013; Raelin, 2008). Even when viewed in the aggregate all of these 
approaches still leave MOS with a general dearth of effort in this area (for exceptions see 
Dandridge, 1986; Meier Sorenson & Spoelstra, 2012).   
 
While this brief review highlights the diversity of research in the utilitarian, pedagogic, or 
linguistic study of play and games, most of this research still does not investigate the socio-
cultural intersectionality between play and games with work and organization.  Even less study is 
conducted from a socio-historical perspective.7  This is considered problematic as a socio-historic 
perspective teaches us that the taken-for-granted nature of managerial and scholarly beliefs, e.g., 
the separation of leisure from organization and work, are likely to be historically contingent. 
 
 
The Socio-Historical Gaze 
 
Most social science scholars still rarely attend to the metaphysical assumptions which 
underpin the theory and methods they employ (Van Maanen, Sorensen, & Mitchell, 2007).  
Recognition of this was largely brought to light by Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) historical tracing 
of sociological theory.  While the surfacing of these assumptions spawned much debate, coined 
the ‘paradigm wars’ (Jackson & Carter, 1993; Willmott, 1993), discussion of metaphysical 
assumptions again subsided in mainstream MOS.  While history was implicit in the paradigm 
                                                          
6 See, for example, journals such as Decision, Decision Management, Decision Sciences, and similar publications grouped into the 
subject areas of Operations or Management Sciences. 
7 Game Theory is only very loosely related to the broader cultural concept of play and games. While Game Theory has its roots in 
games of chance, it is a reductionist view of games taken from the narrow perspectives associated with mathematics/probability 
studies and the economics of decision utility and risk.  Consequently, in this study, while the common root of origin for play-games 
and Game Theory’s is acknowledged it will not be treated with further 
discussions it was an unreflective use of history that did not theoretically or methodlogically tie 
itself to the broader socio-historic context within which much of the positioning of the debate was 
conducted.  This was/is a circumstance sympomatic of the laregly ahistorical approach of much 
of the work in our discipline.  In this regard MOS has also failed to surface and debate the more 
fundamental problematic of the historical dimensions of our own knowledge (Jacques, 2006; 
Parker, 2004).  Of such concern is the ahistorical nature of MOS research that several scholars 
have strongly called for the inclusion of more history in organizational studies (Clark & 
Rowlinson, 2004; Kieser, 1994).  There have since been numerous additional arguments 
justifying greater theoretical and methodological engagement between MOS, history, and the 
humanities (Booth & Rowlinson, 2006; Zald, 1993, 1996).  While this is now beginning to take 
place (Weatherbee, Durepos, Mills, & Helms Mills, 2012) the turn to history remains nascent 




Monopoly™, ANTi-History and Mediology 
One particular game, the well-known game of Monopoly™, has been chosen as an ‘ideal’ 
game-object of study.  This has been done for pragmatic, methodological, and theoretical reasons.  
Pragmatically, Monopoly™ is currently one of the world’s most enduring board games, i.e., it has 
a significant historicity, and is well known, i.e., it has a significant historical presence.  
Methodologically, therefore, there is a great deal of historical facts or trace which may be re-
assembled into a history.  Theoretically, as Monopoly™ is a cultural artifact which has 
successfully transitioned multiple changes in the conceptualization of play, work and organization 
within the context of modern Western culture, it affords the opportunity of using an historical, 
versus ahistorical, approach to theory development. 
 
This study traces the evolution of Monopoly™ by employing two complementary 
historical methodologies; ANTi-History (Durepos & Mills, 2012) and Mediology (Debray, 1996, 
2004).  As ANTi-History is a relatively recent approach in MOS (Durepos & Mills, 2012; 
Durepos, Mills, & Weatherbee, 2012; Mills, Weatherbee, & Durepos, 2013), and since, as far as 
this author has been able to determine, mediological approaches have yet to be used within a 
MOS context (The first comprehensive presentation of the mediological method is still very 
recent, see Debray, 2004), the following sections will briefly summarize why these methods are 
appropriate for an historical study of this type. 
 
An ANT framework was chosen as the ontological assumptions of Actor-Network 
Theory (Latour, 2005), the heterogeneous nature of actor-networks comprised of both human and 
non-human elements, very strongly resonates with the concept of material play or game; i.e., 
games as a performative social object that is comprised of both ideational and material elements.  
Drawing upon mediological techniques,  specifically the concepts associated with the processes 
of transmission,  organized materiality and materialized organization (Debray, 1996, 2004), 
allows Monopoly™ to be analyzed in ideational (symbolic) and performative ( material cultural 
practices) terms. The use of ANT and mediology in this way permits the surfacing of both the 
materiality and the performativity of play-as-board-game while. Materiality is defined here as the 
process of design, construction and organization of game materials (e.g., board, playing pieces, 
etc.) by various actor-networks.  Performativity is both the playing of the game (e.g., enacting the 
rules and conduct) as well as those activities that are not play but are related to the physical and 
ideational presence of the game within an historical context (e.g., applying for patents, marketing 
and selling the board game, etc.).  The methods of ANTi-History are used for the re-assembly 
(Mills et al., 2013) of a history of the gaming activities of various actor-networks.  A re-assembly 
focused upon the intersections between historical situated actor-networks, board games, and work 
and organization over time to place them into context.  Mediology highlights those elements 
needed to explain how materialization and ideation are linked in cultural practices from an 
historic perspective. 
Debray’s work (1996, 2004), for which he coined the neologism mediology, is similar to 
Actor-Network Theory (Latour, 2005) in so far as it is not viewed as either a science or a theory 
(Debray, 2004).  Instead, like ANT, mediology is conceptualized as a method or approach to 
study the social.  In counter-poise to ANT, however, a mediological project is broader and seeks 
to understand the socio-material conditions which permit the transmission of culture and how 
society both produces and reproduces itself (Vandenberghe, 2007).  Thus the central empirical 
questions for mediological approaches are derived from Marx and Althusser; i.e., how do ideas 
become a material force and under what material conditions do some ideas survive while others 
do not?  Put differently, how do ideas, which are ephemeral constructs expressed within a culture 
both linguistically or symbolically, come to have the power to enroll, persuade, or otherwise 
capture the attention of individuals and collectives such that they enact them and make them real?  
For mediologists, the answer lies in the reconceptualization of the modern (and modernist!) 
understanding of communication and its relation to our notions of ideation, materiality, and 
performativity. 
 
A mediological perspective starts by splitting communication into two related but 
analytically and empirically distinct processes.  These processes are the communication of 
information and the transmission of information.  When analytically separated communication 
may be seen as the transport or movement of information in spatial terms.  Thus, information is 
communicated from one place to another place.  Transmission, on the other hand, may be seen as 
the processes of transport or the movement of information in temporal terms.  Thus, transmission 
systems and processes act to connect or relate information temporally, from one time to another 
time.  It is only in very modern communications where the message and medium appear 
synchronous in space and simultaneous in time.  It has been the technical capability of immediacy 
in our communications, which have become commonplace and taken for granted, which has 
masked the collapse of the spatial and temporal dimensions of communication into one.  Modern 
society has forgotten that instantaneous global communications is a historically recent 
phenomenon, e.g., only with the advent of electrical/electronic technologies and that 
communications have not always been so.  Throughout most of the history of civilization 
communication and transmission were distinct and separate processes.  To use a now ‘quaint’ 
example, consider the letter (information communication) and the postal service (information 
transmission).  Mediology's conceptual separation of communication from transmission permits a 
more refined and socio-historical understanding of how ideas move through space and time and 
how societies first form and then reproduce themselves.  In cultural terms, it is the 
communication of ideas which allows for social formation; i.e., collectives to cohere or networks 
to form, while it is the transmission of ideas which permits the collectives or networks to endure 
and have continuity over time (Debray, 2004). 
 
A mediological perspective also attends to the performative nature of the transmission of 
information, knowledge, or ideas.  While cultural studies looks largely to semiotics, symbolism 
and the media (i.e., communication), it rarely attends to the materiality of technology as 
technology (i.e., transmission) as it maintains its focus on the social over the material.  While 
technological studies try to understand the use and influences that technology has in social and 
cultural terms, its focus is centered on the material at the expense of the social (Vandenberghe, 
2007) and the role of technology in the formation of collectives is absent.  It is in the overlapping 
Venn-space which conjoins communication and transmission, ideation and materiality, that 
mediology sees social, cultural and technological hybrids in performative terms.  It is 
communication and transmission in performance/praxis/practice which “makes the spatial 
production of society through communication of information possible and that, by storing 
memory, contributes to its temporal reproduction through the transmission of culture from 
generation to generation.” (Vandenberghe, 2007, p. 26).  To use Debray’s terminology, it is the 
actions of materialized organization (the network, the institution) which are generative of 
organized materiality (the material objects) which translate (or transforms) ideation into material 
force.  Put otherwise, performativity is the materialization of ideas through organization. 
 
It is in this moment, when the material organization of an idea is manifest and understood 
as a material force that mediology moves beyond ANT as the materials must be embedded in a 
network of relations to sustain them as "[s]tability does not inhere in materials themselves." (Law, 
2009).  Mediology marries the ideational or symbolic ‘word’ with the heterogeneous and material 
nature of the ‘world’ in seeking to understand the dynamics of ‘the production of signs and the 
production of events” (Debray, 1996, p. 17).  However this is not to say that mediology is 
dismissive of ANT.  For it is the performativity of actor-networks which may now be seen as 
working to organize the symbolic into the material with the results of their praxis the organized 
materiality which acts as a vector for the reproduction and transmission of knowledge.  In this 
sense, mediology may be considered as a materially-discursive orientation that views ideas as 
manifest in material form.  A form which imparts material force, and hence durability, and allows 
objects and systems of objects to transmit ideas over time.  From this one can see that ideas need 
materialization and praxis (organization) in order to be durable.  It is this notion which separates 
the communications and transmissions functions of classical communications theory (Debray, 
1996) and allows for ontology and epistemology to be collapsed into the material force.  What 
Barad (2003) conceptualizes as the intra-action or performative transformation of the word into 
the world; where both the word and the world, the symbolic and the material, are placed into a 
mutually constitutive relation.  When methodologically used in combination ANTi-History and 
mediology permits the identification and analysis of actor-network performativity, organized 
materiality and materialized organization in a socio-historical context.  Further, it also highlights 
both the ideational and material elements and how they are related in actor-network 
performativity. 
 
In order to surface how actor-networks work to produce and diseminate organized 
materiality in such a way as to perpetuate or reproduce the symbolic or ideational elements from 
one historical context to another we must first historically situate and then re-assemble a socio-
history of board games.  The following sections will, in sequence; contextualize the social nature 
of board games, re-assemble a history of Monopoly™, and describe the intersectionality of games 
and work in the socio-historic context of America from which Monopoly™ emerged. 
 
Board Games in History 
 
Our knowledge of play is as old as human historical and socio-cultural reckoning and 
there is much anthropological and archaeological evidence for play materialized as board games.  
Game boards, game pieces, and inscribed rules of play appear to have existed in parallel with the 
development of civilizations and for most of our collective history board games were locally 
produced artefacts created by individuals.  These artefacts spread in ways similar to that of oral 
culture moving from person to person, community to community, and sub-culture to sub-culture.  
How board games were made in pre-industrialized civilizations would vary based upon the local 
availability of materiality, creativity or design choice, and social purpose.  The rules associated 
with the games would also vary from community to community, and culture to culture as board 
games were first and foremost a variable social folk practice (Flanagan, 2009). 
 
In Western culture, from ancient Greece through Rome and into Northern Europe, there 
is a great deal of material evidence for board games (Kurke, 1999; Whittaker, 2004, 2006).  The 
historicity of board games is to be found in other non-Western cultures as well.  The antecedents 
of the popular Chinese game of Go can be dated even before 500 BC (Eberhard, 1968), while the 
modern form of chess, as known within the Western world, had its origins in the distant past of 
India.  From there it spread to Russia, Africa, and China before eventually reaching Europe 
around 1000 AD (Murray, 1913).  Similar style board games were played as early as 5000 BC in 
Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Persia (Flanagan, 2009).  Historically then, board games appear as 
ubiquitous and historical as our cultures themselves.  The historical evidence would also seem to 
invoke a prima facie case that the material forms of ancient board games, including playing 
pieces with boards or maps, were the cultural precursors to the modern board games so common 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  While this may be true on a material basis – it is not the 
case for the social and cultural purpose of games.  Such a conclusion would be in error.  For like 
play (Huizinga, 1949), the place, role, and purpose of board games must be  historically examined 
and contextualized in socio-cultural terms to be understood.  Fortunately, board games 
themselves are amenable to lending a hand in this respect. 
 
As materialized “cultural texts" (Sugarman, 1994, p. 323) board games can give us 
insight into their social functions as board games often reflect the dominant interest and concerns 
of specific historical and socio-political contexts (Hofer, 2003; Kurke, 1999).  They can be 
interrogated to separate out the universal themes of human play from those themes that are 
particular to different cultures at different times.  In this way, individual board games yield 
insight into a culture’s particular perspective at one point in time, and when viewed collectively 
may yield insight into the stability or change of those interests over time.  So our first entry into 
the investigation of board games and their relationship with the then contemporary 
conceptualization of work and organization is to be through an historical lens.  A lens focused 
most especially on the purpose, place, and role - the ‘who’ and ‘why’ - of board games in general 
and of Monopoly™ in particular. 
 
Re-assembling Monopoly™ 
There has been a great deal of effort expended in the historical study of Monopoly™.  It 
is a complex story that has unfolded a little at a time over a period of almost 75 years. This is not 
unusual given its historicity, its popular status, and its global ubiquity in the Western world of 
leisure and games.  However, of pragmatic necessity, due to the focus of this study as well as the 
limitations of space, a fully detailed history of all the various actors and events involved will not 
be presented.  Readers are instead referred to the several very detailed histories on Monopoly™ 
(see Anspach, 1998; Axelrod, 2002; Hofer, 2003; Kennedy, 2004; Orbanes, 2006).  In order to 
situate the various actor-networks within their historical context(s) a re-assembly of the historical 
trace is described in the sections which follow.  This re-assembled history is a summarized and 
synthesized description of the facts (persons, events, locations, and dates) sourced from the 
publications cited above.  Where other sources beyond these have been used they are referenced 
separately.  The relevant actor-networks are briefly described in rough chronological order for the 
sake of clarity. 
 
The Georgists and the Ideologue:  Henry George was a Progressive economist who 
developed an alternative economic theory in response to the growing monopolism of capitalism 
in the United States in the 1800’s (Collier, 1979; George, 1912) .  George’s theory demonstrated 
the relationship between land, labour and capital as they related to a governments’ ability to 
generate tax revenue for the purpose of investing in the economy and social development.  
George’s economic theory was premised upon the concept that the private ownership of land or 
the holding of monopolies on natural resources generated wealth but did not add to the productive 
capacity of the economy nor contribute to the economic needs of the community (Heilbroner, 
1999).  He saw the rise of monopolies in the United States as a disturbing trend as the value of 
monopolistic holdings only increased as a function of scarcity meaning that much wealth 
accumulation was essentially economically non-productive as the value of holdings increased as a 
function of scarcity or speculation.  George saw this as having two important and adverse effects 
on the economic well-being of the nation and its people.  First, because the increase in value of 
monopolistic holdings was non-productive it did not contribute to the growth of the economy 
overall.  Second, the failure of the government to tax land ownership and the monopolists of 
natural resources shifted the burden of social development (e.g., the costs of community 
commons improvements) onto those who could least afford it; the renters and non-monopolists.   
 
George saw this circumstance as producing a vicious circle where increased monopolistic 
wealth accumulation allowed for speculation and wealth generation while productive 
work/workers bore the cost of the tax burden as it moved away from the increasingly wealthy 
rentiers to those of lower economic strata.  This in its turn served to increase the total non-
productive wealth being accumulated by monopolists and worsening the condition of the 
productive segments of the economy.  George firmly believed that this only served to further 
exacerbate the gap between the rentiers and the renters, between the rich and the poor.  A 
conclusion drawn from what George had observed in the pattern of industrialization and 
urbanization of the United States throughout the latter part of the 1800’s.  To resolve this 
circumstance George developed and advocated a Single Tax policy; a land tax that would reduce 
non-productive wealth accumulation and which would more equitably benefit everyone in society 
through equitable taxation policy (George, 1912).  His work was considered a very progressive 
theory in its day - his text went on to sell more than 3 million copies after its publication in 1879 
(England, 2010) – and the importance of his theory continues to be discussed today over a 
century later (Hoff, 1991; Shoup, 2004).  In its day, his ideas resonated very strongly with many 
in America and abroad.  One of these persons was Lizzie Magie. 
 
Lizzie Magie, the person who designed and constructed one of the immediate material 
predecessor games to Monopoly™, was a social progressive and an ardent proselytizer of the 
economic theory of Henry George.  She had been exposed to Georgian social economic theory 
through her father and her residency in the Single Tax community of Arden Delaware (see 
below).  In order to educate members of society in George’s economic theory and to demonstrate 
the adverse consequences of poor economic policies of government, e.g., allowing for private 
monopolies, Lizzie Magie designed and developed a board game which she called the 
Landowner’s Game.  She applied for and received two patents for the game, the first in 1904 for 
the original version, and a subsequent patent in 1924.  The second was for a variant of the game 
re-designed to more fully highlight the economic dangers of monopolies (Magie, 1904; Magie 
Phillips, 1924).  These games were explicitly designed to show how the accumulation of wealth 
through land ownership and private monopolies would lead to an increasing gap between 
economic rentiers and non-landowners.  The 1924 variant of Landlords saw Lizzie Magie re-
write the rules to include a second rule set, titled Prosperity, which explicitly showed how the 
financial and economic differences in outcomes between monopolistic versus anti-monopolistic 
were based on the player’s economic choices.  In other words, the Landlords Game had been 
materially (game board, game pieces) and ideationally (rules of play and the economic model of 
the game) designed to highlight the then contemporary problematics of the capitalist system and 
the potential for a Georgist economic policy as a fairer alternative.   For Lizzie Magie the game 
was designed to be  "educational in its nature" in order to "illustrate to them [the players] how 
under the present or prevailing system of land tenure, the landlord has an advantage over other 
enterprises and also how the single tax would discourage land speculation." (Magie Phillips, 
1924).  Through personal advocating, word of mouth, and the establishment of the Economic 
Game Company, Lizzie Magie’s efforts saw the spread of the Landlord’s Game throughout the 
Northeastern United States.  Much of the spread of the game was also enabled through the 
cultural practices of ‘folk gaming’; a process which was inextricably linked to Lizzie Magie’s 
game. 
 
The Folk Gaming Practice:  Prior to the industrialization of America, in the United States 
as elsewhere, folk games were a dominant form of entertainment.  Games would be created and 
played within localized communities.  In the early 1900’s the process of folk gaming impacted 
the evolution of the Landlord’s Game in both material and ideational terms as various actors and 
networks produced and played their own ‘folk’ versions of the game.    These folk gamers were 
comprised of individuals and groups who had been exposed to the game by Lizzie Magie, the 
Ardenites (see below), and other gamers brought together by social acquaintance.  For example, 
members of the community of Arden, an experimental community established upon the Georgist 
Single Tax philosophy in 1900 (Group, 2013), regularly re-created, i.e., made by hand with 
materials at hand, and played the Landlord’s Game.  These versions went either by the names 
Landlord’s, Auction-Monopoly, or Monopoly depending on which rules of play, monopolistic 
versus anti-monopolistic, were preferred.  In this fashion, localized versions of Landlord’s were 
spread from player to player, place to place, and community to community for over two decades 
with each rendition of the game similar to the one before, yet also varying in material and rules.  
One of the members of the Arden community who re-created and played the Landlord’s game in 
this way was Scott Nearing. 
 
The Academy:  The Progressive, anti-monopolist, and political radical Scott Nearing was 
introduced to the Landlord’s Game while a resident of the Arden community.  Whether he was 
introduced to the game by Lizzie Magie or others in the community is unknown.  However, when 
Nearing left Arden to pursue his education at the University of Pennsylvania, he took the game 
with him.  After completing his PhD in economics he assumed a position teaching at the 
University of Pennsylvania Wharton School of Finance and Economics from 1906 through 1915 
(Collection, 2013; School, 2013).  While there he used the Landlord’s Game as a teaching tool to 
demonstrate the anti-social nature and harmful effects of monopolistic economic practices.  
However, due to his radical social and economic views he was ultimately dismissed from 
Wharton (School, 2013).  After he was fired from Wharton he took a position at the University of 
Toledo (1916-1917) (Collection, 2013).  It is not known if he taught using the Landlord’s Game 
at this institution as his tenure at Toldeo was very brief.  He was let go from the university due to 
his openly expressed anti-war sentiments.  After his position at the University of Toledo, he 
became a free-lance journalist and lecturer, publishing articles and texts, and advocating for 
various social improvements; many of which directly involved educating others of the dangers of 
monopolistic practices and the social ills caused by the capitalist system of economics.  While at 
Wharton, several other persons, students of Nearing and other fellow students, were exposed to 
and became interested in the game.  One of these was Rexford Tugwell; a student of Nearing’s 
who would himself become an economist.  He who would go on to teach economics at Columbia 
University from 1920 through 1936 (University, 2013).  Tugwell would also introduce the game 
to other students at Columbia University as he also used it as teaching tool in class.  One of the 
students exposed to the Landlord’s Game was Daniel Layman.  Layman would go on to produce 
and market a variant of the Landlord’s Game which was to be called Finance.  Finance, as a 
game, had been stripped of all of its anti-capitalistic ‘political’ or ‘social’ sentiments and was 
designed to be played on purely capitalistic and economic terms.  The elements of social critique 
inherent in the previous versions were ‘written’ out of the game. 
 
The Monopolists:  Charles Darrow, who was proclaimed the ‘inventor of record’ was the 
individual who first produced and sold the first version of a board game officially, entitled 
Monopoly.  Darrow had been exposed to the game through the folk gaming community and in 
classic American entrepreneurial fashion began producing and selling the game in the local 
markets of the northeastern United States.  He had essentially transformed what had been a folk 
game and folk practice into a production and manufacturing practice.  The success of the game’s 
sales drew the attention of Parker Brothers one of the largest manufacturers of board games in 
America.  Parker Brothers, and later on Hasbro who purchased Parker Brothers in 1991, 
purchased the intellectual property rights from Charles Darrow and paid him royalties on each 
game subsequently sold.  Eventually, Parker Brothers purchased the rights for all of the variants 
of Landlord’s / Monopoly / Finance from Lizzie Magie, Daniel Layman and others.  They 
patented and trademarked the name Monopoly in order to protect their investment.  Between 
them these companies produced, marketed, and sold the Monopoly™ board game worldwide.  
Today, it is estimated that some 270 million copies have been sold around the globe with over a 
billion people having played the game (Hasbro, 2013). 
 
Ideology and the Shifting Hegemonies of Play 
 
In socio-historical terms the modern Western notion of childhood and society’s role and 
responsibility towards children is very recent.  The contemporary and modernist social 
conceptualization of childhood is but the latest in a series of developments and shifts arising out 
of social change stemming from the enlightenment.  Childhood and children as socio-culturally 
defined categories have changed and evolved several times since (Aries, 1962).  One line of 
historical study places the emergence of the social differentiation between adult and child, the 
root conceptualization of modern-day childhood, as late as the 1600’s (Postman, 1985).  
Adolescence as a liminal category between childhood and adulthood would not appear until the 
late 1800’s and would not fully emerge and stabilize until the early 1900’s (Lesko, 1996).  Prior 
to this children were socially considered “as miniature adults whose sole purpose was to become 
big adults as quickly as possible." (Eiss, 1994, p. 1).  This is a significantly different positioning 
of children in social terms than held in modern Western culture today.  The contemporary 
concepts that we associate with childhood, e.g., play, protection, learning and education, were far 
different as recent as a century ago.  The social meanings and functions associated with play and 
games as they related to children in the nineteenth century were also very different. 
   
In Western culture, and particularly in America, the 'child' of the 18th and 19th centuries, 
most especially the male children, were seen as a potential and "a profitable source of labor" 
(Eiss, 1994, p. 10).  Children were future adults and workers; first for the agrarian family and 
then, with the advent of the industrial revolution, for the factory.  At this time childhood, gender, 
and work were normatively bundled conceptualizations.  Males were often the only "economic 
providers for their families" and so "biological sex" was synonymous with "economic function" 
and the masculine gender, including that of children, was defined almost exclusively in economic 
terms (Blair, 1994, p. 308).   Male children were to be managed and trained as future labor assets 
who would, in their turn, become economically productive adults and contributors to society.  
Only then could they fulfill their economic role as breadwinners for family and the productive 
backbone of society and the nation (Lesko, 1996).  So strongly held were these social norms that 
"[t]hose males who lack[ed] the mental quality of Industry lack[ed] the external sign by which it 
[was] known, labor".  Children who failed to assume their role as industrious adults in society 
were considered "economic castrati." (Blair, 1994, p. 309). 
 
So board games from their earliest inception in Western thought, through to America in 
the late 1800's, had two combined social purposes, play and education (Kurke, 1999).  However, 
the first board games in America emerged prior to the reconceptualization of childhood in the 
twentieth century and so most board games were designed for the training of future adults.   That 
is to prepare children for work and organization.  As the United States transitioned from a 
primarily agrarian to primarily industrial society "the American home, [was] no longer the heart 
of economic production" and as the spheres of work and home life separated, the home became 
"the center of education, entertainment, and moral enlightenment." (Hofer, 2003, p. 13).  Board 
games were therefore "concentrated on specific, narrow, practical matters” (Eiss, 1994, p. 2) in 
order to prepare children for their future economic roles as adults.  In this context board games 
taught children how to "take turns, how to follow rules and how to win and lose in the vocabulary 
of their times." (Sugarman, 1994, p. 324). 
 
While games such as chess and checkers had been imported to America from Europe 
(and the other antecedent geographies prior to Europe) during the establishment of the country, it 
was not until the late 1800's that American manufacturers were producing their own original 
designed-in-America board games (Hofer, 2003).  At this time most of the board games produced 
in the United States reflected American society’s overriding interest and preoccupation with 
religion, entrepreneurship, economics, and industry.  Many of the American produced board 
games reflected America's competitive spirit, technological achievements and the educational and 
moral development of children (Hofer, 2003).  For example, in the Game of The District 
Messenger Boy (1886) success was defined as avoiding the sins of sloth and dishonesty in order 
to progress and to become a respected businessman and member of good standing in society.  
Similarly, in the game The Errand Boy (1891) actions and rule play were designed to highlight 
the importance of industriousness and moral behaviour which were considered key to career and 
economic success.  These board games reflected the specifics of how children were viewed by 
society at large (Sugarman, 1994) and were "based on the idea that children should only read [or 
do] what would improve them." (Eiss, 1994, p. 3).  Other board games provided education on the 
arts (Gems of Art: A New and Instructive Game), geography (The Dissected map of the United 
States), History (The Historioscope Panograma), language (Anagrams and Other Letter Games), 
morals (The Checkered Game of Life (1860) and social roles (The Elite Social and Sentimental 
Conversation Cards), and on religion (Pilgrimn's Progress, The Mansion of Happiness, and 
Grandma's Sunday Game of Bible Questions).   
 
By the late 1800's one of the defining themes in American board games was the 
accumulation of wealth through economic capitalism, or 'rags to riches' stories.  One 
advertisement for the board game The Monopolist (1885) read, "On this board the great struggle 
between Capital and Labor can be fought out to the satisfaction of all parties, and , if the players 
are successful, they can break the Monopolist and become Monopolists themselves." (as cited in 
Hofer, 2003, p. 84).8  So most of the board games, as objects to be performed as edutainment or 
education in the home, exposed and taught the children of America the primary economic and 
social values, beliefs, norms and behaviours, and expectations for success in adulthood.  As 
children’s games contain the ideological elements of the dominant social order (Limon, 1983), in 
the case of America, they were educated in morality and trained in industriousness, the economics 
of capitalism, careerism, and the accumulation of wealth.  An ideology passed from one 
                                                          
8 Titles, dates and descriptions are sourced from (Hofer, 2003) 
generation to another and that would be carried forward and would only grow stronger throughout 
the twentieth-century. 
Ideology: An American Perspective 
 
In the context of the United States’ experience, ideology is commonly understood to be a 
political system of beliefs.  Beliefs that are normatively antithetical to the nature of democratic 
liberal market capitalism in America; e.g. other forms of economic or state control such as 
communism, fascism, and socialism (Lodge, 1977).  As a consequence in the United States 
ideology is largely viewed in a negative or pejorative sense; likely due to the prominence of 
ideology read as a central concept of the political ‘left’ stemming first from Marx’s materialism 
(Marx & Engels, 1947) then Gramscian hegemony (Gramsci, 1971) and latterly Althusser’s 
ideological apparatus (Althusser, 1971).  Ideology has been defined as both false belief (Marx & 
Engels, 1947) and true belief (Mannheim, 1985).  Beliefs founded upon, in the case of the former 
a materialist, and in the case of the latter, an idealist perspective.  While ideology has been a core 
theoretical and analytic concept in political science (Goren, Federico, & Kittilson, 2009; Marx & 
Engels, 1947) and the sociology of knowledge (Mannheim, 1985), outside of Bendix’s work 
(1956) it has been employed only sparingly within MOS (for exceptions see Alvesson, 1984; 
Barley & Kundra, 1992; Bendix, 1956; Beyer, 1981; Beyer, Dunbar, & Meyer, 1988; Burnham, 
1941; Starbuck, 1982).9 
In MOS ideology has been variously defined as “logically integrated clusters of beliefs, 
values, rituals, and symbols” (Starbuck, 1982, p. 3) or “broadly defined ways of understanding 
that are based on shared values and beliefs.” (Beyer & Hannah, 2002, p. 483), or following 
Bendix as “a system of ideas concerning management that explain and justify managerial 
authority and that are related to a distinct set of managerial techniques and practices.” (Parush, 
2008, p. 49).  Barley and Kunda define ideology as “a stream of discourse that promulgates, 
however, unwittingly, a set of assumptions about the nature of the objects with which it deals.”  
(Barley & Kundra, 1992, p. 363).    The conceptual use of ideology in this way in MOS has meant 
that ideology has been bereft of its political interpretations.10  What is left is a managerialism 
where ideology has been extended to, and defined in terms of, a system and pattern of thinking 
whose assumptive and taken-for-granted nature precludes questioning or imagining of other ways 
of seeing the world (Alvesson, 1984).  From this perspective “The ‘spirit of capitalism’ is 
therefore an ideology; one that “serves to sustain the capitalist process in its historical dynamism 
while being in phase with the historically specific and variable forms that it takes.” (Chiapello & 
Fairclough, 2002, pp. 187, emphasis added).  So if ideology, conceptually and ideationally, has 
remained relatively stable in MOS - even while varying within specific socio-historical contexts – 
what mechanisms or processes facilitate or contribute to ideological endurance in this way? 
 
One potential answer is to be found by analytically separating out the ideational from the 
material, or reproductive, components of an ideological system.  In other words, the ideation 
associated with the system from the performativity of the system.  Althusser has provided a 
                                                          
9 As we see today, at that time board games were a form of "edu-tainment" (Hofer, 2003, p. 20). 
10 More recently, Parush (2008) argues that in management and organizational studies that the management ‘fashion’ stream of 
research has essentially replaced what used to be und rstood as management ‘ideology’. 
partial answer (1971).  In brief, Althusser proposed that the reproduction of any social system 
was dependent on the dominant ideology successfully being passed from one generation to the 
next.  For Althusser this is achieved through the actions of Ideological State Apparatus (ISA) and 
Repressive State Apparatus (RSA).  ISAs are the institutional mechanisms, such as the system of 
education which serves to teach the ideational components of ideology, while RSAs, are the 
mechanisms that maintain the dominant order through action.  That is, the performativity of the 
government and the judiciary when enacting laws and legislation through enforcement by state 
police and militaries.  While ideology tends to be concealed within the actions of the ISAs, it is 
most apparent in the actions of the RSAs (Althusser, 1971) and taken together this matrix serves 
to implicitly and explicitly reproduce both the ideological and the structural basis of the social 
system.  In this way ruling hegemonies are perpetuated in both ideational and material forms. 
 
From this perspective it can be seen that board games in general and Monopoly™ in 
particular have served to educate and reproduce a capitalist ideology within the United States and 
the capitalist system.  However, board games are neither ISAs nor RSAs - so what are they?  
Moving beyond the Althusserian ISA/RSA matrix allows an argument to be made that board 
games should be considered a form of Ideological Materialized Apparatus (IMA).  IMAs defined 
as social objects performative of both the ideational and material components of an ideological 
system which serve to transmit ideology over time.  Or, in socio-cultural-material terms, 
Landlord’s/Monopoly™  culturally transmitted the idea of capitalism in the form of an organized 
materiality through (Debray, 2004) when played.  However, play was dependent, in the first 
instance, on making.  In order for play to happen, the game needed to be both organized and 
performed.  First, the game board, the player’s pieces and other paraphernalia, and the rules had 
to be materially organized.  Only once organized materiality was successful could a network be 
formed for play.  The formation of an actor-network itself required two further conditions.  First, 
actors needed to pass through an obligatory point of passage; acceptance of the game world.  
Second, once within the game world, the rules needed be performed or enacted.  Only then could 
play happen; otherwise, when not performed as game, the ideological elements of capitalism lay 
dormant within the game box. 
 
From a very young age we learn to observe and frame the complexities of the world 
through the use of metaphor.  Metaphor thus pervades our language and structures our 
understanding and interactions with the world from our earliest years (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003).  
“The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of 
another.” (italics in origininal, bold emphasis is added, Lakoff & Johnson, 2003, p. 5).  Perhaps 
the most dominant metaphor for business in American culture is the ‘game’ (Clancy, 1989; 
Donaldson & Lorsch, 1983).  The metaphor of business as a game has a long history and many 
notable businesspersons in the 19th and twentieth centuries century often described business as a 
game or used gaming metaphors to conceptualize business and business practices (Clancy, 1989).  
Many of them describe their practices as based upon what they learned during their play of 
Monopoly™ (Axelrod, 2002).  The system of metaphors that structure our thinking also serve to 
highlight and hide elements of the underlying metaphorical concepts we employ in our language 
and thinking (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003).  As the patterns of social behaviour in games informs us 
that individuals use the bounded game space, the rules of the game, to inform their decision 
making and actions, game players will often grant the rules of the game higher priority in their 
decision making than from any moral reasoning (Reall, Bailey, & Stoll, 1998).  By thinking of 
‘game’ as an innocent and leisure activity, as we tend to do today, we have fail to perceive the 
intersectionality it has and had with work and organization. 
 
The re-assembly of Monopoly™ using ANTi-History and mediology reveals that 
Monopoly™ was first an ideational based token, a quasi-object or mutable mobile (Law & Mol, 
2001), which was passed within and between folk gaming networks.  It was then translated into 
an immutable mobile which had been black-boxed to conceal the underlying 
ideational/ideological nature of the game (Latour, 2005) imbued into its materiality by Lizzie 
Magie and others.  This effect had come about in the transition of the Landlord’s/Monopoly 
variants as folk games to the mass-produced consumer game Monopoly™.  The loosely related 
networks of the folk gaming community meant that both the ideational and material components 
of the game spread slowly and were open to variation; depending on the capability and interests 
of the creator/user.  However, when manufactured, marketed, and sold by Darrow and then Parker 
Brothers, the variable Landlord’s/Monopoly folk practice had been stabilized.  It had been fixed 
as organized materiality through a strongly materialized organization; the effect of which was to 
bind the ideational and material components of the game into an ideological potentiality waiting 
to be performed over and over again. 
 
While the rules of play could (and undoubtedly were) variable in their application, e.g. 
house-rules, the materiality of the game board was not as variable – it had essentially become 
materially immutable.  The relative immutability of Monopoly™ was reinforced as Parker 
Brothers protected Monopoly™ by excluding other similar game ideations and materialities 
through the use of trademarks, and patents.  Combined with the actions of the judiciary which 
enforced these protections on others (for a very spectacular case of this see Anspach, 1998) the 
effect was strengthened.  Through processes of Debrayian organized materiality and the 
establishment of a strong and coercive network, materialized organization, Parker Brothers 
created and sustained a monopoly on Monopoly™.  In this punctualization Monopoly™ had 
become both an actor-network and an actant (Latour & Woolgar, 1986).  A materialized vector 
which served to transmit (Debray, 2004) and reproduce a capitalist ideology.  An ideology whose 
fundamentals had been black-boxed (Latour, 2005) and hidden, enrolling others through their 
‘benign’ acts of play.  Once the game had become culturally embedded as a stabilized and black-
boxed actant, only then could it be materially re-organized into the variants of Monopoly™ we 
see today (for example, see the many games based upon Monopoly™ at 
http://www.hasbro.com/monopoly/en_CA/). 
 
The concept of organized materiality and the transmission of ideas, knowledge, and 
information over time arguably extends Gramscian (Gramsci, 1971) and Althusserian (Althusser, 
1971) notions of ideology.  A mediological stance can be seen to extend this work and the 
concept of ideology in three manners.  First, mediologists argue that ideology cannot be 
understood in purely hegemonic ideational terms.  In other words, ideology qua ideology has no 
material force (Marx & Engels, 2004).  And without material force, ideology cannot be 
hegemonic (Gramsci, 1971). Second, and here the extension, without material force ideology 
cannot be produced/reproduced, even by Althusserian Repressive State (RSA) and Ideological 
State (ISA) Apparatus.   For in order for ideology to be hegemonic and for it to reproduce itself 
ideology must first be materialized, organized, communicated and transmitted. Thus, the 
dissemination and adoption of an ideology is neither solely idealist (Gramsci, 1968) nor 
materialist (Marx & Engels, 1947) in nature.  It is to be found in the processes of transmission 
wherein materialized ideology is transported through time. To return to the Althusserian question, 
it was the stabilization, punctualization, and transmission of Monopoly™ as a culturally 
embedded object which produced an Ideological Material Apparatus.  An empirical case which 




Despite renewed interest and practice of games and work, a closer inspection reveals that 
rather than being a new phenomenon, play and games have intersected with and been directly 
related to work and organization for a substantial amount of time.  In the North American context, 
play, games, and work have intersected more often than not.  The assumption of the separation of 
play and games from work and organization is a modernist assumption; one particularly dominant 
throughout the twentieth century (Malaby, 2007).  By following the historical traces of play 
manifest in the materiality of games we can begin to re-assemble the relationship of play and 
games with their culturally assigned meanings (e.g., their relations with work and organization) 
over time.  This is viewed as important as games function as social technologies through the 
ordering logic and relationships set up by the rules of play and games have "assist[ed] in the 
development of conceptual processes, to invoking ritual, to forging a connection with time and 
the future, players throughout history have struggled to gain agency and understand uncertainty 
through game play." (Flanagan, 2009, p. 73). 
An historical approach which acknowledges both the materiality of play-as-games as well 
as their symbolic/ritual cultural role(s) has several advantages.  First, it avoids the theoretical 
problematics of reductionism that have plagued the two classical approaches mentioned 
previously (Malaby, 2007).  Second, the reconceptualization of play as having both material and 
symbolic/ritual dimensions allows us to investigate the linkages between the cultural or ideational 
contexts of games and their materiality within and across specific socio-historical contexts.  
Methodologically this permits a surfacing of the intersections and relations between play and 
games with work and organization.  An historical re-assembly allows the opening of these ‘black-
boxes’ of intersectionality. 
 
Under the rhetorical rubric of gamification, games and game elements are expected to 
increasingly intersect with spheres of activities not classically associated with leisure pursuits.  
This is the case now with modern communications technology (Zichermann & Cunningham, 
2011), the increase of work practices based on games/game elements in organizations and 
business (Reeves & Read, 2009) and in all ranks of education (Jenkins et al., 2009; Kapp, 2012).  
Given the rapidity with which serious gaming (Ritterfield, Cody, & Vorderer, 2009) and 
processes of gamifiying  have made inroads into the practices of management and work, the lack 
of study into the socio-cultural nature of games is viewed as a growing gap; a gap that urgently 
needs to be addressed by MOS scholars.  Hopefully, this study goes partway to delineating and 
explicating one of the “ideological mechanisms through which the worker becomes accustomed 
to accepting the roles, rules, and linguistic usage belonging to the workplace” (Burell and 
Morgan, 1979 Sociological Paradigms, p. 322-324, as cited in Alvesson, 1984, p. 66). 
Finally, strangely, and paradoxically enough, what had been designed as an tool to inform 
persons about the dangers of particular forms of capitalism and economic exchange through 
materialization, translation, and stabilization had become a game which served an opposite 
purpose; one that accentuated all that was originally envisioned as wrong with contemporary 
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DAMNANT QUODNON INTELLIGENT? 





As the 21st Century progresses and Canadian society becomes 
more diverse, organizational challenges arise when conflicting 
worldviews collide.  The case study Damnant Quodon 
Intelligent? explores Trinity Western University’s proposal to 
establish a School of Law and the resistance it faces, principally 
because of organizational policies that flow from the university’s 
identity as a private, Christian post-secondary institution.  The 
case seeks to invite discussion regarding organizational / societal 
ethical behavior, the management of dichotomous worldviews, 






A Controversial Proposal 
 
 On June 18, 2012, Trinity Western University (TWU) announced that it had submitted a 
proposal to the Ministry of Advanced Education, Innovation and Technology (MAEIT) and the 
Federation of Law Societies of Canada (the Federation)2 to establish a School of Law at its 
Langley, BC campus. If approved, TWU planned to begin classes in September of 2015.  
Opposition to TWU’s proposal was immediate, with many detractors taking exception to the 
school’s mandate to follow the teachings of the Bible.  Some – including the Canadian Council of 
Law Deans – suggested that such a school would by definition be discriminatory and would not 
produce lawyers that would be able to be objective in conserving the law.  Others opposed the 
proposal on the grounds that a number of law schools already exist in British Columbia. 
 
                                                        
1  This case is based on historical events and not intended to illustrate either effective or ineffective 
decision-making.  The legal term employed in the title (damnant quodnon intelligent) is translated as “they 
condemn what they do not understand.” 
2 Every lawyer in Canada, and notary in Quebec, is required to be a member of a provincial law society and 
to follow the rules that govern the province or territory in which they practice.  The Federation is mandated 
to represent the public interest and to ensure that each lawyer or notary meets the high standards of 
competence and professional conduct. 
  
The proposal enjoyed the backing of both the University’s Senate and Board of 
Governors3, however as opposition mounted the Board was faced with the prospect that the 
endeavor might not be approved.  While the Board was confident that the proposal met all of the 
criteria required to offer a law degree, there was concern that negative press might have an 
adverse effect on the school and its students.  And what would be the impact on the institution if 
the proposal was not approved?  Could the proposal legitimately be rejected because of TWU’s 
religious beliefs?  
 
 
Trinity Western University 
 
TWU’s founders established “Trinity Junior College” (TJC) in 1962 with a unique vision 
for Christian liberal arts and sciences education in Canada.  While its first graduating class had 
only four students, by 1982 the university had an enrolment of over 80.  In 1985 TJC was granted 
full membership in the Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada (AUCC),4 leading the 
BC legislature to recognize the school as a university under its new name – Trinity Western 
University. 
 
TWU was a comprehensive liberal arts, sciences, and professional studies university 
committed to continually build upon its “Educational Vitality,” which included “educating, 
transforming, and impacting the world through the wisdom and enterprise of its students, 
alumni/ae, faculty, and staff” (Exhibit 1).  The entire university was based on the Christian faith 
and “emphasize[d] excellence in academic scholarship, while always keeping in mind how the 
knowledge and understanding we gain through study can serve the world’s deepest needs.”  It 
was organized into six schools (Business, Nursing, Education, Human Kinetics, Arts, Media and 
Culture, and Graduate Studies) and two faculties (Humanities and Social Sciences, and Natural 
and Applied Sciences), and offered 42 undergraduate and 16 graduate degree programs. 
 
 
A Proposed School of Law 
 
The development of a law school was seen as the next step in TWU’s objectives for the 
development of the university.  Specifically, the law school would aim to develop “highly 
competent, professional and ethical graduates who will no doubt distinguish themselves in the 
legal community and beyond [as] a natural and appropriate advancement of the TWU mission.”  
Its mission would focus on leadership development and would work toward the achievement of 
specific ends statements: 
 
§ In the pursuit of missional ends globally, Trinity Western University will bring hope, 
healing, compassion and reconciliation to the world through Christ-like dedication, 
service and engagement of its students, alumni, faculty and staff. 
§ Institutionally, the university will be a world-class centre for vital research, exemplary 
scholarship, and excellence in comprehensive adaptive, integrated learning.  
                                                        
3 TWU’s Senate approved the proposal on April 3, 2012, and the Board of Governors signed its approval on 
April 29, 2012. 
4 The AUCC represents 97 public and private not-for-profit Canadian universities and is involved in the 
development of public policy, the administration of leadership seminars for university leaders, and the 
management of scholarships and international programs. 
  
§ Individually, the university will assist students in becoming those who can change the 
world by their competence, character, commitment and calling.5 
 
 
Specifically the proposal was to offer a Juris Doctor (JD) program6 “with a view to 
excellence in leadership development, professionalism and public service.”  The JD was a 
graduate level program, and to meet eligibility requirements a prospective student would already 
possess an undergraduate degree.  Building on a common JD curriculum, students would have the 
“opportunity to specialize in ‘Charities and Social Justice’ or ‘Entrepreneurial’ law, with the 
possibility of exploring legal approaches to social enterprise and social innovation.”  The program 
would (a) focus on professionalism, practice competence, and high ethical standards; (b) integrate 
practical assignments; (c) emphasize leadership and character development; and (d) integrate a 
Christian worldview. 
 
TWU had been planning its offering for many years and felt that this move “[fit] well 
with the University’s mission to develop Godly leaders for the marketplaces of life.”  Janet Epp 
Buckingham, an associate professor at TWU and Executive Director of the Laurentian Leadership 
Centre in Ottawa, had initially approached the university with the idea some 20 years prior.  She 
held a firm belief that there was a need for a law school “that had a focus on Christian principles 
of justice in society where students would be able to discuss what it means to be a Christian and 
be a lawyer and to have a really different kind of focus on law.”7  The university struck an 
advisory council that consisted of lawyers and judges, and laid down plans to construct a new 
building to house the law school when the proposal was approved (a process estimated to take 
between 6 to 12 months). 
 
One part of the rationale behind starting a new law school was to “increase accessibility 
to a Canadian legal education, as demand for entry currently outstrips the number of law school 
places available.”  Buckingham believed that there were many students who desired to study law 
but were not able to get into law school because of the limited number of seats available.  
Accordingly many Canadian students had to attend law schools in Australia, England, and the 
United States – so many in fact that one Australian law school had hired Canadian professors and 
adopted a Canadian curriculum. 
 
TWU had developed partnerships with various agencies, which would “give students 
unique opportunities to provide needed legal services to the less privileged and [represent] again a 
natural and appropriate advancement of the TWU mission.”  Students would be encouraged to 
view being a lawyer as a “high calling in a life of service to God and the community.”  This 
perspective fit well with the overall mission of TWU.  As Buckingham explained, the Canadian 
legal system has a Judeo-Christian heritage and the Bible has much to say about the law.  “There 
is a huge amount of the Bible that one can look at in terms of legal principles and justice 
principles.  Clearly, law is something God cares about because it involves the relationships we 
have in our society.”  She submitted that TWU’s law school would be different from the others 
because “law is a client-focused way of life, and so we want to make sure that TWU’s law school 
                                                        
5 From TWU’s proposal. 
6 Juris Doctor (JD) is also known as Doctor of Jurisprudence. In the past Canadian universities offered a 
Bachelor of Laws (L.L.B.) degree, which was common in other Commonwealth countries.  The United 
States offered the JD degree, and over time a perception developed that the Canadian L.L.B. did not meet 
the same level of education as the American designation.  In 2001 the decision was made to adopt the JD 
designation. 
7 From an interview with Peter Stockland. 
  
focuses on the client and helps law students to develop into client-focused professionals.”8  From 
her perspective, other law schools focused not on the client, but on legal principles, and when 






The MAEIT was the provincial government agency responsible to oversee the assessment 
of new degree applications in BC, and in order for TWU to implement a new degree program it 
was required to apply to the Ministry under the BC Degree Authorization Act.  A Degree Quality 
Assessment Board (QAB) would then be struck to assess the application to ensure that it met 
“consistent and high-quality criteria.”  These criteria, developed in harmony with national 
standards, included:10 
 
1. Degree Level Standard 
2. Credential Recognition and Nomenclature 
3. Curriculum/Program Content 
4. Learning Methodologies/Program Delivery 
5. Admission and Transfer/Residency 
6. Faculty 
7. Program Resources 
8. Program Consultation 
9. Program Review Assessment 
 
 
TWU submitted its proposal and – as per standard practice – it was posted to the MAEIT 
website for public viewing.  When the QAB completed its assessment the proposal was submitted 
to the MAEIT for review and final decision, with the results of the assessment, the QAB’s 




The Federation of Law Societies of Canada and the Canadian Bar Association 
 
The Federation was the national coordinating body for all of Canada’s provincial law 
societies.  Every lawyer (or notary in Quebec) was required to become a member of the law 
society in the province or territory in which they practiced, overseen in turn by the Federation 
who’s mission was to “[act] in the public interest by strengthening Canada’s system of 
governance of an independent legal profession, reinforcing public confidence in it and making it a 
leading example of justice systems around the world.” 
 
In order to help strengthen the Canadian legal system, the Federation had, according to its 
mandate, adopted national requirements for law school graduates (Exhibit 4) which were applied 
                                                        
8 From an interview with Peter Stockland. 
9 An articling position is an apprenticeship required of all students desiring to become lawyers.  It is 
typically completed at a law firm and before the writing of the bar exam. 
10 An expanded description is provided in Exhibit 2. 
  
when proposals for new law schools were submitted to the Federation’s Approval Committee.11  
If a school met the requirements its graduates would be considered to have met the requirements 
for entry into their respective bar admissions program.12  Accordingly TWU had concurrently 
submitted its proposal to the Approval Committee. 
 
The Canadian Bar Association (CBA) differed from the Federation – while Federation 
membership was mandatory for all lawyers via their provincial law societies, the CBA was an 
advocacy organization intended to represent the interests of its membership, which was voluntary.  
The CBA provided lawyers with such benefits as professional development, advocacy in 
government policy development and law reform, discount pricing for CBA products, and access 
to conferences, newsletters, magazines, and online resources. 
 
 
Approaching the Bar 
 
The process of becoming a lawyer in Canada began with the completion of a law degree.  
Graduates then applied for admission to the law society of the province or territory in which they 
wished to practice law.  Once accepted additional steps included: 
 
§ Completion of an apprenticeship program (articling).  
§ Attendance of a professional legal training course (the bar admission course).  
§ Passing of licensing examinations (the bar examinations). 
 
 
Upon completion of all prerequisites a candidate would then be “called to the bar” and 
admitted as a member of the provincial law society. 
 
 
Opposition to the TWU Proposal 
 
The Canadian Council of Law Deans13 (the Council) opposed TWU’s proposal on the 
basis of the university’s character and values as a religious community.  Bill Flanagan, Dean and 
Professor of Law at Queen’s University, wrote a letter on behalf of the Council to the Federation 
challenging the proposal.  The Council considered the principal problem to be that TWU “as an 
evangelical Christian community, has all students who voluntarily enter the university sign on to 
a ‘community covenant agreement’.”  This agreement (Exhibit 3) reflected TWU’s mission, core 
values, curriculum, and community life and stated explicitly that “according to the Bible, sexual 
intimacy is reserved for marriage between one man and one woman, and within that marriage 
bond it is God’s intention that it be enjoyed as a means for marital intimacy and procreation.”  
The Council called on the Federation to investigate whether the covenant was inconsistent with 
federal and provincial law on the basis that it discriminated against gay, lesbian and bi-sexual 
students. 
 
                                                        
11 The Approval Committee was appointed by the Federation, which is comprised of seven members – four 
of which have regulatory experience in Canadian law societies and three of which are Deans at Canadian 
law schools. 
12 In general “the bar” is considered to mean the legal profession and / or the qualification process whereby 
a lawyer is licensed to practice law. 
13 The Canadian Council of Law Deans consists of the heads of the different law schools and exists to 
enable executive level communication between Canada’s providers of legal education. 
  
Constitutional and civil rights lawyer Clayton Ruby, in an editorial in the Toronto Star, 
stated, “It is just wrong to have a law school approve discrimination in its own structure.  That 
kind of discrimination, which denies some people the right to equality, is fundamentally 
inconsistent with law and democracy.”14 
 
Lawyer Robert Brun wrote to the Federation on behalf of the CBA, calling on it to 
investigate whether TWU’s proposal met the national standards.  From the perspective of the 
CBA, any new law degree program must “strike a balance between freedom of religion and 
equality, and give full consideration to its public interest mandate and to the values embodied in 
the Canadian human rights laws.”  He went on to state that “the Federation has a duty to go 
beyond a strict determination of a proposed law school’s compliance with the national standards.  
It must assess whether the institution and its program complies with Canadian law, including the 
protections afforded by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the human rights 
legislation in BC, and in every province and territory where a proposed law degree may be 
recognized by the law societies for admission to bar.”   
 
Another letter to the Federation from Amy Sadalauskas, Robert Peterson, and Level 
Chan, representing the CBA’s Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Conference and the 
Equality Committee, raised the concern that “the National Standards’ ethical, constitutional and 
human rights components” had not been met.  They submitted that while TWU operated under 
the Trinity Western University Act of 1969, which stated that TWU “is recognized as a Christian 
institution affiliated with the Evangelical Free Church of Canada,” the university should not 
benefit from a suggested exemption from anti-discrimination legislation in the British Columbia 
Human Rights Code (BCHRC).  They reminded the Federation that while BCHRC (s.41(1)) 
stated that… 
 
41 (1) If a charitable, philanthropic, educational, fraternal, religious or social organization 
or corporation that is not operated for profit has as a primary purpose the promotion of 
the interests and welfare of an identifiable group or class of persons characterized by a 
physical or mental disability or by a common race, religion, age, sex, marital status, 
political belief, colour, ancestry or place of origin, that organization or corporation must 
not be considered to be contravening this Code because it is granting a preference to 
members of the identifiable group or class of persons; 
 
 
…and that TWU did not – according to the Trinity Western University Act – promote the 
interests of an identifiable group, and that it had not been given authorization to “grant a 
preference to members of any particular church or religion.”  The authors pointed specifically to 
Subsection 3(2) of the Act which stated: 
 
(2) The objects of the University shall be to provide for young people of any race, colour, 
or creed university education in the arts and sciences with an underlying philosophy and 
viewpoint that is Christian. 
 
 
The authors submitted that “freedom of religion does not allow one group of individuals to 
exclude another group of identifiable individuals from access to a public service.”   
 
 
                                                        
14 Ruby’s editorial was published March 1, 2013 in The Star, a Toronto newspaper. 
  
Trinity Western’s Defense 
 
The university had travelled this road before.  In 1997 the British Columbia College of 
Teachers had opposed its offering of a teacher training program because of its biblical beliefs, 
stipulating that the school “violated human-rights laws.”  The matter escalated all the way to the 
Supreme Court of Canada who in 2001 sided with the university because the College of Teachers 
could not prove that TWU graduates would engage in discriminatory actions in the classroom.  
Nevertheless an editorial in the National Post proclaimed that much had changed since then: 
 
“The crux of the issue is how the discrimination and institutional environment at TWU 
impacts the ability of the school to teach law.  In order to permit entry into a provincial or 
territorial law society (as determined by the Federation), the law degree program must 
meet national standards in its curriculum.  Those standards require critical thinking about 
ethical and legal issues. No person can truly think critically from one pre-determined 
lens, in this case, a lens mandated by TWU.”15 
 
 
The university, however, begged to differ, basing its defense in part upon its claimed 
exemption from certain prescriptions of national and provincial human rights legislation.  The 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guaranteed all citizens four fundamental freedoms: (1) 
freedom of conscience and religion; (2) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, 
including freedom of the press and other media of communication; (3) freedom of peaceful 
assembly; and (4) freedom of association, and stipulated that “every individual is equal before 
and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without 
discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, 
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.”  Canada’s Constitution Act stipulated 
that each province was responsible for legislation relating to education, specifying that “nothing 
in any such law shall prejudicially affect any right or privilege with respect to denominational 
schools which any class of persons have by law in the province at the union.” 
 
TWU however was a private institution and maintained that it was exempt, in part, from 
BCHRC human rights legislation and to which the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms did 
not apply.  Canada’s Human Rights Code stated that non-profit organizations of a charitable, 
philanthropic, educational, fraternal, religious or social nature could avail themselves of an 
exemption for the purpose of “the promotion of the interests and welfare of an identifiable group 
or class of persons characterized by a physical or mental disability or by a common race, religion, 
age, sex, marital status, political belief, colour, ancestry or place of origin,” and that the 
“organization or corporation must not be considered to be contravening this Code because it is 
granting a preference to members of the identifiable group or class of persons.” 
 
Douglas Todd, a columnist for the Vancouver Sun, explained in an article that the 
president of the BC Civil Liberties Association (BCCLA), Lindsay Lyster, had denounced the 
Council for its opposition of TWU’s proposed law school.  Lyster had accused “the deans of the 
country’s secular law schools of wanting to ‘monopolize’ legal education and keep ‘religiously-
minded’ people from becoming law students and lawyers.”  Todd also quoted Lyster as saying 
that the Council operated on the premise that “those who are religiously minded should be 
excluded from all legal education.  That would, by extension, include all professors, students and 
                                                        
15 National Post. (2013, January 24). Counterpoint: Why Trinity Western University Should Not Have a 
Law School. Retrieved April 6, 2013: http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2013/01/24/counterpoint- why-
trinity-western-university-should-not-have-a-law-school/  
  
eventually lawyers and judges who held to the religious views the CCLD says are repugnant.”  
Lyster believed that in this case the BCCLA supported TWU on the “principle of religious 
freedom,” and said “secular universities often imposed restrictions on free thought, including in 





Other critics objected to TWU’s proposal, maintaining that there existed a national 
shortage of articling positions, a fact that would be keenly obvious in BC, given its three schools 
of law at the University of British Columbia (Vancouver), the University of Victoria, and 
Thompson Rivers University (Kamloops).  An article in Maclean’s magazine (June 25, 2012) 
suggested that, “given that there is a national shortage of articling positions for law graduates, the 
decision to open new programs seems curious.” 
 
Interestingly, one reader’s response was to agree that there was a shortage of articling 
positions and no shortage of lawyers in most of BC (especially in the Lower Mainland area where 
the proposed school would be located) but that this might be due to the fact that most law school 
graduates didn’t move to small communities to practice law, but rather settled in to work in the 
urban areas in which they had studied. 
 
TWU replied that it would be hiring an articling coordinator to help place students – 
especially in small, under-served communities.  “The whole focus is really going to be on 
building skills alongside building legal analysis and understanding so that when students graduate 
from the law school they would be able to go into a small firm already with skills that they can 
use and apply,” said Janet Buckingham.  Reiterating her position she explained that many existing 
law schools are not teaching skills, thus when students graduate and start at their articling 
position, “they can’t do some of the basic things like drafting contracts and going to court and 
representing clients.”16   
 
 
Damnant Quodon Intelligent? 
 
By July 2013 the prospect of a delayed decision on the proposal appeared possible.  
While the criteria of the MAEIT appeared to have been met satisfactorily, the Federation seemed 
hesitant to make a decision, citing the fact that when the national requirements had first been 
instituted issues such as the ones being raised by the Council and the CBA had not been 
anticipated and were as such “outside of the mandate of the Approval Committee” (Exhibit 4).  
To this end the Federation had struck a Special Advisory Committee to investigate the proposal 
and concerns with it more fully. 
 
For Trinity Western’s part, the university continued to deal with sporadic negative press 
and the very real prospect that its plans might be delayed, or worse scuttled by a decision against 
it.  Had the university stepped beyond the boundaries of the law?  Were its detractors 
unreasonable in their criticisms?  Was there any room for a faith-based school of law in pluralist, 
post-modern society?  The days ahead would prove telling. 
 
  
                                                        
16 From an interview with Peter Stockland. 
  
EXHIBIT 1 




The vision for Trinity Western University’s future builds on its identity and essence as a 
Christian university of the liberal arts, sciences and professional studies, and on its historical 
mission to develop people of high competence and exemplary character who distinguish 
themselves as exceptional leaders in “the marketplaces of life.” 
 
Within a context of global challenges and opportunities, we envision Trinity Western 
University as a people, a place, a provision of God, and a priority: 
 
AS A PEOPLE, 
 
the University will increasingly be characterized by educational vitality, full of life; 
organized for excellence into communities of learning; concentrated on areas of competence and 
character; called to care about the well-being of others; and committed to knowledge and 
understanding that addresses the world’s deepest needs and most profound opportunities. 
 
AS A PLACE, 
 
the University will increasingly draw learners and scholars from around the world into its 
various campus communities. Trinity Western University communities will increasingly provide 
venues and resources that facilitate innovative research and scholarship, deep reflection on the 
meaning and value of truth, and highly-engaging dialogue on the implications of truth for the 
world. 
 
AS GOD’S PROVISION, 
 
the University will increasingly be a wonderful gift to the world, a steward of resources 
to be cherished and further developed, including: intelligent and committed people; attractive and 
functional lands and facilities; state-of-the-art technology; generous financial aid through 
scholarships and bursaries; and endowments that support the infrastructure necessary for 
educational excellence. 
 
AS A PRIORITY, 
 
the University will increasingly attract the finest students, faculty, and staff; engage 
visionary investors and partners who enable mission fulfillment; and raise the prominence of the 
University on a local, provincial, national, and international level in a way that recognizes twu’s 
graduates and scholarly activities as among the finest in the world. 
Trinity Western University, as a people of vitality, a place of beauty and capacity, a provision of 
God‘s remarkable resources, and an institution of priority, will become one of the world’s 





Ministry of Advanced Education 
Degree Program Criteria 
 
1. Degree Level Standard: The institution must demonstrate that the proposed program meets or exceeds 
the proposed degree level standard. 
 
2. Credential Recognition and Nomenclature: The institution must demonstrate that the program’s 
learning outcomes and standards are sufficiently clear and at a level that will facilitate recognition of 
the credential by other post-secondary institutions, professional and licensing bodies and employers. 
Where appropriate, the program, courses or curricular elements are designed to facilitate credential 
recognition by other post-secondary institutions and by employers, both within the province and other 
jurisdictions. 
 
The name of the degree should convey long-term meaning; the content of a degree program should be 
consistent with the name; and the reputation of the institution and of post-secondary education in 
British Columbia should be enhanced by the quality of the offering. Beyond that is the value to 
graduates of having a professional credential recognized by appropriate licensing and accrediting 
bodies as the basis for entry to practice. 
 
3. Curriculum/Program Content: The management structures and methods of the program are well 
defined and permit delivery of the quality of education necessary for students to attain the learning 
outcomes. The institution must demonstrate that the program in both subject matter and learning 
outcome standards, offers an education of sufficient breadth and rigour to be comparable to similar 
programs at the proposed degree level offered by recognized provincial, national and international 
post-secondary institutions. The curriculum must be current and reflect the state of knowledge in the 
field, or fields in the case of interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary programs. 
 
4. Learning Methodologies/Program Delivery: Learning methodologies are the methods of delivery 
that will be used to achieve the desired learning outcomes at the degree level standard and at an 
acceptable level of quality. The institution must demonstrate that it has the expertise and resources to 
support the proposed method of delivery and ensure its effectiveness. In some cases, it may be more 
appropriate for the institution to demonstrate that it has a realistic plan to put the necessary expertise 
and resources in place. 
 
5. Admission and Transfer/Residency: The institution should demonstrate that the program is designed 
to provide flexible admission and transfer arrangements. Where appropriate, the program, courses or 
curricular elements are designed to facilitate credit transfer by other post-secondary institutions both 
within the province and other jurisdictions. 
 
6. Faculty: The institution must demonstrate that it has the human resources necessary to develop and 
deliver a quality degree program. In some cases, it may not be feasible for an institution to hire faculty 
until it receives program approval. In these cases, the institution should provide the specific faculty 
selection criteria that will be used to ensure new faculty hires have the necessary qualifications for the 
degree level being offered and program being proposed. 
 
7. Program Resources: The institution must demonstrate that it has the physical, learning, and 
information resources (both start-up and development) needed to assure a program of acceptable 
quality. These includes facilities, equipment, library resources, laboratories, computing facilities, 
shops, specialized equipment, etc., and cooperative work placements where this is a component of the 
program. In some cases, an institution may not be able to ensure resources are in place until after it 
receives program approval. In these cases, the institution may bring forward a proposal based on a 
realistic plan for putting the appropriate resources in place as an alternative to demonstrating that all 
resources are in place. 
 
  
8. Program Consultation: The institution must demonstrate that it has consulted appropriate individuals 
and organizations in the development of the program proposal. 
 
9. Program Review Assessment: In order to ensure the ongoing currency of the program and the quality 
of its learning outcomes, the institution must show evidence that a program review and assessment 







Community Covenant Agreement 
 
Our Pledge to One Another 
Trinity Western University (TWU) is a Christian university of the liberal arts, sciences and professional 
studies with a vision for developing people of high competence and exemplary character who distinguish 
themselves as leaders in the marketplaces of life. 
 
1. The TWU Community Covenant 
The University’s mission, core values, curriculum and community life are formed by a firm commitment to 
the person and work of Jesus Christ as declared in the Bible. This identity and allegiance shapes an 
educational community in which members pursue truth and excellence with grace and diligence, treat 
people and ideas with charity and respect, think critically and constructively about complex issues, and 
willingly respond to the world’s most profound needs and greatest opportunities. 
 
The University is an interrelated academic community rooted in the evangelical Protestant tradition; it is 
made up of Christian administrators, faculty and staff who, along with students choosing to study at TWU, 
covenant together to form a community that strives to live according to biblical precepts, believing that this 
will optimize the University’s capacity to fulfill its mission and achieve its aspirations. 
 
The community covenant is a solemn pledge in which members place themselves under obligations on the 
part of the institution to its members, the members to the institution, and the members to one another. In 
making this pledge, members enter into a contractual agreement and a relational bond. By doing so, 
members accept reciprocal benefits and mutual responsibilities, and strive to achieve respectful and 
purposeful unity that aims for the advancement of all, recognizing the diversity of viewpoints, life journeys, 
stages of maturity, and roles within the TWU community. It is vital that each person who accepts the 
invitation to become a member of the TWU community carefully considers and sincerely embraces this 
community covenant. 
 
2. Christian Community 
The University’s acceptance of the Bible as the divinely inspired, authoritative guide for personal and 
community life is foundational to its affirmation that people flourish and most fully reach their potential 
when they delight in seeking God’s purposes, and when they renounce and resist the things that stand in the 
way of those purposes being fulfilled. This ongoing God-enabled pursuit of a holy life is an inner 
transformation that actualizes a life of purpose and eternal significance. Such a distinctly Christian way of 
living finds its fullest expression in Christian love, which was exemplified fully by Jesus Christ, and is 
characterized by humility, self- sacrifice, mercy and justice, and mutual submission for the good of others. 
 
This biblical foundation inspires TWU to be a distinctly Christian university in which members and others 
observe and experience truth, compassion, reconciliation, and hope. TWU envisions itself to be a 
community where members demonstrate concern for the well-being of others, where rigorous intellectual 
learning occurs in the context of whole person development, where members give priority to spiritual 
formation, and where service-oriented citizenship is modeled. 
 
3. Community Life at TWU 
The TWU community covenant involves a commitment on the part of all members to embody attitudes and 
to practice actions identified in the Bible as virtues, and to avoid those portrayed as destructive. Members 
of the TWU community, therefore, commit themselves to: 
 
§ cultivate Christian virtues, such as love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, 
gentleness, self-control, compassion, humility, forgiveness, peacemaking, mercy and justice  
§ live exemplary lives characterized by honesty, civility, truthfulness, generosity and integrity  
§ communicate in ways that build others up, according to their needs, for the benefit of all  
§ treat all persons with respect and dignity, and uphold their God-given worth from conception to 
death  
  
§ be responsible citizens both locally and globally who respect authorities, submit to the laws of this 
country, and contribute to the welfare of creation and society  
§ observe modesty, purity and appropriate intimacy in all relationships, reserve sexual expressions 
of intimacy for marriage, and within marriage take every reasonable step to resolve conflict and 
avoid divorce  
§ exercise careful judgment in all lifestyle choices, and take responsibility for personal choices and 
their impact on others  
§ encourage and support other members of the community in their pursuit of these values and ideals, 
while extending forgiveness, accountability, restoration, and healing to one another. In keeping 
with biblical and TWU ideals, community members voluntarily abstain from the following 
actions:  
§ communication that is destructive to TWU community life and inter–personal relationships, 
including gossip, slander, vulgar/obscene language, and prejudice  
§ harassment or any form of verbal or physical intimidation, including hazing  
§ lying, cheating, or other forms of dishonesty including plagiarism  
§ stealing, misusing or destroying property belonging to others  
§ sexual intimacy that violates the sacredness of marriage between a man and a woman  
§ the use of materials that are degrading, dehumanizing, exploitive, hateful, or gratuitously violent, 
including, but not limited to pornography  
§ drunkenness, under-age consumption of alcohol, the use or possession of illegal drugs, and the 
misuse or abuse of substances including prescribed drugs  
§ the use or possession of alcohol on campus, or at any TWU sponsored event, and the use of 
tobacco on campus or at any TWU sponsored event. 
 
4. Areas for Careful Discernment and Sensitivity 
A heightened level of discernment and sensitivity is appropriate within a Christian educational community 
such as TWU. In order to foster the kind of campus atmosphere most conducive to university ends, this 
covenant both identifies particular Christian standards and recognizes degrees of latitude for individual 
freedom. True freedom is not the freedom to do as one pleases, but rather empowerment to do what is best. 
TWU rejects legalisms that mistakenly identify certain cultural practices as biblical imperatives, or that 
emphasize outward conduct as the measure of genuine Christian maturity apart from inward thoughts and 
motivations. In all respects, the TWU community expects its members to exercise wise decision-making 
according to biblical principles, carefully accounting for each individual’s capabilities, vulnerabilities, and 
values, and considering the consequences of those choices to health and character, social relationships, and 
God’s purposes in the world. 
 
TWU is committed to assisting members who desire to face difficulties or overcome the consequences of 
poor personal choices by providing reasonable care, resources, and environments for safe and meaningful 
dialogue. TWU reserves the right to question, challenge or discipline any member in response to actions 
that impact personal or social welfare. 
 
Wise and Sustainable Self-Care 
The University is committed to promoting and supporting habits of healthy self- care in all its members, 
recognizing that each individual’s actions can have a cumulative impact on the entire community. TWU 
encourages its members to pursue and promote: sustainable patterns of sleep, eating, exercise, and 
preventative health; as well as sustainable rhythms of solitude and community, personal spiritual 
disciplines, chapel and local church participation, work, study and recreation, service and rest. 
 
Healthy Sexuality 
People face significant challenges in practicing biblical sexual health within a highly sexualized culture. A 
biblical view of sexuality holds that a person’s decisions regarding his or her body are physically, 
spiritually and emotionally inseparable. Such decisions affect a person’s ability to live out God’s intention 
for wholeness in relationship to God, to one’s (future) spouse, to others in the community, and to oneself. 
Further, according to the Bible, sexual intimacy is reserved for marriage between one man and one woman, 
and within that marriage bond it is God’s intention that it be enjoyed as a means for marital intimacy and 
procreation. Honouring and upholding these principles, members of the TWU community strive for purity 
  
of thought and relationship, respectful modesty, personal responsibility for actions taken, and avoidance of 
contexts where temptation to compromise would be particularly strong. 
 
Drugs, Alcohol and Tobacco 
The use of illegal drugs is by definition illicit. The abuse of legal drugs has been shown to be physically 
and socially destructive, especially in its potential for forming life-destroying addictions. For these reasons, 
TWU members voluntarily abstain from the use of illegal drugs and the abuse of legal drugs at all times. 
 
The decision whether or not to consume alcohol or use tobacco is more complex. The Bible allows for the 
enjoyment of alcohol in moderation, but it also strongly warns against drunkenness and addiction, which 
overpowers wise and reasonable behaviour and hinders personal development. The Bible commends 
leaders who abstained from, or were not addicted to, alcohol. Alcohol abuse has many long-lasting negative 
physical, social and academic consequences. The Bible has no direct instructions regarding the use of 
tobacco, though many biblical principles regarding stewardship of the body offer guidance. Tobacco is 
clearly hazardous to the health of both users and bystanders. Many people avoid alcohol and/or tobacco as a 
matter of conscience, personal health, or in response to an addiction. With these concerns in mind, TWU 
members will exercise careful discretion, sensitivity to others’ conscience/principles, moderation, 
compassion, and mutual responsibility. In addition, TWU strongly discourages participation in events 
where the primary purpose is the excessive consumption of alcohol. 
 
Entertainment 
When considering the myriad of entertainment options available, including print media, television, film, 
music, video games, the internet, theatre, concerts, social dancing, clubs, sports, recreation, and gambling, 
TWU expects its members to make personal choices according to biblical priorities, and with careful 
consideration for the immediate and long-term impact on one’s own well-being, the well-being of others, 
and the well- being of the University. Entertainment choices should be guided by the pursuit of activities 
that are edifying, beneficial and constructive, and by a preference for those things that are “true, noble, 
right, pure, lovely, admirable, excellent, and praiseworthy,” recognizing that truth and beauty appear in 
many differing forms, may be disguised, and may be seen in different ways by different people. 
 
5. Commitment and Accountability 
This covenant applies to all members of the TWU community, that is, administrators, faculty and staff 
employed by TWU and its affiliates, and students enrolled at TWU or any affiliate program. Unless 
specifically stated otherwise, expectations of this covenant apply to both on and off TWU’s campus and 
extension sites. Sincerely embracing every part of this covenant is a requirement for employment. 
Employees who sign this covenant also commit themselves to abide by TWU Employment Policies. TWU 
welcomes all students who qualify for admission, recognizing that not all affirm the theological views that 
are vital to the University’s Christian identity. Students sign this covenant with the commitment to abide by 
the expectations contained within the Community Covenant, and by campus policies published in the 
Academic Calendar and Student Handbook. 
 
Ensuring that the integrity of the TWU community is upheld may at times involve taking steps to hold one 
another accountable to the mutual commitments outlined in this covenant. As a covenant community, all 
members share this responsibility. The University also provides formal accountability procedures to 
address actions by community members that represent a disregard for this covenant. These procedures and 
processes are outlined in TWU’s Student Handbook and Employment Policies and will be enacted by 
designated representatives of the University as deemed necessary. 
 
By my agreement below I affirm that: 
I have accepted the invitation to be a member of the TWU community with all the mutual benefits and 
responsibilities that are involved; I understand that by becoming a member of the TWU community I have 
also become an ambassador of this community and the ideals it represents; I have carefully read and 
considered TWU’s Community Covenant and will join in fulfilling its responsibilities while I am a member 





Federation of Canadian Law Societies 
Approval Committee Mandate 
 
The Approval Committee have the following mandate: 
 
§ To determine law school program compliance with the national requirement for the purpose of 
entry of Canadian common law school graduates to Canadian law society admission programs. 
This will apply to the programs of established Canadian law schools and those of new Canadian 
law schools. 
 
§ To make any changes, revisions or additions to the annual law school report as it determines 
necessary, provided the changes, revisions or additions conform to the approved national 
requirement and reflect the purposes described in this report. 
 
§ To make any changes, revisions or additions to the draft reporting timeline set out in Appendix 4 
and any other reporting timelines as it determines necessary to ensure that the compliance process 
operates in an effective manner. 
 
§ To post its final annual reports on the Federation public website and to post information reports on 
the website, covering, at a minimum, the list of approved law school programs and issues of 
interest respecting the continuum of legal education. 
 
§ To participate in efforts and initiatives to enhance the institutional relationship between law 
societies and law schools at a national level. This could, for example, include efforts such as 
promoting a voluntary national collaboration on ethics and professionalism learning that would 
further enhance teaching, learning and practice in this area. 
 
§ To ensure appropriate training for its members. 
 
§ To undertake such other activities and make any necessary changes, additions or improvements to 
its processes as it determines necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the national 
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DAMNANT QUODNON INTELLIGENT? 
TRINITY WESTERN UNIVERSITY’S SCHOOL OF LAW 





Trinity Western University has submitted a proposal to establish a School of Law. This 
proposal has met with opposition primarily because of the nuances of the university’s Christian 
mandate and secondarily because of a perception that an insufficient availability of articling 
spaces for existing law programs.  Real concern has been expressed from certain stakeholder 
groups that a graduate from a Christian university will not be able to practice law in an objective 
and non-discriminatory manner. 
 
 
Objectives of the Case 
 
The case seeks to invite discussion regarding organizational / societal ethical behavior, 
the management of dichotomous worldviews, the balancing of competing rights, and the salience 





Courses: the case is recommended for use in a Business Ethics course, or in that portion of 
Strategic Management / Business Policy course that deals with organizational and/or societal 
ethics. 
 
Level: the case is recommended for use at the senior undergraduate level. 
 
Prerequisites / Co-requisites: Business Ethics 
 
Key Issues: 
§ Organizational / Societal Ethics 
§ Worldview  










§ Ethical Frameworks (utilitarianism, deontology, rights, etc.) 






1. Consider Trinity Western University’s application from the perspective of three 
different ethical frameworks.  What would each suggest is the “right” decision for 
the Federation to make? 
 
2. A central issue in the case would appear to be one of competing rights.  Trinity 
Western University is seeking to establish a school of law that is consistent with its 
institutional beliefs.  Primary objections center on the discriminatory practices 
enshrined in the university’s policies and call for the termination of the planned 
expansion.  Can organizational values (such as Trinity Western’s) be maintained in 
a pluralist society, or must they be submerged?  Discuss your opinion of the conflict, 






1. Consider Trinity Western University’s application from the perspective of three 
different ethical frameworks.  What would each suggest is the “right” decision for 
the Federation to make? 
 
While the authors do not intend for the case to have a decision focus per se, positioning 
the Federation as a tangible actor upon which students can focus may yield some interesting 
discussion.  It is expected that there will be strong opinions on the matter; however requiring 
students to address the situation from the perspective of discrete ethical frameworks will ideally 
force them to consider the facts of the case outside of an emotional response. 
 
The authors recognize that there are many different ethical perspectives from which the 
Federation’s decision might be approached.  For the purposes of the Teaching Note they have 
drawn upon the schema suggested by Beauchamp, Bowie, and Arnold (2009) and present three 
points of view, seeking to faithfully apply each framework by first outlining the perspective and 




Students might find they are most familiar with this framework given its prevalence in 
many types of business analysis (e.g. cost-benefit, risk assessment, etc.).  Broadly defined, 
utilitarianism holds that the consequences of actions ultimately determine their worth from a 
moral perspective.  From this viewpoint the Federation should seek to maximize the greatest 
possible positive value for all persons affected by the decision, and should seek to minimize 
negative value (or “disvalue”) for all persons affected (which put another way suggests that the 
greatest good should be done for the greatest number of persons). 
 
 It is at this point that students may experience difficulty in generating a utilitarian 
decision given that they must define what outcome is “good” and determine why this outcome is 
instrumental for the greatest number of stakeholders.  Many will define the population as 
consisting of the legal community (though some may be tempted to argue at the societal level – 
which may have worth but may be somewhat nebulous given that case data doesn’t really address 
this stratum).  One approach might be to suggest that the CBA is a proxy for many of Canada’s 
lawyers and thus represents the “majority.”  As such the CBA has made it clear that they oppose 
the university’s proposal and see approval as being damaging to practice in the legal community.  
From this perspective utility would seem to suggest that the Federation should not approve the 
  
proposal.  Questions, however, must be considered.  Does the CBA truly represent the legal 
community in Canada?  No – membership is voluntary and while the CBA does play an advocacy 
role, the case does not reveal that it is a true proxy for the entire community.  Does the opposition 
of the Council have a role to play from a utilitarian perspective?  Doubtful – the Council consists 
of law school deans, who – while playing a key role in the oversight of legal education in Canada 
– cannot be construed to represent the majority opinion of the legal community. 
 
 One debate that is doubtless to arise is whether the “greater good” can be served by a 
school that includes discriminatory practices in its human resource and student relations policies.  
A simplistic declaration that “discrimination is wrong” fails to recognize the nuances of this 
scenario – students should recognize that this is a minority opinion being expressed contra a 
dominant, widely accepted standard of behavior.  In this case utilitarianism might suggest a 
grounds to not approve the proposal, although some interesting conversation might take place 
around whether the exclusion of minority opinions in the legal community ultimately serves it 
well (i.e. a “monopolization” of legal education as suggested in the case by Lyster). 
 
(b) Kantian Ethics (Deontology) 
 
Named for the works of ethicist Immanuel Kant, this framework centers on the ideas that 
(a) human beings possess inherent moral value and as such should be treated as ends and not 
means, and that (b) motives are of more importance than the actions they underlie (ergo actors 
should make the right decisions for the right reasons).  The Kantian framework is inherently 
deontological in that it defines categorical imperatives (rules) that guide decision making. 
 
Deontology is certainly at play in the case – both the MAEIT and the Federation have a 
set of criteria (rules) against which they are considering TWU’s application.  In the MAEIT’s 
case it would appear that the QAB is satisfied that the university’s application meets the 
requirements of the categorical imperatives in effect.  In the Federation’s case it at least appears 
that its requirements are being met – ergo, one might conclude that a Kantian perspective would 
effectively dictate that because the proposal meets the criteria for the establishment of a law 
school it should thus be approved.  Interestingly, the Foundation – because of the opposition that 
has been expressed regarding the proposal – appears uneasy with the criteria, suggesting that 
when they had been established a scenario such as this had not been envisioned. 
 
Some interesting discussion might be had around the Kantian prescription that actions 
based upon political expediency are prudential, but not moral.  For example, were the Foundation 
to move beyond criteria and not approve the university’s application because of the objections of 
various stakeholders, such action might be construed as being politically motivated and thus – 
from a Kantian perspective – an immoral (and therefore wrong) decision. 
 
(c) Rights Theories 
 
Rights form the justifying basis of obligations, of which there are two types: negative 
obligations, which require non-interference with the liberty of others, and positive obligations, 
which require action in the provision of benefits or services to others.  Broadly, there are two 
types of rights: legal rights, which are derived from membership in a state or group, and human 
rights, which are independent of membership in a state or group and derived from principles of 
natural justice. 
 
Much can be made of the conflicting rights in the case.  First, notwithstanding the 
objection of the CBA Committee regarding the Trinity Western University Act (1969) (which 
  
appears to be a somewhat tenuous argument), a cursory reading of the legislative provisions in the 
case suggests that TWU has a legal right to its position – this might suggest a negative obligation 
to refrain from interference with the university’s proposal in respect of the institution’s liberty to 
act within its legal rights.  Second, it is also clear that human rights provisos guarantee citizens 
freedom from discrimination – this might suggest a positive obligation to act to ensure the 
maintenance of this benefit and thus not approve the university’s proposal.  Thus, students are 
presented with a situation of competing rights, and doubtless will struggle not to elevate one right 
above another (this could lead to an interesting discussion regarding the criteria employed in the 
assessment of which right is considered more or less important, a topic broached in Question 2). 
 
 
2. A central issue in the case would appear to be one of competing rights.  Trinity 
Western University is seeking to establish a school of law that is consistent with its 
institutional beliefs.  Primary objections center on the discriminatory practices 
enshrined in the university’s policies and call for the termination of the planned 
expansion.  Can organizational values (such as Trinity Western’s) be maintained in 
a pluralist society, or must they be submerged?  Discuss your opinion of the conflict, 
and whether any means exists whereby these two positions might be equitably 
reconciled. 
 
In a pluralist society like Canada situations of competing rights must be expected.  As 
outlined in Question 1 (c) two rights are in direct conflict – the university’s legal right to 
discriminate (broadly defined as freedom of religion), and the rights of individuals in society to 
be free from discriminatory practice in the context of employment, etc. (broadly defined as 
freedom from discrimination).  It is not unusual in such situations for each side to claim that its 
rights are inviolable and unable to be subordinated, and students themselves will likely struggle 
not to subordinate one right to another. 
 
Can these rights be balanced in a manner that is equitable to all involved?  Given the 
inflammatory nature of the conflict, it is unlikely that balance can be achieved in a way that is 
satisfactory to both sides, but fairness may be possible.  In previous work by one of the authors in 
this area, it has been suggested that re-framing the problem might be useful, encouraging the 
student to step away from the facts of the case to consider a parallel situation in another 
discipline.  For example, students could be encouraged to consider the challenges regularly faced 
in the field of medicine whereby practitioners are often challenged by a conflict of values on 
religious or moral grounds, pitting “an individual’s right to religious freedom against the 
government’s strong interest in protecting citizens from discrimination… lead[ing] to frustration 
and tension between patients and providers.” (Roshelli, 2009) (NB: this perspective requires 
students to equate organizational values to individual values). 
 
Canada’s largest association of physicians – the Canadian Medical Association (CMA) – 
stipulates that a doctor need not provide a full range of services (for which s/he is qualified) to the 
public should the provision of certain services run contrary to individual conscience or religious 
belief. 
 
Health care providers should not be expected or required 
to participate in procedures that are contrary to their professional 
judgment or personal moral values or that are contrary to the 
values or mission of their facility or agency. Health care 
providers should declare in advance their inability to participate 
in procedures that are contrary to their professional or moral 
  
values. Health care providers should not be subject to 
discrimination or reprisal for acting on their beliefs. The exercise 
of this provision should never put the person receiving care at 
risk of harm or abandonment… if a health care provider cannot 
support the decision that prevails as a matter of professional 
judgment or personal morality, allow him or her to withdraw 
without reprisal from participation in carrying out the decision, 
after ensuring that the person receiving care is not at risk of harm 
or abandonment. (CMA, 1998) 
 
 
Benson (2007) suggests that clashes of rights/beliefs (such as those for which the CMA 
has made allowance) are “unavoidable and are incidents of living in free and open societies… 
expression, including religious expression, often creates heat as well as light and even successful 
constitutional claimants must come to recognize that they cannot get everything they seek in the 
public sphere.”  Benson calls for a balance to be struck between conflicting parties, in this 
instance the doctor and the patient – the doctor must explain the rationale for declining to render 
service and the patient must seek medical provisions elsewhere provided he/she is not subjected 
to the “risk of harm or abandonment.”  Moving beyond the medical frame Benson states that, 
 
The argument that one citizen treats another as a second-
class citizen when refusing to perform a service based upon the 
exercise of a constitutionally protected right (conscience or 
religion) focuses the inquiry into the conflict of beliefs in the 
wrong place.  The way to solve a collision of rights is through 
balancing or reconciling, not submitting the rights of one citizen 
to another. (Benson, 2007) 
 
 
Could the same approach be taken within the context of the conflict manifest in the case?  
Approval of the university’s proposal could be construed as recognition of its right to religious 
freedom (and legitimate discriminatory practice) – thus its legal rights are upheld.  Students and 
faculty facing discrimination may find service and / or employment at other schools (of which 
there are many) – thus the “risk of harm or abandonment” would not appear to be significant and 
human rights will be served (albeit by another provider).  Will discrimination occur?  Yes, but 
legitimately so under the maintenance of the balancing – both parties will be spared material 
harms (although there may be psychological harms that, while difficult to assess in the context of 
the case, may have a material bearing upon the discussion).  In theory both rights can be 
balanced, which Benson would suggest represents the most equitable approach to such dilemmas: 
 
When a citizen, in an appropriate manner, sets out 
grounds for a conscientious or religious objection, the duty shifts 
to the State or employer – that is, to other citizens – to create the 
appropriate conditions for a reasonable accommodation.  Some 
commentators appear to approach this the other way around and 
focus the inquiry on responses to the claim of religious liberty 
rather than where it should be focused – the request for 
conscientious and religious exemption.  To focus on the 
“feelings” of the person at the other end of the conscientious or 
religious refusal deflects us from the proper task at hand and 
would, in almost every case, be a rationale to treat the exercise of 
  
a conscientious or religious refusal as irrelevant.  A better 
example of failure to place any weight at all on the scales of the 
balance can scarcely be imagined.  Exemptions should always be 
used where the conflict has no other manner of being resolved. 
 
To impose… a supposed “public duty” as a “trump” on 
individual liberty eviscerates the freedom of conscience and 
religion and gives no balancing at all when a conflict exists… 
The quid pro quo that citizens, whether minority or majority, 
give to other citizens for civic membership is an important aspect 
of the right of dissent and is essential for both freedom of 
expression and the public dimension of conscience and religious 
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Small enterprises often struggle with determining the 
profitability of its product offerings.  In some circumstances this 
may be complicated by the feelings / intuits of the founder of the 
business.  Hop-portunity Lost? is a case study that examines 
challenges faced by Moncton, NB based Spetz Brewery and 
sister operation Winexpert, and seeks to provide opportunity to 
evaluate a business from a managerial accounting perspective to 
determine whether the business is profitable (and should 





An Ale of a Problem 
 
Nancy Wheeler let out an exasperated sigh.  “Another problem with the fridge!”  Ever 
since it had been installed there had been one problem after another. 
 
Nancy took a moment and looked reflectively around the shop.  “The on premise beer 
brewing2 business has never been very profitable,” she thought.  From its opening in September 
2009 Spetz Brewery had not attracted as many customers as expected, and expensive fridge 
repairs had been eating up any profit that might have been made.  Nancy felt she was in a 
conundrum - she believed that the brewing operation should be shut down, but knew that it meant 
a lot to her father, George Kraemer, who had founded the business.  Although he had officially 
retired in December 2011 and left Nancy in charge, it seemed that he still had the final word in all 
major decisions. 
                                                        
1  This case is based on historical events and not intended to illustrate either effective or ineffective 
decision-making. 





Spetz Brewery had been established as one division of the numbered corporation 634384 
NB Inc. for the purpose of offering on premise beer brewing to the Moncton, NB marketplace.  
Sister division Winexpert made up the remainder of the enterprise, and focused on the provision 
of on premise wine making.  While the wine making operation had been consistently profitable, 
as far as Nancy was concerned the beer-side of the business just seemed to be a hassle. 
 
As Nancy once again dialed the number for the refrigerator repair man, she decided to 
take another look at Spetz’s financial situation.  “It’s time for a decision to be made,” she thought. 
 
 
The Accidental Vintner 
 
 George Kraemer was a long time entrepreneur with a background in engineering.  After 
earning his degree he had specialized in sheet metal fabrication – specifically ductwork for 
residential and commercial applications – and in the 1960’s moved to England to bring this 
technology to the construction industry there.  George found a wide open market – central heating 
was somewhat of a novel concept to the English as many homes still had coal fireplaces in each 
room.  George’s company provided construction firms with sheet metal ductwork fabrication 
until 1981, when he sold the business and returned to Canada to take over his father’s sheet metal 
fabrication enterprise.  As the market changed, George changed with it, moving from ductwork 
into fire place screens, and then old-fashioned cook stoves.   
 
 George moved to Moncton in 1999 when he invested in an M&M Meat Shop franchise.3  
Nancy and her husband Brad managed the shop while George enjoyed his “retirement.”  With a 
need to stay busy he designed and built blocks for stacking golf balls – which he sold to golf 
courses around North America – all while writing a book entitled “Faith and Foundation” which 
told the story of his ancestors and their escape from the Napoleonic wars. 
 
 In 2004, George opened a new franchise, Wine Not, which sold wine kits and made wine 
on premise.  He had been interested in home winemaking for many years, and while living in 
England had made his own wine at home. 
 
 About a year after opening, the Wine Not franchise was bought out by Winexpert, the 
world’s largest manufacturer of consumer wine making products.  This presented George with the 
option of becoming completely independent, keeping the Wine Not name and working with 
Winexpert, or becoming an independent dealer for Winexpert.  George decided on the latter, and 
thus the name of his store changed to Winexpert.  One of the hallmarks of the business was the 
fact that it was the first in the province to make wine on premise.  While there were competitors 
in the area, they only sold kits for customers to take home and it would be 2006 before other on 
premise businesses popped up. 
 
 
The Fruit of the Vine 
                                                        
3 The M&M Meat Shop was sold in December 2011 at which time George retired and Nancy began 





 Many customers purchase wine kits because of the enjoyment they derive from making 
their own wine.  In the Canadian marketplace there were four types of wine kit available – these 
were categorized by the type and purity of the juice involved and ranged from freshly crushed 
grapes to a combination of juice and concentrate.  The price of a kit varied depending on the 
purity of the juice, with a kit that is pure juice being the most expensive.  Included in each kit 
were the additives required to turn juice into wine. 
 
 The rationale behind the growth of on premise businesses was simple: wine making 
required a fair bit of equipment (see Exhibit 1) which many consumers were hesitant to purchase 
due to cost or space limitations in their homes.  Further, many customers appreciated the 
economy derived from homemade wine: on premise kits yielding 30 bottles of wine ranged in 





 Winexpert was not a franchise, but rather a network of independent dealers.  This 
arrangement required that a free online certification program be completed by each dealer, and 
that a percentage of the business’s inventory consist of Winexpert products (dealers could carry 
other products as desired).  There were no annual licensing fees, and a Winexpert regional 
representative kept in touch with all of the dealers and served as the first point of contact with the 
company. 
 
 George met regularly with his accountant, who was in charge generating financial 
statements from the information George provided.  It was at one of these meetings in 2006 that 
the accountant recommended that George incorporate, and thus the numbered company 634384 
NB Inc. (operating as Winexpert) was born.  The business prospered, and by 2008 operations had 
grown to the point that the space in a strip mall in Moncton’s retail district was too small.  Given 
that George and his wife Penny lived in a house directly across the street, they decided to add an 





 The decision to brew beer was not accidental - George had been thinking for some time 
that there was a market for good commercial grade, less expensive beer.  He decided on the name 
Spetz Brewery because his ancestor, Johan Thibeault Spetz, had operated a mini brewing 
business in Ontario until it was shut down under prohibition in the 1930s. 
 
 As George researched the idea of opening an on premise beer brewing business he 
decided that he wanted to can the beer instead of bottling it, which would provide a product 
without sediment on the bottom.  Home-brewed beer was typically carbonated with sugar, which 
caused sediment to form on the bottom of bottles.  George’s visits to small microbreweries 
revealed that most were employing a cold filtering process (keeping it at about -1 degree Celsius 
                                                        




for canning) and carbonating with carbon dioxide (CO2) instead of sugar and thus generating no 
sediment.  Inspired by his research George searched online and found a website that sold manual 
canning machines that used CO2 – shortly thereafter he was installing all of the equipment needed 
to brew and can beer in the space previously occupied by Winexpert, which he renovated to suit 
Spetz’s needs.5  He purchased a commercial fridge and hired one new employee to run the beer 
business with an existing Winexpert employee while George and Penny operated Winexpert at 
the new location. 
 
 September 2009 witnessed the grand opening of Spetz Brewery.  In the hopes of 
attracting customers George advertised the business in the local newspaper and distributed flyers 
throughout the city.  He expected that many of Winexpert’s customers – who were wine drinkers 
– would also want to make beer, but as the months passed it seemed that there were not as many 





 Six months later found George disappointed in Spetz’s performance.  The business had 
struggled to turn a profit, and he found himself considering shutting the operation down 
altogether.  Thus it seemed fortuitous when the owner of a Little Caesars Pizza franchise 
approached him with an offer to buy out his lease and move in.  Before long George had lugged 
all of Spetz’s gear across the street and into a garage that was attached to the back of Winexpert’s 
space.  While production would take place in the garage, customers would be served in the 
Winexpert retail space. 
 
 With the move complete, George redeployed his two employees.  One was moved over to 
Winexpert while the other was tasked with overseeing Spetz, though because beer brewing wasn’t 
generating enough activity to support full-time engagement this employee also worked the wine 
side.  George also looked for other ways to cut costs.  Although he had been in favour of canning, 
he knew that cans drove up his costs as they had to be shipped from Alberta.  Cans also took up a 
lot of storage space, which George did not have in the garage.  After giving it some thought he 
made the decision to switch to bottles, which were both cheaper and reusable.  He sold his 
canning equipment and purchased a tap for filling bottles.  
 
 
The Market for Suds 
 
 George’s experiences in England had shown him that Europeans drink beer all year long, 
so when he began on premise beer brewing in Canada he expected demand to be much the same.  
To his surprise he found the business to be very seasonal – things picked up in February and 
March as customers would begin making their beer in anticipation of the warmer weather.  The 
busy period ended in June to be followed by a spike in late fall in anticipation of the Christmas 
season. 
 
 Because there were no other businesses using CO2 in their brewing processes and 
                                                        




providing a bottling service George believed Spetz stood out from its competition.  There were 
five other businesses in Moncton that sold beer kits, but only two of these made beer on premise.  
One bottled beer for its customers, but used sugar to achieve carbonization (with its resultant 
sedimentation).  The other used CO2 but didn’t bottle the beer for the customer opting instead to 
fill kegs (from which the customer would later dispense their beer). 
  
 Yet in spite of George’s perceived competitive advantage, he found that many customers 
did not repeat their business with Spetz, and he wondered if it might not have something to do 
with the nature of his beer.  George and his staff had learned that because Spetz’s beer was not 
pasteurized6 it had to be kept cool (below 14°C).  He presumed that many customers did not have 
extra fridge space at home and thus would store their bottles at room temperature – this would 
cause the yeast to begin to re-ferment which in turn caused the beer to develop a “skunky,” stale 
taste.  Kit-beer had a shelf life of only three to four months, so if a customer wasn’t a frequent 
beer drinker the product would go bad before they had time to consume it, and if a customer had 
to write-off most of their purchased product, they might be put off the idea of brewing on premise 
beer again. 
 
   
The On Premise Brewing Process 
 
 The beer brewing process began when a customer walked into the store.  Although 
Winexpert emphasized on premise wine (and beer) making, the staff always asked first-time 
customers whether they wished to purchase the kit to make at home or on premise, as kits were 
priced accordingly (Table 1).  If the customer decided to make the beer at home, payment would 
be made for the kit and any supplies needed.  These “home brewers” represented about 15% of 
sales.  Alternatively, if the customer desired to make beer or wine on premise then the price 




Winexpert Price List 














Barons Blue Label $27.95  $74.95  Island Mist $55.00  $110.95  
Barons Green Label $32.95  $79.95  Vintner's Reserve $100.00  $155.95  
Festa Premium $39.95  $94.95  World Vineyard $120.00  $175.95  
Festa Specialty $44.95  $99.95  International Series $130.00  $185.95  
      Eclipse $175.00  $230.95  
Table 1. Price List 
                                                        







 The business fell under the jurisdiction of the New Brunswick Department of Public 
Safety, which required certain regulations7 to be followed for on premise brewing (Exhibit 2).  
For example, upon purchase of a kit, the customer had to be present when the kit was prepared.  
The customer had to personally add the yeast to begin the fermentation process (the yeast creates 
the alcohol and staff were permitted to initiate the process).  From there staff would handle the 
rest of the process until it was time to bottle at which point regulations required the customer to 
return, bottle the beer, and take it home immediately. 
 
 
The Cost of Making Beer 
 
 Nancy believed that on premise beer making was costing more than it was worth.  She 
had considered the company’s 2012 performance across both beer and wine activities and was not 
content with what she saw: 256 beer kits had been sold for on premise brewing compared to 
2,168 wine kits.  Further, the fridge since its installation had needed significant repairs – about 
every four months a repairman would have to be called and the resultant expense had run from 
$400 to $1,400. Denis, who worked on the beer side of operations, believed that the fridge was 
not installed properly and that it could possibly be fixed with the next maintenance call.  Nancy 
wasn’t so sure – the level of sales on the beer side of the operation just didn’t seem high enough 
to warrant this continued expense.  And then there was the cost of electricity associated with 
running the beast.  It seemed to her that the power bill rose and fell with the sale of beer kits, and 
it was not unusual to have only one keg cooling at a time.8  Maybe the time had come to eliminate 
on premise beer brewing and the refrigeration unit in one fell swoop, and simply continue to offer 
the home brew kit for sale. 
 
 Costs associated with brewing the beer were fairly straight forward (Table 2), with wine 




Spetz Brewery Costs 
 
 Barons Blue Label Barons Green 
Label 
Festa Premium Festa Specialty 
Cost of Kit $15.00 $16.00 $18.00 $22.00 
Labour 18.00 18.00 18.00 18.00 
CO2 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 
Labels 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 
Filters 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 
Table 2. Costs per Kit 
                                                        
7 Winexpert’s license allowed it to hold alcohol on premise in bulk only and not in bottles, and forbade the 
sale of alcohol, permitting only the sale of the ingredients necessary to enable the making of alcohol. 
8 It was possible to store up to 16 kegs at one time in the fridge, though there was typically between one 






 Denis was the only employee that worked on the beer making side of the operation.  He 
was paid $12 an hour and from the time of purchase to bottling each kit took 1.5 hours to 
complete.  Other expenses included utilities, 50% of which was allocated to the beer making 
operation (located separately from the winemaking operation in the climate-controlled garage 
which included the fridge), and 50% to the winemaking operation (this included the fermentation 
room9 and the retail store) (Table 3).  Nancy considered utilities to be a major contributor to the 
cost of each beer and wine kit.  The beer making operation occupied approximately 1,000 square 
feet of space while the winemaking operation and retail space occupied approximately 3,000 
square feet.  When the fridges were operating they generated heat, which required air 
conditioning to maintain the temperature of the room.  The beer making room was kept at a 
temperature of 22° Celsius, and when beer was first made it was kept at this temperature for 21 
days after which it was moved into the fridge at -1° Celsius for four days to cool.  The beer was 
then carbonated with carbon dioxide, filtered, and transferred to a keg.  The keg remained in the 
fridge for another two days in preparation for bottling, and if it got too warm, the beer would 
foam when poured into the bottles.  Wine, on the other hand, had to be maintained at temperature 





October 524.23 October 458.07 
November 525.44 November 447.92 
December 658.70 December 577.35 
January 667.96 January 766.33 
February 544.13 February 623.32 
March 635.30 March 623.01 
April 620.88 April 571.52 
May 591.18 May 469.09 
June 617.74 June 496.12 
July 559.09 July 450.73 
August 474.88 August 427.56 
September 482.60 September 366.73 
Table 3. Utilities Expense 
 
 
 The Department of Public Safety required that the number of liters of alcohol made in on 
                                                        




premise operations be recorded and reported (Table 4).10  Each kit made 23 liters of beer or wine, 




Quantity of Wine and Beer Sold 
 
 Wine (Liters) Beer (Liters) 
2011   
April 5,405 322 
May 4,600 667 
June 3,910 437 
July 2,944 345 
August 5,290 483 
September 3,910 460 
October 5,520 345 
November 2,990 621 
December 2,323 299 
Total 36,892 3,979 
   
2012   
January 4,830 368 
February 4,140 483 
March 5,290 759 
April 4,531 736 
May 5,198 644 
June 4,255 759 
July 3,197 460 
August 4,393 368 
September 3,542 391 
October 4,439 230 
November 3,772 483 
December 2,277 207 
Total 49,864 5,888 





 Nancy had given some thought to the impact closing Spetz might have on expenses.  She 
knew it was the major contributor to maintenance charges (Exhibit 3).  If Spetz were to be shut 
down, the garage could be opened up and used as storage for winemaking equipment, bottling 
supplies and other product inventory.  Air conditioning and heating would still have to be used to 
                                                        





control the temperature, but the problematic refrigerator would be eliminated.  Other expenses 
would not be impacted by the closure – Nancy concluded that the employee who worked on the 
beer side of the business would simply shift over to the wine side, given that he worked an 





 Nancy was tired of fixing the chronically broken fridge and watching Spetz’s profits go 
down the drain.  She also believed that the electricity expense to run the fridge was too high, 
which just seemed to add insult to injury.  As she hung up the phone after having summoned the 
repairman, she let out a long sigh.  “It’s time to take the bull by the horns,” she thought.  She dug 
out her accounting records to attempt to make some calculations around the profitability of the 
beer business.  Her intuition told her that it was time for Spetz to die, and to simply carry on with 






Wine Making Equipment 
 
 
Basic Equipment required for home winemaking 
  
Equipment Description 
Gallon jug Glass container used exclusively to prepare the sanitizing solution to clean 
your equipment. 
Primary fermenter Food-grade plastic pail in which to start the batch which should include a 
cover. 
Large measuring cup 
(2 quarts or bigger) 
Large enough to measure and pour the water for the recipe. 
Long-handled plastic 
(food-grade) spoon 
Large enough to mix a 5-gallon batch. 
(Photo)Hydrometer This two-piece set (including the hydrometer and the plastic chamber) 
allows you to measure the specific gravity (SG) of the wine must.  This 
gives an indication of how much alcohol is in the wine. 
Siphon hose (5 feet) This PVC-grade plastic hose allows you to transfer wine from the primary 
fermenter to a carboy or from one carboy to the next. 
Two glass carboys (19 
litre or 5-gallon) 
Containers that come to a small opening at the top. 
Airlock and rubber 
bung 
This water-filled plastic device set into the rubber stopper allows carbon 
dioxide gas to escape from the carboy while preventing air from getting in. 
Large food-grade 
plastic funnel 
A funnel will make it easy to transfer cleaning agents or any additives you 
may want to pre-mix with extracted wine. 








New Brunswick Department of Public Safety Regulation 
 
NEW BRUNSWICK REGULATION 84-265 
under the 




62.2(1) A UVin/UBrew licensee shall ensure that a customer visits the UVin/UBrew establishment at least 
2 times and carries out the following tasks: 
 
(a) during the first visit, the customer shall
(i) if applicable, pay for the ingredients for the manufacture of wine or beer; 
 (ii) pay for the services for the manufacture of wine or beer at the UVin/UBrew establishment; and 
 (iii) mix all the ingredients necessary to start the fermentation process to manufacture the  wine or 
beer; and 
(b) during the second visit, the customer shall 
(i) if the bottles to be used for bottling the wine or beer bear the labels of wineries or breweries, 
remove the labels from the bottles; 
(ii) bottle the wine or beer and cork or cap the bottles; 
 (iii) package the bottles of wine or beer; and 
 (iv) remove the wine or beer from the UVin/UBrew establishment. 
 
62.2(2) A customer may be accompanied by a person who assists the customer in performing the tasks 
mentioned in subsection (1) as long as that person is not the UVin/UBrew licensee. 
 
62.2(3) If the customer is physically incapable of performing the tasks mentioned in subsection (1), the 
UVin/UBrew licensee may perform the tasks on the customer’s behalf in the customer’s presence. 
 
62.3 The customer shall carry or convey his or her wine or beer in unopened bottles to his or her residence 
and any person who is not prohibited from consuming liquor may consume the wine or beer at the 
customer’s residence. 
 
62.4(1) A UVin/UBrew licensee shall provide the customer with an invoice setting out the following 
information: 
 (a) the customer’s name, address and telephone number; 
(b) whether the customer is manufacturing wine or beer and the quantity of the wine or beer; 
c) if applicable, the ingredients provided to the customer and the price charged for the ingredients; 
 (d) the services provided to the customer and the price charged for the services; 
 (e) the date on which the customer begins manufacturing wine or beer; 
 (f) the amount of payment received from the customer; 
 (g) the name, address and telephone number of the UVin/UBrew establishment; and 







634384 NB Inc. 
For Year Ended 2011 and 2012 
634384 NB Inc. 
Income Statement 












Cost of Goods Sold 
 
  
  Purchases 
 
$164,729  $167,083  
  Freight 
 
1,011  1,125  




  Wages & Levies $51,075  $194,680  
Total Payroll Expense $51,075  $194,680  
General and Administrative 
 
  
  Accounting & Legal $5,200  $410  
  Advertising & Promotions 454  9,454  
  Courier & Postage 80  149  
  Credit Card Charges 7,418  7,354  
  Insurance 
 
(34) 2,444  
  Interest Charges - 43  
  Bank charges 480  435  
  Office Supplies 672  770  
  Cleaning Expense 3,578  1,802  
  Computer Support 485  240  
  Donations 
 
650  108  
  Miscellaneous 4,596  4,527  
  Professional Fees 4,300  5,450  
  Uniforms 
 
14  - 
  Rent 
 
42,000  42,000  
  Repair & Maintenance 3,413  5,463  
  Telephone 
 
1,708  2,259  
  Travel & Entertainment (26) 758  
  Utilities 
 
6,902  6,278  
Total General and Administrative $81,891  $89,944  
Total Expenses 
 
$298,706  $452,832  
Net Income 
 
$98,961  ($50,057) 







Matthews, E. (Spring 2000). Your First Wine from a Kit. WineMaker Magazine. 
Retrieved from: http://www.winemakermag.com/new/kit.  
 
New Brunswick Department of Public Safety. (October 29, 1984). New Brunswick 













SPETZ BREWERY CONSIDERS A PALE FUTURE 





 Nancy Wheeler, manager of Winexpert, has to make a decision on whether or not to shut 
down the on premise beer brewing side of the business.  While Winexpert was established as on 
premise wine brewing business, in 2009 company owner George Kraemer began offering on 
premise beer brewing with the belief that there was a market for this product.  When George 
retired in 2011 his daughter, Nancy, took over the day-to-day management of the business and as 
she examines Nancy examines the books she is seeking to determine the veracity of her belief that 
the brewing business is unprofitable. 
 
 
Objective of the Case 
 
 The case seeks to provide students with the opportunity to evaluate a business from a 
managerial accounting perspective to determine whether the business is profitable (and should 





Courses: this case is recommended for use in Managerial / Cost Accounting classes. 
 
Level: this case is recommended for students in an undergraduate business program. 
 






§ Cost behavior 





 Primary research for this case included interviews with the case principal.  Secondary 








§ Least-Squares Regression Method 
§ Cost-Volume-Profit Analysis: Multiple Products  





1. Is the manager’s assumption of a correlation between the number of beer kits sold and 
the rise and fall of the utilities bill correct? Identify and assess any other assumptions 
made by the manager that could impact this calculation.  
 
2. Has Winexpert achieved break-even in the on premise beer brewing operation? 
 






1. Is the manager’s assumption of a correlation between the number of beer kits sold and 
the rise and fall of the utilities bill correct?  Identify and assess any other assumptions 
made by the manager that could impact this calculation.  
 
 Students may choose one of a number of techniques to determine whether a correlation 
exists and while visual fit or high-low methods commonly taught in introductory textbooks are 
both simple and easy to apply, neither one provides a measure of how well units processed 
explains fluctuations in utilities cost.  Simple linear regression analysis will provide this measure 
of goodness of fit by calculating R2 and would therefore be the superior choice in this application.    
 
 The case offers several real life complications for the student to address in applying a 
regression concerning data collection and the selection of the simple regression model.   The first 
is the recognition that the information available by month for utilities spans 24 months whereas 
the information for sales exits for a shorter timeframe.  The instructor has a lovely opportunity 
here to push students to examine whether the timeframe available is sufficient to draw long-term 
conclusions regarding the cost behavior of utilities expense and to address the limitations of using 
past cost behavior to predict future cost behavior, establishing the difference between the historic 
reporting purpose of accounting information and the need to use this information for predictive 
purposes in decision making (see question 3 for an expanded discussion of relevance). 
 
 A second issue surrounding data collection involves matching time periods.  By 
reviewing the financial information students should understand that the expense numbers 
provided, including utilities, are prepared on a cash basis not on a usage basis, and while this is 
likely appropriate given the short time frames involved, the choice to use this imperfectly 





 Finally the selection of a simple linear regression analysis vs. a more complex multiple 
linear regression should be examined.  The student should question whether the utilities bill is 
more likely driven by a single variable (number of units processed) or multiple variables (ambient 
temperature, building volume, number of units processed, etc.)  If the model selected is the wrong 
model, then its ability to predict futures costs is compromised.  Students will likely need to be 
pushed to consider the limitations of the model and its relevance for this case.  Overall, they 
should conclude that when examined against the information available and the sophistication of 
the manager, the simple linear regression is adequate for the purpose. 
 
 An interesting reporting reality is that the reports made to government regulators are 
made in liters, whereas the reporting within the business for decision making purposes is prepared 
by “kit”.  In order to maintain consistency within the calculations in Questions 1 and 2, a well 
thought out answer will first examine total liters of beer and wine sold and convert these numbers 
into the number of kits sold using the 23 liters/kit conversion factor provided in the case 
(calculations provided in TN Exhibit 1).  With these adjustments made, the least-squares 
regression calculation can be performed to estimate the cost behavior of the utilities expense (TN 
Exhibit 2).   
 
 The graph following plots the least-squares regression line for the utilities expense.  The 
fixed component of the expense is $357.30 per month and the variable component per kit is 




 To evaluate whether this regression line is economically plausible, the goodness of fit 
(R2) is assessed.  The goodness of fit has been calculated to be 2.3%, indicating that this 
regression line is not a good fit for the data and that it would not be a good predictor of future 
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number of kits processed on premise and the rise and fall of the utilities bill.   
 
 
2. Has Winexpert achieved break-even in the on premise beer brewing operation? 
 
 The break-even point is the point at which total revenues and total costs equals 0.  The 
calculation of the break-even point – considering that there are two products – is calculated using 
the sales mix percentage of the two products: 
 
 
CVP Analysis: Multiple Products (FY 2012) 
Product Kit Price Unit VC Unit CM Units Sold* Sales Mix 
Wine Kit 172 40.44 131.56 2,183 88.96% 
Beer Kit 87.45 23.11 64.34 271 11.04% 
Total       2,454   
 
 
 An average of the kit costs was used in this calculation.  Unit variable costs for on 
premise wine making is 75% higher than the beer brewing variable costs (23.11 + 75% = $40.44).  
The sales mix is then used to calculate the weighted-average unit contribution margin, which is as 
follows: 
  
Weighted-average CM = (131.56 x 88.96%) + (64.34 x 11.04%) 
 
    = $124.1 
 
The break-even point is as follows: 
 
 Break-even point =  Fixed Costs ____ 
     Weighted-average CM 
 
    =  284,624  
       124.14 
 
    = 2,293 kits  
 
 
In light of the sales mix, the break-even point for each product is calculated as follows: 
 
 Wine kits: 2,293 x 88.96% = 2,040 kits 
 Beer kits: 2,293 x 11.04% = 253 kits 
 
 
 This analysis shows that Spetz exceeded the break-even point for both products in 2012, 




manager (and the student) can use this information in the final question to inform the decision of 
whether beer kits should be dropped from the product line. 
 
NB: In calculating the break-even the number of units sold was calculated from October 2011 to 
September 2012 - the fiscal year of the company. 
 
 
3. Should Winexpert drop the on premise brewing operation and just sell kits to home 
brewers?  
 
 The decision to drop the on premise brewing service requires the student to determine 
which information is relevant.  Students struggle with this distinction often commenting that 
“every question is different” or “we didn’t include that last time,” failing to grasp the required 
conceptual understanding of relevance and trying to memorize a format used successfully in the 
past.  This is especially true for accounting students who have completed introductory financial 
accounting courses which tend to be driven by considerations of format, consistency and 
repetition.    
  
 A conceptual understanding of decision relevant information has two components: 
information is relevant when it is future oriented (and therefore not relevant when it references 
past spending, actions or decisions), and it differs for each alternative (and therefore not relevant 
when the future action is common among alternatives).  While many students are able to recall 
this definition of relevance, the “messiness” of a case provides the perfect opportunity to apply 




 The case explicitly states the problem:  should the on premise brewing be eliminated?  
The student will assume either a “Keep” or “Drop” state and craft the quantitative analysis from 
that viewpoint.  The sample analysis following assumes “Drop” in keeping with the manager’s 
viewpoint and therefore if the bottom line renders a positive number the on premise brewing 
operation will be dropped; if the outcome is negative the operation will be kept.  In terms of 
determining the relevance of information to use in the analysis, the information can be 
conveniently understood in two categories: contribution margin (CM) and fixed cost.   
 
 Contribution margin (i.e. selling price and variable costs) is typically relevant.  If 
Winexpert “Keeps” the operation, CM will continue in the future; if it “Drops” the operation the 
CM will cease therefore meeting both the future oriented and varies under alternatives criteria.  
The calculation of CM will create the same problems and required assumptions as the student 
faced in Question 2.  With multiple products of varying selling price and no product line sales 
information, a simplifying assumption regarding CM must be made - for example using a simple 






Average Contribution Margin per Unit 
Average selling price  $87.45 
Average variable costs:   
Cost of kit $17.75  
CO2 4.00  
Labels .49  
Filters .87  
Utilities .28  
Total variable costs  23.39 
Average CM per unit  $64.06 
 
 
 This calculation was made using information provided in Table 2 of the case and the 
variable per kit utilities cost calculated in Question 1.  Two areas of complication should be 
noted.  First, only the variable portion of the utilities is included in the calculation.  The fixed 
portion, because it is volume driven will not change by eliminating the on premise brewing.  
Therefore it is not included in the analysis.  Second, direct labour has also been excluded from the 
calculation – while it is appropriate for the purpose of full costing the product for pricing, it is not 
eliminated if on premise beer brewing is dropped.  The employee will simply be shifted to other 
duties on the wine side of the business where he also currently works.  Therefore the labour cost 
which may appear “variable” is excluded.  The student may argue the point that this cost is in fact 
eliminated from the beer production costs – which is true – but the manager must think 
holistically in terms of the impact on the business in total.  A transfer of costs from one division 
to another is not a net cost savings to the business. 
 
 Calculating total contribution margin will require the student to make sales volume 
assumptions for the future.  Using TN Exhibit 1, annual kit sales are quickly calculated as 245 
units.  The reasonableness of this number is borne out by its consistency since the start of the 
operation.  Other sales volumes could be used, but this one is selected as a conservative 
alternative, assuming no future growth.  Using this average with the information calculated above 
provides a total annual CM from on premise brewing of $15,694.70, which would be given up by 
ceasing operations.   
 
 Ultimately, if the business is to benefit from dropping on premise brewing there must be 
cost savings greater than the sacrificed CM.  Since variable costs have been included in the CM 
calculation, the student should review any fixed costs that could be eliminated.  By definition 
fixed costs are not impacted by changes in volume unless capacity is eliminated, but that is not 
the case here since capacity will either revert to wine production or sit idle, neither of which will 
create cost savings for the business.  However, the manager suggests that the cost of repairing the 
refrigeration unit could be eliminated and is creating a loss in this product line and it is in fact this 
factor that has contributed to Nancy’s desire to drop the product.  Interestingly this view is not 
shared by her employee who suggests that “the fridge was not installed properly and that it was 
possible that it could be fixed with the next maintenance call.”  
 




incremental cost savings associated with no longer running and repairing the refrigerator should 
be included in the analysis, but estimating this number under conflicting opinions is not obvious.  
A reasonable alternative is to choose to be conservative in spite of what Denis says and include 
an amount comparable to that which has been spent in the past.  Nancy suggests that “about every 
four months a repairman would have to be called and the resultant expense had run from $400 to 
$1,400” or up to $4,200 per year.  This is confirmed by reviewing the financial information that 
presents repairs and maintenance as $3,400 and $5,500 (2011, 2012 respectively) for the entire 
organization.  Using the $4,200 will render the following: 
 
 
Impact of Eliminating On premise Beer Brewing 
 “Drop” 
Contribution margin per unit $64.06 
Projected annual sales units 245 units 
Total annual CM (lost) ($15,694.70) 
Annual Costs Saved:  
Repairs and Maintenance 4,200.00 
Net Annual Gain (Loss) Created by 





It is clear from the quantitative analysis that dropping the on premise brewing operation 
will conservatively cost the company $11,500 annually.  Given such a clear financial mandate to 
continue the operation, contrary to the manager’s view, students should consider any qualitative 
factors that are influencing Nancy’s decision.   
 
A final note in the quantitative analysis would recognize that on premise beer brewing at 
256 units is currently operating at 38% above its break-even point of 185 units as calculated in 
Question 2 and – as mentioned in the narrative – this has been achieved with very little in the way 
of promotional spending.  This level of safety margin provides a positive return on this operation 





 Can the nuisance factor be sufficiently quantified?  On page 6 there is an interesting 
statement: “Nancy believed that on premise beer making was costing more than it was worth” 
(emphasis added).  Since it is clearly “worth it” financially to continue the operation, some 
speculation as to qualitative factors that are influencing her is warranted.  Questions to consider 
include: 
 
§ Can they grow the beer market? 
§ Is beer interfering in the potential growth of the wine business?  (Analysis can 
demonstrate that there is sufficient capacity to do both.  If capacity was constrained, wine 
is the better choice since it has a higher per kit CM.  With no constraints they should 




§ Is wine the better product in some (unidentified) intangible way? 






 Winexpert ultimately decided to discontinue making beer on premise, although it would 
continue to sell beer kits.  As at the time of writing, the business had discontinued stocking the 
Festa brand (because it wasn’t a Winexpert brand) even though it was more popular among who 









TEACHING NOTE EXHIBIT 1 
Quantity of Beer and Wine Sold 
 
 
Quantity of Beer and Wine Sold 
       
2011       
 Wine 
(Liters) 
Wine Kits Beer 
(Liters) 
Beer Kits Total 
Liters 
Total Kits 
April 5,405 235 322 14 5,727 249 
May 4,600 200 667 29 5,267 229 
June 3,910 170 437 19 4,347 189 
July 2,944 128 345 15 3,289 143 
August 5,290 230 483 21 5,773 251 
September 3,910 170 460 20 4,370 190 
October 5,520 240 345 15 5,865 255 
November 2,990 130 621 27 3,611 157 
December 2,323 101 299 13 2,622 114 
Sub-Total 36,892 1,604 3,979 173 40,871 1,777 
2012       
January 4,830 210 368 16 5,198 226 
February 4,140 180 483 21 4,623 201 
March 5,290 230 759 33 6,049 263 
April 4,531 197 736 32 5,267 229 
May 5,198 226 644 28 5,842 254 
June 4,255 185 759 33 5,014 218 
July 3,197 139 460 20 3,657 159 
August 4,393 191 368 16 4,761 207 
September 3,542 154 391 17 3,933 171 
October 4,439 193 230 10 4,669 203 
November 3,772 164 483 21 4,255 185 
December 2,277 99 207 9 2,484 108 
Sub-Total 49,864 2,168 5,888 256 55,752 2,424 
       






TEACHING NOTE EXHIBIT 2 
Least-Squares Regression Analysis 
 
Least-Squares Regression Analysis 
         
Computation of Regression Estimates   Computation of R2 














  Y X X2 XY Y1 (Y-Y1)2 (Y-Y)2 
2011 April 496.70 249 62,001 123,678.30 427.965 4,724.555 6827.402 
 May 472.94 229 52,441 108,303.26 422.289 2,565.564 3465.453 
 June 494.19 189 35,721 93,401.91 410.937 6,931.131 6418.909 
 July 447.27 143 20,449 63,959.61 397.882 2,439.197 1102.114 
 August 379.90 251 63,001 95,354.90 428.532 2,365.091 1167.719 
 September 386.08 190 36,100 73,355.20 411.220 632.039 783.547 
 October 366.46 255 65,025 93,447.30 429.667 3,995.176 2266.893 
 November 358.34 157 24,649 56,259.38 401.855 1,893.553 3106.045 
 December 461.88 114 12,996 52,654.32 389.652 5,216.947 2285.614 
2012 January 613.06 226 51,076 138,551.56 421.437 36,719.298 39596.26
2 
 February 498.66 201 40,401 100,230.66 414.342 7,109.493 7155.146 
 March 498.41 263 69,169 131,081.83 431.938 4,418.552 7112.914 
 April 457.22 229 52,441 104,703.38 422.289 1,220.203 1861.758 
 May 375.27 254 64,516 95,318.58 429.384 2,928.282 1505.588 
 June 396.90 218 47,524 86,524.20 419.167 495.810 294.874 
 July 360.58 159 25,281 57,332.22 402.423 1,750.801 2861.384 
 August 342.05 207 42,849 70,804.35 416.045 5,475.259 5187.155 
 September 293.38 171 29,241 50,167.98 405.828 12,644.594 14566.53
6 
 October 239.30 203 41,209 48,577.90 414.910 30,838.799 30545.21
9 
 November 335.87 185 34,225 62,135.95 409.801 5,465.850 6115.538 
 December 421.05 108 11,664 45,473.40 387.949 1,095.692 48.694 








         
 Mean 414.072       
 Intercept 357.298       
 Slope 0.2838       
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TIES THAT BIND: 
AN INSTITUTIONAL ISOMORPHIC COMPARISON OF MANDATORY  






This empirical paper represents a novel study of a mandatory CSR reporting regime. 
Five Canadian financial institutions are compared in terms of their references to three 
voluntary reporting standards in their annual and CSR reports. Institutional 
isomorphism is used as our frame of reference to examine how CSR reporting varies 
across these firms. Implications arising from this study affect the future development 






Mandatory corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting is a relatively new 
phenomenon in Canada. It only became a requirement for Canada’s biggest banks in 2001, 
following the passing of Bill C-8, An Act to establish the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada 
(Canada, 2001), which among other requirements made the issuing of public accountability 
statements mandatory for financial institutions with equity exceeding $1 billion. Prior to this Act, 
such reporting was voluntary, and it remains so for firms outside of the financial services sector, 
and even for financial institutions with smaller equity holdings. With voluntary reporting, firms 
that can afford the costs associated with collecting and disseminating CSR information may 
choose to differentiate themselves from rival firms that opt not to follow suit. From a research 
perspective, this can result in methodological challenges in terms of the sample size and quality. 
Whereas with a mandatory reporting regime, the differences among firms when every 
organization has a compulsory obligation to report enable better comparisons into both intra-
industry firm behavior and the CSR standards themselves. 
 
Our research objective is to examine how CSR standards with differing origins and 
characteristics are incorporated into the CSR reporting activities of large firms. We chose as the 
sample for our study the Canadian financial services sector, and undertook an in-depth 12-year 
study of the five largest institutions’ CSR reporting activities. These firms operate under a 
mandatory CSR reporting regime, in contrast to other firms in Canada, and to financial 
institutions in other major countries such as Germany, the United Kingdom and the United 
States. This facilitates intra-industry comparisons that would otherwise not necessarily be 
possible in industries with a voluntary CSR reporting regime in which some firms choose not to 
report. Facing the same regulatory requirements to report, but with great liberty with what to 
 
 
report under Statutory Regulation 2002-133 (Canada, 2002), financial institutions in Canada 
began mandatory reporting in 2001/02.  
 
We have collected both the annual reports and the public accountability statements for 
these five institutions for the period 2001 to 2012 and using content analysis, identified the three 
most frequently cited CSR reporting standards: the Equator Principles, the United Nations 
Global Compact, and the Global Reporting Initiative. For these three reporting regimes, we next 
examined the nature and the frequency with which each reporting standard was measured. We 
qualitatively analyzed each mention of the reporting standard and in order to assess the degree to 
which these standards were employed in firms’ CSR and annual reports. We begin with a 
discussion and comparison of these three standards, followed by a review of the literature. The 
research methods by which this study was undertaken are next detailed, and this is accompanied 
with the findings of our qualitative analysis. We conclude by articulating the implications of this 





 In our review of the extant literature, we wish to address two issues. The first issue is 
why an understanding of CSR reporting behavior is a worthwhile research endeavor. The second 
are the incremental benefits of our particular study; how it builds upon the scholarly work that 
came previously. 
 
Importance of this Research Topic 
 
The value in a study of CSR reporting behavior is premised upon the value-added contribution of 
existing research. This research field of inquiry has concluded that CSR activities provide a 
range of benefits to firms which justify the reporting effort. Various studies (Adams and Ambika, 
2005; Khan, Halabi, and Martin, 2009) suggest these benefits include improved employee 
retention and recruitment (Simms, 2002); enhanced business decision-making and cost reduction 
(Adams, 2002; King, 2002; Simms, 2002); strengthen corporate image and stakeholder 
relationships (Marx, 1992/93; Pike, 2000; Adams, 2002; Bernhut, 2002; Joyner and Payne, 2002; 
King, 2002); and improved financial performance (Margolis and Walsh, 2003). Additional 
benefits include improved transparency and perceptions to be less involved in corporate 
malfeasance (Tapscott and Ticoll, 2003). As a result, the last decade has seen the development of 
a number of CSR reporting initiatives, frameworks and standards which may be adopted by 
corporations for their CSR reporting. For this study, we reviewed 125 CSR and annual reports 
for five Canadian financial institutions that contained references to a plethora of CSR standards. 
In a process detailed in the Research Methods ection below, the three most referenced CSR 
standards among leading Canadian financial institutions were identified. These were the Equator 
Principles, the United Nations Global Compact, and the Global Reporting Initiative. Studying 
firms’ references to these CSR reporting standards, of which these three are examples, helps 
practitioners improve their CSR reporting activities and researchers to: 
 
• Understand how differences in CSR reporting standards are associated with differences in 
CSR reporting activity; and 
 
 
• Discover how firm behavior in terms of CSR reporting activity changes over time. 
 
Incremental Benefits of this Study 
 
The second aspect of our literature review that we wish to address is what incremental 
benefit can be gained from this particular study of the topic. We identified 18 peer-reviewed 
scholarly publications of potential relevance to our study that made reference to the Equator 
Principles, the UN Global Compact and the Global Reporting Initiative. Of these articles, none 
provided an empirical comparison of these CSR standards in terms of firms’ corporate reporting 
activities. Three were relevant in other contexts. For example, Jamali (2010, 617-618) noted the 
existence of a research gap in this regard, writing that “while there has been a proliferation of 
academic writings, examining IAS [International Accountability Standards] from the perspective 
of their scope, purpose, and overall utility, the practical engagement of practitioners and MNCs 
with these standards has not been systematically carried out, despite the fact that they constitute 
the audience for whom these standards are most intended.” Pérez and Rodríguez del Bosque 
(2012) highlighted the importance of the financial services sector as a medium for CSR research, 
finding significant CSR investments by the financial services sector in their study of six Spanish 
financial institutions and how CSR activities shape corporate personality and how firms’ 
organizational behavior influences their CSR reputation. Their findings further support our 
premise of the validity of the financial services sector as an appropriate venue for CSR-related 
research. Cuesta-González, Muñoz-Torres, and Fernández-Izquierdo (2006, 290-291) noted the 
central role of banking institutions to the economy and commented that “new management 
strategies with sustainability criteria that companies currently encounter have forced banks to 
analyze their role in society and their contribution towards obtaining more sustainable 
development.” They classified research on corporate social responsibility in the banking sector 
into three categories: theoretical approaches tying together economics and business ethics; CSR 
behavior and the relationship to social and financial performance; and the design and 
implementation of reporting systems to assess social performance, of which this article falls into 
the third category.  
 
We next examined the literature pertaining to research methods and contexts regarding 
CSR reporting and analysis in the financial services sector. Research methods have typically 
emphasized content analysis, including the empirical review of annual reports, (Khan, Halabi 
and Martin, 2009; Khan, 2010; Bayoud, Kavanagh and Slaughter, 2012; Mondal and Ghosh, 
2012), CSR reports, or both (Idowu and Towler, 2004). Among the many geographic contexts 
examined, studies have been undertaken in Australia (Cuganesan and Khan, 2008); Bangladesh 
(Khan, Halabi and Martin, 2009; Khan, 2010), India (Mondal and Ghosh, 2012), Libya (Bayoud, 
Kavanagh and Slaughter, 2012) and the United Kingdom (Idowu and Towler, 2004). In terms of 
the subject context, Nikolaeva and Becho (2010) claimed to have the first study to examine the 
voluntary adoption by firms of Global Reporting Initiative CSR standard. They incorrectly state 
that “at least up to the end of 2009, there are no regulatory bodies in any country that require 
companies either to undertake or report on CSR activities” (Nikolaeva and Bicho, 2010, 138) 
when in fact government imposed mandatory reporting in the Canadian financial services sector 
has existed since 2001 (Canada, 2001, 2002). What our literature review has revealed is that a 
comparative empirical examination of CSR reporting standards in both annual report and CSR 
reports has not been undertaken, particularly with respect to the interesting case of Canada with 
its mandatory CSR reporting regime for large financial services firms. By addressing this 
 
 
knowledge gap from an institutional perspective, this paper provides an incremental scholarly 
contribution to the CSR field. 
 
Research Methods 
An initial caveat for the research was that the authors intended to study an industry in 
which CSR reporting was mandatory. The necessity of this requirement was to foster 
comparisons among firms within a single industry; to enhance the quality of the analysis; to 
reduce sample bias; and to provide a starting point for comparisons to other industries and 
countries where CSR reporting is of a voluntary nature and where the data is less complete. The 
banking sector in Canada was chosen as this segment of the industry is federally regulated and 
one of the regulations mandates CSR reporting in the form of public accountability statements 
(Canada, 2001, 2002). This mandatory CSR reporting environment provided an excellent data 
source for our study. 
Data Sample 
We began our study by identifying the top five Canadian financial institutions based upon 
total assets, all of which surpass the mandatory reporting threshold established by the federal 
government (Canada, 2001). We have used the following monikers to make their identities 
anonymous: Bank Alpha; Bank Bravo; Bank Charlie; Bank Delta and Bank Echo. We collected 
the annual reports for each firm from 2000 to 2012. We next collected the corporate social 
responsibility reports for each firm’s Canadian operations, some of which began in 2001 and 
others in 2002, through 2012. In most cases, firms in a given year published their annual report 
and their CSR report as separate documents. There were two exceptions when: 
• A financial institution produced a CSR report that was separate and generally broader 
in scope than the public accountability statement which they also published; or 
• The firm integrated their CSR report and annual report into a singular document.  
This produced a list of 125 documents spanning the time period of 2000 to 2012.  
Identification of CSR Standards 
We next identified every CSR standard mentioned during this time period in any of the reports. 
Once a comprehensive list of standards was developed, we then counted the number of 
references to each standard, and the number of documents in which each standard was measured. 
We then calculated the mean number of references per document for each standard. The three 
most frequently mentioned standards, according to this measure, were the Equator Principles, 
followed by the United Nations Global Compact and the Global Reporting Initiative; these three 
CSR standards became the basis for this analysis. This data collection process intentionally 
excluded any standalone reports on any of the standards, and corporate websites, in order to 
enhance inter-firm comparisons within the industry.  
Comparison of CSR Standards 
This selection process resulted in the analysis of three very different CSR standards. The Equator 
Principles (2006) are relevant to those firms engaged in project financing, which is relevant in 
 
 
the financial services sector but not every industry sector. The UN Global Compact (United 
Nations 1999, UNGC 2011) is multi-sectoral by nature and is designed to promote ethical 
business principles. The Global Reporting Initiative is also multi-sectoral, but is designed around 
specific reporting requirements for each of the dimensions it examines; in comparison to the 
Global Compact, the GRI lends itself to being operationalized by firms to a much greater degree 
(GRI, 2011a). It also features a supplement applicable to the financial services sector (GRI, 
2011b). We summarize the key components of each CSR standard in Table 1. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 here 
------------------------------------------------------- 
Analytical Methods and Validity 
A case analysis-based approach to the research methods was employed. Each of the five 
firms was treated as a single case, with the subsequent analysis consisting of within-case and 
cross-case analyses (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles and Huberman, 1994) using each report as the basic 
unit of analysis. Within-case analysis involves the documentation and review of individual case 
descriptions as distinct entities. Cross-case analysis invokes a comparative approach across 
multiple cases to identify areas of commonality and difference. CSR and annual reports for each 
of the five firms were individually and collectively analyzed using a four-item ordinal scale. A 
coding key was developed a priori analysis in order to promote the consistent assessment of each 
report that was reviewed, and was revised as needed during the analysis, which was then 
repeated, to achieve accuracy and reliability in the coding (Weber, 1990), and to promote 
intersubjective verifiability. 
Ordinal Rating: Description: 
A Fulsome discussion or analysis of the CSR standard  for the particular 
reporting year. Examples include the applied use of a GRI Index, Equator 
Principles-specified reporting template (2011), or a detailed discussion of 
the UN Global Compact principles and their application by the financial 
institution. 
 B  CSR standard discussed in the context of strategic plans or objectives. 
C CSR standard discussed in the context of the firm’s operations, policies of 
activities. 
D Nominal mention consisting of little descriptive information. A passing 
reference. 
Firms were assigned anonymous labels: Bank Alpha, Bank Bravo, Bank Charlie, Bank 
Delta and Bank Echo. CSR reports were analyzed first, in sequential order, followed by annual 
reports, as the former tend to have broader discussions of the CSR standards. This enabled the 
authors to better assess the extent of the information available for inclusion in the annual report, 
which typically includes a synthesis of key points from the CSR report. Each report was 
analyzed in terms of the three CSR standards: the Equator Principles, the UN Global Compact, 
 
 
and the Global Reporting Initiative. All mentions of these standards were reviewed in terms of 
the context and significance of their use. Since the references to each of the three CSR standards 
represented a small portion of the overall content of each CSR and annual report, and we were 
interested in comparing changes in CSR reporting in aggregate, with the report being the basic 
unit of analysis, we chose to employ whole text coding (Weber, 1990) for each report. To 
advance inter rater reliability, we opted to escalate the ordinal ranking assigned to a report to the 
highest rating for which any element of the report, individually or collectively, was able to 
achieve. This rule resulted in the benefit of the doubt being given to each report: it favoured the 
assignment of a higher rating, rather than a lower rating, in order to reduce the potential for 
rating inconsistencies arising from the assignment of ratings.  
References to the CSR standards, once classified according to the scale above, were 
logged into a table to facilitate comparisons among CSR standards for each firm, across firms, 
and across standards. We quantitatively assessed the results of our qualitative ratings of each 
CSR and annual report. We created frequency distributions for the quality ratings of each report, 
by CSR standard and by each financial institution. We also examined the frequency of both total 
references to each CSR standard, as well as the frequency of non-mentions, in order to evaluate 
what was written as well as what was not written in the reports. We then segmented our findings 
in terms of both the CSR standard – to give insight on each reporting mechanism – and by 




 We report our findings in two sections. In the first section, we examine CSR reporting in 
terms of the three standards examined. In the second section, we explore the topic from the 
perspective of firms in the financial services sector in Canada. 
Findings by CSR Standard 
Of the three CSR standards, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) originated first in 
1997. However, the first set of standards was not released until three years later (GRI, 2011c). 
That same year, the United Nations Global Compact was released, followed by the Equator 
Principles in 2003. For each reporting year (2000 to 2012 for the GRI and the UN Global 
Compact, 2003 to 2012 for the Equator Principles), we examined whether and which institutions 
made reference to the standard, and classified the extent to which the standard was mentioned in 
each of their CSR and annual reports.  
Among our initial findings was that there was a delay between the introduction of a 
standard and the first references being made by a Canadian financial institution. For example, the 
Global Reporting Initiative was introduced in 2000 but it was not until two years later, in 2002, 
when one bank first referenced it in either an annual or a CSR report. It was 2006 – a full six 
years from launch, that the UN Global Compact was referenced. By comparison, the Equator 
Principles was first mentioned in the year of its launch, by three financial institutions. This may 
be a function of the perceived relevance of the standard to a firm, as the Equator Principles are 
industry-specific to financial service providers, whereas the UN Global Compact is a pan-
industry, principle-driven standard. As slow as some institutions were in even acknowledging 
 
 
this particular global CSR standard, it is noteworthy to mention that one institution (name 
withheld) has not included any reference to the United Nations Global Compact in any of its 
annual or CSR reports from 2000 to 2012. From an institutional perspective, this is 
counterintuitive: while strategic responses to institutional processes include resistance toward 
pressure to confirm (Oliver, 1991; Jamali, 2010) over the long term, isomorphic forces 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) would be expected to eventually result in increasingly similar 
reporting practices. 
Our second finding was in relation to the rate of diffusion of the various CSR standards. 
For the Global Reporting Initiative, it took a mere two years from the first bank to the last bank 
to make at least a passing reference to the standard (2002 to 2004). The Equator Principles took 
twice as long: 2003 to 2007. Worse still was the UN Global Compact: While one institution 
voiced support for these principles in 2006, and four of the institutions acknowledged it by 2010, 
one of the financial service providers still has yet to acknowledge the standard in any of their 
annual or CSR reports. This indicates a considerable time lag between the introduction of a CSR 
standard; its first reference or inclusion in a firm’s CSR reporting; and widespread inclusion 
across all firms in an industry. This finding adds to the theoretical uncertainty of CSR reporting, 
adding issues of temporal difference in the effects of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991; Jamali, 2010) on firms’ CSR reporting behavior. 
We next drilled down in the data for further insights about the frequency and quality of 
references to each of the three CSR standards. Each financial institution had 26 opportunities to 
mention either the GRI or the UN Global Compact, and 20 opportunities to mention the Equator 
Principles during the time period studied. Collectively, this results in 130 possible inclusions of 
the GRI and UN Global Compact standards, and 100 inclusions of the Equator Principles, for the 
five banks which we examined. Our findings reveal that in terms of total references to each 
standard, the Equator Principles was referenced in 78% of the CSR and annual reports; the GRI 
in 48% of the reports; and the Global Compact in just 8% of the available opportunities. The 
Equator Principles also had the lowest frequency of passing references: just 15% of all mentions 
were assessed as of marginal value. However, the GRI had the highest frequency of top quality 
references – 40% of all references were deemed to represent a fulsome analysis or discussion of 
the standard. The CSR standard with the lowest inclusion was the UN Global Compact: there 
were only 11 reports out of 130 that made reference to this standard; none of the references were 
of a top tier nature; and 73% of the references were of marginal value. These results indicate that 
while the Equator Principles was the most referenced standard, and the UN Global Compact the 
least referenced, with the GRI representing the CSR standard that was best incorporated into 
financial institutions’ CSR and annual reporting in terms of the quality of reporting. These 
variations in the frequency and quality to which each CSR standard is referenced adds to the 
theoretical ambiguity of the role that isomorphic forces play in CSR standard implementation. 
Findings by Financial Institution 
 In examining the results for each financial institution, we totaled each of the number of 
A, B, C, and D-rated mentions for the three CSR standards. This represents 26 reporting 
opportunities to mention either of the GRI or UN Global Compact standards, and 20 
opportunities to mention the Equator Principles. We found an equally poor level of reporting 
performance for each firm during the time period studied. Bank Delta failed to mention any of 
the three CSR standards 56% of the time in 72 opportunities. Bank Alpha failed to mention the 
 
 
standards 57% of the time; Bank Bravo and Bank Charlie 58% of the time and Bank Echo 60% 
in 72 opportunities. These results are all attributable to infrequent reporting in the early years of 
this study and the frequent non-reporting of references to the United Nations Global Compact. 
This finding is evidence of isomorphic forces at work, as the number of references to CSR 
standards did increase for all financial institutions after the initial time period where poor 
reporting frequencies were noted. 
 We also examined the results by financial institution in terms of the number of actual 
references to each standard. In this way, we assess each firm in terms of what they did report, not 
what they did not report, in the context of the three CSR standards. The five firms had a 
remarkably similar number of reports in which the CSR standards were mentioned; these ranged 
from a low of 29 reports for Bank Echo to a high of 32 reports by Bank Delta. Firms in the 
Canadian financial services sector have not, to date, differentiated themselves in terms of the 
frequency of CSR reporting. This is further evidence of institutionalized isomorphism: we would 
not expect, over the long term, for there to be substantial differences in the total number of 
published reports, as the inconsistent reporting activity becomes marginalized with the passage 
of time. 
The pattern of citation across institutions and over time was also of interest. We were 
interested to see which standards were most consistently mentioned from CSR to annual reports, 
year in, year out. For Bank Alpha, the GRI was mentioned consistently in both types of reports 
from 2007 to 2012, the last year for which data is available. Bank Echo also more consistently 
referenced the GRI than the other standards, mentioning it unfailingly from 2007 to 2012 in both 
report types. For their three rivals, each mentioned the Equator Principles more consistently, with 
Bank Bravo having the longest streak, from 2004 to 2012 inclusive. This suggests a 
differentiated approach to CSR reporting, and possibly to CSR behavior, with some banks 
emphasizing a broad spectrum approach to the topic (those that favour the GRI) and those that 
take a more project finance perspective (those that focus on the Equator Principles). While this is 
counterintuitive from an isomorphic perspective, it is consistent with the findings of Pérez and 
Rodríguez del Bosque (2012) who also found the firms employ CSR practices differently in 
order to shape and influence external perceptions of their corporate identity. 
One source of differentiation from firm to firm was the quality by which the CSR 
standards were incorporated into the CSR and annual reports. In each year that Bank Charlie 
issued either an annual or a corporate social responsibility report, 47% of the time that report 
contained a thorough incorporation of one of the three CSR standards we studied. Bank Alpha 
scored lowest in terms of top quality references to CSR standards, a mere 13% of all references 
by that institution; the industry average was 30%. We also looked at the frequency of passing 
references to CSR standards. In this case, Bank Bravo had the lowest frequency of marginal 
references to each of the CSR standards, at 23%. Bank Echo had the highest percentage of 
passing references, at 55%, which was well above the industry average of 35%. This reflects a 
great disparity in the quality of the CSR reporting from institution to institution. However, this 
measure is for the entirety of the timeline studied, 2000 to 2012. To more fairly gauge the 
theoretical significance of this finding, we need to see whether quality improvement is or is not 
happening within the time horizon studied. 
Thus, we wished to examine whether the CSR reporting performance of firms improved 
over time. If quality improvement in CSR reporting is occurring, this would be evidence of 
 
 
organizational learning and development (Argyris and Schoen 1978; Argyris 1982), which would 
be consistent with a rise in homogeneous CSR reporting activity within the industry as a result of 
isomorphic forces. To explore this issue, we chronologically segmented our quantitative results 
into three time periods: the introductory period of 2000 to 2004, which includes the first mention 
of one or more of the standards by each financial institution; the growth period of 2005 to 2009 
in which CSR reporting became more frequent; and the contemporary period of 2010 to 2012 
which incorporates the most recently published data. Our intent was to see whether the frequency 
of A-quality top tier mentions improved over time. This would imply a movement toward more 
substantive CSR reporting over time. To adjust to the different lengths of time in each period (5 
years, 5 years and 3 years respectively), we computed results on a percentage basis. In terms of 
A-rated references to the CSR standards, four of five firms continuously improved the 
percentage of top tier references in each time period; only Bank Delta saw a decline in the most 
recent time period of 2010 to 2012. There was also a substantial variation in the frequency of the 
top tier references, with 17% of Bank Alpha reports in the final time period were of a superior 
caliber, whereas 75% of Bank Charlie references to the same standards were exemplary. This 
suggests that for the majority of banks, the frequency of their top-tier CSR reporting was 
becoming more frequent. Consistent with our findings, we would theoretically expect that as 
CSR knowledge and the application of best reporting practices becomes more diffusely spread 
within the industry, the incidence of A-rated references would increase and the frequency of D-
rated references would decline. 
 As part of our assessment of organizational learning and development, we also 
investigated whether the frequency of D-rated passing references declined over time. This would 
suggest a movement away from less substantive mentions of the CSR standards over time. Of the 
five institutions, only Bank Alpha exemplified the expected pattern, with a declining frequency 
of passing references in each of the three time periods. Bank Bravo had a moderate frequency of 
passing references initially (40%), declined to a healthy 13% in the interim period, before 
rebounding to 33% of all references being passing references in the contemporary period. Bank 
Charlie began with no passing references, surged to 32% in the growth period for CSR reporting, 
and then reversed course slightly and finished at 25% of contemporary references to the CSR 
standards being passing ones. Bank Delta and Bank Echo had initial declines in D-rated 
references before experiencing slightly increased D-rated references in the contemporary period. 
One can speculate that these mixed results may reflect differences in perception as to whether the 
CSR standards are sufficiently embedded in stakeholder thought so as to not require as 
substantive a discussion as was needed previously, or whether there has been an organizational 
shift to using buzzwords over substantive discussions of CSR-related issues. 
Additionally, we examined the frequency of non-references to the CSR standards. A non-
reference occurs when a financial institution issues a CSR or an annual report and does not 
mention each of the three most prominent CSR standards despite having had three opportunities 
to do so with each report. Unlike examining the frequency of D-rated references, this calculation 
does not factor quality into the analysis, only the presence of any mention of the CSR standard. 
Thus we would expect the frequency of non-references to decline in each time period as the CSR 
standards become more embedded within the organization. By this measure, three of five 
institutions exemplified the expected pattern: Bank Alpha, Bank Delta and Bank Echo. Both 
Bank Bravo and Bank Charlie showed initial declines in non-response from the introductory time 
period to the growth time period, countered by increases (slight for Bank Bravo, more substantial 
 
 
for Bank Charlie) in the contemporary time period. As a result of these three assessments of 
organizational learning and development, Bank Alpha demonstrated the most consistent 
improvement: their A-rated references continuously improved and the incidence of both D-rated 
reference and non-references declined in tandem. All other firms’ results were mixed. This is not 
a pattern we expected from a theoretical perspective; greater consistency in the decline of non-
references was anticipated. 
To conclude our examination of organizational learning and development, we offer a 
final contribution to this topic, by classifying firms according to the relative frequency with 
which they engaged in A-rated and D-rated CSR reporting of the three preeminent reporting 
standards. To assess the frequency with which CSR standards were mentioned in a firm’s CSR 
reports, we calculated the total number of A-rated references to the three CSR standards for the 
introductory CSR reporting period, 2000 to 2004. We then found the median number of A-rated 
mentions CSR standards occurring in all firms’ CSR and annual reports for this time period. If 
the firm’s total number of mentions was greater than or equal to the median number of mentions 
for the industry, we classified this in the “high” category, which represented firms that more 
actively engaged in high quality inclusions of the CSR standards than their peers in the sample; 
otherwise, the firm was classified in the “low” category. We replicated this approach with D-
rated or passing reference to the three CSR standards in each firm’s CSR and annual reports from 
2000 to 2004, and similarly classified them as “high” or “low” based on the median of the 
industry. As a result, we were able to classify each of the five financial institutions in terms of 
their reporting frequency of the CSR standards, as indicated in the table below: 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 here 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
The table above parses industry members by the quality of their CSR reporting during the 
introductory reporting period. Bank Charlie is in the optimal position, with a high frequency of 
in-depth references to the CSR standards, and a low frequency of CSR reporting involving 
passing references to these standards. No firms are in the second most optimal position, the 
bottom right quadrant, in which a firm produces an above average level of both A-rated and D-
rated references to the standards. Bank Bravo and Bank Delta, while not embedding the three 
CSR standards into their reporting as effectively as Bank Charlie does, at least curtail the 
frequency of fluffy, non-substantive references to these standards. Unfortunately, both Bank 
Alpha’s and Bank Echo’s initial CSR reporting were found to be lacking in depth of analysis of 
the CSR standards and a proclivity to engage in the use of passing references. We repeated this 
analysis for the most recent reporting period, 2010 to 2012, to see whether there was evidence of 
improvement. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 here 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
From Table 3, we can see that Bank Charlie maintains its position in referencing the three CSR 
standards to a high degree, while minimizing the use of passing references when compared to 
their peers. Bank Bravo has improved their reporting and joins Bank Charlie in this category. 
 
 
Bank Delta, while not embedding as substantive references to the CSR standards in their 
reporting as Bank Bravo and Bank Charlie, still manages to refrain from significant use of 
passing references. The firm is joined by their peer, Bank Alpha, in this category. Unfortunately, 
Bank Echo continues to engage in low-quality referencing of these standards relative to their 
peers, and in the use of passing references to these important CSR standards. This is not to 
suggest that Bank Echo is not improving, but that the pace of their improvement is not on par 
with the pace of change in rival institutions. This suggests that isomorphic forces are experienced 
differently, and responded to differently, by firms. This finding is consistent with the literature 
on institutional isomorphism (Oliver, 1991; Jamali, 2010).  
 
Implications 
As a result of the findings from this exploratory study suggest, there are implications for 
CSR advocates, practitioners, and researchers we wish to discuss.  
Implications for CSR Advocates 
For CSR advocates, an important observation relates to the successful launch of a social 
reporting standard. In the continually evolving world of social reporting, there are a plethora of 
multi-sectoral reporting standards that have emerged, such as the Global Reporting Initiative and 
the United Nations Global Compact. While the potential for new multi-sectoral standards may be 
limited, there is also the potential for sector-specific standards, such as in the case of the 
financial services sector with the Equator Principles, to emerge in the future. Thus it is not 
unreasonable to expect new CSR standards to develop in the years ahead in sectors beyond the 
financial services realm.  
With this is mind, we have noted that CSR standards appear to be more readily adopted 
by a particular firm with there are business endorsements at launch in the same sector, than 
standards launched either without business endorsements or endorsed by firms from a different 
sector than that of the prospective participant. This observation arises from the qualitative 
evidence which suggested a relationship exists between the breadth of business endorsements for 
a CSR standard at launch and the length of time before major financial institutions chose to 
participate in such standards. Ten international financial institutions signed on at the launch of 
the Equator Principles in 2000 (Equator Principles, 2013). Of these ten firms, two Canadian 
firms – Bank Charlie and Bank Bravo – signed on within the first few months of launch. With 
both Canadian firms making reference to the Equator Principles in their CSR reports that first 
year, Bank Alpha and Bank Delta followed suit two years later, with Bank Echo joining in 2007. 
In comparison, the UN Global Compact was endorsed at its launch by 35 multinationals, 
including six non-Canadian financial services firms (UN Global Compact, 2012). Since then, 
only Bank Delta in 2010 has formally signed on as a participant and to date Bank Bravo has yet 
to even acknowledge it in either their CSR or their annual reports. Similarly, the Global 
Reporting Initiative involved no financial institutions at its founding in 2000, and it was not until 
two years later before any of the financial institutions examined in this study made reference to it 
in their annual or CSR reports.  
For CSR standards to avoid delays in making a positive impact for social change, we 
posit that negotiating for corporate partners prior to the time of launch, possibly key players or 
 
 
flagship companies (Rugman and d’Cruz, 2000) in a variety of industry sectors is a key success 
factor. This is consistent with the literature, which suggests that early adopters of a CSR 
reporting standard or framework, particularly those at launch, implement the principles of a 
given CSR standard to a greater degree than latter adopters, while at the same time being a 
source of influence and support for the framework (Arevalo, 2008). We extend this proposition 
to suggest that organizations which have launched CSR standards actively work on business 
partnership engagement to maintain and grow their roster of firms which are employing their 
particular CRS standard, as competition for the endorsement of standards by flagship firms will 
likely increase. 
Implications for CSR Practitioners 
Our study noted the following findings on a firm-level basis: 
• Firms have become consistent in their referencing of the Equator Principles and the 
Global Reporting Initiative by the end of 2013; 
• Firms have not differentiated the frequency of their CSR reporting; each issues a CSR 
report annually; 
• Differentiation in the content of CSR reporting has occurred, with some firms (Bank 
Alpha and Bank Echo) emphasizing broad-based measure of CSR while others (Bank 
Bravo, Bank Charlie and Bank Delta) choosing a more narrowly focused perspective; 
• The quality of the CSR reporting varies among firms both in terms of the frequency of 
high-quality reporting and the frequency of low-quality reporting, which are two distinct 
variables; 
• Organizational learning and development in terms of CSR reporting is occurring. In 
absolute terms, four out of five firms (excluding Bank Delta) saw a continuous 
improvement in the frequency of high quality A-rated references to the three CSR 
standards. Only one firm, Bank Alpha, saw a continuous decline in the frequency of low 
quality D-rated references. Three firms – Bank Alpha, Bank Delta, and Bank Echo – 
consistently reduced the frequency of non-references to the CSR standards. On a relative 
basis, Bank Charlie has been a top tier performer in terms of their relative CSR reporting, 
and has been joined by Bank Bravo that has experienced improvement. Bank Alpha has 
improved to a mid-range level, joining Bank Delta whose position relative to the industry 
is unchanged. Bank Echo remains the poorest performer in terms of CSR reporting 
quality compared to industry rivals. 
With institutions having established a yearly reporting frequency for their CSR reports in 
response to the public accountability report obligations, our advice to CSR practitioners is to 
continuously improve the quality of their CSR reporting in these two reporting venues. 
Performance improvements may arise from improving not only the frequency of high-quality, 
detailed references to the CSR standards in both their report venues, but reducing the frequency 
of passing and non-references to the standards. Additionally, firms may wish to differentiate 
themselves in terms of the frequency of CSR reporting. While each firm has supplemental 
websites and/or additional CSR-related materials, it is the CSR reports that are read by the CSR 
community, as it is the annual reports read by the investment community; firms should therefore 
 
 
be careful not to fragment their CSR efforts by reporting on their activities in different media 
without synthesizing it in a single comprehensive repository, which is what the CSR report is 
best positioned to do. Lastly, while each firm studied showed indications of improvements over 
time, the pace of that improvement did vary among financial institutions. For firms such as Bank 
Alpha, Bank Delta and especially Bank Echo, there is an opportunity to improve their 
performance to Bank Bravo and Bank Charlie performance levels. For Bank Bravo and Bank 
Charlie, to remain ahead of their rivals will be a challenge since these two firms lack a superior 
quality benchmark for which they may aspire; maintaining their lead will be difficult when the 
performance metrics of future CSR success remain ill-defined. 
Implications for CSR Researchers 
For CSR researchers, much effort has been spent on analyzing the content of CSR reports 
and related activities (Chapple and Moon, 2005; Reynolds and Yuthas, 2008; Vurro and Perrini, 
2011). While we concur that such analysis is important, and makes a valuable contribution to the 
social reporting literature, we suggest additional effort is merited in how frequently, and 
consistently, is that content reported. From our analysis, it would appear that there are many 
inconsistencies with regard to the nature and frequency of the CSR reporting by firms. Some 
firms are quick to join new CSR reporting standards, others slower and for some firms, they 
resist the actions of their rivals within the industry, suggesting a constraint on the isomorphic 
effects within the financial services sector as it pertains to corporate social responsibility 
reporting. Even when a firm undertakes to report according to a particular CSR standard, that 
reporting may be limited to their CSR reports and may or may not extend to inclusion in their 
annual reports; this phenomenon brings into question the institutional embeddedness of CSR 
activities. Further, once reporting has begun, it does not imply it will continue uninterrupted, as a 
number of firms displayed inconsistent reporting behavior regardless of the reporting standards 
which they employed; this is suggestive of changing perspectives with regard to emerging norms 
of CSR reporting activities. As a result, questions arise from an institutional theory perspective 
as to the impact CSR reporting has had on firm behavior. Further research is merited in this 
regard: to better assess the extent to which CSR values and principles are truly embedded within 
an organization, as opposed to merely articulated for public relations purposes.  
From an academic perspective, this paper contributes to the discussion about institutional 
isomorphism and firm behavior. While the literature has established that firms become more 
similar over time (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) while experiencing different firm responses to 
isomorphic pressures (Oliver, 1991; Jamali, 2010),  our findings suggest either of two 
possibilities: norms of CSR reporting activities are still developing and thus rival firms are not 
perceiving their own outlying behavior as being counter to established practice, or, firms are 
intentionally resisting isomorphic pressures in their CSR reporting activities because of 
perceived benefits from doing so. Further research is necessary to resolve this issue, and with the 





 The purpose of this paper was to improve our understanding of how CSR standards are 
implemented in the annual and CSR reporting activities of large firms. We chose the financial 
 
 
services sector in Canada because federally regulated banks with equity over a particular 
threshold must engage in CSR reporting by law; a condition that is evidently quite rare in 
international circles (Nikolaeva and Bicho, 2010). In our examination of five Canadian banks, 
we found both similarities and differences in terms of (a) the implementation of different CSR 
reporting standards; and (b) CSR reporting activity by firms. From the perspective of developing 
and embedding voluntary CSR reporting standards, we posited the following: 
 
• New CSR reporting standards are likely to be developed in the future; 
• Those reporting standards with business endorsements at launch are more readily adopted 
by firms than those that have fewer or no endorsements; and 
• Competition for endorsement by flagship firms will necessitate greater business 
partnership engagement. 
 
Consequently, we anticipate that the existing fragmented nature of CSR standards will eventually 
give way to an environment where a few CSR standards, such as the Equator Principles and the 
Global Reporting Initiative, are dominant, and other standards become marginalized or disappear 
altogether. 
 
From the viewpoint of financial institutions, we found that firms are, or have become, more alike 
in terms of their use of two of the three CSR reporting standards and the frequency with which 
they issue their annual and CSR reports. We also discovered that firms are unalike in the nature 
of their CSR activities; the quality of their CSR reporting; and the pace of their organizational 
learning and development. Given the newness of this organizational activity, we expect firm 
behavior to continue to evolve as norms become established and proliferate in regards to CSR 
reporting. However, much evidence exists of the rising impact of isomorphic pressures in the 
field of CSR reporting. For firms wishing to compete against their better positioned rivals, 
opportunities for effectively using social competition instead of, or in addition to, economic 
competition are shrinking with each passing year. 
 
We finally wish to acknowledge three particular limitations of this study. The first is in relation 
to the data sample. For the purposes of consistency, we only evaluated the CSR/public 
accountability reports and the annual reports for five institutions that were publicly available. 
While this did entail a sample of 125 reports, some financial institutions have referenced one or 
more of the CSR standards in topic-specific reports and websites. Internal, non-public reports 
may also exist. As we could not determine with certainty the population of these irregular 
reporting activities, we chose the more conservative approach of analyzing just those report types 
published by all firms and which are in the public domain. A second limitation relates to the 
ordinal scale for our assessment of each CSR or annual report. While we have applied the report 
assessment scale consistently across years and firms, scales that involve qualitative assessments 
are subjective, and therefore open to issues of inter rater reliability. A change in scale or rater 
could conceivably impact the outcome of the study. Last is that the study is confined to Canadian 
firms reporting in a mandatory CSR reporting regime. While such a scenario facilitated data 
access for this study, the results may not be generalizable to non-Canadian geographies, or for 





Table 1: Comparison of the Three CSR Reporting Standards 
 Equator 
Principles 










Revisions Yes, EP-1 2003; EP-2 2006, EP-3 2012. None. Yes, GRI-1 2000, GRI-2 in 2002 and GRI-G3 
issued in 2006. GRI-G4 published in 2013. 
Dimensions 1. Social and Environmental Risks 
2. Labor and Working Conditions 
3. Resource Efficiency and Pollution 
4. Community Health and Safety 
5.Land acquisition and involuntary 
resettlement 
6. Conservation of Biodiversity 
7. Indigenous People 
8. Local Cultural Heritage 
1 Human Rights 




1 Economic Performance 
2 Environmental Performance 
3 Social Performance 
3.1 Labor Practices 
3.2 Human Rights 
3.3 Society 





No No If the GRI report has been assured by a 
independent company the GRI permits the 
company to add a (+) to the either self-declared 
reporting level or adds a (+) if the report has been 




No Yes, GC “Notable COP 
program”. 
Yes, GRI Application Level. Permits reporting 
companies to either self-declare their reporting 
level or apply with GRI to get their reporting level 
checked and being approved (checked) by GRI. 
Members according 
to information 
provided by the 
Associations as of 
Jan 14th, 2013. 
78 signatories and 1 associate member. 10,000+ signatory 
members since inception 
in 2003 but not 
necessarily all are 
currently reporting 
members. 
2,047 organizations reported according to the GRI 
database in 2012. The entire database itself features 
4,868 organizations.  
There are more than 600 organizational 
stakeholders who are members of the GRI in 2012. 
Source: Authors, based on information provided by the three association’s websites retrieved in July, 2013. 
 
 
Table 2: Matrix of CSR Reporting Activity by Firms (2000 to 2004) 
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FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS, R&D INVESTMENT, AND THE VALUE OF CASH 
This Version: August 2013 
This paper investigates whether the relationship between financial constraints and the 
marginal value of corporate cash holdings varies across firms with and without R&D 
investment. We find that among firms with positive R&D investment the marginal value 
of cash is higher in financially constrained firms than unconstrained ones, whereas this 
difference is not significant among firms without R&D investment.  
 
Key words:  Value of Cash, Research and Development, Financial Constraints 





One important area of research in corporate finance is the impact of financial constraints on 
investment and financial policies. Capital market frictions increase the cost of external financing. 
Firms with great frictions in raising external financing (i.e. financially constrained) suffer from 
higher financing costs and may even miss some value-enhancing growth opportunities. As 
investment and financial policies are naturally intertwined, firms may adjust their financial 
management to attenuate the negative impacts of financial constraints. Liquidity management, in 
particular corporate cash holdings, has been studied by several recent papers. Almeida, Campello, 
and Weisbach (2004) find that financially constrained firms have higher propensity to save cash 
out of cash flows. Faulkender and Wang (2006) find that cash holdings are more valuable for 
financially constrained firms than for unconstrained firms. Together, these studies show that 
hoarding cash is a value-increasing activity for constrained firms.  
 
Our study aims to extend this literature by examining whether the relationship between financial 
constraints and value of cash holdings would vary across firms with different involvement in 
R&D activity. This question is important for several reasons. First, the literature indicates a 
 
strong link among financial constraints, investment, and financial policies, so it is interesting to 
consider these three components jointly. Further, relative to physical investments measured by 
capital expenditure, R&D investment has some unique features, including high information 
asymmetry, lack of collateral and high adjustment costs, that indicate a more important role of 
cash holdings on investments. In particular, Brown and Petersen (2011) provide empirical 
evidence that financially constrained firms use their cash holdings to help smooth R&D in spite 
of volatile and limited sources of external and internal financing.  
 
We apply an extended version of the empirical methodology designed by Faulkender and Wang 
(2006) to a sample of publicly listed manufacturing firms in the United States over the period of 
1972-2007. We split the sample into firms with and without R&D investment and examine the 
relationship between financial constrained and the value of cash in these subgroups respectively. 
For firms with positive R&D investment, we find that the value of an additional dollar of cash is 
higher for financially constrained firm than for unconstrained firms, and this relationship 
becomes economically and statistically significant in the second period (1984-1995) and third 
period (1996-2007). On the other hand, for firms without R&D investment, the difference in not 
significant for all three periods. These findings are robust to alternative measures used to classify 
firms into financially constrained and unconstrained firms. 
 
This study is related to several strands of literature. First, this paper is directly linked to Brown 
and Petersen (2011). Using dynamic R&D models, Brown and Petersen (2011) find empirical 
evidence that firms most likely to face financial constraints rely on cash holdings to smooth R&D 
investment, while financially unconstrained firms do not. As maintaining a smooth path of R&D 
investment is important due to the high cost of adjustment, their empirical finding implies that 
among firms with R&D investment cash holdings should be more valuable for financially 
constrained ones than for unconstrained firms. This implication is directly tested and supported 
by our paper. Second, this paper also contributes to the literature on financial constraints. 
Although existing studies have examined the relationship between financial constraints and the 
value of cash holdings, our paper moves one step further, investigating whether this relationship 
varies according to the nature of investment. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and 
develops testing hypotheses. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology and data. Empirical 




2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
A large literature in corporate finance examines how financial constraints, i.e. the frictions in 
access to external capital markets, influence corporate investments and financial policies. The 
seminal paper, Fazzari et al. (1998) focuses on investments, and proposes that when a firm is 
more likely to be financially constrained its investment will vary with the availability of internal 
funds, instead of just with the availability of positive NPV projects. Hence, the investment to cash 
flow sensitivity will increase with the degree of financial constraints. Although their work has 
 
been challenged on both theoretical grounds (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Povel and Raith, 2001) 
and empirical grounds (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Cleary, 1999; Erickson and Whited, 2000), 
their insight on the importance of financial constraints to corporate finance decisions is far-
reaching.  
 
On investigating the value of corporate cash holdings, Faulkender and Wang (2006) find that an 
additional dollar of cash holdings is more valuable for shareholders in financially constrained 
firms than for unconstrained firms. This finding can be attributed to two reasons. First, holding 
cash can help firms avoid the high cost of external financing. Second and more important, cash 
reserves allow firms to take value-increasing investment opportunities when other sources of 
financing are costly or limited. Denis and Sibilkov (2011) examine whether the difference in the 
value of cash between constrained and unconstrained firms is related to investment policy and 
find empirical evidence to support the second reason. 
 
Although the aforementioned studies indicate a strong link among financial constraints, 
investment, and value of cash holdings, their focus is on physical investment as measured by 
capital expenditure, ignoring research and development (R&D), another important type of 
investment.  Especially, Brown, Fazzari and Petersen (2009) show that R&D investment has 
increased significantly in the United States since 1980s and has become the principal investment 
for many public firms.  
 
Compared to physical investment, R&D investment has some unique features (see Hall (2002) for 
a more detailed literature review). First, the nature of R&D prevents outsiders from making 
accurate assessment about its likelihood of success and the value of the innovative project. Firms 
have less incentive to reduce this high information asymmetry due to strategic concerns that 
competitors can imitate the innovative ideas. The difficulty of access risk characteristics and 
default probabilities, along with the lack of collateral, implies the difficulty to finance R&D 
through debt markets. Meanwhile, the high information asymmetry indicates high cost of equity 
financing a la Myers and Majluf (1984). Second, a sizable portion of R&D spending is the 
salaries of highly trained scientists and engineers, and the knowledge accumulated through R&D 
investment is embedded in the human capital of these R&D workers. Hence, R&D investment 
involves high adjustment costs as the adjustment tends to involve layoffs and rehires. Rehiring 
involves high training costs to build up proper knowledge. Further, knowing proprietary 
information, fired workers are able to transmit valuable knowledge to competitors. To avoid or 
minimize these high adjustment costs, firms tend to maintain a smooth level of R&D investment.  
 
Due to these unique features of R&D investment, the relationship between financial constraints 
and the value of cash holdings may be different between firms with and without R&D investment. 
Hence, we propose the following two hypotheses to test in this paper.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Among firms with R&D spending, cash holding is more valuable for financially 
constrained firms than for financially unconstrained firms. 
 
This hypothesis is based on the following three reasons. For firms with R&D spending, cash 
holdings is more valuable for financially constrained firms as it helps them avoid the high cost 
 
and limited access of external financing that is mainly driven by information asymmetry. 
Furthermore, R&D projects tend to have high-risk and high-return. Cash holding is more valuable 
for financially constrained firms as it helps them avoid missing potentially value-increasing 
projects. Last but not least, Brown and Petersen (2011) find empirical evidence that financially 
constrained firms rely extensively on cash holdings to smooth R&D, while financially 
unconstrained firms do not. Hence, cash holdings should be more valuable for financial 
constrained firms as it is essential for R&D smoothing.    
 
Compared with firms relying on R&D investment, the level of information asymmetry between 
insiders and outside investors is less severe for firms without R&D investment, so external 
financing may be less costly. Further, the growth opportunities of these firms are based on 
physical investments, which can be used as collateral for debt financing in the future. Based on 
these, we reach the following hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Compared to firms with R&D spending, the relation between financial constraints 
and the value of cash is weaker among firms without R&D spending. 
 
 
3. Methodology and Data 
 
3.1 Empirical Methodology  
 
To examine the difference in the marginal value of cash between positive-R&D firms and zero-
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This methodology is essentially a long-run event study, investigating the impact of the change in 
corporate cash holdings on a firm’s valuation over the event window of a fiscal year. The 
dependent variable is the excess return for firm i over fiscal year t, computed as stock i’s return 
minus the return of stock i’s benchmark portfolio over fiscal year t. The benchmark portfolios are 
the twenty-five Fama and French portfolios, formed by an independent sort of stocks on their size 
and book-to-market characteristics. The benchmark returns are used to control for the variation in 
the discount rate due to its sensitivity to time-varying risk factors. 
 
 
Besides the change in cash holdings, the independent variables also include the changes in the 
firm’s profitability (measured by earnings before extraordinary items), investment policy 
(including net assets and R&D expenditures), and financial policy (including interest expense, 
dividends, leverage, and net financing). Except for leverage, all the independent variables are 
scaled by the lagged market value of equity (Mi,t-1). Since the dependent variable can be rewritten 
as the change in the market valuation of equity divide by the lagged market value, the coefficient 
estimates can be interpreted directly as the value that shareholders place on a one-dollar change in 
the related independent variables. The independent variables also include the interaction terms of 
the change in cash with lagged cash and leverage, since the marginal value of cash to 
shareholders may decrease with the firm’s existing cash position and the level of leverage.  
 
To investigate the difference in the value of cash between financially constrained and 
unconstrained firms, we include an indicatory variable (Constrained) equal to 1 for firms that are 
more likely to be financially constrained, and an interaction term between the change in cash and 
this indicator variable. The coefficient estimate on this interaction term ( 1g ) directly represents 
the difference in the marginal value of cash between financially constrained and unconstrained 
firms. The regression model is estimated with industry and year fixed effects. As suggested by 
Petersen (2009), robust standard errors clustered by firm are used to account for within-firm 
correlation of the error terms, i.e. the observations are assumed to be independent across firms, 
but not within firms.  
 
3.2 Data  
 
The base sample contains all U.S. publicly traded firms in the CRSP-Compustat merged database 
(Fundamental Annual) over the period of 1972-2007. We only keep manufacturing firms (SIC 
2000-3999) in this study as most corporate R&D occurs in this sector and the literature on 
financial constrains tends to focus on this sector. Firm-year observations are deleted if there is 
missing value for any of the variables in equation (1). All the variables are winsorized at the one 
percent tails to reduce the effect of outliers. The sample screening leaves an unbalanced panel of 
53,184 firm-year observations.   
 
We divide the sample into three sample periods of equal length: 1972-1983, 1984-1995, and 
1996-2007. According to whether a firm reports positive R&D in each given sample period, we 
divide the firms into ‘positive R&D’ and ‘no R&D’ subsamples. We use firm age, the number of 
years since the firm appeared on Compustat with a non-missing stock price, as our primary 
criterion to classify financially constrained and unconstrained firms. Firm age has been associated 
with financial constraints in the literature (Rauh 2006; Fee et al. 2009). Hadlock and Pierce (2010) 
collect detailed qualitative information on financial constraints from financial filings. They find 
that firm age and size are two most useful predictors of financing constraint level based on 
qualitative information. Moreover, these two measures are less endogeneous than other measures. 
As younger firms are more likely to be financially constrained, a firm is classified as ‘constrained’ 
if its age is a given year is less than or equal to ten years.  
 
Table 1 provides the summary statistics for each subsample. For firms with positive R&D 
spending, young firms tend to hold more cash than mature firms. The difference is very 
 
significant in the second and third periods, with both mean and median ratios of cash to total 
assets significantly higher for young firms. This is consistent with the literature that firms 
classified as financially constrained tend to hold more cash (Almeida et al. 2004; Faulkendar and 
Wang, 2006; Denis and Sibilkov, 2011). We also notice that young firms’ R&D investment is 
more intensive than mature firms in all three periods. Moreover, both mean and median R&D 
investment ratios increase considerably for young firms, while the increase is less significant for 
mature firms. The sample of firms without R&D investment is smaller than the sample of firms 
with positive R&D. Compared to positive R&D firms, firms without R&D tend to hold less cash 
and the difference, in both mean and median, has widened over time. Moreover, mean and 
median cash ratios are very similar for young and mature firms in all three periods.  
 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
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4. Empirical Results and Analysis 
 
4.1 Young Firms vs. Mature Firms  
 
Table 2 and Table 3 report the estimates of regression model (1) when firm age is used to classify 
firms into financially constrained and unconstrained groups.  
 
In Table 2, the first column contains the regression result for the whole sample. The coefficient 
estimate of the interaction term between constrained dummy and the change in cash is positive 
and statistically significant at 1% level. This indicates that shareholders put a higher marginal 
value on the cash holdings of young firms than on the cash of mature firms. This result is 
consistent with previous studies that show cash is more valuable for financially constrained firms 





Table 2:  Firm Age and the Value of Cash 
Constrained according to Age 1972-2007 1972-1983 1984-1995 1996-2007 
Constrained*Change in cash 0.154 0.036 0.246 0.211 
 
(0.001) (0.570) (0.002) (0.027) 
Constrained -0.020 -0.006 -0.025 -0.031 
 
(0.000) (0.444) (0.001) (0.001) 
Change in cash 1.530 1.128 1.412 1.952 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Change in earnings 0.508 0.517 0.488 0.517 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Change in net assets 0.212 0.162 0.248 0.246 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Change in R&D 1.109 1.400 1.270 0.687 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Change in interests -1.671 -1.619 -1.619 -1.868 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Change in dividends 3.252 4.293 3.509 1.613 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) 
Lagged cash  0.276 0.260 0.256 0.328 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.502 -0.415 -0.535 -0.564 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Net financing  0.031 0.030 0.049 -0.032 
 
(0.054) (0.185) (0.104) (0.387) 
Change in cash*lagged cash -0.914 -0.682 -0.909 -1.292 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Change in cash*leverage -1.596 -1.098 -1.353 -1.780 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant  0.231 0.190 0.104 0.128 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 53,184 17,417 18,838 16,929 
Adj. R-squared 0.220 0.242 0.220 0.219 
This table reports the results of regression model (1) for the full sample period of 1972-2007 and three sub-
periods of equal length. In this table, we use firm age to classify firms into financially constrained and 
unconstrained groups. Constrained is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if a firm’s age is less than or 
equal to ten years. All specifications include year fixed effects and industry fixed effects. The standard 
errors are adjusted for clustering on firms. P-values are reported in parentheses. For each regression, 
adjusted R2 is reported. 
 
 
To examine whether this relation varies over time, we conduct the test in each period and report 
the results in Columns [2]-[4].  For all three periods, the coefficient estimate of the interaction 
term between constrained dummy and the change in cash is positive, but it is statistically and 
economically significant for the second period (1984-1995) and third period (1996-2007). For 
 
economical interpretation, the coefficient estimates of this interaction term imply that the 
marginal value of cash is about 25 cents higher for young firms than for mature firms during 
1984-1995, and the difference is about 21 cents during 1996-2007. These findings are related to 
the new listing effect proposed in Fama and French (2004). Firms that went public in the 1980s 
and 1990s tend to have more growth opportunities and are less profitable than earlier firms. This 
implies that young firms in the second and third periods may face more severe financial 
constraints. Therefore, the importance of cash holdings for young firms, as a means of internal 
financing, is acknowledged by investors through higher market valuation.  
 
To examine whether the relation between financial constraints and the value of cash varies across 
firms with and without R&D investment, Table 3 provides estimates of regression (1) for these 
two groups respectively in each of the three periods. We focus our analysis on the second and 
third time periods as the new listing effect leads to a stronger contrast between young firms and 
mature firms in terms of the likelihood to be financially constrained. 
 
For firms with positive R&D spending, the coefficient estimates on the interaction term between 
constrained dummy and the change in cash are positive (0.293 for 1984-1995 period and 0.284 
for 1996-2007 period) and statistically significant at 1% level. This finding supports our first 
hypothesis. The value of coefficient estimates on this interaction term implies that among those 
firms with positive R&D spending the marginal value of cash is about 28 to 29 cents higher in 
young firms than in mature firms. This finding is directly related to Brown and Petersen (2011), 
that young firms use cash reserves to smooth their R&D investment while mature firms can rely 
on other sources for financing. The summary statistics in Table 1 shows that R&D investment is 
more intensive in young firms than mature firms. Hence, for those firms with R&D investment, 
cash should be more valuable for young firms as it is essential to their investment and growth by 
avoiding cutting R&D and missing growth opportunities. In this sense, our analysis supports the 
view that a policy of great cash retention by young firms with R&D investment tends to be a 
value-enhancing policy.   
 
On the other hand, the coefficient estimates on the interaction term between constrained dummy 
and the change in cash are statistically insignificant for firms without R&D spending. Compared 
to the statistically and economically significant relationship between financial constraints and the 
value of cash among firms with R&D investment, this finding here implies a weak relationship 
between the value of cash and financial constraints (measured by firm age here) when firms are 





Table 3:  Firm Age, R&D, and the Value of Cash 
  1972-1983 1984-1995 1996-2007 














Constrained*Change in cash 0.087 -0.015 0.293 0.104 0.284 -0.102 
 
(0.281) (0.884) (0.001) (0.483) (0.009) (0.619) 
Constrained -0.005 -0.010 -0.036 0.000 -0.044 0.008 
 
(0.600) (0.414) (0.000) (0.969) (0.000) (0.622) 
Change in cash 1.151 0.970 1.484 0.982 2.021 1.558 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Change in earnings 0.584 0.412 0.519 0.425 0.533 0.487 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Change in net assets 0.181 0.134 0.248 0.244 0.283 0.189 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Change in R&D 1.407 1.227 1.313 2.158 0.695 2.369 
 
(0.000) (0.362) (0.000) (0.338) (0.003) (0.314) 
Change in interests -1.975 -1.100 -1.701 -1.478 -1.939 -1.521 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Change in dividends 3.689 5.306 2.746 4.697 0.426 3.306 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.640) (0.000) 
Lagged cash  0.266 0.243 0.295 0.148 0.368 0.187 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.003) 
Leverage -0.426 -0.390 -0.563 -0.498 -0.604 -0.529 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Net financing  0.023 0.036 0.071 -0.004 -0.057 -0.030 
 
(0.434) (0.323) (0.076) (0.931) (0.214) (0.599) 
Change in cash*lagged cash -0.726 -0.547 -0.997 -0.604 -1.425 -0.753 
 
(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.034) (0.000) (0.015) 
Change in cash*leverage -1.068 -0.982 -1.357 -0.806 -1.638 -1.572 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.001) 
Constant  0.172 0.232 0.043 0.168 0.100 0.175 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.233) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Observations 12,603 4,814 13,585 5,253 12,858 4,071 
Adj. R-squared 0.247 0.235 0.228 0.224 0.223 0.237 
This table reports the results of regression model (1) for firms with and without R&D investment 
respectively during three sub-periods of equal length. In this table, we use firm age to classify firms into 
financially constrained and unconstrained groups. 'Constrained is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if a 
firm’s age is less than or equal to ten years. All specifications include year fixed effects and industry fixed 
effects. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering on firms. P-values are reported in parentheses. For 





4.2 Alternative Measures of Financial constraints  
 
We further perform the analysis based on several alternative approaches for sorting firms into 
groups more or less likely to face financial constraints (Fazzari et al. 1988; Gilchrist and 
Himmelberg, 1995; Almeida et al. 2004; Faulkender and Wang, 2006; Rauh 2006; Fee et al. 2009; 
Dennis and Sibilkov, 2011; etc.).  
· Payout. Compared to financially constrained firms, unconstrained firms are more likely to 
distribute cash to their investors. We assign those firms with positive cash payout, defined as 
cash dividends plus stock buybacks minus stock issuances, to the financially unconstrained 
group. Firms with zero or negative cash payout are classified as constrained.  
· Dividend payment. Although share repurchase has become a popular way to distribute cash to 
shareholders, it is used by some firms to management earnings, offset stock option dilution, 
etc. (Brav, et al., 2005) Hence, using payout to classify firms may introduce some noise. To 
address this issue, we classify firms according to its annual cash dividend payment. Firms 
without cash dividends are assigned to financially constrained group, while firms with 
positive cash dividends are classified as unconstrained.  
· Firm size. In general smaller firms are younger and less known in capital markets, so they 
tend to suffer more from capital market imperfections. We split firms into large and small 
size groups based on their sales at the end of the previous fiscal year. Those firms in the top 
three deciles of the firm size distribution are classified as the unconstrained group. Firms in 
the other deciles are classified as constrained.  
· Bond ratings. Bond ratings stand for the market’s assessment of a firm’s credit quality since a 
firm need to reach a certain quality before the risk associated with information asymmetry is 
low enough to make bond issuance feasible. We split firms based on whether or not a bond 
rating (S&P long-term senior debt rating) is reported in Compustat and categorize those firms 
that did not have their public debt rated as financially constrained. 
 
 
Table 4:  Correlation of Various Classifications of Financial Constraints 
                                         Financial constraints criteria 
  Age  Dividend Payout Size 
Dividend 0.374       
 
(0.000) 




  Size 0.351 0.433 0.348 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 Bond Rating 0.247 0.339 0.264 0.630 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    Correlation coefficient estimates are reported with p-values in parentheses below.  
 
Table 4 reports Pearson’s correlation coefficients for these four alternative measures of financial 
constraints, as well as firm age. All correlation coefficient estimates are positive and statistically 
significant at 1% level, indicating that these measures capture some common information about 
 
financial constraints. The correlation coefficient estimates range from 0.247 to 0.741, implying 
that each measure may contain some unique information as well. Therefore, we conduct further 




Table 5: Alternative Financial Constraints Measures and the Value of Cash 
  1984-1995 
 


















Constrained*Change in cash 0.355 -0.106 0.439 -0.038 0.320 0.182 0.210 0.168 
 
(0.000) (0.436) (0.000) (0.805) (0.002) (0.191) (0.067) (0.315) 
Constrained 0.039 0.035 -0.002 0.039 -0.022 -0.002 -0.044 -0.003 
 
(0.000) (0.015) (0.823) (0.007) (0.013) (0.893) (0.000) (0.807) 
Change in cash 1.411 1.106 1.334 1.062 1.416 0.888 1.526 0.928 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Change in cash*lagged cash -0.977 -0.595 -1.055 -0.593 -1.036 -0.609 -1.029 -0.584 
 
(0.000) (0.031) (0.000) (0.033) (0.000) (0.031) (0.000) (0.047) 
Change in cash*leverage -1.522 -0.823 -1.516 -0.833 -1.443 -0.788 -1.539 -0.809 
 
(0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.012) 
Observations 13,585 5,253 13,585 5,253 13,585 5,253 12,701 4,881 
Adj. R-squared 0.228 0.225 0.227 0.225 0.227 0.224 0.227 0.225 
           1996-2007 
 


















Constrained*Change in cash 0.148 0.028 0.236 -0.314 0.331 -0.353 0.249 -0.054 
 
(0.214) (0.883) (0.090) (0.186) (0.027) (0.104) (0.091) (0.796) 
Constrained 0.029 0.045 -0.053 0.019 -0.104 -0.092 -0.125 -0.091 
 (0.005) (0.015) (0.000) (0.268) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Change in cash 2.050 1.471 1.966 1.700 1.868 1.810 1.926 1.548 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Change in cash*lagged cash -1.360 -0.714 -1.369 -0.689 -1.372 -0.673 -1.333 -0.718 
 
(0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.029) (0.000) (0.036) (0.000) (0.022) 
Change in cash*leverage -1.730 -1.543 -1.735 -1.441 -1.642 -1.738 -1.664 -1.620 
 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Observations 12,858 4,071 12,858 4,071 12,858 4,071 12,858 4,071 
Adj. R-squared 0.221 0.238 0.222 0.238 0.226 0.244 0.227 0.241 
This table reports the results of regression model (1) for firms with and without R&D investment 
respectively during three sub-periods of equal length. We use four alternative criteria, payout, 
dividend, size and bond ratings, to classify firms into financially constrained and unconstrained 
groups. See the text for definitions of criteria used to classify firm into financially constrained and 
 
unconstrained groups. Constrained is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if a firm is classified 
as more likely to be financially constrained according to a given criterion. All specifications 
include year fixed effects and industry fixed effects. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering 
on firms. P-values are reported in parentheses. For each regression, adjusted R2 is reported. 
 
 
We estimate the regression model (1) for each subsample respectively. However, to conserve 
space, we only report in Table 5 coefficient estimates on those items that are related to cash 
holdings. The results for the second period (1984-1995) and the final period (1996-2007), based 
on each of these four alternative criteria, are reported in Table 5. The results are very similar to 
results from the young vs. mature firms split documented in Table 2. More specifically, for firms 
with positive R&D spending, the coefficient estimates for the interaction of the financial 
constraints dummy with the change in cash is positive and statistically significant for all 
alternative criteria of financial constraints. The only exception is for the 1996-2007 period when 
payout is used to measure financial constraint. The coefficient estimates imply that the marginal 
value of cash holdings is between 21 and 44 cents higher for financially constrained firms than 
for financially unconstrained firms in 1984-1995 period, or between 15 and 33 cents higher for 
financially constrained firms in 1996-2007 period. For firms without R&D investment, the 
coefficient estimate of the interaction term between financial constraints dummy variable and the 
change in cash is statistically insignificant. This indicates a weak relationship between financial 
constraints and the value of cash among zero R&D firms.  
 
Overall, the results documented in Table 5 provide further support for our testing hypotheses as 
our results are robust to alternative approaches for sorting firms into groups more or less likely to 





This paper investigates the relationship between financial constraints and the value of cash 
holdings for firms with and without R&D investment respectively. We find that the value of cash 
is higher in financially constrained firms than unconstrained firms among firms with positive 
R&D, whereas this difference in the value of cash holdings across firms with different levels of 
financial constraints is not significant among firms without R&D investment.  
 
The findings in our paper show that the importance of cash holdings for financially constrained 
firms varies according to the nature of investment. The unique features of R&D investment 
indicate a more important role of cash holdings in financial management, especially for 
financially constrained firms (Brown and Petersen, 2011). This paper shows that accumulating 
cash is a value-increasing activity for constrained firms with positive R&D. To some extent, our 
finding is also consistent with Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009). They identify a secular increase in 
corporate cash holdings over recent decades and attribute this partially to increasing R&D 
intensity. Our paper shows that cash holdings have increased sharply for firms with R&D 
investment, among which the level and the marginal value of cash holdings are always higher for 
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This study focuses on the market reaction to information transfers from 
economically linked customers. I examine whether investors have limited 
attention with respect to the information contained in customer earnings 
announcements for suppliers. Using 1,083 unique customer-supplier 
relationships for the period 1983–2011, I find that the cumulative abnormal 
returns of a supplier surrounding and following linked customers’ earnings 
announcements are positively related to earnings information of the 
customers. The results provide evidence that customer earnings 
announcements convey information for suppliers, suggesting that limited 
investor attention to customer-supplier information transfers from earnings 
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Introduction 
 This study aims to identify predictable returns by using ex ante economic links between 
customers and suppliers. Recent studies on the limited investor attention hypothesis, 2 which state that 
investors’ limited attention to the arrival of new information causes return anomalies, show that 
investor inattention is more likely when a large number of same-day earnings announcements are 
made by other firms (Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh, 2009) or where there are a large number of Friday 
earnings announcements (Dellavigna and Pollet, 2009). Investor inattention is also more likely when 
publicly available information about economically linked firms is neglected (Cohen and Frazzini, 
2008). More importantly, evidence on the limited attention to economically linked firms suggests that 
information diffuses from customers to suppliers, generating predictable returns across linked assets.  
In this paper, I examine whether investors have limited attention with respect to the 
information contained in customer earnings announcements for suppliers. More specifically, I 
investigate the immediate responsiveness of a firm’s abnormal returns surrounding the announcement 
dates of its linked customers as well as the delayed responsiveness of stock returns following the 
linked customers’ earnings announcements. The disclosure of customer-supplier links between firms 
was required according to Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 14 before 1997 
and based on SFAS No. 131 after 1997, and this information is available for public use. When news 
about a linked firm is released into the market, the stock price of the supplier firm should respond 
immediately to that news if investors consider these ex ante links. On the other hand, if investors pay 
limited attention to such links, the stock price of the supplier will react slowly to the linked firm’s 
earnings news, and delayed abnormal returns can be expected. As a result, limited investor attention 
to a linked firm’s announcements (i.e., a customer’s unexpected earnings news3) leads to market 
underreactions.  
Through the use of 1,083 unique customer-supplier relationships between 1983 and 2011, I 
find that the cumulative abnormal returns of a supplier surrounding and following linked customers’ 
earnings announcements are positively related to unexpected earnings news of the customers. The 
findings indicate that there is a direct immediate relation between supplier returns and customer 
earnings surprises, and customer earnings surprises are positively related to post-customer earnings 
announcement supplier returns. Additionally, these results are robust to controlling the timing and 
order of the earnings announcement, same-industry effect, and the ratios of firm size, sales, and 
returns4  of linked customers to suppliers, and with respect to the delayed returns over different 
horizons. Because customer-supplier links between firms are typically associated with information 
transfer, the main results suggest that limited investor attention to the arrival of new information about 
economically linked firms generates abnormal stock returns. 
The limited investor attention hypothesis by Cohen and Frazzini (2008) argues that customer 
returns predict future supplier’s returns because investors pay limited attention to the customer-
supplier link. To identify what role, if any, customer earnings surprises play in the customer-supplier 
return predictability, I further examine the effect of customer earnings surprises on the customer-
supplier returns and find the positive enhancing effect of customer earnings surprises in the 
relationship between customer returns and supplier returns. The evidence supports the notion that 
investor’s underreaction to the customer’s earnings surprise leads to a drift in the customer’s post-
earnings announcement returns (Bernard and Thomas, 1989), which in turn is reflected in the 
supplier’s returns due to the limited attention hypothesis. It also provides strong support that the 
customer’s earnings surprise is a predominant source of the cross-firm return predictability.  
                                                          
2 The limited attention hypothesis by Cohen and Frazzini (2008) states that stock prices underreact to firm-
specific information that induces changes in the valuation of related firms, generating return predictability 
across assets. In particular, stock prices underreact to negative (positive) news involving related firms and, in 
turn, generate negative (positive) price drift. 
3
 Unexpected earnings news, unexpected earnings, earnings surprises, earnings news, and earnings-related 
information are exchangeable terms used in the paper. 
4
 Cohen and Frazzini (2008) provide evidence of return predictability across economically linked firms. 
 
The paper contributes to existing literature in several ways. First, the paper adds to the 
growing stream of studies on the implications of limited attention for stock returns. Cohen and 
Frazzini (2008) examine how investors’ limited attention to economically related firms leads to 
predictable future stock returns by testing “customer momentum,” which is defined as a monthly 
strategy of buying firms whose customers had the most positive returns in the previous month and 
selling firms whose customers had the most negative returns in the previous month. If investors pay 
limited attention to the stock returns of economically linked firms, one would expect investors also to 
be inattentive to earnings-related information from such firms. Consequently, I hypothesize that 
market underreactions for suppliers are related to limited investor attention to earnings 
announcements by economically linked customers. I test this hypothesis by examining immediate 
(delayed) market reactions surrounding (following) earnings announcements by economically linked 
customers. Though most studies investigate market reactions around the time of a firm’s own earnings 
announcements,5 I focus on market reactions around the time of earnings announcements by related 
firms because investors tend to ignore the publicly available link between suppliers and economically 
related customers. That is, investors are inattentive to customer-supplier links, and thus, stock returns 
are predictable. 
Second, this study provides a new insight into information diffusion. The customer-supplier 
links between firms are longstanding public relationships. Thus, the earnings information released by 
customers is closely related to the earnings information for suppliers. Prior studies have shown that 
one firm’s earnings news can be useful in updating earnings expectations for other firms in the 
industry. 6  For instance, Ramnath (2002) examines intra-industry information diffusion by 
investigating the market reaction experienced by a firm that announces its earnings subsequent to the 
first announcing firm in the same industry when the earnings of the latter is unexpected. A recent 
study by Kovacs (2011) further shows that the firm’s post-earnings announcement drift is driven by 
information diffusion from subsequent-announcing industry peers. If earnings information is 
transferred from other firms in the industry, one would also expect that investors perceive the 
earnings-related information from the economically related announcing-customers to be useful in 
updating their expectations for suppliers, and thus earnings information to be transferred from 
economically related firms. I find that the immediate and delayed returns of a supplier7 surrounding 
and following customers’ earnings announcements are positively related to customers’ unexpected 
earnings, confirming that customer earnings announcements convey information for suppliers.   
Related Studies and Hypotheses 
Limited Investor Attention  
This paper builds on the finance literature on limited investor attention and its effects on 
financial markets. Recent empirical studies have related limited investor attention to asymmetric 
selling behavior (Barber and Odean, 2008), demographic shifts (Dellavigna and Pollet, 2007), and 
relevant information at the time of previous extraneous news (Huberman and Regev, 2001). Using 
share turnover as a proxy for investor attention, Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2009) show that price 
underreaction to earnings news is weak when investors are attentive, but the price drift caused by 
investors’ overreaction is strong with investor attention. In the same vein, Loh (2010) finds that 
                                                          
5  Koch and Sun (2004) test announcement reactions around the firm’s subsequent dividend changes, 
conditioning on the sign of the firm’s unexpected earnings. Kovacs (2011) examines the effect of same-industry 
peers’ earnings announcements on the post-earnings announcement drift. Cohen and Frazzini (2008) investigate 
market reactions to news about related firms but do not relate the phenomenon to the price response of suppliers 
around (after) the customer’s earnings announcement. 
6  Earnings-related information transfers in the industry examined in prior studies include, among others, 
Freeman and Tse (1992), Ramnath (2002), and Kovacs (2011). 
7
 On the basis of Regulation SFAS No. 131, it is the suppliers that need to report the identity of customers 
representing more than 10% of their total sales in interim financial reports issued to shareholders. As a result, 
customers are much larger firms than their suppliers. Thus, the customer is important to suppliers based on 
sales. However, there is no information available about how important the supplier is to the customer.  
Therefore, this study only focuses on the effects of customer earnings surprises on supplier returns. 
 
investor inattention and the underreaction to stock recommendations lead to postrecommendation 
drift. In contrast, Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011) use the Google search volume index (SVI) as a 
proxy for investor attention and show stronger price momentum among stocks with higher levels of 
SVI. Yuan (2012) finds that high market-wide attention generates heavy trading and price changes by 
analyzing the ability of market-wide attention-grabbing events, which are measured as record-
breaking events for the Dow index and front-page articles about the stock market. Bae and Wang 
(2012) investigate whether the China-name affects investor attention and firm value and find that the 
returns of China-name stocks are, on average, more than 100% higher than those of non-China-name 
stocks. Bae and Wang attribute this phenomenon to increased investor attention to China-name stocks 
after controlling for alternative measures of investor attention, such as Wall Street Journal news 
coverage, abnormal trading volume, extreme past one-day returns, and the Google SVI. In addition, 
Gilbert, Kogan, Lochstoer, and Ozyildirim (2012) use the U.S. Leading Economic Index as a proxy 
for the stale information and find that investor inattention to the stale nature of information causes 
return anomalies. 
The literature also discusses theoretical approaches to modeling limited investor attention. For 
instance, Merton (1987) suggests that higher expected stock returns are obtained from lesser-known 
stocks with smaller investors. Hong and Stein (1999) suggest that investor profit from trading on 
information is gradually transferred across the population if the information is helpful in predicting 
future outcomes. Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) model how investors’ inattention to accounting reports 
can lead to the misvaluation of stocks. Peng and Xiong (2006) demonstrate that investors are more 
likely to respond to market- and industry-wide information than they are to consider firm-specific 
information, which makes cross-sectional returns predictable. Finally, Peng (2005) develops a model 
in which the learning process for investors is optimally allocated when they have a limited capacity 
for information processing. Peng further predicts that mispricing is related to the speed with which 
investors process information about large or small firms.  
Information Transfers 
Several studies also focus on the role of information transfer in the prediction of future stock 
returns. For instance, Ramnath (2002) finds that the response to subsequent announcing firms around 
the first announcing date in the industry is positive when the earnings of the first announcing firm are 
unexpected. The underreaction, in turn, leads to predictable stock returns for subsequent announcers 
in the same industry. In the same vein, Hong, Torous, and Valkanov (2007) suggest that some 
industries predict future stock market returns. A recent study by Desir (2013) documents that 
managers of non-announcing firms are more likely to disclose good news to minimize the impact of 
negative information transfers from their industry competitors. Both Cohen and Frazzini (2008) and 
Menzly and Ozbas (2010) find that individual customer returns generate predictable future supplier 
returns. The former focuses more broadly on customer-supplier links. By contrast, the latter examines 
specific inter- and intra-industry relations.  
In addition, Prokopczuk (2010) reports strong evidence that earnings news leads to a 
substantial contagion effect in the banking industry, but outside that industry, the magnitude of the 
contagion effect is positively related to the bank size and the size of the reporting news. Similarly, 
Jorion and Zhang (2012) investigate information transfer effects of bond rating downgrades and find 
evidence of a predominant contagion effect for investment-grade firms. A recent study by Cai, Song, 
and Walkling (2011) finds strong evidence that bidder abnormal returns are positively related to the 
degree of surprise associated with a bid announcement, and the prices of rival firms adjust at the time 
of an initial industry bid, suggesting the transfer of bid-related information through industry channels. 
Using the degree of accessibility of foreign investors to emerging stock markets as a proxy for 
investibility of foreign investments, Bae, Ozoguz, Tan, and Wirjanto (2012) find that greater 
investibility is associated with faster diffusion of global market information across stocks in emerging 
markets. 
On the other hand, recent studies have shown that information transfers play an important role 
in the post-earnings announcement drift. Among others, Kovacs (2011) presents strong evidence that 
subsequent same-industry earnings announcements are related to a firm’s post-earnings 
 
announcement drift. Hou (2007) argues that industry information transfer from large firms to small 
firms contributes to the post-earnings announcement drift. 
Hypothesis Development 
My study is distinct from these other articles in that I analyze earnings-related information 
diffusion from customers to suppliers. That is, I test how a supplier’s abnormal returns around the 
customers’ earnings announcement date react to the unexpected earnings by linked customers. In a 
closely related paper, Cohen and Frazzini (2008) examine how limited investor attention to 
economically related firms leads to predictable future stock returns, whereas Ramnath (2002) 
investigates investor and analyst reactions to earnings announcements by related firms in the industry. 
A recent study by Kovacs (2011) further shows that the firm’s post-earnings announcement drift is 
driven by information diffusion from subsequent-announcing firms in the same industry. If the 
corresponding price drift of the firm can be predicted based on earnings-related information from 
subsequent-announcing firms in the same industry, one would expect the stock price reactions of the 
firm surrounding the earnings report date of related firms to reflect this information. Therefore, 
investors can incorporate the information from linked customers’ earnings announcements into their 
expectations for suppliers. In an efficient market, one would expect the immediate price responses for 
a supplier encompassing its linked customers’ earnings announcements to reflect those 
announcements. Thus, the stock price responses of a supplier around its customers’ announcements 
will be positively related to unexpected customer earnings. I therefore make the following hypothesis: 
H1a: The cumulative abnormal return of a supplier, surrounding the linked customers’ 
announcement date, is positively related to linked customers’ earnings news.  
However, prior studies (e.g., Bernard and Thomas, 1989; Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992; 
Ramnath, 2002) have shown that investors cannot completely adjust their earnings expectations for 
announcing firms and that this dynamic leads to predictable stock returns (see the relationship in 
arrow #1 in Figure 1). More specifically, investor underreactions to first announcer’s news yield 
predictable stock returns for subsequent announcers in the same industry (Ramnath, 2002). If 
investors are inattentive to earnings-related information from economically related customers, they 
cannot immediately react as strongly to the earnings-related information. Therefore, the corresponding 
drift in prices, i.e., the abnormal returns of a supplier cumulated after the customers’ earnings 
announcement date, would be predictable even after the customers’ actual earnings are released to the 
market. Thus, one would expect that the stock returns of a supplier cumulated after the customers’ 
earnings announcement date will be positively related to unexpected customer earnings. It follows 
that: 
H1b: The abnormal return of a supplier, cumulated after the linked customers’ announcement 
date, is positively related to linked customers’ earnings news.  
The discussion above suggests that limited investor attention to a linked firm’s announcement 
(i.e., customers’ unexpected earnings news) leads to market underreactions. This underreaction 
generates predictable stock returns for suppliers following the customers’ earnings announcements. 
That is, stock prices do not promptly incorporate information from linked firms, generating substantial 
abnormal returns.  
Data and Research Design 
Sample Selection 
To empirically investigate the relation between the supplier’s cumulative abnormal returns 
surrounding (following) linked customers’ earnings announcements and an earnings surprise for the 
customer, I obtained data from three sources: Compustat segment, which provides linked data for 
suppliers and their principal customers; CRSP, which provides information on stock returns; and 
Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES), which provides data on quarterly earnings and the 
timing of announcements.  
 
According to Regulation SFAS No. 131, firms must periodically release their financial 
information for any industry segment that comprises more than 10% of consolidated annual sales and 
for any linked customer that represents more than 10% of total reported sales. Based on the 
Compustat segment file for each firm, I inspect whether the customer is another company listed in the 
CRSP, Compustat, and IBES files by matching the customer name, and I assign it the corresponding 
CRSP permno number to ensure that customers are matched to the appropriate stock returns and 
financial information.8  
I extract stock returns from CRSP based on the announcement dates of both suppliers and 
their linked customers at the same fiscal quarter end. To construct the unexpected earnings, I require 
the actual earnings and analyst forecasts. The IBES unadjusted individual analyst forecasts for 
quarterly earnings per share (EPS) are based on the number of shares outstanding on the estimate date. 
By contrast, the actual reported EPS are based on the number of shares outstanding on the earnings 
report date. To ensure that both estimated and actual EPS are based on the same number of shares 
outstanding, I use the CRSP cumulative adjustment split factor extracted from the CRSP daily stock 
files. Merging these data with the unadjusted detailed history and the data from the actual files in the 
IBES database, I generate the final sample of 10,207 firm-quarter observations for the period 1983–
2011, which cover a total of 1,083 unique customer-supplier relationships. 
Research Design 
I examine market reactions to earnings news involving linked customers by estimating several 
specifications of the following model:  
,                 (1) 
,                  (2) 
where the dependent variable CAR [–1, 1] 9  is defined as a supplier's 3-trading-day cumulative 
abnormal returns around the customer's earnings announcement and CAR [2, 61] as the supplier's 
subsequent 60-trading-day cumulative abnormal returns after the customer's earnings announcement. 
The independent variable CUE is the customer's unexpected earnings, defined as the actual earnings 
per share subtracted from the median of the individual analyst forecasts,10 normalized by the stock 
price on the date of the fiscal quarter end.  
Z is a vector of control variables that are routinely used in return anomaly regressions (e.g., 
Ramnath, 2002; Cohen and Frazzini, 2008; Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh, 2009). 11  ADISTANCE 
denotes the absolute value of the reporting lag between the supplier and its linked customers. 
FEARLY is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the supplier announces earnings earlier than its 
linked customers for the same quarter and that equals 0 otherwise. CEARLY is an indicator variable 
that equals 1 if linked customers announce earnings earlier than the supplier for the same quarter and 
that equals 0 otherwise. CBNEWS is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the customer's unexpected 
earnings are negative and 0 otherwise. CANALYSTS represents the number of analysts following the 
customer. PERCRET represents the ratio of stock returns surrounding the earnings announcement 
date of linked customers to that of suppliers. PERCSALE represents the logarithm of the ratio of sales 
of economically linked customers to that of suppliers. PERSIZE is the logarithm of the ratio of market 
capitalization of linked customers to that of suppliers, where market capitalization is defined as price 
times the number of shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal quarter. MKTRET represents the 
market return on the S&P 500 Index surrounding the customers’ earnings announcement date. 
                                                          
8 Customers for which I could not identify a unique match are excluded from the sample. 
9
 To more accurately assess the potential trading profits of investors, researchers should capture the immediate 
stock price response to earnings using days –1, 0, and +1 and the delayed stock price response to earnings 
beginning returns on day +2 (Battalio and Mendenhall, 2011). 
10  Some studies (e.g., Zhang, 2008) have used the latest individual analyst forecast to compute firm’s 
unexpected earnings. I use the latest analyst consensus forecast in my study. However, the inferences are 
unchanged if I use the latest individual analyst forecast as a proxy for market expectations.  
11
 See also Givoly and Palmon (1982), Chambers and Penman (1984), Atiase, Bamber, and Tse (1989), Chae 
(2005), which focus on good (bad) news that is released early (late). 
 
SAMEDAY is an indicator variable that equals 1 if both the supplier and its linked customers report 
their earnings on the same day and that equals 0 otherwise. SAMEINDUSTRY is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if both the supplier and its linked customers are in the same industry and that 
equals 0 otherwise. I also control for industry (according to the 10-industry classification in Fama and 
French (1997)) and year effects. ε denotes the error term. Details regarding the construction of the 
variables are also given in the Appendix. 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the variables for the full sample. Panel A reports 
the number of observations, the mean, median, 25th and 75th percentile, and the standard deviation for 
all variables used in the main analysis. There are 1,083 unique customer-supplier relationships for the 
period 1983–2011 in the final sample.  On average, the supplier’s 3- and 60-trading-day cumulative 
abnormal returns around and following the linked customer’s earnings announcement are 0.2% and 
1.8%, respectively, wherein the customer’s 3- and 60-trading-day cumulative abnormal returns 
following customer earnings announcements are 0.1% and 0.9%, respectively. This evidence shows 
that with respect to customer earnings announcements, supplier’s immediate and delayed returns are 
larger than customer’s immediate and delayed returns. The average unexpected earnings for 
customers in the sample is –0.1%. The indicator variables of customer bad earnings news (0.359) and 
supplier bad earnings news (0.783) show that bad earnings news is observed mostly for suppliers in 
the sample. On average, there are 20 analysts following the customer and 7 analysts following the 
supplier, respectively. The ratio of the supplier’s abnormal returns surrounding the earnings 
announcement date to its linked customers is 0.154. The market value of a customer’s equity is about 
$20 million, wherein the market value of a supplier is around $0.6 million (i.e., firm size of customers 
is 33 times larger than suppliers’ firm size). Linked customer sales in the sample represent 12% of a 
supplier’s total reported sales on average, which is in line with the reporting requirements by 
Regulation SFAS No. 131. The reporting lag between suppliers and their linked customers is about 12 
days. With regard to early, late, and same-day announcements, 66.2% of sample firms are linked 
customers who report their quarterly earnings earlier than suppliers, 27.3% of sample firms are 
suppliers who report their quarterly earnings earlier than their linked customers, and 6.5% are 
suppliers who release their quarterly earnings on the same day as their linked firms.  
Table 1 Summary Statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics for all variables used in the main regression analysis of the impact of customer 
earnings surprises on supplier returns and the sample distribution by the percentage size, sales, and analyst coverage to the 
customer. The sample consists of 1,083 unique customer-supplier relationships for the period 1983–2011. The appendix 
outlines the definitions and data sources for the variables. Panel A reports the number of observations, the mean, median, 
25th and 75th percentile, and the standard deviation for all variables used in the main analysis. Panel B reports supplier and 
customer returns in different CUE quintiles. Panels C, D, and E show two portfolios of CUE, supplier and customer returns 
based on the percentage size, sales, analyst coverage to the customer, respectively. 
VARIABLES N Mean SD P25 Median P75 
Panel A: Summary statistics for full sample 
CAR[-1, 1] 10176 0.002 0.068 -0.027 -0.001 0.028 
CAR[2, 61] 10167 0.018 0.281 -0.113 0.014 0.141 
CCAR[-1, 1] 10175 0.001 0.064 -0.028 0.000 0.030 
CCAR[2, 61] 10172 0.009 0.159 -0.065 0.007 0.084 
CUE 10206 -0.001 0.062 0.000 0.000 0.002 
CBNEWS 10207 0.359 0.480 0.000 0.000 1.000 
CANALYSTS 10207 20.319 15.415 9.000 17.000 28.000 
CEARLY 10207 0.662 0.473 0.000 1.000 1.000 
CSIZE 10206 16.844 1.723 15.791 17.101 18.117 
FBNEWS 10207 0.783 0.412 1.000 1.000 1.000 
FANALYSTS 10207 7.237 7.978 2.000 5.000 9.000 
FEARLY 10207 0.273 0.445 0.000 0.000 1.000 
FSIZE 10146 13.331 1.716 12.147 13.167 14.390 
 
ADISTANCE 10207 11.526 11.029 4.000 8.000 15.000 
MKTRET 10207 0.000 0.014 -0.006 0.001 0.007 
PERCRET 9791 0.154 11.036 -0.600 0.033 0.977 
PERCSALE 10174 -2.120 1.239 -2.809 -2.213 -1.537 
PERCSIZE 10145 3.515 2.326 1.740 3.685 5.233 
SAMEDAY 10207 0.065 0.246 0.000 0.000 0.000 




CUE CAR[-1, 1] CAR[2, 61] CCAR[-1, 1] CCAR[2, 61] 
Panel B: Supplier and customer returns by customer earnings surprises 
1  -0.016 0.002 0.026 -0.019 0.019 
2  0.000 0.004 0.009 -0.005 0.000 
3  0.000 0.003 0.009 0.001 0.004 
4  0.001 0.000 0.016 0.006 0.004 
5  0.009 0.003 0.028 0.021 0.018 
Panel C: Supplier and customer returns by the percentage size to the customer  
1 1.117 -0.002 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.011 
2 1.449 0.000 0.003 0.030 0.000 0.007 
Panel D: Supplier and customer returns by the percentage sales to the customer 
1 0.056 0.000 0.003 0.015 0.000 0.011 
2 1.738 -0.002 0.002 0.020 0.002 0.007 
Panel E: Supplier and customer returns by the percentage analysts coverage to the customer 
1 1.575 -0.001 0.002 0.013 0.000 0.010 
2 11.176 -0.002 0.002 0.023 0.001 0.008 
Panel B reports supplier and customer returns in different customer earnings surprise 
quintiles. It shows that suppliers in the second quintile of customer earnings surprises have the highest 
average abnormal return (0.4%) over the customer’s 3-day event window, whereas customers in the 
lowest (highest) quintile of this measure have the lowest (highest) average abnormal return of -1.9% 
(2.1%) over the customer’s 3-day event window. With respect to the delayed returns for both 
suppliers and customers, the highest average abnormal returns are likely distributed to the lowest and 
highest quintiles. Panels C through E show two portfolios of customer earnings surprises, supplier 
returns, and customer returns based on the percentage size, sales, and analyst coverage to the 
customer, respectively. The evidence shows that the reactions of the supplier’s delayed returns are the 
strongest for firms in the higher percentage of size, sales, and analyst coverage to the customer, 
suggesting that the higher the percentage size, sales, and analyst coverage to the customer, the more 
important the customer is to the supplier. Consistent with this interpretation, I later show that firms 
that are in the portfolio with higher percentage size, sales, and analyst coverage to the customer play 
an important role in transferring earnings-related information to supplier firms. 
Overall, the evidence shows that the average immediate and delayed stock reactions of 
supplier returns to the customer earnings announcement are stronger than customer’s immediate and 
delayed return reactions to the customer earnings announcement. The evidence suggests that there are 
observable post-customer earnings announcement supplier returns generated after the customer 
earnings announcement date.  
Empirical Results 
Since firm-specific information, such as customer earnings announcements, recurs 
systematically and induces changes in the valuation of economically related firms, it might have the 
potential to play a substantial role in the supplier’s returns. To gain insight into the relation between 
 
the stock returns of a supplier and the earnings news of its linked customers, I investigate the 
immediate (delayed) price reaction of the supplier surrounding (following) the customer 
announcements to the unexpected earnings of its linked customers. If investors are aware of the ex 
ante customer-supplier links, the stock returns of the supplier will fully adjust when the information 
about its linked customers is released into the market. If investors do not fully react to information 
released by the supplier’s linked customers, one can expect to observe predictable stock returns during 
the period following the customer announcements.                                                                                                                              
Supplier Stock Price Reactions to Earnings News Involving Linked Customers 
Table 2 reports the regression results. Columns 1 to 4 present the specifications with the 
supplier’s 3-trading-day cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the earnings announcement date for 
its linked customers, CAR [-1, 1], as the dependent variable. Each regression employs control 
variables that have the potential to influence supplier’s immediate returns. Column 1 provides the 
baseline result for the immediate price reaction of a supplier, surrounding the customer 
announcements, to the unexpected earnings of its customers. I control for CBNEWS, CANALYSTS, 
PERCSALE, PERCSIZE, SAMEDAY, MKTRET, and their interaction terms with CUE, as well as 
industry and year effects. The coefficient of CUE is 0.106 and is statistically significant at the 5% 
level, confirming the presence of the immediate return predictability of a supplier around the customer 
announcements in my sample. To eliminate the concern that the impact of customer earnings surprises 
on the supplier’s immediate stock returns is driven by the timing and order of announcements, I also 
control for other correlated factors, such as ADISTANCE, FEARLY, and CEARLY. The coefficient 
of CUE in column 2 is significantly positive at 0.094, which suggests that suppliers’ stock returns are 
immediately responsive to the earnings announcements of their customers. In column 3, I add a 
control variable of SAMEINDUSTRY. The coefficient of CUE is significantly positive at 0.093. To 
mitigate the concern that my results are not driven by stock returns of both suppliers and customers, I 
also control for the ratio of stock returns of linked customers to suppliers on their own earnings 
announcement dates respectively (i.e., PERCRET) and its interaction term with CUE. The coefficient 
of CUE in column 4 is significantly positive at 0.120, which confirms the immediate responsiveness 
of stock returns to unexpected customers’ earnings.  
Table 2 Test of Supplier’s Stock Price Reaction Surrounding the Customer Announcements 
This table presents the estimation results obtained by regressing the supplier’s cumulative abnormal returns around the 
customer’s earnings announcement (CAR [-1, 1]) on the customer’s unexpected earnings (CUE), on several controls, and on 
the interaction terms between CUE and controls. The appendix outlines the definitions and data sources for the regression 
variables. For the sake of brevity, industry and year controls are included, but the results are not tabulated; the industry 
controls are based on Fama and French’s (1997) 10-industry classification. t-statistics based on robust standard errors 
adjusted for clustering by firms are reported in parentheses. ***, **, *, indicate statistical significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 
0.10 level, respectively. 
 
H1a:  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES CAR[-1, 1] CAR[-1, 1] CAR[-1, 1] CAR[-1, 1] 
CUE 0.106** 0.094** 0.093* 0.120** 
 
(2.30) (2.03) (1.94) (2.07) 
PERCRET 
   
0.000 
    
(0.28) 
CUE × PERCRET 
   
-0.004 





   
(0.53) (0.67) 
CUE × SAMEINDUSTRY 
  
-0.052 -0.081 
   
(-0.57) (-0.91) 
 
CUE × ADISTANCE × 
FEARLY  
 
0.002 0.002 0.001 
  
(0.95) (0.80) (0.38) 
CUE × ADISTANCE × 
CEARLY  
 
0.003 0.003 0.003 
  
(1.01) (1.00) (1.08) 
CBNEWS 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.71) (0.73) (0.71) (0.73) 
CANALYSTS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.75) (0.77) (0.78) (0.51) 
PERCSALE -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(-0.76) (-0.77) (-0.81) (-0.78) 
PERCSIZE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.83) (0.83) (0.91) (0.94) 
SAMEDAY 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.24) (0.23) (0.20) (-0.18) 
MKTRET 0.140* 0.140* 0.140* 0.159** 
 
(1.89) (1.88) (1.88) (2.09) 
CUE × CBNEWS -0.068 -0.077 -0.077 -0.102 
 
(-1.37) (-1.54) (-1.56) (-1.48) 
CUE × CANALYSTS -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 
(-0.00) (0.03) (0.04) (-0.12) 
CUE × PERCSALE 0.029** 0.035** 0.033* 0.035* 
 
(2.47) (2.33) (1.80) (1.67) 
CUE × PERCSIZE -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.010 
 
(-0.26) (-0.07) (-0.16) (0.76) 
CUE × SAMEDAY -0.168* -0.161* -0.151 -0.150 
 
(-1.89) (-1.77) (-1.52) (-1.53) 
CUE × MKTRET 0.880 0.531 0.523 -0.349 
 
(0.60) (0.36) (0.36) (-0.24) 
Intercept -0.007 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 
 
(-0.72) (-0.47) (-0.52) (-0.35) 
N 10,110 10,110 10,110 9,735 
R2 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 
Remarkably, the coefficients for the interaction term (CUE × PERCSALE) are positive at the 
10% level in columns 1 through 4. The total effects of CUE on CAR[-1,1], even when there is higher 
percentage sales to customer, are still positive with the magnitude of 0.135, 0.129, 0.126, and 0.155 in 
columns 1 through 4, respectively. These results indicate that the higher the percentage sales to 
customer, the stronger the effect of customer earnings surprises on supplier’s immediate returns. 
Taken together, the evidence in Table 2 indicates that the cumulative abnormal return of a 
supplier around the customer announcements is positively related to the unexpected earnings of linked 
customers. 
Supplier Stock Price Reactions Following the Customer Announcements 
The immediate responsiveness of stock returns surrounding the customer announcements, as 
indicated above, offers important evidence of the market reactions to earnings news involving the 
customers of suppliers. However, Cohen and Frazzini (2008) report that stock prices do not fully 
 
reflect news involving related firms, which generates predictable subsequent price moves. 
Accordingly, I further investigate cumulative stock return responses of a supplier to customers’ 
unexpected earnings following the customer announcements.  
Table 3 reports the estimation results. Columns 1 to 4 present the specifications with the 
abnormal returns of a supplier cumulated 60-trading-day after the earnings announcement date for its 
linked customers, CAR [2, 61], as the dependent variable. The independent and control variables used 
in the delayed stock return analysis are the same as in the immediate stock return analysis. The 
coefficients of CUE in columns 1 to 4 are all positive and significant at the 1% level with magnitude 
of 0.724, 0.843, 0.834, and 0.849, respectively. The positive and statistically significant coefficient is 
in line with the hypothesis, and suggests that the stock reactions of a supplier after linked customer 
earnings announcements to unexpected customers’ earnings are substantial.  
Table 3 Test of Supplier’s Stock Price Reaction Following the Customer Announcements 
This table presents the estimation results obtained by regressing the supplier’s cumulative abnormal returns following the 
customer’s earnings announcement (CAR [2, 61]) on the customer’s unexpected earnings (CUE), on several controls, and on 
the interaction terms between CUE and controls. Appendix outlines the definitions and data sources for the regression 
variables. For the sake of brevity, the industry and year controls are included but are not tabulated; the industry controls are 
based on Fama and French’s (1997) 10-industry classification. t-statistics based on robust standard errors adjusted for 




  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES CAR[2, 61] CAR[2, 61] CAR[2, 61] CAR[2, 61] 
CUE 0.724*** 0.843*** 0.834*** 0.849*** 
 
(3.50) (4.32) (4.27) (3.16) 
PERCRET 
   
0.000 
    
(1.17) 
CUE × PERCRET 
   
0.016 





   
(0.32) (-0.01) 
CUE × SAMEINDUSTRY 
  
-0.235 -0.245 
   
(-0.56) (-0.56) 
CUE × ADISTANCE × 
FEARLY  
 
-0.025* -0.026* -0.023 
  
(-1.74) (-1.76) (-1.32) 
CUE × ADISTANCE × 
CEARLY  
 
-0.020 -0.020 -0.014 
  
(-1.45) (-1.45) (-1.11) 
CBNEWS 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.010 
 
(1.09) (1.11) (1.08) (1.52) 
CANALYSTS -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* 
 
(-1.79) (-1.82) (-1.81) (-1.85) 
PERCSALE 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 
(1.48) (1.48) (1.45) (1.61) 
PERCSIZE 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 
(5.00) (5.01) (4.98) (4.83) 
SAMEDAY -0.019** -0.019* -0.019** -0.022** 
 
 
(-2.00) (-1.96) (-1.98) (-2.17) 
MKTRET 0.360 0.364 0.364 0.296 
 
(1.28) (1.30) (1.29) (1.04) 
CUE × CBNEWS -0.600** -0.509** -0.508** -0.552* 
 
(-2.25) (-2.27) (-2.27) (-1.80) 
CUE × CANALYSTS 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 
(0.72) (0.69) (0.70) (0.57) 
CUE × PERCSALE 0.246*** 0.173*** 0.161*** 0.150** 
 
(3.49) (3.40) (2.72) (2.33) 
CUE × PERCSIZE 0.045 0.014 0.010 0.023 
 
(1.13) (0.32) (0.22) (0.49) 
CUE × SAMEDAY -0.899*** -0.943*** -0.900*** -0.849*** 
 
(-3.09) (-3.82) (-3.35) (-3.13) 
CUE × MKTRET 2.419 6.220 6.190 5.400 
 
(0.48) (1.19) (1.19) (1.00) 
Intercept 0.033 0.036 0.036 0.010 
 
(0.71) (0.79) (0.79) (0.19) 
N 10,101 10,101 10,101 9,727 
R2 0.030 0.031 0.031 0.031 
Likewise, the coefficients for the interaction term (CUE × PERCSALE) are positive at the 5% 
level in columns 1 through 4. The total effects of CUE on CAR[2,61], even when there is higher 
percentage sales to customer, are still positive with the magnitude of 0.970, 1.016, 0.995, and 0.999 in 
columns 1 through 4, respectively. Similar as the effect of customer earnings surprises on supplier’s 
immediate returns in Table 2, the higher the percentage sales to customer even stronger the effect of 
customer earnings surprises on supplier’s delayed returns. The evidence indicates that the presence of 
large percentage sales to customer is associated with stronger supplier’s immediate and delayed price 
reactions to customer earnings surprises.  
Interestingly, the coefficients of the interaction term (CUE × CBNEWS) in Table 2 are all 
insignificant, however, the coefficients of the interaction term (CUE × CBNEWS) in Table 3 are all 
negative and significant at the 10% level. The sum of coefficients on CUE and (CUE × CBNEWS) 
are still positive with the magnitude of 0.124, 0.334, 0.326, and 0.297 in columns 1 to 4 in Table 3, 
respectively. Since the measure of CBNEWS is a binary variable for when customer earnings news is 
negative, the coefficients on CUE in Tables 2 and 3 should reflect the reaction of supplier returns to 
positive customer earnings surprises (good news) only, and the sum of the coefficients on CUE and 
the interaction term (CUE × CBNEWS) will reflect the reaction of supplier returns to negative 
customer earnings surprises (bad news). Thus, supplier’s immediate reaction to good news is positive 
and significant, but there is no difference in supplier’s delayed reaction to CUE based on the sign of 
the news. This evidence shows that supplier returns have a stronger, if any, delayed reaction to 
negative customer earnings news, which is in line with the notion of slow diffusion of bad news 
(Hong and Stein, 1999; Hong et al., 2000; Hou, 2007).  
Remarkably, the coefficients on the interaction term (CUE × SAMEDAY) are negative at the 
1% level and approach the magnitude of the coefficients on CUE in columns 1 through 4, 
respectively. Since the sum of the coefficients on CUE and (CUE × SAMEDAY) reflects the reaction 
of supplier returns to CUE when customers and suppliers report earnings on the same day, the 
evidence shows that supplier returns have weaker delayed reaction to customer earnings news. I 
interpret this as evidence of the investor distraction hypothesis (Hirshleifer, et al., 2009), whereby 
customer earnings news draws investor attention away from supplier when customers and suppliers 
report earnings on the same day, and further generates less supplier returns. 
 
Overall, the results in Tables 2 and 3 show that stock prices do not promptly incorporate 
information from linked firms, which in turn generates the abnormal returns for suppliers cumulated 
after earnings announcements by related customers. These results are consistent with the notion that 
systematic limited attention to a given piece of information predicts return forecastability with respect 
to the impact on firm value of the piece of information being ignored, and thus provide support to the 
hypothesis that limited investor attention to economic links causes market underreactions. 
Enhancing Effect of Customer Earnings Surprises on the Customer-Supplier Returns    
The limited investor attention hypothesis by Cohen and Frazzini (2008) argues that customer 
returns predict future supplier’s returns because investors pay limited attention to the customer-
supplier link. Though the second hypothesis discussed above supports a delayed supplier reaction to 
customer earnings announcements, it is of great interest to identify what role, if any, customer 
earnings surprises play in the customer-supplier return predictability.  
Under the scheme that customer earnings surprises leads to customer returns and the latter, in 
turn, affects supplier returns, customer earnings surprises might have the potential to play a 
substantial role in the relationship between customer and supplier returns. Along this view, the 
predictability of supplier returns is simply the consequence of increases in customer returns due to 
customer earnings surprises. Thus, I argue that investor’s underreaction to the customer’s earnings 
surprise leads to a drift in the customer’s post-earnings announcement returns (Bernard and Thomas, 
1989), which in turn is reflected in the supplier’s returns due to investors not taking economic links 
into account rationally and efficiently (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008). 
In attempt to investigate the impact of customer earnings surprises on customer-supplier 
returns, I estimate a regression including the cumulated post-earnings announcement return of the 
customer (CCAR [2, 61]) and its interaction term with the customer’s standardized unexpected 
earnings (SUE).12 SUE is defined as decile-adjusted unexpected earnings and is obtained by ranking 
CUE into ten deciles based on the sample distribution of customer earnings surprises by quarter in 
each industry and then scaling them between 0 and 1 (Bernard and Thomas, 1990; Bartov et al., 2000; 
Zhang, 2008). I use the interaction term between customer returns and the standardized unexpected 
earnings (CCAR [2, 61] × SUE) to test the role of customer earnings surprises in the relationship 
between customer returns and supplier returns. In line with the second hypothesis, I expect that the 
coefficient of the interaction term to be positive, suggesting that market underreaction to earnings 
surprises enhances the positive effect of customer returns on supplier returns due to limited attention 
to customer-supplier economic link. 
 
                          (3) 
The results in Table 4 show that the coefficients for CUE are positive and significant at the 
5% level whereas for the interaction terms (CCAR [2, 61] × SUE) they are also positive and 
significant at the 5% level. Remarkably, the total effects of customer earnings surprises on supplier 
returns, even when there is customer returns, are still positive and significant at the 1% and are 
enhanced to 0.843, 0.970, 0.968, and 0.814 in columns 1 to 4, respectively. It is remarkable that the 
direct effects of customer returns on supplier returns are positive at the 1% level, in which the 
customer’s post-earnings drift is reflected significantly in the supplier’s returns. This finding is 
consistent with the limited investor attention to economic links hypothesis (Cohen and Frazzini, 
2008). Overall, these results provide support for the positive enhancing effect of customer earnings 
surprises in the relationship between customer returns and supplier returns, implying that the 
customer’s earnings surprise is a predominant source of the cross-firm return predictability. 
Table 4 Enhancing Effect of Customer Earnings Surprises on the Customer-supplier Returns 
This table presents the estimation results for the enhancing effect of customer earnings surprises on the relationship between 
customer returns (CCAR [2, 61]) and supplier returns (CAR [2, 61]). The models augment the basic specifications of H1b in 
                                                          
12
 Using the customer standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) instead of customer unexpected earnings (CUE), 
I focus on the enhancing role when the degree of customer earnings surprises is high enough. 
 
Table 3 by including the cumulated post-earnings announcement return of the customer (CCAR [2, 61]) and its interaction 
term with the customer’s standardized unexpected earnings (SUE). Appendix outlines the definitions and data sources for the 
regression variables. For the sake of brevity, industry and year controls are included but are not tabulated, and the industry 
controls are based on Fama and French’s (1997) 10-industry classification. t-statistics based on robust standard errors 
adjusted for clustering by firms are reported in parentheses. ***, **, *, indicate statistical significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 
0.10 level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES CAR[2, 61] CAR[2, 61] CAR[2, 61] CAR[2, 61] 
CUE 0.680*** 0.815*** 0.813*** 0.662** 
 
(2.93) (3.53) (3.49) (2.51) 
CCAR[2, 61] 0.202*** 0.208*** 0.207*** 0.208*** 
 
(4.90) (5.00) (5.01) (5.01) 
CCAR[2, 61] × SUE 0.163** 0.155** 0.155** 0.152** 
 
(2.37) (2.23) (2.24) (2.18) 
PERCRET 
   
0.000 
    
(1.10) 
CUE × PERCRET 
   
0.021 





   
(0.26) (-0.09) 
CUE × SAMEINDUSTRY 
  
-0.069 -0.115 
   
(-0.18) (-0.30) 
CUE × ADISTANCE × 
FEARLY  
 
-0.028* -0.028* -0.027 
  
(-1.89) (-1.87) (-1.49) 
CUE × ADISTANCE × 
CEARLY  
 
-0.023* -0.023* -0.018 
  
(-1.70) (-1.70) (-1.42) 
CBNEWS 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.010 
 
(1.25) (1.26) (1.25) (1.60) 
CANALYSTS -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* 
 
(-1.91) (-1.95) (-1.94) (-1.94) 
PERCSALE 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004* 
 
(1.53) (1.53) (1.51) (1.68) 
PERCSIZE 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 
(5.30) (5.32) (5.26) (5.03) 
SAMEDAY -0.019** -0.018* -0.018* -0.021** 
 
(-1.98) (-1.94) (-1.94) (-2.13) 
MKTRET 0.344 0.348 0.348 0.277 
 
(1.25) (1.27) (1.27) (1.00) 
CUE × CBNEWS -0.424* -0.316 -0.317 -0.147 
 
(-1.68) (-1.39) (-1.39) (-0.49) 
CUE × CANALYSTS 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 
 
(0.78) (0.76) (0.76) (0.57) 
CUE × PERCSALE 0.237*** 0.153*** 0.150** 0.111* 
 
(3.03) (2.96) (2.40) (1.76) 
CUE × PERCSIZE 0.007 -0.030 -0.031 -0.046 
 
 
(0.15) (-0.65) (-0.64) (-0.98) 
CUE × SAMEDAY -1.029*** -1.083*** -1.069*** -1.012*** 
 
(-3.39) (-4.62) (-4.07) (-3.77) 
CUE × MKTRET 4.844 9.227** 9.215** 11.161** 
 
(1.01) (1.99) (1.99) (2.17) 
Intercept 0.012 0.015 0.015 -0.061 
 
(0.22) (0.29) (0.29) (-1.24) 
N 10,098 10,098 10,098 9,724 
R2 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.056 
Robustness Checks 
The focus of H1a and H1b is on whether investors have limited attention with respect to the 
information contained in customer earnings announcements for suppliers when the ex ante customer-
supplier links between firms are publicly available. 
To address the possible effect of different horizons on return sensitivities, I compute supplier 
stock returns following the customer announcements over 30-, 45-, 60-, 75-, and 90-trading-day 
horizons. I find that in using these contrasting horizons, the results are quite similar. I therefore 
conclude that the delayed returns over different horizons are not likely to affect the results.  
To assess how my previous inferences change depending on how important the customer is to 
the supplier, I repeat the main analyses using alternative sample selections based on the percentage 
size, sales, and analyst coverage to the customer. The subsamples are based on the percentage size to 
the customer, the percentage sales to the customer, and the percentage analyst coverage to the 
customer. These results are consistent with evidence in Table 3 and further address the importance of 
the percentage size, sales, and analyst coverage to the customer on determining the predictive power 
of customer earnings surprises on supplier returns.  
Overall, these results 13  provide evidence that customer earnings announcements convey 
information for suppliers depending on how important the customer is to the supplier, and thus 
provide further support for investor inattention to customer-supplier information transfers. 
Concluding Remarks 
The limited investor attention hypothesis proposes that limited investor attention to firm-
specific information of economically linked firms (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008), a large number of 
same-day earnings announcements made by other firms (Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh, 2009), Friday 
earnings announcements (Dellavigna and Pollet, 2009), and stock recommendations (Loh, 2010) 
cause market underreactions to new information, generating predictable returns across firms.  
This study investigates whether limited investor attention to linked customers’ earnings 
announcements leads to market underreactions. I show that the cumulative abnormal stock returns of a 
supplier surrounding and following its linked customers’ earnings announcement date are positively 
related to customers’ earnings news, which suggests that investors are inattentive to customer-supplier 
information transfers from earnings announcements. The evidence consistently supports the limited 
attention hypothesis. Investors pay limited attention to economic links and are slow to update their 
expectations regarding future earnings upon receiving new information from economically related 
firms. When customer news is released into the market, investors pay limited attention to the ex ante 
economic link. Consequently, the price of the supplier’s stock does not promptly adjust; instead, the 
more substantial reaction is predictable following the customers’ surprising earnings. 
Under the scheme that customer earnings surprises leads to customer returns (e.g. Bernard 
and Thomas, 1989) and the latter, in turn, generates supplier returns (Cohen and Frazzini, 2008), I 
                                                          
13 These results are not included for the sake of brevity and are available upon request. 
 
find that customer earnings surprises play a substantial role in the relationship between customer 
returns and supplier returns. This enhancing effect of customer earnings surprises on the customer-
supplier returns provides strong support that the customer’s earnings surprise is a predominant source 
of the cross-firm return predictability. 
Appendix Description of the Variables 
Variables Description and Source 
Panel A: Cumulative abnormal returns 
CAR[-1,1] 
Supplier's 3-trading-day cumulative abnormal returns around the customer's earnings 
announcement. Source: author’s calculations based on Compustat segment, CRSP, and IBES. 
CAR[2,61] 
Supplier's subsequent 60-trading-day cumulative abnormal returns after the customer's earnings 
announcement. Source: author’s calculations based on Compustat segment, CRSP, and IBES. 
CCAR[-1, 1] 
Customer's 3-trading-day cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the customer’s earnings 
announcement. Source: author’s calculations based on CRSP and IBES. 
CCAR[2, 61] 
Customer's subsequent 60-trading-day cumulative abnormal returns after the customer’s earnings 
announcement. Source: author’s calculations based on CRSP and IBES. 
Panel B: Unexpected earnings 
CUE 
Customer's unexpected earnings is defined as the actual earnings per share subtracted from the 
median of individual analyst forecasts scaled by the end of the quarter share price. Source: 
author’s calculations based on IBES and CRSP. 
SUE 
Customer’s standardized unexpected earnings is defined as decile-adjusted unexpected earnings 
and is obtained by ranking CUE into ten deciles based on the sample distribution of CUE by 
quarter in each industry and then scaling them between 0 and 1. Source: author’s calculations 
based on IBES and CRSP. 
Panel C: Other control variables 
CBNEWS 
Indicator variable that equals 1 if the customer's unexpected earnings are negative and 0 
otherwise. Source: author’s calculations based on IBES. 
CANALYSTS The number of analysts following the customer. Source: author’s calculations based on IBES. 
CEARLY 
Indicator variable that equals 1 if linked customers announce earnings earlier than the supplier for 
the same quarter and 0 otherwise. Source: author’s calculations based on IBES. 
CSIZE 
Customer’s log of market capitalization which is price times the number of shares outstanding at 
the end of the fiscal quarter. Source: author’s calculations based on CRSP. 
FBNEWS 
Indicator variable that equals 1 if the supplier's unexpected earnings are negative and 0 otherwise. 
Source: author’s calculations based on IBES. 
FANALYSTS The number of analysts following the supplier. Source: author’s calculations based on IBES. 
FEARLY 
Indicator variable that equals 1 if the supplier announces earnings earlier than its linked customers 
for the same quarter and 0 otherwise. Source: author’s calculations based on IBES. 
FSIZE 
Supplier’s log of market capitalization which is price times the number of shares outstanding at 
the end of the fiscal quarter. Source: author’s calculations based on CRSP. 
ADISTANCE 
The absolute value of the reporting lag between the supplier and its linked customers in each 
quarter. Source: author’s calculations based on Compustat segment, CRSP, and IBES. 
MKTRET Market returns on the S&P 500 Index. Source: CRSP. 
PERCRET 
Ratio of stock returns of linked customers to suppliers on their earnings announcement date 
respectively. Source: author’s calculations based on IBES and CRSP. 
PERCSALE 
Log of the ratio of sales of economically linked customers to suppliers. Source: author’s 
calculations based on Compustat segment. 
PERCSIZE 
Log of the ratio of market capitalization of linked customers to suppliers. Source: author’s 
calculations based on CRSP. 
SAMEDAY 
Indicator variable that equals 1 if both the supplier and its customers release their earnings on the 
same day and that equals 0 otherwise. Source: author’s calculations based on IBES. 
SAMEINDUSTRY 
Indicator variable that equals 1 if both the supplier and its linked customers are in the same 
industry and that equals 0 otherwise. Source: author’s calculations based on Compustat segment 
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Abstract
In this paper we examine the relationship between transactions costs and options-related trading fre-
quency. We develop a model which enables us to examine option hedging behaviour through any set of
asset price and time paths, including large price changes in small time intervals, within a Black-Scholes
numerical solution set. This approach allows for a type of completeness that is not possible with a
binomial tree or Monte Carlo simulation. Our model suggests a linear relationship between transactions
costs and trading frequency.
1. Introduction
Under the assumptions of the original Black-Scholes (B-S 1973) model for options pricing, there are no
transactions costs and trading is continuous in time. When transactions costs are positive, trading at
discrete but frequent intervals is prohibitively expensive. The investor who hedges a written position in an
option by trading the option and the underlying asset will be forced to trade less frequently, and will face
hedging losses as a result. We explore the relation between trading frequency and transactions costs.
Section 2 gives a review of relevant literature. Section 3 analyzes the impact of transactions costs on
the B-S model. In Section 4 we provide an overview of the interaction between transactions costs and risk
taking. Section 5 discusses the setup of the model, and Section 6 gives an explanation of the model with
an outline of some results. We follow in Section 7 with a quantitative analysis of these results. In Section
8 we conclude and suggest possibilities for further research.
2. Literature Review
In the original B-S paper, several assumptions were made that allowed them to solve an option pricing
equation without knowledge of risk preferences. Of interest are the assumptions of continuous trading and
zero transactions costs. There have been several papers which derive techniques for option pricing when
trading is not continuous and transactions costs are not zero.
Leland (1985) incorporates transactions costs into the pricing equation through an adjustment to the
volatility term in the asset price process. A more volatile underlying asset requires a larger adjustment in
the hedging position, and therefore a higher transactions cost. Our analysis addresses Leland’s statement
that “transactions costs associated with replicating strategies are path-dependent: they depend not only
on the initial and final stock prices, but on the entire sequence of stock prices in between” (Leland, p.
1284). Our model enables traversing through every possible path, and uses the information from all the
paths.
Boyle and Vorst (BV) (1992) derived a model including transactions costs in discrete time. BV use
the Cox et al. (CRR) (1979) binomial tree model as a basis for their conclusions. The CRR binomial tree
model allows for an option of two price steps at each time step. Our model extends this to allow the price
of the asset to be any of a wide number of values at the next time step.
3. Transactions Costs and the Black-Scholes Model
As with the B-S model for options pricing, we start with a portfolio composed of a long position in one
unit of a call option, and short position in some quantity of the asset underlying that option. The value Π
of this portfolio can be written
Π = V (S, t) −∆S
where V is the option price, S is the underlying asset price and ∆ is the quantity of this asset held in a
short position. We assume the asset price S to follow the standard Brownian-motion process.
(1) dS = µSdt + σSz
√
dt
where µ is the drift rate of the asset price and σ is its standard deviation. The term z is a standard normal
random variable. Deriving the time path of Π requires the use of stochastic calculus (Itō’s lemma). The
result is
dΠ = dV − ∆dS




The B-S uses the fact, from (2), that if ∆ is chosen such that ∆ = VS then the stochastic term will be
eliminated. The portfolio must then earn the riskless rate of return. The resulting equality dΠ = rΠdt
gives the Black-Scholes partial differential equation. This derivation assumes no transactions costs and
continuous trading so that the investor can maintain ∆ = VS at all times. When transactions costs are
positive, continuous trading becomes infinitely expensive and trades can only be made at discrete intervals.
In the time that elapses between these trades, the hedging position ∆ is fixed but VS will change because
the underlying asset price changes. This results in a discrepancy between the two values, called a hedging
error, denoted ε and defined as ε = VS −∆. This error results in a nonzero coefficient on the stochastic
term dS and is the source of risk in the portfolio:




4. Theoretical Basis for Model
First, notice from (1) and (3) that the variance of the portfolio (the coefficient of the stochastic term z
√
dt)
is dependent on the magnitude of the product of hedging error ε and asset price S. The absolute value of
this product, denoted η, will be called portfolio risk. In our model, investors allow the portfolio risk η to
grow to a critical size before eliminating it. This interval of acceptable risk is known as a band of inaction.
We assume no other fixed transactions costs and no limits on the divisibility of securities, market features
that might otherwise influence an investor’s band of inaction. The edge of the band is determined as the
point where the risk has become excessive, and so the transactions cost is paid and the hedging error ε
(and thus the risk η) is eliminated. Excessive risk is defined as that for which
(4) f(η, γ) ≥ kη
where γ is a constant of risk aversion, and f is some function describing the investor dollar disutility of
risk. The term k is the proportional transaction cost and the right-hand side defines the total transaction
cost of eliminating the hedging error ε.





where U is a utility function of wealth. In this model, risk aversion is derived from the diminishing marginal
returns to wealth. Our function f is also analagous to the component of the mean-variance analysis of a
financial asset that describes the negative effect of an increase in volatility on that assets value. If H(µ, σ2)
is a preference function describing the value of an asset, based on its expected return µ and variance σ2,
our function f would be related to ∂H/∂(σ2), although with the opposite sign.
The fact that the threshold η∗ exists, that there is some amount of risk that is tolerable in a portfolio,
but that after a certain point (4) the investor is better-off eliminating it, provides information about the
nature of risk attitudes among investors. In order for η∗ to exist given the characteristics of the cost
formula kη on the right-hand side of (4), the function f must have the following properties, properties
which allow for the intersection of f and kη at some point η∗, and insure that on the interval (0, η∗), we
have f < kη.
∂f
∂η
≥ 0 , ∂
2f
∂η2
≥ 0, for η ≥ 0




In some ways this characterization of f runs counter to the inutition behind the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of
risk aversion and some expected utility-derived theory of risk, which would predict f to be diminishing,
i.e. (∂2f/∂η2) < 0. However, the difference might be explained by other factors faced by firms and other
actors in financial markets. Investment firms face some hard constraint on the total amount of risk that is
deemed acceptable for them to carry at any given time. If one asset’s inordinate riskiness begins to crowd
out the firm’s capacity to take on normal risk levels on other assets, this could be seen as imposing an
additional cost and would explain the observed shape of f .
In our model, we can observe investors’ rebalance frequency Φ for different critical risk thresholds η∗.
Our goal is to relate the rebalancing frequency Φ to the proportional transactions cost k. We now define
the link between the transactions cost and the risk threshold.
Consider the following function for f that displays the required characteristics.
(5) f(η, γ) = γη2




Thus, with this form for f(η, γ), the effect of a change in η∗ on rebalance frequency will be a scaling of the
effect of k on the rebalancing frequency.
5. The Method
The B-S partial differential equation (PDE) can be solved in a number of ways. The numerical methods
approach involves discretizing each element of the PDE into standard finite difference formulas. Once each
element has been discretized into a difference formula, the formulas can be algebraically manipulated in
order to solve for the entire solution space in a row-by-row, iterative fashion. For example, a discretization
of the term VS could be written
VS ≈
V (S +△S, t)− V (S −△S, t)
2(△S)
and similarly for the other derivatives in the PDE, where △S is the size of the price-step. Then, by
algebraic manipulation, the value of V at the next time step can be approximated using information found
at nodes in the current timestep.
This method presents two challenges when used to solve the B-S PDE. First, unlike many equations
solved using finite difference methods that run forward in time, we only know the value of the option at
maturity, and thus must solve the equation backwards in time (a “terminal-value problem,” as opposed
to the standard “initial value problem”). Second, the fact that one of the boundary conditions is itself a
function of time poses challenges for the construction of the tri-diagonal multiplier matrix used to perform
the iterative calculation. The general approach is called the Forward Difference method or Explicit Euler
method.
An important aspect of a numerical method like the Euler is the possibility of instability. We are not
concerned with the details of what causes the stability or instability in this method, and just note that
the time steps must be sufficiently smaller than the space (underlying asset price) steps in order for the
solution to be stable. There is an alternative method known as the Backward Difference or Implicit Euler,
in which backward difference formulas are used for discretization and the tri-diagonal multiplier matrix is
inverted prior to being multiplied by each row in the iterative solution process. While this method works in
theory, a more complicated approach must be taken to deal with the two boundary conditions and involves
the additional computation of inverting a matrix. The solution set uses as its terminal condition the call
option payoff function
V (S, τ = 0) = max(S − E, 0)
where E is the option excercise price. This is the payoff function for a European call option1. This type
of option is very widely traded and requires simple computations when used in our analysis. Time is
converted to run backwards using time to maturity τ . The boundary conditions (b.c.) on the B-S solution
are
V (0, τ) = 0
lim
S→∞
V (S, τ) = S − e−rτ
For the numerical approximation we define Smax as the largest price of the underlying asset, so that the
b.c. become:
V (S, τ) =
{
0 S = 0
(S − Ee−rτ ) S = Smax
Notice that the b.c. for S = Smax depends on time to maturity τ . The resulting numerical solution
provides us with an approximation to the B-S option price V at each point in time τ and for each stock
price S (given some volatility, riskless rate of return, and strike price)2. This is significant in itself because
it provides desired values for a wide range of circumstances in an efficient and complete manner. By
contrast, accounting for such a complete range of circumstances using Monte Carlo methods takes a lot of
time and repeated simulations, with no guarantee of success.
Additionally, the fact that we have an option price for each stock price and time (each node), allows us
the possibility of traversing through a wide range of stock values in one time step, which is not possible in
the binomial tree model. The most important result is that we can look at all possible paths including large
stock price changes in small time steps. This is therefore an opportunity to make an original contribution
to the understanding of the interaction between options trading and transactions costs.
6. The Model
Financial markets are opaque and exceedingly complex. It is not realistic to attempt to isolate the effect
of a change in transactions costs in this setting. Our approach is to study a simplified simulation, akin to
a controlled experiment.
We take from our numerical solution set a smaller matrix of option prices V (S, τ), on some interval
of underlying asset price S and time to maturity τ , and then identify and map out every possible path
through it. We then use this collection of paths to test the effect of changes in risk threshold η∗ on the
hedging behaviour of investors as they follow each path.
1The B-S solutions for call and put options are symmetric. By call/put parity, an equivalent analysis of put options could
be derived from our results.
2At this time, we are interested chiefly in the effect of changes in transactions costs on the frequency of options-related
trading (such as delta hedging) and not specifically on its effect on the market price V of those options. Inclusion of transactions
costs in the method of Leland or BV does indeed change V , but it has a negligible effect on the shape (ie. the partial derivatives)
of the solution function V (S, τ) and it is these derivatives that influence the hedging behaviour of investors. As a result, we
are satisfied for now to use a numerical solution for V that is built on the original Black-Scholes assumptions.
Figure 1: Example path through 6× 6 matrix (with τ on the vertical axis and S on the horizontal axis)
The number of possible paths is a function of the dimensions (m,n) of the matrix we select for study.
Specifically, the number of paths will be nm, where m is the number of time-steps and n is the number of
price-steps (steps in underlying asset price S).
At the beginning of each path, the investor sets up a portfolio with a long position in one call option,
and ∆ = VS units of the underlying asset in a short position. At the next node in the path (Si, τm−1), the
portfolio will be assessed for its hedging error and will be rebalanced if it satisfies (4). If not, the portfolio
will maintain its previous hedging position into the next time-step, (Si, τm−2) where all portfolios on all
paths are again re-assessed. For the purpose of each assessment, hedging error ε will be defined as
(7) ε = VS(Si, τj) − ∆
Where VS(Si, τj) is the value of VS at the present node and ∆ is the value of VS at the past node where
the portfolio hedging position was last rebalanced. Numerical approximations of the partial derivative VS
are obtained from the solution matrix using middle differences.
(8) V̂S(Si, τj) =
Vi+1,j − Vi−1,j
2 (△S)
Where Vi,j is the option price, V̂S(Si, τj) is the numerical estimate of its partial derivative with respect to
S at node (Si, τj) and △S is the size of the price-step.
The behaviour of the investor on each path (i.e., the number of portfolio rebalances) are observed
for a range of values for the threshold η∗. Because of the exponential relationship between matrix size
and number of paths, computing power is a limitation for our model. The largest matrix we can feasibly
investigate is 6× 6. Although we have looked at a range of solutions, we present some quantitaive analysis
for one 6× 6 matrix. In this case we used the following parameters in our B-S numerical solution
E = 50 , σ = 0.2 , r = 0.05 , △S = 1 , △τ = 0.0001
Where E is the option strike price, σ is the standard deviation of the underlying asset price, r is the
riskless interest rate, and △S and △τ are the size of the price- and time-steps respectively. We take from
this larger solution matrix the 6 × 6 square (such as the one in Fig.1) that surrounds the strike price at
maturity and contains 66 = 46, 656 unique paths. Using the strategy outlined above, we can chart the
effect of a change in risk threshold η∗ on the total number of rebalances Φ that occur on all 46, 656 paths
during the time interval τ = (0, 6).
Figure 2: Risk threshold and rebalance frequency, for 6× 6 matrix centred at strike price at maturity
Ideally, we would like to study larger matrices (again, computing power is the limitng factor). In the
meantime we can move the small matrix further from maturity and/or further into or out of the money in
order to gain more perspective on this relationship. The following figure illustrates a set of 5× 5 matrices,
each one a different distance from maturity (where darker paths are further from maturity). It is clear
that the slope changes with time to maturity. This is because ∂VS/∂τ and ∂VS/∂S are smaller when τ is
larger.
Figure 3: Risk threshold and rebalance frequency for a set of 5× 5 matrices moving away from maturity
The fact that we are giving equal weight to every possible path through a matrix might suggest that we
are giving a disproportionately high weight to a large number of unlikely price paths. Thus we examine
the characteristics of price variance that the set of observed price paths exhibit collectively. Specifically,
we check whether our set of paths is consistent with an asset price standard deviation of σ = 0.2. We are
able to measure volatility by counting the total price change along each path. It is difficult for us to extract
from this information the price “variance” as it is strictly defined, but examining our proxy measure of
volatility is still useful.
Figure 4: Price volatility frequency distribution
This distribution has the skewed shape expected given that the stochastic term in dS has a normal dis-
tribution, and so S has a log normal distribution. The most volatile path that can be taken through the
matrix (there are two of them, mirror images of one another) with a total price change of 25, has an actual
standard deviation of 2.7389. This is several orders of magnitude higher than the parameter value σ = 0.2,
although the mean standard deviation of the whole set is lower than 2.73893. This discrepancy could be
rectified by using a matrix that is not square, but has more time-steps m than price-steps n. We could
also use a smaller price-step △S or a larger value for the parameter σ.
7. Quantitative Estimation
We can use a simple OLS regression to fit a curve to the data. Although jagged, the relationship seems to
be linear. We expect that using a larger matrix, with a sufficient number of steps in time and price, would
yield a smooth relationship. We suggest the following specification4:
(9) ̂Frequencyi = β0 + β1Thresholdi + errori
where Frequency is the frequency with which portfolio hedging positions are rebalanced Φ, and Threshold
is the risk threshold parameter η∗. We report the results in Table 1, with coefficient standard errors in
parentheses.
3This is difficult to calculate precisely. Consider from fig.4 the mode volatility of 9. Paths with a wide range of standard
deviations fall into this category, from a minimum of σ ≈ 0.95 to a maximum of σ ≈ 2.35. The mean value of σ for the entire
set probably sits near the middle of this range.
4It is possible to achieve a marginally better fit by including a (negative) quadratic term in the model, but this disagrees









The fit of this specification can be evaluated visually by comparing our prediction Φ̂ and the set of obser-
vations Φobs, as shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Fit of Model Estimation
Judging by the way it changes when the matrix is moved, the slope β1 of this relationship depends on
how close it is to the strike price and maturity. In other words, it seems to depend on the second partial
derivatives VSτ and VSS , which is what we expect. The intercept β0, as a measure of the quantity of
trading under the condition of no transactions costs, seems to be independent of these derivatives. Instead,
it would depend on the number of agents in the market, and their technological capacity for high-frequency
trading.
8. Conclusion and Further Research
Our model has allowed us to explore all the paths an option price can take within some bounds of asset
price S and time to maturity τ (imposed by limitations on computing power5). From the 6× 6 matrix we
have been able to identify the nature of the effect of proportional transactions costs on the frequency of
delta-hedge rebalancing. We are confident that what appears to be a jagged relationship would become
smooth with sufficiently large number of time- and price-steps. Our quantitative analysis suggests the
underlying relationship is linear, and can be written
5Recall that the number of paths through a matrix are a function mn of its dimensions. As a consequence, the number of
calculations required to process the analysis of these matrices grows exponentially with their size.





where β0 and β1 are positive constants determined by market conditions, γ is a coefficient representing the
risk aversion of investors and k is the proportional transactions cost. Observation of investor activity may
give good estimates of these parameters. If these coefficients could be estimated then it would be possible
to predict the effect of a change in transactions costs on the quantity of trading, at least in the part of the
market that mimics the behaviour of the investors in our model6.
Besides investigating matrices that are larger than 6× 6, our method could be refined by including in
the options pricing model the effect of changing transactions costs, possibly by the augmented variance
method of Leland. We could also pursue the BV suggestion of endogenizing the trading frequency we
have measured here into the option pricing model, through their version of Leland’s augmented variance
method. Currently the option price solution set used in our model is constructed using the original B-S
PDE, and the transactions costs are not reflected in those prices. Finally, we could adjust the parameters
of our analysis to be consistent with observed asset price volatility.
6It would also be necessary to account for any features of the market such as fixed transactions costs or limits on the
divisibility of assets, that might otherwise affect an investor’s band of inaction and how it interacts with the proportional
transactions cost k.
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HOW MANY DAYS EQUAL A YEAR? A NOTE 
ON THE MEAN-VARIANCE MODEL
In portfolio management, the means and variances of stock returns 
are usually estimated on a daily basis and then converted to longer 
periods of time. This paper examines the issue of how to convert 1-
day means for longer periods and investigates the impacts of this 
conversion on capital allocation decisions and portfolio 
performance evaluations.  
1. Introduction
The mean-variance model and the related efficient frontier provided the basis of the 
development of modern portfolio theory.  It offered the first systematic analysis of the risk-
return trade-off faced by each investor and it still constitutes a fundamental theory for 
portfolio formation.  Markowitzs’ ground-breaking theoretical model and associated 
numerical solutions of portfolio selection under uncertainty supported the foundation for 
many important developments in financial economics like the Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM), derived by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), and Mossin (1966)) and the now 
classical distinction between systematic and idiosyncratic risks. Although the importance of 
his work remains undeniable, mean-variance portfolio analysis generated more questions than 
answers and, consequently, caused a large body of research.
In this paper, we address the importance of an issue which is very practical, but often 
ignored, on estimating the means and variances of stock returns. In practice, mean and 
variance on a stock return is often estimated on a 1-day horizon, and then they are converted 
to longer horizons as needed, by scaling. However, this conversion is not always trivial, 
because the time scale used for this conversion may not be the same as the calendar days and 
depends on the stock price movement.
First, in the literature, Fama (1965), French (1980), Roll (1984), French and Roll (1986) 
and many other researchers find that volatility is caused by trading activities. This means that 
only trading days should be counted to determine the time scale. For example, the 1-year
variance of return on a stock traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) should be 
equal to 1-day variance multiplied by 252, the number of trading days in a year on NYSE, 
rather than by 365, as shown in Hull (2012). Although some researchers, including
Smithsonite and Minton (1996 a,b), J.P. Morgan (1996), Diebold et al (1997), among others, 
show different perspectives, this approach has been widely accepted by industry and 
regulators such as the Basel committee.
However, little attention has been paid to the issue of converting a 1-day mean to a 
longer time horizon. While the volatility is caused by trading activities, the mean of a series 
of returns depends on a variety of factors among which time and the time value of money 
consideration. This implies that non-trading days should also be counted toward calculating 
the time scale. At the same time, since only trading days contribute to volatility, or market 
price risk, the expected returns on no trading days cannot be same as those on trading days. 
Thus, for instance, the simple rule of multiplying by 252 may not be correct to convert a 1-
day mean to 1-year mean.
In this paper, we present an approach to convert a 1-day mean to a longer horizon, based 
on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), and show how this conversion may affect the 
decisions of capital allocation and on the portfolio performance evaluation.
2. Mathematical Framework
Let E(rx x be the mean and standard deviation of the daily return on stock X, i.e., 
1-day mean and 1-day standard deviation, respectively. If the time horizon of our investment 
is a period of N calendar days, in order to use the mean-variance model to make optimal 
investment decisions, we need to adjust these parameters to fit our time horizon.
We denote E*(rx x* to be the mean and standard deviation of the return on stock X 
for the time period of N calendar days, and n the number of trading days in the period. Then, 
since only trading days contribute to volatility, we have:
nXX
*
                   (1)
However, not only the number of trading days contributes to the determination of the mean, 
but also that of the non-trading days. Thus, the mean for an N-day period is consisting of two 
components: the total mean of n trading days and the total mean of (N-n) non-trading days. 
The first component is the 1-day mean multiplied by the number of trading days, i.e., nE(rx ). 
Regarding the second component, in the light of the CAPM, the expected return consists of 
the risk free rate of return and a risk premium, representing compensation for investment time 
and for the risk assumed, respectively. During a non-trading day, an investment will require 
compensation for time value of money only . However, since risk or volatility is mainly 
caused by trading activities, the risk on a non-trading day can be ignored, and the risk 
premium required should be close to zero. Thus, the second component is equal to (N-n)RF , 
where RF
 
is the daily risk free rate of interest. Therefore, in summary, we can calculate the 
mean for an N-day period as follows:  
E*(rx )= nE(rx )+ (N-n)RF           (2) 
In some financial markets, such as foreign currency exchange market, trading is carried 
out seven days a week, and therefore N, the number of calendar days, is the same as n, the
number of trading days. Since both the mean and standard deviation are adjusted by the same 
time scale, the investment horizon should have no impact on the portfolio decision.     
However, in other financial markets, such as stock markets around the globe, trading is 
interrupted during weekends and stock market holidays, and therefore, number of trading 
days is less than the number of calendar days. For instance, there are 252 trading days on the 
New York Stock Exchange in one year, that is n=252 while there are N=365 calendar days. 
Thus, formula to convert 1-day mean and standard deviation to 1-year ones are:
  
 E*(rx )= 252E(rx )+ 113RF
                    
     (3) 
252* XX                (4)
Since the mean and standard deviation are adjusted by different time scales, the optimal 
portfolio selection may differ with different investment horizon. In next section, we will 
show some examples on this effect.
3. Effects of Time Horizon Changes
3.1. Effects of on Capital Allocation
For the purpose of illustration, we present a numerical example as follows:    
From the historical daily data from December 1, 2009, to December 1, 2012, we obtained the 
estimates of the mean and standard deviation of the daily return on the S&P 500 as below:
E(rS&P500 )= 0.000407
S&P500= 0.011648
For simplicity assume the risk free rate is Rf *=3% per annum, or Rf=0.000082 per day.
1
Following Bodie et al (2012), we assume an investor has a utility function as follows: 
U= E ( r) (A/2) 2
with a degree of risk aversion, A, equal to 4, 
First, assuming that the investment horizon is one day, following Bodie et al. (2012), 
1 0.03/365=0.000082
the optimal capital allocation between the risk free asset and the equity for the investor is:
yd = (E(rS&P500 )-RF)/(A S&P500
2) = (0.000407- 0.000082)/(4x0.0116482 ) =60%
This suggests investing 60% in the equity portfolio and the remaining 40% in T-Bills.
Now, assuming that the investment horizon is one year and using Eq. (3) and (4), the 






Similarly, by following Bodie et al.(2012) the optimal allocation between the risk free asset 
and the equity is:







This suggests investing 55% in the equity portfolio and the remaining 45% in T-Bills.
The above simple example shows that the investment horizon could affect capital 
allocation decision considerably.
3.2. Effect on Performance Measurement
On a daily basis, the Sharpe ratio of an asset is given by:
Sx = (E(rX )-RF)/ X
and on an annual basis, the Sharpe ratio is 
S*x = (E*(rX )-R*F)/ *X
Since  
E*(rX )-R*F= nE(rx )+ (N-n)RF -NRF =n(E(rX )-RF)
the annual Sharpe ratio becomes:
S*x = n(E(rX )-RF)/ X n
1/2
= n1/2 Sx   
The above equation indicates that, though the value of the Sharpe ratio is dependent on the 
investment horizon, the ranking among securities traded in the same market will remain the 
same. For example, for two portfolios of NYSE traded stocks, if one is better than the other 
based on the daily Sharpe ratio, the same ranking will be maintained if the annual Sharpe 
ratio is used. However, when we compare the performances of securities traded in different 
markets with different number of trading days, the investment horizon may affect their 
ranking. 
For the purpose of illustration, we can look at the following numerical example: 
Consider a stock X traded on NYSE and a foreign currency Y, traded on the FX 
market. Assume that the means and standard deviations of the annual rate of returns on X and 
Y are given as follows:
Stock X:     E*(rX ) = 20% , *X =30%  
Currency Y:  E*(rY ) = 12% , *Y =8%
The risk free interest rate is R*F = 4% per annum. 
The number of calendar days is N=365, while the number of trading days for X is nx=252 
and that for Y is ny=365.  Then on an annual basis, the Sharpe ratios of X and Y are as 
follows:
S*X = (E*(rX )-R*F)/ *X =(0.2-0.04)/0.3=0.53 
S*Y = (E*(rY )-R*F)/ *Y = (0.12-0.04)/0.14=0.57 
Since S*X <S*Y, we conclude that currency Y has better performance than stock X. 
If we perform the same analysis on a daily basis, using equations (2) and (3), the 
means and standard deviations of the daily rate of returns on X and Y are calculated as 
follows:
Stock X:     E(rX ) = 0.000745, X =0.018898  
Currency Y:   E(rY ) = 0.000329, Y =0.007328
The risk free interest rate is RF = 0.000110 per day. 
Then the Sharpe ratios of X and Y are as follows:
SX = (0.000745-0.000110)/0.018898=0.0336 
SY = (0.000329-0.000110)/0.007328=0.0299 
Since SX > SY , we conclude that stock X has better performance than currency Y. 
The above example indicates that the difference in investment horizon may affect the 
performance ranking of the assets. 
One note worth mentioning in this context is that since beta is independent of time 
horizon, investment horizon should not affect the performance ranking given by the beta-
based performance measures, such as Treynor ratio.     
4. Conclusions and Suggestions
When using the mean-variance framework in portfolio management, it is common to 
estimate the 1-day means and variances of stocks and other assets, and then convert them to 
ones with longer horizons, such as annual means and variance. While the conversion of
variances has been widely addressed and there is an approach popularly accepted, the 
conversion of means has been rarely addressed.
In this paper, we present a formula to convert 1-day means to 1-year means or means 
with other horizons, based on the CAPM model. Then, with this formula, we investigate the 
impact of time horizon changes to the optimal capital allocation decision and to the 
performance evaluation, with numerical examples.
We show that the optimal capital allocation decision can be different for a particular 
investor if he or she would change his or her investment horizon. In addition, when the 
Sharpe ratio is used to evaluate the performance of portfolios, the choice of the time horizon 
may significantly affect the evaluation. 
While we present a simple approach for the conversion of means with different time 
horizons, the issue is much more complex. As we are working in the mean-variance 
framework, the expected return consists of 2 distinguishable components: the risk-free rate 
and market risk premium. Thus, since market risk is mainly caused by trading activities, risk 
premium on non-trading days can be safely ignored. Consequently, the mean on a non-
trading day should include only the risk-free interest rate. However, many recent studies have 
shown that there are some other factors which also contribute to mean levels. One of the most 
significant developments in this direction of researches is the Liquidity-based Asset Pricing 
Model (LAPM) developed by Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Acharya and Pedersen (2005), 
and Liu (2006), among others, which indicates that illiquidity is priced as a security 
characteristic and/or as a risk factor and such, the illiquidity premium should be added to the 
expected returns. In the light of the LAPM model, non-trading days should have higher 
illiquidity premium than trading days, although they have lower market risk premiums. How 
to incorporate these issues into the conversion formula for means will be a direction of our
future research.
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A NOVEL ADAPTIVE BOUNDARY SEARCH ALGORITHM FOR SOLVING 
FACILITY LAYOUT PROBLEMS1 
An highly effective algorithm is presented to solve open space facilities layout planning 
problems involving modules with constant aspect ratios. This algorithmm is a novel 
combination of steepest descent and corner search. Layout solutions produced by the 
proposed algorithm for well-known test problems were found superior to the published 








Facility layout planning problem is a well-studied combinatorial 
optimization problem arising in a variety of applications (Drira, 2007; Taghavi, 2011; Anjos, 2010; 
Yang, 2011; Saif, 2004). Most commonly, the goal is to produce high-quality optimal layouts for 
problems involving rectangular blocks or modules representing functional units like department, 
machine, room, cell or empty space. In facilities layout planning problems, locations of a given 
number of such modules are determined to minimize a specific cost function such that no 
overlapping exists between the modules. This problem is a known NP-complete problem (Sahni, 
1976) and therefore, in almost all cases, a verifiably optimal solution is not known. Hence, all 
published work in this area has presented the performance of new algorithms comparing them with 
the previously published algorithms. A review of different approaches reported in the literature to 
solve facility layout planning problems is given in (Singh, 2006). 
                                                          
1 The authors would like to acknowledge the generous support and resources extended by Umm 
Al-Qura University, University of Waterloo, and Dalhousie University throughout the course of 
this research. This research has been partially supported by a research grant from the Faculty of 
Management, Dalhousie University, Canada. 
There are different types of facility layout planning problems. Facility 
layout planning involving modules of equal area is referred to as cell assignment problem. In such 
problems, a certain area is divided into identical cells and each facility is assigned to one of the cells. 
Several approaches have been used. Recently, (Ramkumar, 2009) have solved the problem by 
treating it as Quadratic Assignment Problem and (James, 2009) present an example of solving such 
problems using Tabu search. Other methods for solving these problems may be found in (Raoot, 
1994; Ahuja, 2000; Misevicius, 2003; Talbi, 2001). 
In case of facility layout planning involving modules of non-identical areas, 
the problem, the methods developed for solving equal area facilities layout problem cannot be used 
(Kado, 1995). These problems involving unequal area modules can be classified into two sub-groups 
considering the modules as “Soft” or “Hard”.  A soft module has pre-specified area of variable aspect 
ratio (defined as the ratio of the vertical length of the facility to its horizontal length) with given 
upper and lower bounds on them. There are several published articles on such problems that involve 
only soft modules. Some of the most recent articles in this area include (Komarudin, 2010; 
McKendall, 2010; Scholz, 2010; Scholz, 2009). 
In contrast with soft module unequal area facility layout planning, there are 
problems that involve only “Hard” modules. A hard module has fixed dimensions with a constant 
aspect ratio (VIP-Planopt, 2011). In many applications, the solution to such problems is required 
because the modules have pre-specified dimensions to suit the particular applications. Also, the 
flexibility of varying the aspect ratios does not exist. Such problems are harder to solve and therefore 
relatively fewer publications report techniques for solving such problems. Nevertheless, this class 
of problem is of particular interest due to its value to both researchers and practitioners in facility 
planning domain. 
A facility layout may be static or dynamic. Static facility layout problem is 
the one where a given cost function is optimized and material flows between modules are assumed 
to be constant over the planning horizon. When material flows between departments change during 
the planning horizon, the problem becomes a dynamic facility layout planning problem. Several 
approaches have been used to solve these problems, for example, (McKendall, 2010; Sahin, 2010; 
Dong, 2009; Ulutas, 2009).  However, for both static and dynamic facility layout planning, the basic 
optimization remains the same and an efficient technique developed for static layout planning may 
be incorporated in a dynamic layout planning, as done by (McKendall, 2010) who used the technique 
developed in (Imam, 1998) to solve the dynamic facility layout planning problem. 
Facility layout planning problems may also be classified based on existence 
or absence of the enclosing area constraint. The enclosing area constraint may be imposed to obtain 
the optimal layouts with a given rectangular, a single row (Samarghandi, 2010; Anjos, 2009), or 
multiple rows (Ficko, 2010). On the other hand, facility layout problems with open space (Mir, 2001) 
do not impose any constraint on the enclosing area.  
The objective of this paper is to present a novel algorithm for solving the 
hard module unequal area facility layout planning problem in an open space. Over the past decade, 
little research has been done to solve this class of problems.  
Hard module unequal area facility layout planning problems have been 
solved using analytical methods and other techniques including evolutionary algorithms. Among 
analytical methods, seven algorithms have been reported in (Imam, 1989; Mir, 1990; Mir, 1992; 
Imam, 1993; Mir, 1996; Imam, 1998; Mir, 2001). In one of these publications, a hybrid optimization 
approach is used that combines Simulated Annealing and Analytical Method (Mir, 2001). In another 
publication, the idea of Cluster Boundary Tracking is presented with remarkable results (Imam, 
1998). The same authors have reported a number of other algorithms, such as, analytic annealing 
(Mir, 1996), optimization through controlled convergence (Imam, 1993), and nonlinear 
programming (Imam, 1989). Recently, (McKendall, 2010) have used the analytical method of 
Cluster Boundary Tracking method published by (Imam, 1998) the most recent paper that has dealt 
with these types of problems.  
It is observed that since 2001, analytical methods have not been published 
for solving these types of problems and the thrust has been on evolutionary algorithms. However, 
examples of heuristics and evolutionary algorithms are very few. Simulated Annealing has been 
successfully applied to by (Tam, 1992), evolutionary algorithms used for solving these problems 
mainly cover Genetic Algorithms (GA). A good survey of some of the earlier work that addresses 
hard module unequal area facility layout planning using GAs has been reported in (Kado, 1995). 
Although there are several other papers that have used GAs to solve facility layout planning 
problems, such research focused on other types of facility layout planning problems such as those 
involving equal-area modules, soft modules, etc. 
This paper presents an effective algorithm for solving the special class of 
open-space facility layout planning involving hard modules of unequal dimensions. The proposed 
algorithm is a novel combination of heuristic cluster boundary search construction phase and 
analytic steepest descent improvement phase of optimization. It is to be noted that the analytic 
steepest descent for layout improvement has been employed in past (Imam, 1989; Mir, 1990). In 
addition, the heuristic cluster boundary search using a corner search has also been reported (Ahmad, 
2006; Ahmad, 2005; Ahmad, 2005; Welgama, 1993). However, little research can be found on 
synergistically employing the two techniques in one algorithm, a venue that offers significant 
promise. Simulation results presented in this paper demonstrate that the proposed technique is more 
effective than all previously published algorithms for open-space facility layout planning involving 
hard modules of unequal dimensions 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the 
problem statement. Section III describes benchmark problems used to test the proposed algorithm. 
Section IV provides detailed description of the proposed algorithm. Section V provides results and 







Let there be  modules of fixed dimensions to be placed at optimal 
positions in the Euclidean plane without any overlaps such that a given cost function C is minimized. 
The position of a module  is denoted by the coordinates of its centroid . Let  denote 
the length and width of module  along the - and -axes, respectively. If   represents the cost of 
flow per unit distance between modules  and  and  represents the inter-module distance 





The overlap area  between two modules and  is defined in the following using (Mir, 2001): 
  (2)  
where 
 
 (3)  
 
(4)  
 for  and  
otherwise
(5)  
A positive value of indicates there is an overlap between modules 
and . To avoid overlapping of the modules, the is restricted to zero. In the light of this 
discussion and Equations (1) to (4), the open-space, unequal area and hard module layout planning 
problem can now be formulated as: 
 Minimize  
subject to 








In Table I, we provide a tabular compilation of three relatively large-scale 
published benchmark problems that we used to test our algorithm. In this table, each row contains a 
separate problem with columns giving the serial number, the problem ID along with the first known 
citation of the problem, the problem size in terms of the number of modules, the distance norm used 






We propose a hybrid algorithm involving dual hybridizations: 
construction-cum-improvement hybrid and analytic-cum-heuristic hybrid. We call the proposed 
algorithm as Adaptive Boundary Search (ABS) algorithm. The algorithm employs a Near-
Optimality Hypothesis and a definition of Local Optimum Layout for reducing the otherwise infinite 
search space. Both of these concepts are described in the following.  
Table I: Benchmark Problems Used to Test the Algorithm 
 Problem ID [Original Source] 
Size 
(Modules) 
Distance Norm Cost Function 
1 OUH-020-IMx (Imam, 1993) 20 Rectilinear  
2 OUH-028-MIx (Mir, 1992) 28 Squared Euclidean  
3 OUH-050-EOS (VIP-Planopt, 2012) 50 Euclidean  
 
 
The traditional definition of local optima of satisfying the stationary 
conditions cannot be used in facility layout planning because of the discontinuities in the cost 
function occurring due to the overlap constraints (Imam, 1989; Mir, 1989). We define Local 
Optimum Layout as one in which cost cannot be improved by slightly perturbing the position of any 
module taken one at a time.  
We state our Near-Optimality Hypothesis as follows. In a constructive-
cum-improvement algorithm, modules are added to the layout one by one followed by an 
improvement cycle after every addition of module. If a Local Optimal Layout is achieved at each 
stage of optimization then the final layout will be a near optimal layout.   
Here we provide a detailed description of the main components of the 
proposed algorithm. We also provide the pseudo-code of our algorithm in Appendix A. 
The algorithm starts with an initial layout of two modules by randomly 
selecting a module as the first Incoming Module (IM1) and placing it at an arbitrary position. Once 
placed, this module will be called Placed Module (PM). This is followed by randomly selecting 
another module as the second Incoming Module (IM2) and placing it optimally on the boundary of 
the PM resulting in the Initial Boundary Placement (IBP), inspired by the idea described in (Imam, 
1998). At this stage, the partial layout is also the global optimum layout and there is no need to 
perform an improvement cycle until there are more than two PMs. 
The main loop in the ABS algorithm loop starts with the selection of the 
third module. In each iteration of this loop, an incoming module IM is randomly selected from the 
list of candidate modules followed by IBP to determine the best possible position on the boundary 
of the partial layout of PMs. The algorithm merges any mini-clusters formed during placements. 
After the placement of the IM through IBP, the improvement cycle starts. Each module of the cluster 
of PMs is moved one by one to obtain further gains in the cost through steepest descent. We refer to 
this procedure as Analytic Improvement, which is repeated until no gain is possible by moving any 
of the PMs.  At this stage, the layout is a Local Optimal Layout.  Subsequently, another module is 
randomly selected as an IM from the list of unplaced modules. The IBP is performed and the process 
to achieve a Local Optimal Layout through analytic improvement is repeated. The loop continues 
until all modules have been placed.  
The Heuristic Boundary Search we have used explores positioning of an 
incoming module only at vacant corners of the placed modules. This heuristic search reduces the 
otherwise infinite solution space to tractable limits. Since our placement decisions are restricted only 
to the corners of placed modules, for a given module, there are only O(n) possible locations 
supporting the use of some fast pseudo-exhaustive search in a hierarchical manner (Ahmad, 2006; 
Ahmad, 2005; Welgama, 1993; Imam, 1998). 
As shown in the pseudo-code given in Appendix A, the Heuristic Boundary 
Search proceeds by investigating the placement opportunities for each of the four corners of an IM 
(or PMj, as the case may be) at each of the four corners of the placed module PMk. Given i modules 
in the cluster, there are a maximum of 16i possible locations to explore, a very loose upper bound. 
In the proposed algorithm, the Heuristic Boundary Search is called twice, first to place every 
incoming module (IM) and then to find a better location for a placed module (PMj) after the 
application of the steepest descent improvement technique. 
Once the best position for an incoming module has been found on the 
cluster of placed modules using Heuristic Boundary Search, the analytic improvement through 
steepest descent is carried out on all placed modules. For this purpose, the slopes of steepest descent 
for all placed modules are determined.  
Following the decreasing order of slopes, each PM is moved in the direction 
of the steepest descent. The slope of steepest descent Sp for the pth module from the list of PMs is 
given by the following equation: 
 
Whereas, the direction of steepest descent is given by the vector 
  
This analytic improvement procedure is explained through the example 
given in Figure 1, showing a cluster of eight PMs formed after applying Heuristic Boundary Search 
on IM8. Since the best position of IM8 on the boundary of the cluster has been obtained, analytic 
improvement through steepest descent procedure will be applied to each of the PMs.  
In the example shown in Figure 1, module 6 has the highest value of SP. 
This module is therefore moved first in its direction of steepest descent, which is vertically upwards. 
The optimal position is shown in Figure 1(b), while ignoring the overlap with Module 3. To remove 
any overlap, heuristic boundary search is applied to Module 3 for determining its best position on 
the boundary of the cluster, resulting in a layout as shown in Figure 1(c). It is to be noted that the 
analytic improvement may result in an overlap of multiple modules. In such a case, all overlapping 
modules, except the module moved by the analytic improvement procedure, are placed at superior 
positions using heuristic boundary search.  
If the new layout does not result in an improved cost, the improvement 
procedure is backtracked and the module with the next highest slope is moved and the procedure is 
repeated. If the move is successful, the slopes are calculated again and the analytic improvement 
procedure is repeated. Once all modules have been considered, or no further improvement is 
possible, the heuristic boundary search is applied to all modules. This cycle of analytic improvement 
through steepest descent and heuristic boundary search is repeated until no gains are possible and a 
Local Optimal Layout is achieved. 
Our heuristic improvement is inspired by ideas explored in (Imam, 2010). 
It involves minor horizontal and vertical perturbations in the position of each module present in the 
cluster, by considering one module at a time. These perturbations are retained only when these result 
in cost improvement. Furthermore, to reduce computational complexity we perform these heuristic 
improvements in a slightly greedy manner. For instance, a useful rightward perturbation would mean 
ignoring any leftward perturbation or, vice versa, but vertical perturbations are still explored. This 
final tuning was performed only once at the end of all iterations of analytic and heuristic 
improvements. It involves detecting any super modules, where adjacent modules perfectly align 




Results and Discussion 
 
 
The proposed algorithm was implemented using MATLAB and was used 
to solve the benchmark problems listed in Table I using a 2.0 GHz quad-core computer running on 
Windows 7 with a 8 GB main memory. The data for the benchmark problems can be found in 
(Tasadduq, 2012).  Comparison of layouts obtained from the proposed ABS algorithm with the 
verifiably best available published results and those obtained from VIP-PLANOPT (VIP-Planopt, 
2012) – an extremely effective commercially available layout optimization software – are presented 
here (Heragu, 2006; Tompkins, 2002). Table II provides a summary of these comparative analyses, 
clearly indicating the superiority of the proposed algorithm. Detailed discussions on these 





(a)  (b) (c) 
Figure 1: Example of application of the analytic improvement procedure 
(a) Before analytic improvement  (b) Steepest descent move of Module 6  (c) Module 3 







































This twenty-module problem was first introduced in (Imam, 1993) and a 
solution with a cost of 1,264.94. Subsequently, the problem has been solved by (McKendall, 2010) 
reporting a solution with a cost of 1151.40. We were able to obtain and verify the layout data from 
the authors through personal communications. Recently, this problem has been solved using a 
Memetic Algorithm resulting in a superior solution with a cost of 1,199.50 (Tasadduq, 2011). The 
best solution produced by VIP-PLANOPT has a cost of 1,157.00 (VIP-Planopt, 2012). In 
comparison, the proposed ABS algorithm yields the best layout with a cost of 1,140.00, shown in 
Figure 2, which is the best solution reported for any algorithm thus far. 
 






This randomly generated 28-module problem was presented as a test 
problem in (Mir, 1992). The paper reports a layout with a cost of 9,626.00 and provides all the data 
for verification. Later, it was used as a test problem for a new technique called Analytical Annealing, 
reporting a cost of 8,640.00 for the best layout obtained (Mir, 1996). Complete data were provided 
to verify the cost of the layout. The best layout produced by VIP-PLANOPT for this problem has a 
cost of 6,447.25 (VIP-Planopt, 2012). Our proposed ABS technique yields a cost of 6,289.64 for the 
best layout shown in Figure 3, which is significantly better than the previous best solutions as well 
































This 50-module problem was introduced by VIP-PLANOPT as a randomly 
generated benchmark problem in 1996 (VIP-Planopt, 2012). Previously, no test or benchmark 
problem of 50 or more modules was presented in the literature on facility layout planning. The best 
layout obtained by VIP-PLANOPT has a cost of 78,224.70 for this problem (VIP-Planopt, 2012). 
Subsequently, it was used as test problem in (Mir, 2001) for their hybrid search algorithm. They 
obtained a layout with a cost of 80,794.24. Recently, it has been used as a test problem in 
(McKendall, 2010) and the reported cost of the best solution as 71,291.40. Although no layout has 
been shown in the paper and no data are given to verify the given cost, we were able to obtain and 
verify the layout data from the authors through personal communication. This 50-module problem 
was also used in (Tasadduq, 2011) as a test problem and the reported layout cost was 77,504.00. The 
proposed ABS technique is able to obtain a layout with a cost of 71,151.41, which is lower than the 
reported cost by any published source or commercial software. The layout is shown in Figure 4.  
 
 
Summary of Results 
 
 
A comparison of the obtained results is summarized in Table II. The results 
clearly demonstrate that proposed technique is more effective than all previously published 
algorithms as well as popular commercially available layout optimization software. Data relevant to 
the layouts optimized using the proposed algorithm, such as coordinates of the lower left corners 
and problem dimensions, etc. are available from (Tasadduq, 2012). 








































Figure 4: Optimal layout for problem OUH-050-EOS 
 
Table II. Summary of Results 





1 OUH-020-IMx 1,151.40  (McKendall, 2010) 1,157.00 1,140.00 
2 OUH-028-MIx 8,640.00   (Mir, 1996) 6,447.25 6,289.64 







This paper presents a novel, efficient and effective algorithm for open-
space, unequal area and hard module layout planning problems using a definition for Local Optimal 
Layout and a Near-optimality Hypothesis. This hybrid algorithm is a novel combination of an 
analytical technique (steepest descent) and a heuristic boundary search (corner search). The steepest 
descent has been used to determine the optimum direction of movement of a module. Corner search 
has been used at each placement of a module, where the modules are moved individually as well as 
collectively if these movements improve the objective function value. 
The proposed algorithm brings significant, often dramatic, improvements 
over published techniques. The algorithm was tested on various well-known and large-scale 

























































benchmark problems involving open-space, unequal area and hard module layout planning. For all 
these problems, the proposed algorithm furnished layouts whose cost surpassed all of the previously 
reported solutions including those obtained by the commercial software VIP-PLANOPT. In future, 
we plan to survey other published benchmark problems for open-space, unequal area and hard 
module layout planning for further testing of the efficacy of the proposed algorithm. 
 
This research is expected to afford efficient procurement of superior layout 
outcomes and to facilitate cognitive, ergonomic, and economic efficiency of layout designers and 
operations managers. Applications of reported research are broad ranging including facilities layout 
design, VLSI circuit layout design, webpage layout design, newspaper layout design, cutting and 
packing dynamic memory allocations, multi-processors’ scheduling, etc. It would also help improve 
the efficiency, efficacy, and scalability of layout optimization software and facilitate development 
of expert systems and decision support systems for relevant application domains. An ability to 
efficiently generate superior layout outcomes would also spur creativity of operations managers 






Let,    
NM = Number of modules 
SCM = Set of candidate modules 
PM = Set of placed modules 
with their locations 
TPM 
IM 
= Total number of PMs 
= Incoming module 
PMS = Set of PMs with slopes 
in descending order 
PMtemp = Temporary set of PMs 
Cost = Cost of the objective function 
CostPMtemp = Temporary cost of the objective 
function 




= Set of PMs with possible overlap(s) 
= A small positive number 
/Initialize/ 
Set Cost = ∞ and TPM = 0 
Randomly select IM  SCM 
Place IM 
Add IM to PM 
TPM = TPM + 1 
MainAlgo ( ) 
For i = 2 to NM 
Select another IM  SCM 
Call SearchBorder ( )        
Add IM to PM      
TPM = TPM + 1      
Calculate Cost 
Call ImproveAnalytically( )  
For j = 1 to TPM 
Call SearchBorder ( ) 
Call ImproveHeuristically(i)       
 
 
SearchBorder ( ) 
For k = 1 to TPM 
Place corners of IM or PMj on that of PMk 
Calculate Cost as newCost  
Save the minimum Cost in CostPMtemp 
Save layout in PMtemp 
If CostPMtemp < Cost 
Cost = CostPMtemp  
PM = PMtemp 
ImproveAnalytically ( ) 
For i = 1 to TPM 
Calculate Si 
Sort PM modules by Si & store in PMS 
For i = 1 to TPM 
Do While CostPMtemp < Cost 
Move PMj  PMS in the direction of Si  
CheckOverlaps 
If TPMO ≠ Ø 
RemoveOverlaps 
Calculate new Cost (CostPMtemp) 
If CostPMtemp < Cost 
PM = PMtemp 
Cost = CostPMtemp 
 
ImproveHeuristically (k) 
For i = 1 to k 
For d = 1 to 4 
Do While CostPMtemp < Cost 
Move PMi in direction “d” by ε 
Save Cost in CostPMtemp 
Save layout in PMtemp 
If CostPMtemp < Cost 
PM = PMtemp 
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SOCIO-TECHNICAL PERSPECTIVES ON IMPEDIMENTS IN ADOPTION OF 
OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE TOOLS 
This paper explores ways of enhancing the efficacy of OR/MS techniques within a 
broader context. We examine differences and complementarities between a pure OR/MS 
and a Systems approach to problem solving. We attempt to identify some potent 
impediments in adoption of OR/MS tools from both technological and behavioral 
perspectives. Furthermore, we provide some recommendations for alleviating the 
inherent issues with OR/MS approaches. 
 
Introduction 
The disciplines of Operations Research and Management Sciences (OR/MS) have been 
defined in various ways by various researchers and organizations. One concise definition is: 
“[OR/MS are the disciplines] of applying advanced analytical methods to help make better 
decisions” (www.scienceofbetter.org). For over sixty years, OR/MS has been growing in 
complexity and usefulness. Indeed, OR/MS brought with itself new technologies and paradigms 
to aid effective decision-making (Taylor, 2013). More importantly, such decision-making 
paradigms and technologies have enhanced the effectiveness of interdisciplinary problem solving 
teams and added value and efficacy of OR/MS tools (INFORMS, 2013). The proliferation of 
information technology further facilitated the use of OR/MS tools by more people, rendering an 
increased capability to add value through OR/MS tools. This impact of information technology on 
OR/MS discipline is expressed by the way The Institute for Operations Research and the 
Management Sciences (INFORMS) defines OR/MS: “[OR/MS are] the professional disciplines 
that deal with the application of information technology for informed decision-making” (Ibid.). 
Indeed, OR/MS disciplines are deemed responsible for substantial improvement in 
efficiency, efficacy, and productivity in industry, government, and research and development. 
Nevertheless, the traditional style of preaching and teaching OR/MS made many people perceive 
OR/MS as a panacea in the real world problem solving. In reality, some OR/MS practitioners 
may advocate it as the rational and scientific problem-solving regime. Conceivably, when people 
discover through hard experience that this discipline has its constraints in dealing with the 
majority of omnipresent socio-technical and ill-structured problems, a negative affect prevails. 
Nevertheless, the OR/MS tools in tandem with other soft decision-making and problem solving 
approaches could deliver a lot more than what some people perceive. 
In this paper, our objective is to explore ways of enhancing the efficacy of OR/MS 
techniques within a broader context. We will also examine differences and complementarities 
between a pure OR/MS and a Systems approach to problem solving. It is not our intention to 
cover these techniques in depth because of space and scope limitations. However, we have tried 
to identify some potent impediments in adoption of OR/MS tools from both technological and 
behavioral perspectives. Furthermore, our discussions are generalized in the sense that we would 
not be wading into any lists, or details, of OR/MS tools and techniques found in OR/MS texts. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We offer a brief historical perspective of the 
OR/MS discipline. Next, we discuss the value provided by OR/MS tools in various arenas. 
Subsequently, we delineate some core aspects of OR/MS tools and techniques followed by an 
outline of some of the problems with traditional OR/MS approaches. Next, we provide some 
recommendations for interdisciplinary and synergistic approaches needed in advancing 
applications of OR/MS as well as its adoption in more effective problem solving and decision-
making. We conclude the paper with a summary and limitations of the paper as well as some 
future research directions. 
 
Historical Perspective 
We believe that a quick glance at the history and success of OR/MS as a discipline would 
enable putting some relevant arguments in a better perspective. The OR/MS has its beginnings in 
the Second World War, when British military authorities faced pressing problems that were not 
amenable to any known scientific methods (Pidd, 2001). These problems arose from new 
technologies and applications to organizing operations. In order to maximize utilization of 
military resources, especially radar installations, and to analyze the available data, military 
formed teams of scientists from a wide variety of backgrounds, aptly named as the Operational 
Research Group. The eventual success of the OR group in improving resource utilization and 
effective decision-making lead to the creation of similar group in the US military. In fact, it can 
be argued that the victory of allies in the Second World War is attributable to efficient and 
effective use of all kind of resources made possible through the application of OR (INFORMS). 
In post-war scenario, British and US scientists realized that this approach of creating 
diverse teams for building and optimizing models could be used to great effect and benefit in 
business and the public sector (Pidd, 2004). The practice of employing OR/MS in the civilian 
domain soon spread throughout the developed world. By the end of the 1950s, OR/MS had 
established a set of problems and methods that it generally dealt with. Lists of such tools and 
applications can be found in any OR/MS text (Taha, 2010; Taylor, 2013). The spectacular rate of 
increase in computing power coupled with the development of more advanced modeling and 
optimization tools meant that more complex models and problems have been progressively 
tackled with OR/MS techniques. 
The modeling/optimization approach remained a major constituent of OR/MS theory and 
practice throughout the 1960s and 70s. However, starting in the early 1980s, many OR/MS 
researchers and practitioners realized and acknowledged that the traditional OR/MS approach was 
not adequate in all situations (Ackoff 2001). Several researchers and practitioners expressed 
concerns about the ever-increasing mathematical bias and narrow focus on optimization in the 
OR/MS. These people suggested that the systems thinking, the soft systems methodology, and 
other related techniques were more appropriate than mathematical programming for many 
complex, ill-defined, and difficult-to-model problems confronted by OR/MS practitioners 
(Ackoff 2001, Ahmad 2005). They extended the narrow quantitative optimization focus to 
incorporate thoughts from such disciplines as philosophy, sociology, and organizational behavior. 
Indeed, this multidisciplinary approach envisioned by proponents was in line with the earliest 
applications of OR during wartime when the OR Group consisted of experts from a wide array of 
disciplines and work domains. 
The 1990s saw a revolution in computer and information technology that has had a 
significant effect on the OR/MS practice. During the recent decades, there was a dramatic 
proliferation of spreadsheets, easy access to inexpensive OR/MS software, simple communication 
and computational tools, the spread of OR/MS knowledge via the web, and other forms of 
modern information technologies. This lead many more individuals getting involved in OR/MS 
applications, often with little OR/MS training or education or intellectual support. It has added to 
the burden of OR/MS to prove itself as a viable and value enhancing discipline when many 
pseudo-practitioners in OR/MS have only perfunctory knowledge of a small subset of OR/MS 
tools. The situation is aggravated because many such individuals cannot, and often do not know 
how to, effectively complement OR/MS tools with some other pertinent disciplines.  
 
The Value of OR/MS 
The OR/MS tools are ubiquitously creating value in organizations ranging from small to 
large multi-national corporations, in public sector to militaries, in terrestrial explorations to extra-
terrestrial explorations, etc. Such applications of OR/MS tools are directed at achieving more 
with fewer resources. The availability of better and cheaper computing power provides more 
opportunities to create value and improve effectiveness through OR/MS. It helps provide 
quantitative and business insight into complex problems. Furthermore, it helps improve 
performance through a variety of modes, including analyses and recommendations about business 
processes, decreasing cost or investment, assessing the likely outcomes of decision alternatives 
and uncovering better alternatives, providing a superior basis for forecasting and planning, 
efficiently scheduling staff and equipment, improving productivity of organizations, increasing 
return on investment, improving quality, quantifying qualitative considerations, managing and 
reducing risk, achieving greater utilization from limited equipment, facilities, money, and 
personnel as well as supporting operational, tactical, and strategic planning. 
Nevertheless, the field of OR/MS has expanded so much that most OR/MS analysts may 
only boast expertise in a small section of it. Consequently, they are highly likely to tailor/model 
any problem situation to fit in a small number of OR/MS techniques of their own expertise 
(Daellenbach and McNickle, 2012). Furthermore, one aim of OR/MS tools is to provide insights 
for informed decision-making (Ahmad et al., 2008). Nevertheless, problem arises when users of 
OR/MS tools start taking the output of an OR/MS model as a decision rather than an input for 
decision support. In addition, there is a considerable gap between theory and practice of problem 
solving techniques in the real world situations (Silver and Meal, 1998). There is a need to provide 
deep and rigorous treatment of OR/MS to practitioners without complicating mathematics (Ibid.). 
 
The Traditional OR/MS Approaches 
The traditional OR/MS approaches are analytic and reductionist (Jackson, 2000). A 
hierarchical decomposition approach is followed to explore how a system works leading to 
recommendations as to how things can be changed for better (Daellenbach and McNickle, 2012). 
It often consists of hard and technical ways to tame the problem, embracing scientific 
methodologies (Ibid.). An interesting analogy of OR/MS is that of “a doctor who, with little 
participation from the patient, indicates how health can be improved” (Keys 1991, pp. 2). 
One simplifying tactic used by OR/MS practitioners is to focus on individual parts of the 
system and try to improve the performance of parts (Jackson, 2000). The assumption is that 
improving the performance of the parts of a system taken separately will improve the 
performance of the whole (Lawson, 2005). In reality, it may even destroy the whole system 
(Ackoff, 2001; Warfield and Staley, 1996). Nevertheless, dividing large projects into manageable 
parts has remained a viable problem solving strategy, which usually results in 
compartmentalization of information (Lawson, 2005). 
From the early days of OR/MS, quantitative analyses were employed to provide some 
discernible and computable measures of effectiveness, enabling meaningful interpretations of the 
information generated. OR/MS provided useful information and insights to decision-makers for 
more informed and effective decision-making. Indeed scientific methods provide a basis for 
traditional OR/MS to relate theory to practice. However, OR/MS has traditionally assigned 
greater substance to its observance of scientific methods. In the next Section, we discuss some 
other important aspects of OR/MS as well as some problems associated with those. 
 
Problems with the Traditional OR/MS Approaches 
In OR/MS, the usual starting point is a relatively well-structured and tightly defined 
problem with clearly articulated performance measures and alternative courses of action. It 
proceeds with formulation of a model for the problem situation, collecting necessary data, and 
solving and validating the model. A tendency to follow a mathematically accurate approach to 
problem solving and perceiving OR/MS as exact science turns out to be an impediment in effective 
problem solving. Although such an exact approach is desirable in mathematical research, 
presuming it to be a necessary step in solving complex real world problems tends to mask the right 
perspective of the problem and proving a certain lemma becomes the focus of the exercise. Such 
an approach reinforces the view that the OR/MS academics largely solve academic problems quite 
removed from reality. This usual approach inherently contains several problems that may limit 
efficacy of OR/MS tools, some of which are discussed below. 
Deterministic and Hard Optimization Paradigm 
An optimization model consists of an objective function and a set of constraints. The goal 
is to find a solution that gives the best value objective function while satisfying all the constraints 
included in the model. However, often the solution obtained is the solution to the model and not 
to the actual problem (Lawson, 2005). Although some techniques support stochastic processes, 
OR/MS models and tools still deal with abstractions and simplifications of reality more 
appropriate for deterministic systems (Ackoff, 2001). 
In a typical OR/MS approach, mathematical modeling precedes the generation of 
alternative courses. Consequently, there is often a futile and time-consuming exercise of 
formulating a mathematical model that might not even produce a feasible solution keeping in 
view the plethora of qualitative constraints in socio-technical systems (Foulds and Thanchekary, 
2001). However, once an OR/MS analyst has spent a significant amount of time in formulating a 
complex, albeit rigidly and myopically defined, mathematical model, such cognitive biases as 
anchoring may hinder the search for a viable course. These cognitive biases, as discussed further 
subsequently, might impede the much-needed leaps of faith and the need for breaking away from 
the course already followed (Greenberg, 2010; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Resource 
limitations further aggravate the problem by providing a rationale for not looking further. 
The hard optimization and mathematical programming approach particularly fails when 
addressing complex problems with conflicting objectives. It often provides a unique optimal 
solution against a single, simple criterion (Ahmad 2008; Triantaphyllou et al., 1998). The 
solution is often based on a model that fails to capture many of the realities of the practical 
situation and includes only hard constraints (Ahmad, 2005). Furthermore, it often cannot provide 
answers within reasonable computational time (Foulds and Thanchekary, 2001). Even though 
OR/MS practitioners may come up with an optimal solution to a certain problem given the 
objective situation, some highly subjective considerations often constitute the imperative and 
decisive role in the selection of the solution alternative (Ibid.). 
Problem Complexity 
Another issue with traditional OR/MS approaches is the complexity of the problem. 
Complexity of a problem is often seen as the number of components, variables, and their 
combinations considered or needing to be considered in making a decision (Jackson, 2000; 
Warfield and Staley, 1996). It is commonly referred to as combinatorial complexity (Garey and 
Johnson, 1979). For instance, the scheduling of jobs on various machines available is a hard 
problem from combinatorial standpoint. The larger the number of machines or jobs at hand, the 
larger the number of possibilities that should be screened in search of an optimal solution. 
However, the real world systems also exhibit another subtle but critical sort of complexity – the 
dynamic complexity – discussed further subsequently. The dynamic complexity appears from 
complex interactions among various system variables and agents over time. In fact, many 
variables may change simultaneously, thus confounding the effects of any intervention into the 
system.  
OR/MS still tends to focus on narrowly defined questions with more emphasis on 
breaking down problems into smaller and lower-level components that are more tractable to 
analysis and more immune to uncertainty (Drejer et al. 2000). The tradition of reductionism in 
OR/MS can be traced back to F.W. Taylor and his Scientific Management approach to industrial 
engineering. Although the current practice of OR/MS employs tools boasting a much higher level 
of scientific sophistication and efficacy than early scientific management techniques, Taylor’s 
scientific management approach still provides a classic perspective to reductionism. Such 
reductionist approaches involved reducing a system to its simplest elements, analyzing them, and 
calculating how to improve each element – an antithesis of a much more plausible integrative 
approach discussed later in this paper. The underlying notion in scientific management is that 
observation and measurement provide a secure ground for analysis (Taylor, 2013). 
Social Aspects in Socio-Technical Problems 
The dynamic complexity may arise in seemingly very simple problem situations. For 
instance, most political/social problems seen from the so-called objective lens would appear as 
very simple problems that may be resolved by resorting to simple interventions. However, such 
interventions do not always help keep other variables constant and modeling the effects of 
variable of interest.  
Furthermore, problems arising from social, behavioral, or political influences require an 
understanding of such influences before embarking on some OR/MS solution methodology. Due 
regard to social and behavioral determinants of operational success might provide very high 
returns without resorting to rigid OR/MS techniques for optimizing some tangible aspects of the 
system. For instance, studies in Sun Microsystems™ have shown how spending about $20,000 in 
understanding and improving intangible determinants of product success yielded about $150 
million dollars return (Rhodes, 2000). An oft-cited classic example relates to the wait time at 
elevators in a building during the early days of OR/MS. Users of elevators constantly complained 
about the excessive perceived waiting time for elevators. Decision makers, and a series of OR/MS 
teams, embarked on a variety of futile interventions to reduce the waiting time of passengers. The 
solution finally came from an OR/MS professional who tried to break away from the discipline’s 
usual approach of modeling a problem situation and then solving it optimally and tried to inspect 
the situation personally rather than relying on heaps of data available. The magic solution that 
followed the observation constituted of installing large mirrors in the elevator areas giving people 
a chance to appreciate theirs and others appearances discreetly while waiting (Taha, 2002). 
Interestingly, all complaints about excessive wait times suddenly vanished. 
Another example of disregarding social and behavioral aspects of relates to Taylor’s 
scientific management approach towards improving the efficiency of an individual and, 
purportedly, improving the workplace and business productivity. It disregarded many important 
dynamics of the whole system, such as potential compensation paid by businesses to workers 
suffering injuries in performing repetitive task in a rigid fashion. Union resistance and resulting 
social tensions were ignored as well as any other social aspect of socio-technical systems, as 
highlighted by the famous Hawthorne study (Greenberg, 2010). Consequently, even though the 
apparent efficiency of an individual worker during a short time period may be improved, the 
overall business efficiency and productivity may be reduced and render the whole exercise of 
scientific micromanagement counter-productive. 
Information Unavailability, Uncertainty, and Filtering 
An OR/MS tool without data is like a person without soul. However, the data is often so 
scarce that it constrains meaningful application of quantitative and statistical tools available to us. 
Furthermore, the information we receive usually comes through various information filters and 
strong systematic assumptions (Sterman, 1994). In a socio-technical system, such filters may 
involve propaganda and control of information. In other technical systems, where data is based on 
measurements, these might involve distortions, errors, biases, uncertainty, ignorance, etc. (Ibid.). 
Indeed, measurement is based on selection – not only the selection of variables of interest but also 
the range, the format, the equipment, the environment, and the agent for measurements.  
A classic example comes from the Nimbus 7 project NASA launched in 1978, where the 
measurements of atmospheric ozone levels did not enable the detection of a gigantic ozone hole 
above Antarctica. It was only in 1985 when the first scientific evidence of this ozone hole was 
published, forcing NASA scientists to investigate the reasons of this failure. The cause was the 
computer program that was based on the belief that very low readings of ozone may only come 
from instrumental malfunctioning. Indeed, a revisit to the original data collected by Nimbus 7, 
before the filtering, showed that this ozone hole, with all its potentially disastrous consequences 
for our planet, could have been detected in 1978 (Meadows et al., 1992; Sterman, 1994). In short, 
a measurement system was created that simply filtered important pertinent information. 
Interestingly, such filtering is not only present in information procurement but also in the 
selection of the problem and its potential solution. The famous garbage can model illustrates how 
a problem is pseudo-randomly selected from various existing problems and then a pseudo-
randomly selected solution approach is pursued (Greenberg, 2010). Indeed, solving the wrong 
problem, facetiously referred to as type III error, is not rare. Again, a classic example comes from 
the very early days of OR/MS discipline when scientists in the Royal Air Force’s OR group 
started working on optimally fortifying fighter planes. The approach involved meticulous 
measurement and data collection regarding most hit or damaged parts of the warplanes returned 
from war missions. The underlying idea was to fortify the more vulnerable parts of the plane. The 
fallacy was that a wrong conception of vulnerability was employed. This fallacy was recognized 
when a senior air force officer pointed out that they were basing their analyses on those planes 
that have actually returned from combat missions. 
Apart from scarcity and filtering of the problem-pertinent data, the available data often 
supports divergent and competing interpretations. In an attempt to draw inferences from the data, 
we must resort to systematic simplifying assumptions. Nevertheless, our mental and mathematical 
model formulations are constrained by what we resolved to define, observe, and measure and 
other ‘externalities’ are usually disregarded/unnoticed in problem solving and decision-making 
process (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Consequently, such information unavailability, filtering, 
and uncertainty often result in false pretenses as well as unintentional anchoring bias, which 
refers to a cognitive bias that describes the common human tendency to rely too heavily on the 
first piece of information offered when making decisions (Greenberg, 2010). 
Subjectivity and uncertainty in the domain knowledge has been classified by some 
researchers as incomplete, inconsistent, imprecise, and vague knowledge (Ahmad et al. 2005). 
The term incompleteness implies the unavailability of some of the information, necessitating the 
employment of heuristics and approximate reasoning. Inconsistency suggests the disparity or 
conflict in the knowledge, causing problems in using the available information. Imprecision refers 
to values that are loosely defined or measured inaccurately. Vagueness indicates the subjectivity 
in the estimate about some value or fact, causing difficulty in aptly understanding the information 
(Ahmad et al., 2004).  
Often, the preferences and constraints faced in solving problems are intrinsically 
incomplete, imprecise, inconsistent, and vague (Ahmad, 2004, 2005). In addition, the uncertainty 
tackled in operations research literature is largely limited to the uncertainty in the occurrence of a 
well-defined event such as uncertainty in demand forecasts. Nevertheless, many problems also 
involve uncertainty in the event itself due to incomplete, imprecise, inconsistent, and vague 
information. However, even under a relatively deterministic environment, the cost of procuring 
exact and complete information could often be prohibitive as well as implicitly involve 
systematic judgment (Ahmad et al., 2004; Sterman, 1994). 
The limited, imperfect, and uncertain nature of information affects our decisions. The 
ambiguity arising from the confounded nature of interaction among system variables and multiple 
interpretations of linguistic terms significantly alters the human ability to identify the structure 
and parameters of a system from the examination of the system (Jackson, 2000; Warfield and 
Staley, 1996). Indeed, people often reason in terms of vague and context dependent concepts in 
dealing with situations where they encounter uncertainty (Turban and Aronson, 2001). 
Such a multitude of tangible and intangible considerations in real world applications 
underscores the need for a composite/multi-criteria fitness evaluation regime combining various 
desirable characteristics (Triantaphyllou et al., 1998). One reason is that different fitness criteria 
represent different perspectives and are very much likely to be competing and conflicting. 
However, the traditional approach in OR/MS to decision-making with multiple objectives is a 
fundamentally ad hoc methodology. Generally, it works with optimizing the most important 
objective, while meeting minimal aspiration levels on all other objectives. In short, arbitrary 
boundary choices are used with little justification for it, involving high degree of subjectivity. 
Such an ad hoc approach evades many fundamental issues in MCDM (Ibid.). A situation with 
more than one decision-maker further aggravates the problem. 
Indeed, the uncertainty in the environment calls for flexibility in order to respond to 
changes quickly. However, most OR/MS tools are designed to achieve a rigidly defined 
optimality, undermining the very notion of flexibility and adaptability. 
Dynamic Reality and Rationality 
Another salient issue is the dynamic nature of reality and the problem situation. Indeed, 
decision-making is not a static process. It usually involves a planning horizon during which the 
environment encompassing the problem may change significantly. Irrespective of the degree to 
which we agree with such assertions, there is no denying the fact that most problem situations are 
dynamic in nature, as new and unintended dynamics may emerge through interactions among 
various components in a system or its ecology (Daellenbach and McNickle, 2012). Such a 
dynamic and evolutionary character is also true for requirements and preferences of clients, 
pronouncing the need for the OR/MS practitioners to adapt their problem-solving approach quite 
often. Indeed, such dynamism in preferences frequently results from client’s interaction with 
existing or intermediate solutions, a phenomenon often referred to as dynamic rationality 
(Bouyssou and Vincke, 1998; Sterman, 1994). 
Bounded Rationality 
A decision strategy that is completely informed, perfectly logical, and oriented towards 
economic reward is referred to as perfect rationality (Simon, 1955). However, in practice, 
decision makers often resort to bounded-rationality reflecting an inadequacy resources 
(Greenberg, 2010; Simon, 1957). The most taxing issue OR/MS practitioners face is the ill-
structured nature of problems that tend to be complex, novel, subjective, and uncertain (Ignizio & 
Cavalier, 1994). Such undertakings require a high degree of creativity and expertise (Ibid). 
Beside all limitations, ambiguity, and complexity of information, humans may still 
interpret available information in ways that might be far from rational. The search for an 
objective measure for evaluation and comparison of alternatives adds to the constraints that 
hamper effectual decision-making (Simon, 1955, 1957). As such, decision makers often resort to 
satisficing rather than rational optimization (March and Simon, 1958). The term satisficing refers 
to the process of setting an adequate degree of acceptability for a solution to a problem and 
screening solutions till one surpassing the benchmark is found (Greenberg, 2010). 
Cognitive Biases and Flaws 
As mentioned, there are various biases involved in decision-making. For instance, 
decision-makers often resort to making presumptions regarding some aspects of the available 
information, an affinity referred to as framing error (Greenberg, 2010). Furthermore, even when 
objective information remains unchanged, people’s judgment is strongly affected by the frame in 
which information is presented. In addition, cognitive biases for procuring and dealing with 
information in an error-prone fashion may emerge in unsuspecting ways. For instance, there is an 
instinctive human tendency to rely on more recent or readily available information, a phenomena 
commonly referred to as the availability heuristic (George and Jones, 2011). 
 Indeed, memory is distorted by hindsight, the availability and salience of examples, and 
the desirability of outcome. In addition, there is often a propensity to expose oneself only to the 
information that conforms to one’s own analysis and belief of the situation, referred to as the 
confirmation bias (Greenberg, 2010). Sometimes, such biases are a result of the information 
overload where more information is acquired or available than is necessary to make effective 
decisions (George and Jones, 2011). Research provides cogent evidence that even scientists and 
professionals suffer from many judgmental and cognitive biases (Kahneman et al., 1982). 
Consequently, despite all virtues of an expert’s judgment, judgment alone may not be an adequate 
assessment tool (Jackson, 2000; Lawson, 2005). Nevertheless, failure of foresight and judgmental 
flaws often make people blame the technology or tool for the failure. 
Flaws in the Model Development Process 
A mathematical model expresses the relationships among various components of the 
system in quantitative terms. Indeed, mathematical models are relatively easy to manipulate and 
facilitate exploration of the effects of changes in inputs (Daellenbach and McNickle, 2012). 
Nevertheless, a model should be developed with the purpose to solve the problem with a clear 
purpose, which is to solve the problem at hand (Churchman 1970, Jackson, 2000). 
In order to address complex problems arising in industry, many OR/MS practitioners fall 
back on constructing complex models and try to solve them using optimization techniques 
(Ackoff, 2001; Foulds and Thanchekary, 2001; Sterman 2000). However, researchers have 
increasingly asked whether such an approach can deal successfully with many of the complex, ill-
defined, difficult-to-model issues OR/MS practitioners are required to solve giving rise to other 
approaches and such soft systems methodologies as decision support systems, expert systems, 
soft computing, etc (Foulds and Thanchekary, 2001). Indeed, there are many difficult problems 
for which an exact/optimal solution approach would take forever, even with all the computing 
resources of the world at disposal of problem solvers, just to get a feasible or workable solution. 
However, many OR/MS practitioners assume that implementing sophisticated techniques will 
solve all problems (Ackoff, 2001). Furthermore, many OR/MS proponents stress the need for 
adopting a ‘mathematically correct’ solutions approach. In reality, many reasoning mechanisms 
not based on any sound mathematical basis have been very successful in practice (Karray and de 
Silva, 2004; Negnevitsky, 2011; Shafer, 1976; Taguchi, 1989; Turban and Aaronson, 2001). 
Flaws in Model Testing and Validation  
In OR/MS, model testing and validation is presented as essential to any problem solving 
efforts. It establishes the credibility of the model. Such efforts require both internal validity 
(checking that the model is logically and mathematically correct) as well as external validity 
(checking that the model actually a sufficient representation of reality). However, unfortunately, 
more efforts are expended to validate the model, to establish it to be the right model, than to test 
the model. This approach erodes the utility of the model and, more so, the credibility of the 
modeler and the OR/MS discipline. Model testing should instead be designed to uncover errors in 
the approach, understand limitations of the model, enhance the model efficacy, and seek a more 
appropriate model for effective decision-making. 
This exercise should also be directed at testing the validity of assumptions underlying the 
model formulation, its robustness, and its sensitivity to various factors. Indeed, models may not 
essentially be verified or validated as, by definition, all models are abstraction/simplification of 
reality (Jackson, 2000). Furthermore, a parsimonious model, one that explains a large part of the 
variability in the system and its behavior by employing the smallest number of system variables, 
is deemed a desirable outcome (Daellenbach and McNickle, 2012). Nevertheless, such 
desirability should not deter, or digress, the analyst from critically assessing the viability of the 
model and its underlying simplifying assumptions (Churchman 1970). Furthermore, the model 
should be tested for an appropriate time horizon as unrealistically short or long time horizon may 
distort the conclusion resulting from the whole exercise. 
Erroneous Inferencing 
Generally, the success or failure of the OR/MS methodology is gauged using 
performance metrics that have limited capability to capture the essence of success or failure. 
Once again, such performance metrics disregard the importance, sometimes even the existence, of 
organizational, behavioral, and political factors in success or failure of any solution methodology. 
As mentioned, the multitude of tangible and intangible considerations in real world 
applications advocated the use of MCDM regime. Nevertheless, the subjectivity, uncertainty, and 
incommensurable units render MCDM paradigm inherently difficult to realize in many 
applications (Ahmad, 2008). In addition, the tendency of people relying on a pre-existing 
perspective of their skills in judging their performance, or potential for performing well, in 
present and future assignments results in overconfidence (Daellenbach and McNickle, 2012). 
 
Opportunities for Increasing Efficacy of OR/MS Approaches 
Despite an apparently long list of impediments in success and adoption of OR/MS tools, 
these tools have been quite successful in solving a variety of problems and this is expected to 
continue to hold in future (Pidd 2004). However, we believe that the OR/MS techniques can be 
more effectively employed when embedded within decision support and soft OR/MS paradigms. 
Nevertheless, most OR/MS texts fail to provide readers exposure to such approaches and confine 
themselves to computational details of quantitative techniques. However, it is interesting that the 
very first organized textbook on OR/MS clearly stressed the comprehensiveness of OR/MS as a 
systems approach (Churchman et al., 1957). Unsurprisingly, the first two authors of that book 
were also the earliest and most vocal critics of the hard optimization approach that was fast 
becoming a norm in OR/MS at that time (Jackson, 2000). 
We believe that teachings in OR/MS discipline should be complemented by its role in 
organizations providing some perspective of organizational dynamics and business realities. 
Fortunately, many academic programs such as the department of Management Sciences, 
University of Waterloo, realize this requirement and provide students with an essentially 
interdisciplinary outlook. In this Section, we discuss some interdisciplinary solution paradigms 
that offer promise to increase efficacy of OR/MS. 
Systems Perspective 
A systems perspective promotes the notion that the real world problems are part of a 
complex system and should be solved with an integrated perspective (Daellenbach and McNickle, 
2012; Jackson, 2000). Such an integrated and holistic perspective provides the ability to 
appreciate that doing one thing does not essentially keep all other aspects of the system intact and 
that everything is linked to everything else. Different schools of thought in systems thinking seem 
to agree that a systems and integrated view of the world, though rare, is desirable (Doyle, 1997; 
Lane, 1994; Richardson, 1996). Just one decision or intervention may provoke reaction from 
others, the Counterintuitive Behavior of the social systems (Forrester, 1971; Daellenbach and 
McNickle, 2012). Even a single or simple change in one of the factors under consideration may 
result in unpredictable changes in other factors influencing the system (Doyle, 1997). 
A systems approach typically starts with problem definition and proceeds with generation 
of alternatives, model formulation, and analysis/selection of alternative. Notably, model 
formulation follows generation of alternatives where we identify alternative courses, albeit vague 
ones, that satisfy the project objective. The organizational, behavioral, political, and environments 
constraints may dictate only a handful of different courses (Sterman, 1994). Gathering 
information on such alternative courses helps in formulating mathematical models that accurately 
simulate the performance of each alternative. 
The systems approach does not necessarily call for an analytical solution (Keys, 1991). A 
key principle is to scrutinize a problem from multiple perspectives and mull over long-term 
consequences of decisions, including behavioral, organizational, political, and moral implications. 
A systems perspective often requires interdisciplinary teams for problem solving. Indeed, it has 
been frequently argued by many researchers that the traditional rational/scientific thinking in 
OR/MS is largely based on reductionist and cause-and-effect modes and may not be able to cope 
with the complexity and ill-structured nature of most real-world problems (Ossenbruggen, 1994).  
The systems approach also employs qualitative notions of synthesis and emergence that 
can be used to tackle ill-structured problems giving more weight to efficacy than validation. Such 
approaches lead to explanations of why phenomena are, rather than how those operate (Keys, 
1991). Such an approach advocates both subjective evaluation of qualitative factors and an 
objective analysis of quantitative factors in decision-making. Nevertheless, a qualitative analysis 
often proves to be critical in problem solving. In essence, systems analysis is more of a process of 
discovery and learning than an analytical exercise in optimization (Ossenbruggen, 1994). 
The systems approach is not as closely associated with science as tools used in the 
OR/MS approaches. The methodologies employed in a systems approach are rigorous but differ 
in fundamental ways from those of science. For instance, a systems approach may not instill the 
same reliance on quantitative/empirical data as does OR/MS. Furthermore, model validation and 
manipulation offer difficulties for systems approaches. However, these approaches provide ways 
to work when there are limits on effective use of OR/MS. 
The relationship or interrelationship between the OR/MS and the systems thinking has 
been discussed at length by many researchers (e.g. Ackoff, 2001; Churchman 1957, Daellenbach 
and McNickle, 2012; Jackson, 2000; Jackson and Keys, 1985; Keys, 1991; Ossenbruggen, 1994; 
Silver and Meal, 1998; Sterman, 1994; Stainton, 1984). Some even argue that the OR/MS is only 
a strand in different version of the systems approach (Jackson, 2000). 
Soft OR/MS Paradigm 
As already mentioned, researchers have been advocating soft OR/MS approaches for 
several decades (Daellenbach and McNickle, 2012). They aptly indicate that an overwhelming 
majority of real-world problem scenarios violates many, if not most, of the assumptions 
underlying the hard OR/MS approaches. Indeed, behavioral, social, and political facets are largely 
ignored in hard OR/MS approaches. Soft OR/MS approaches were designed to tackle situations 
that are ill-structured, ill-defined, and involve different stakeholders with differing and possibly 
conflicting opinions. Some salient characteristics of such approaches include structuring the 
issues in problem situation instead of narrowly focused problem solving, facilitating dialogue 
among stakeholders and eliciting resolution of the problem from stakeholders themselves, instead 
of imposing a solution from the analyst, focusing the ‘what’ questions before taking up the ‘how’ 
questions, etc. The hard OR/MS deals mainly with the ‘content’ of the problem and gives little 
weight to the ‘process’. In contrast, soft OR/MS emphasize on both content and process starting 
with an attempt to obtain a reasonably comprehensive perspective and shared understanding of 
the pertinent issues (Karray and DeSilva, 2004). 
There is a range of soft OR/MS methodologies starting from Game Theory to Theory of 
Constraints. A detailed discussion of these various soft OR/MS approaches is beyond the scope of 
this paper and inquisitive readers may find good reviews in literature (e.g. Daellenbach and 
McNickle, 2012; Jackson, 1991; Ossenbruggen, 1994). However, all such approaches involve 
active participation of stakeholders and, unlike hard OR/MS, these do not constitute some 
sequence of systems/phases whose output becomes the input to the next system. All these 
approaches are recognized as learning systems used iteratively and flexibly, drawing from 
philosophy, psychology, sociology, and organizational theory (Ossenbruggen, 1994). Several 
researchers have argued that the potential of various soft computing technologies is limited only 
by the imagination of their users (Negnevitsky, 2011; Ruan, 1997; Zha, 2003). However, there is 
no dearth of OR/MS practitioners who look down upon these soft approaches and 
advocate/practice less-pertinent hard optimization techniques even in highly subjective and 
uncertain problem domains (Ahmad, 2005). Nevertheless, OR/MS practitioners should realize 
that their proposed solutions would be implemented in wake of numerous organizational and 
political considerations and soft thinking might provide effective decision courses. Disregarding 
such issues may greatly diminish the chances of their success. 
Decision Support Paradigm 
The Decision Support System (DSS) paradigm to problem-solving provides a means for 
assisting decision makers in retrieving, summarizing, and analyzing decision relevant data. 
Consequently, it results in a reduction in the cognitive overload faced by the decision maker(s). 
Research has shown that DSS techniques are useful in generating and evaluating a large number 
of alternative solutions and effectively helping decision-makers in arriving at better decisions 
(Turban and Aronson, 2001; Greenberg, 2010). However, it should be emphasized that a DSS 
neither automates the decision process nor imposes solutions. It simply provides analytical and 
information processing support in an interactive environment. Indeed, this soft decision-making 
paradigm has successfully been applied in a variety of complex and subjective task domains and 
power of the OR/MS tools can be enhanced by incorporating its models and methods within a 
decision support system (Ayyub, 2001; Foulds and Thanchekary, 2001; Marakas 2002; Turban 
and Aronson, 2001). The author’s personal experience of successfully using Decision Support 
and Expert Systems paradigms and Soft Computing tools for solving highly complex, non-linear, 
subjective, and uncertain problem of layout optimization have sensitized him to the potential of 
such tools coupled with OR/MS methodologies (Ahmad, 2005). 
Indeed, it is irrational to expect that a specific solution would surpass all others for every 
evaluation objective under consideration. Furthermore, the objectives could often be fuzzy and 
dynamic in nature. Consequently, the generation of superior alternatives in a flexible and 
automated manner through some decision support mechanism is critical to many planning 
processes. Decision Support Systems (DSS) represent a class of computerized information 
systems that utilize the knowledge about a specific application domain to assist decision makers 
by recommending appropriate actions and strategies (Ahmad et al., 2008; Turban and Aronson, 
2001). The DSS problem-solving paradigm provides a means for assisting decision makers in 
retrieving, summarizing, and analyzing decision relevant data. Consequently, it results in a 
reduction in the cognitive overload faced by decision makers. Research has shown that DSS 
techniques are useful in generating and evaluating a large number of alternative solutions and 
effectively helping decision-makers in arriving at better decisions (Ahmad, 2002; Turban and 
Aronson, 2001; Greenberg, 2010). However, it should be emphasized that a DSS neither 
automates the decision process nor imposes solutions. It simply provides analytical and 
information processing support in an interactive environment. Furthermore, a DSS should be 
much more than just a mere collection of models and solution techniques (Turban and Aronson, 
2001). The essence of the DSS is the user-system interface that allows the planners to 
interactively conduct experiments, input decision rules and criteria, tackle issues with 
unstructured and semi-structured scenarios, and allow for multiple criteria decision-making as 
well as adapt soft constraints while providing flexibility, user friendliness, and convenience. 
There is a need of developing decision systems that facilitate implementation of more 
sophisticated OR/MS tools giving people systems with which they can creatively solve their own 
problems (Silver and Meal, 1998). This need is more pronounced by the fact that the mantra in 
the industrial and public sector organizations is to empower employees. OR/MS can provide them 
with the means to monitor, comprehend, intervene, and continuously improve their own 
performance. It is our belief that judicious institution of the decision support and expert systems 
paradigms may nicely bring together the scientific methods of OR/MS, the soft thinking of 
systems approach, and the learning from social/behavioral sciences to engender a more effective 
problem solving environment. We perceive these as complementary disciplines. 
Simulation Modeling 
Understanding the behavior of a system requires knowledge about how the state of the 
system changes over time. Collecting relevant data for understanding the behavior might not be 
possible because of various limitations such as high observation cost, long observation time, or 
even the non-existence of the system itself. In such scenarios, simulation or systematic imitation 
of the behavior of the system over time is a general approach and constitutes one of the most 
pertinent tools for an OR/MS analyst (Ahmad, 2005). 
The typical absence of some encompassing, closed-form, and analytical fitness functions 
also render computer simulations a useful alternative (Ahmad, 2005). Such an approach would 
provide detailed analysis, modeling, and evaluation of complex problems (Bookbinder and 
Higginson, 1986). However, simulation models are not easily amenable to optimization and make 
procurement of a superior alternative difficult to achieve (Chan et al., 1995). 
 
Summary 
We argued that the objective of OR/MS is not to provide ‘optimal’ solutions, as most 
traditional texts and practitioners profess, but to provide a basis for more informed and insightful 
decision-making. However, the usual reductionist approach adopted in many OR/MS techniques 
merely permits attention to details of each component of the system under study. In contrast, the 
systems thinking permits attention to the systematic and interactive roles of system components 
as an integrated whole. Often both modes of thinking are required to procure wider 
comprehension of a system. A soft OR/MS or a system thinking approach, though no panacea in 
efficacious problem solving, is a nice complement to traditional OR/MS. Its inherent approach of 
taking an integrated view and permissibility of soft/violable system boundaries is likely to lead to 
more encompassing, more insightful, and more effective decision-making. 
At a meta-level, OR/MS, Systems approach, and Decision Support Paradigms may be 
conceived as sub-disciplines of a wider faculty. We believe that the limits of efficacious use of 
OR/MS approaches can be overcome by using systems approaches. Indeed, OR/MS approaches 
may be perfectly effective in some cases while in others systems approaches may be deployed 
with the same effect. Nevertheless, both approaches can make unique contributions towards 
effective decision-making in tandem with each other. We further believe that it is in the benefit of 
scientific community and the humanity that some effective meta-level framework guiding the 
effectual employment of both approaches be formulated. Such a framework would facilitate an 
environment in which OR/MS (alternatively, Systems) disciplines have a positive view of relative 
strengths, an appreciation of the unique contributions of the other disciplines, and the potential 
learning from both to support effective decision-making and problem solving. Despite all 
arguments and counter-arguments in favor of one philosophy or the other regarding applicability 
of OR/MS, one aspect stands out: OR/MS practitioners should adopt an integrated systems 
methodology, whichever manner we define it, for solving real world problem plagued by 
behavioral, organizational, political, and environmental complexities, uncertainties, and 
constraints. 
This paper is expected to further debate in this direction. However, this paper is limited in 
many ways, including a much-generalized discussion of tools, lacking any elaboration of such 
tools, due to by space and scope limitations. Furthermore, we have not expended much space on 
past efforts made in making OR/MS tools more effective and applicable by incorporating systems 
thinking in a wider problem solving approach. However, we believe, there is still a relative dearth 
in such efforts and some formulation of a wider framework for facilitating complementary 
utilization of OR/MS and other soft systems approaches in effective decision making. 
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REACTIONS OF POWERFUL CEOS TO ACCUSATIONS OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITY 
 
 
We examine how CEOs use power to address public accusations 
of illegal activity by the firm.  Results from a sample of S&P500 
firms are consistent with models of cognitive framing and 
circulation of power, and suggest that powerful CEOs attempt to 
reduce uncertainty by resolving the accusation, either by 




Firms and executives that engage in illegal acts suffer long-term damage, in both performance 
(Baucus & Baucus, 1997), career longevity, and reputation (Beasley, 1996; Karpoff & Lott, 
1993).  Trevino and Youngblood (1990) explained illegal behavior in terms of individual “bad 
apples” acting in “bad barrels” of rationalized organizational and environmental factors (Anand, 
Ashforth, & Joshi, 2004; Ashforth, Gioia, Robinson, & Trevino, 2008).  
 
The organizational perspective of “bad barrels” has contradictory results, with one study arguing 
that firms in munificent environments were less prone to illegal behavior (Staw & Szwajkowski, 
1975), and another stating that they were more likely (Baucus & Near, 1991).  This perspective 
also does not consider the role of individuals in wrongdoing, a key omission when considering 
legal repercussions. 
 
At the individual level, characteristics that likely lead “bad apples” to commit illegal acts include 
misaligned incentives, age, experience, functional background, education, gender, charisma, and 
poor self-control (Zahra, Priem, & Rasheed, 2005; Zhang, Bartol, Smith, Pfarrer, & Khanin, 
2008; Zona, Minoja, & Coad, 2013). 
 
But we know less about how suspected “bad apples” respond to allegations of wrongdoing.  The 
accusations may indeed have flagged illegal behavior, but on the other hand, executives may have 
done nothing wrong and the allegation may represent a retaliatory attack from a competitor, or a 
malicious accusation from a disgruntled former employee.  The CEO is then faced with 
determining whether the allegation represents a threat or opportunity, and thus generates 
considerable response uncertainty, "the lack of knowledge of response options and/or an inability 
to predict the likely consequences of a response choice" (Milliken, 1987).  Considering that CEOs 
have a unique and significant influence on firm actions (Jensen & Zajac, 2004), and a great 
impact on firm performance (Cannella & Hambrick, 1993), we expect CEOs to have a noticeable 
effect on how firms respond to allegations of illegal activity.   
 
Wrongdoing can be seen as a highly risky activity (Mishina, Dykes, Block, & Pollock, 2010).  
However, with few exceptions, earlier studies that examined how executives take risks do not 
discriminate between legal and illegal risk (Chattopadhyay, Glick, & Huber, 2001; Holmes Jr., 
Bromiley, Devers, Holcomb, & McGuire, 2011; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  On the other 
hand, studies on executive wrongdoing tend to focus on individual characteristics, psychological 
effects, or financial incentives (Zahra et al., 2005; Zhang et al., 2008; Zona et al., 2013).   
 
In this paper, we consider the power perspective (Pfeffer, 1992), which argues that CEOs dealing 
with risky situations require considerable power in order to secure the desired organizational 
response. We therefore ask when faced with an accusation of wrongdoing, how do powerful 
CEOs respond?  Some CEOs may see an tactical opportunity and prefer to delay addressing the 
uncertainty by stalling and obstructing any investigation into the accusation in order to increase, 
defend or consolidate their power (Ocasio, 1994).  However, others may insist on a rapid 
resolution of the allegation because it distracts resources and attention from achieving the 
strategic goals of the company (Ocasio, 1997), damages reputation (Hirshleifer, 1993), and 
because stakeholders tend to ignore the relative seriousness of illegalities, paints all wrong-doers 
with the same brush (Baucus & Baucus, 1997).  They may also calculate that the financial 
punishment imposed by accepting a conviction may be insignificant compared to the reputational 
damage the allegation inflicts on both the firm and the executive (Karpoff & Lott, 1993; Lott, 
1996).  
 
We therefore combine theories of cognitive framing of risk (Chattopadhyay et al., 2001), and two 
principal theories of personal power -- agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), and the theories 
of circulation and institutionalization of power (Ocasio, 1994) -- to understand the rationales 
behind CEO responses to allegations of illegal activity.  In short, we first argue that executives 
treat allegations as either a threat or opportunity.  However, in order to act, they also require 
sufficient organizational power.  We consider three forms of power:  chairman, hierarchical, and 
prestige.  Our model is shown in Figure 1.  Our results suggest that powerful CEOs use their 
considerable hierarchical power to resolve allegations and reduce the response uncertainty, 










Cognitive Framing of Risk:  Is the Allegation A Threat or Opportunity? 
 
Allegations of wrongdoing represent a new pressure from the external environment.  Cognitive 
framing theories argue that individuals make decisions depending on how they see their current 
situation relative to a reference target (Bromiley, Miller, & Rau, 2001).  In short, do they consider 
the allegation as a threat or opportunity (Chattopadhyay et al., 2001)?   One central model of 
cognitive framing, prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), suggests that individuals 
become risk seeking in the face of potential loss, since they underestimate the risk of additional 
potential loss and overweigh potential gains that could get them out of the loss position 
(Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988).  Believing that the situation is undesirable, executives therefore 
shift attention towards acting in the external environment to respond to the allegation 
(Chattopadhyay et al., 2001).  However, individuals are risk averse when facing potential gains, 
since they underweigh potential additional gains and overweigh risk of potential loss 
(Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1988; Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993).  They focus on action within the 
organization to address the allegation (Chattopadhyay et al., 2001) because they are satisfied that 
the current situation is better than their reference point. Research generally suggests that 
individuals in gain frames exhibit risk-averse behavior, while those in loss frames give rise to 
risk-seeking behavior (Holmes Jr. et al., 2011). In short, executives prefer risky, externally-
directed responses if they feel they face loss, but they favor risk avoidance through internally-
directed action if they believe they can gain from the allegation situation (George, 




While the CEO may adopt a loss or gain frame in their decision, we also argue that they need 
sufficient power to act.  Since the basis for CEO power is the ability to manage information 
uncertainty (Finkelstein, 1992; Hinings, Hickson, Pennings, & Schneck, 1974), our starting 
premise is that CEOs deal with accusations of illegal activity within their firms in order to defend, 
perpetuate or increase their own power through manipulation of information asymmetry.  
Executives wield at least two distinct forms of power:  vertical power based on structure, and 
horizontal power based on social contacts outside the firm (Mitsuhashi & Greve, 2004), which we 
discuss next. 
 
First, vertical or structural power provides CEOs with a greater ability to bend the organization to 
serve personal objectives (Pfeffer, 1992).  From a resource dependence perspective, those with 
superior power manipulate values and meanings to perpetuate their power (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978).    CEOs with structural power are better able to control two key internal relationships 
within the firm:  i) CEO-board of directors, and ii) CEO-subordinate employees.  
 
Chairman Power. Vertical power occurs if the CEO simultaneously occupies the role of 
Chairman (chairman power) (Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994). Those who are responsible for 
overall management of the firm face a conflict of interest when, as Chair of the Board of 
Directors, they are also in a position to influence how to evaluate their own effectiveness (Zajac 
& Westphal, 1994).  CEO-chairs can exert extra influence over board decisions through 
manipulating the board meeting’s agenda, restricting available information, and steering 
discussions (Firstenberg & Malkiel, 1994).  Agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) warns that 
CEOs with structural power may be better able to decouple their interest for personal gain from 
the interests of stakeholders. Powerful CEOs restrict a board’s ability to effectively monitor and 
discipline the firm’s managers by controlling the board agenda (Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994), 
and steering board attention (Tuggle, Sirmon, Reutzel, & Bierman, 2010) towards the CEO’s 
strategic priorities (Desai, Kroll, & Wright, 2003).  They are therefore more likely to pursue 
action that either maximizes personal gain to the detriment of shareholders, or minimize personal 
employment risk (Boyd, 1995; Donoher, 2007).   The emphasis on personal gain puts the CEO in 
a cognitive ‘gain’ frame, where they would favor risk avoidance through internally directed 
action.  We therefore hypothesize that powerful CEOs will attempt to deflect, delay and obstruct 
any investigation to the allegation of illegal activity: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  There is a negative relationship between CEO chairman power and the likelihood 
that an accusation of illegal activity is resolved.  
 
However, if the CEO focuses on minimizing employment risk, they adopt instead a ‘loss’ frame, 
and respond to the allegation with riskier, externally directed action.  In this case, we hypothesize 
that powerful CEOs will favor resolution of the allegation: 
 
Hypothesis 2:  There is a positive relationship between CEO chairman power and the likelihood 
that an accusation of illegal activity is resolved.  
 
Hierarchical Power.  Even with the Board of Directors on board, the CEO must contend with 
subordinate employees’ adherence to the plan. CEO hierarchical power refers to the top 
executive’s formal position at the apex of the organization hierarchy that provides unique 
authority, resource control and network centrality (Astley & Sachdeva, 1984).   The CEO’s 
position induces hierarchical subordinates to obey not only because of the CEO’s superior rank 
but also in the belief that the CEO has the right to exercise power (Astley & Sachdeva, 1984).  
Ocasio (1994) described two mechanisms to explain structural power:  institutionalization and 
circulation.   He argued that executives face two pressures that threaten their structural power – 
obsolescence and contestation – and that given enough power, they can deal with these pressures 
through power institutionalization.  In this model, executives consolidate power by escalating 
commitment, institutionalizing rules and beliefs, and establishing networks of influence (Ocasio, 
1994).  This power attenuates employee resistance to change (Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999).  
 
CEOs can therefore pursue these personal benefits and avoid stakeholder pressures by decoupling 
practices from policy (Westphal & Zajac, 2001; Zajac & Westphal, 1994).  Even when the 
consequences of strategic action negatively affect the firm, powerful CEOs can escape personal 
sanction (Chatterjee & Harrison, 2003) through impression management (Elsbach & Sutton, 
1992).  CEOs with hierarchical power can therefore avoid shareholder pressures by decoupling 
action that maximizes personal gain from stakeholder pressure to act legitimately (Boyd, 1995). 
The emphasis on potential gain puts the CEO in a cognitive ‘gain’ frame, where they favor risk 
avoidance through internally directed action.  Therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 3:  There is a negative relationship between CEO hierarchical power and the 
likelihood that an accusation of illegal activity is resolved. 
 
On the other hand, CEOs recognize that the being associated with an illegal action may 
significantly jeopardize their personal careers, most likely obsolescence and ultimately, 
termination.  The circulation of power model (Ocasio, 1994) argues that a CEO facing 
obsolescence will lead to a rise of challenges from other executives, who seek to contest the 
CEO’s power.  In short, facing allegations of illegal activity, powerful CEOs will fight back any 
challenges from within the organization by resolving the charge as quickly as possible.  Because 
they adopt a ‘loss’ frame, we expect them to respond to the allegation with riskier, externally 
directed action.  In other words, they favor resolving the allegation: 
 
Hypothesis 4:  There is a positive relationship between CEO hierarchical power and the 
likelihood that an accusation of illegal activity is resolved. 
 
Prestige power.  Horizontal, or prestige power, is formed through the ability of high-prestige 
actors to dominate lower-prestige actors because of their superior ability to access and control 
privileged information (Bunderson & Reagans, 2011). Prestige is therefore seen as a form of 
informal power (Finkelstein, 1992; Fredrickson, Hambrick, & Baumrin, 1988) based on 
associations with powerful and elite contacts as well as tacit knowledge and skills (Finkelstein, 
1992), where executives control access to other social networks and the resources those networks 
control (Brockmann, Hoffman, Dawley, & Fornaciari, 2004).  Prestigious executives have access 
to privileged information that can be used to reduce information asymmetry and aid decision-
making (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001).  These networks can supply managerial talent (Certo, 
2003), or help executives stay up-to-date with the latest practices and procedures used in other 
firms (Davis, 1991). 
 
Blau (1960) suggested that high prestige individuals enjoy a higher tolerance of deviant behavior 
than their lower-prestige counterparts.  CEOs with prestige power are associated with more 
deviant strategies (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997) and perform better (Geletkanycz & Boyd, 
2011), even in the face of market or stakeholder disapproval (Chikh & Filbien, 2011; Haunschild, 
1993) because they can block any potential sanctions (Perrow, 1961), they less likely to be 
sanctioned (Giordano, 1983), and they can more easily recover in case of failure (Chen, 
Hambrick, & Pollock, 2008).  Because they adopt a ‘gain’ frame, we expect CEOs to prefer risk 
avoidance through internally directed action.  Therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 5: There is a negative relationship between CEO prestige power and the likelihood 





We developed a sample of S&P500 firms between 2005 and 2010, where we identified 242 cases 
of illegal activity, including 106 cases of conviction or settlement, and 136 cases where a firm 
was only accused of wrongdoing. We selected S&P500 firms because they are prominent in the 
media, large and well capitalized, ultimately representing a benchmark and aspiration to other 
companies in the U.S. (Mishina et al., 2010). Illegal activities included:  environment 
contamination, fraud, labour law violations, anti-competitive behavior, and misleading 
information.  The sample spanned 52 2-dig SIC industries, with no single industry representing 
more than 9% of the sample and thereby suggesting that no single industry dominates.  Data was 
drawn from COMPUSTAT/Research Insight, EXECUCOMP, BusinessWeek Executive Profiles, 




Dependent variable. Because stakeholders tend to ignore the relative seriousness of illegalities, 
and only note whether or not some form of illegal action is present (Baucus & Baucus, 1997), we 
measured the incidence of illegal activity by noting whether or not at least one illegal activity had 
been associated with a firm during the calendar year.  We noted cases of suspected of illegal 
activity (Resolved=0), and of resolution, either through conviction or out-of-court settlement as 
Resolved (Resolved=1).   
 
We searched LexisNexis for evidence of actual or suspected criminal activity on 255 S&P500 
companies between 2005 and 2010, selecting Newspapers, Newswires, US Newspapers & Wires, 
Non-US Newspapers & Wires, Major Newspapers, and Small Town Papers (US) as our sources.  
Through trial-and-error, we developed what we considered an exhaustive standardized keyword 
search script that was applied to each search in order to capture all possible cases of illegal 
activity.  The majority of evidence was found in small-town news sources, while SEC violations 
were most prominent in wire sources.  We cross-referenced each case across multiple news 
sources and found that there were no cases where sources contradicted each other.  We found 
evidence of illegal activity in all but eight firms, suggesting that such activity (or allegations of 
such activity) is widespread across multiple industries. We summarize the distribution of types of 
illegal activity based on analysis of the representative texts from the news sources in Table 1. 
 
Table 2:  Types of Illegal Activity In The Sample 
Type of Illegal Activity 
Number of Cases 
Accused Resolved 
Environmental contamination 9 18 
Fraud 45 36 
Labour Law Violation 29 10 
Anti-Competitive Behaviour 34 20 
Misleading Information 3 7 
Patent Infringement 9 7 
Other 7 7 
Total 136 106 
 
 
Independent variables. First, we captured CEO chairman power as a dichotomous (0/1) 
variable, indicating whether the CEO also occupied the Chairman role.  Secondly, we used the 
CEO total compensation relative to the mean compensation of the other members of the top 
management team to capture CEO hierarchical power (Daily & Johnson, 1997; Finkelstein, 
1992; Sanders, Davis-Blake, & Fredrickson, 1995).  The total compensation was calculated as the 
sum of salary, bonus, and non-cash compensation (deferred income, stock grants, and stock 
options), with data obtained from EXECUCOMP and from SEC DEF14A proxy statements.  
Finally, we measured CEO prestige power by the number of the CEO’s board directorships, 
where more directorships imply higher informal power (Finkelstein, 1992).  The total number of 
corporate and non-profit boards was also measured.  We also considered the relative prestige of 
the firm on whose board the CEO sits, since being a director of Google would be considered more 
prestigious than sitting on a board of a small, local company.  We therefore noted the stock rating 
at the end of each calendar year of each company using the rating of the firm’s general financial 
condition provided by Standard & Poor’s Stock Quality Index (Finkelstein, 1992).  The scale 
extends from a 0 for a non-rated firm, to 10 for a firm rated A+ by S&P.  To determine the S&P 
board rating, we summed the scores of the firms on whose board the CEO sits.  Principal 
component analysis confirmed a single CEO prestige power factor (eigenvalue = 1.89), 
explaining 63% of the total variance.  Sampling adequacy (KMO = 0.63) exceeded the generally 
acceptable minimum of 0.5 (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998).  Reliability was acceptable 
(Cronbach a = 0.70) (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; Finkelstein, 1992).  
 
Control variables.  To account for alternative explanations of responses to illegal activity, we 
included year, industry-level, firm-level, and CEO-level controls.  Because some industries may 
be more prone to illegal activity than others, we included the two-digit SIC industry.  At the firm 
level, we considered firm size, prior performance, and slack. We controlled for firm size by 
measuring number of employees.  Firm performance in the year prior to the investment accounts 
for the perception of potential gain or loss in risk attitudes of the executive based on prior firm 
performance instead of the accusation of wrongdoing (Wiseman & Gomez-Meija, 1998).  High-
performing executives are more likely to respond to allegations of wrongdoing because they felt 
additional “ratchet effect” pressure to continue improving performance (Freixas, Guesnerie, & 
Tirole, 1985). At the CEO level, we measured CEO age, CEO tenure, and proportion of long-
term compensation relative to total compensation, all factors affecting the likelihood of illegal 
behavior (Daboub, Rasheed, Priem, & Gray, 1995; O'Connor, Priem, Coombs, & Gilley, 2006; 
Williams, Fadil, & Armstron, 2005; Zahra et al., 2005; Zhang et al., 2008).  We calculated the 
proportion of long-term compensation as (total compensation - total cash compensation)/(total 
compensation), where total compensation was the sum on the salary, bonus, deferred income, 
stock grants, and stock options from EXECUCOMP.  Finally, we consider organizational slack 
since stakeholders tend to more closely scrutinize firms with less slack (McNamara, Haleblian, & 
Dykes, 2008). Available slack estimates the resource cushion that is immediately available to be 
used to address the charge of wrongdoing, and is measured as the ratio of current assets to current 
liabilities (Latham & Braun, 2008).  Potential slack captures the ability of a firm to secure 
resources with debt financing. Since some firms have zero debt, we used the debt-to-equity ratio 




We used a logistic regression to test the hypotheses given the dichotomous dependent variable.  
In essence, our model compares S&P500 firms that had outstanding accusations of wrongdoing to 
those who had resolved accusations either by out-of-court settlement or accepting a conviction.  
All independent variables were standardized with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one 
to aid in interpretation of the influence of each variable, and to reduce the effects of 
multicollinearity (Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003). 
Results 
 
The variable statistics and correlations are listed in Table 2.   The logistic regression coefficients, 
expressed as odds ratios, are listed in Table 3.  Model I includes all control variables, while 
Model II adds the three hypothesized CEO power effects. A log likelihood test and a comparison 
of r2 between the models suggest that CEO power has a significant effect on how CEOs choose to 
resolve allegations of illegal activity. 
 
Hypothesis 1 predicted CEO-chairs are less likely to delay due to agency effects, while 
Hypothesis 2 argued that they are more likely.   With no significant coefficient in Model II, 
neither hypothesis is supported.  There is no evidence of an effect due to chairman power.  
Hypothesis 3 suggested that powerful CEOs avoid resolution of allegations as part of power 
institutionalization, while Hypothesis 4 predicted allegation resolution of allegations to avoid 
internal power circulation. A positive significant coefficient in Model II supports Hypothesis 4.  
Finally, Hypothesis 5 predicted prestige power afforded CEOs with the ability to decouple their 
fates from the fate of the firm, thus encouraging them to avoid resolution of the allegation.  We 
found no evidence to support Hypothesis 5 in Model II. 
 
Of the control variables offering alternative explanations of a CEO’s response, we found support 
for prior performance and partial support for potential slack.  CEOs of better-performing firms 
were much more likely to resolve the allegation, in line with the house-money effect of increased 
risk-taking based on playing with the recently gained money (Mishina, Pollock, & Bragaw, 2012; 
Thaler & Johnson, 1990).  This also provides evidence of their response to the “ratchet effect” 
pressure to continue improving performance (Freixas et al., 1985).  We had mixed results 
concerning effects of resources on responsive action.  Total firm resources and available slack 
had no measurable effect.  However, firms with less potential slack (the inverse of our measure) 
were more likely to resolve the allegation, consistent with the idea that CEOs were sensitive to 
stakeholders more closely scrutinizing their firms (McNamara et al., 2008), perhaps because they 





Our study examined two influences on how CEOs address accusations of wrongdoing.  First, we 
considered cognitive framing:  whether CEOs consider allegations as a chance for personal gain, 
or whether they see them as a threat of losing power.  Secondly, whichever cognitive frame CEOs 
adopt, we assumed that CEOs required power to act.  We examined three distinct forms of CEO 
power: chairman, hierarchical, and prestige.  Our results only demonstrate an effect arising from 
hierarchical power, where CEOs were 3.5 times more likely to resolve an allegation through out-
of-court settlement or conviction, than they were to leave the allegation open. 
 
We found no evidence of chairman power or prestige power influencing how CEOs choose to 
address allegations of wrongdoing.  This result is consistent with earlier studies suggesting that 
the effects on strategic action are different for the three sources of power.  For instance, while 
structural power tends to increase with tenure, prestige power does not (Buchholtz & Ribbens, 
1994).  Likewise, structural power can help in recovery from bankruptcy, while prestige power 
does not (Brockmann et al., 2004). 
 
This paper naturally suffers from limitations.  First, our sample represents data from an initial 
survey of secondary S&P500 data.  Data from only 242 of the benchmark’s 500 firms has been 
collected.  As well, our cross-sectional analysis does not consider longitudinal behavior of CEOs.  
In other words, serial illegal behavior by CEOs was not captured in our models.  We also were 
not able to consider two possible combinations of firm actions and accusations, namely:  i) where 
the firm has not been accused of wrongdoing, but in fact has done wrong, and ii) where it has not 
done wrong and they have not been accused of doing wrong.  Finally, we only considered some 
rudimentary “bad apple” contexts in our models, including demographics and one psychological 
decision biases based on prior performance, but omitting more complex psychological attributes 
such as individual psychopathologies of criminal behavior (Babiak & Hare, 2006), charisma 





Table 3:  Variable Statistics and Correlations 
 Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Resolution  0.44 0.50 1           
2 Year 2006  0.08 0.28 -0.02 1          
3 Year 2007  0.12 0.33  0.09 -0.11 1         
4 Year 2008  0.16 0.36  0.01 -0.13 * -0.16 ** 1        
5 Year 2009  0.14 0.34  0.04 -0.12  -0.15 * -0.17 ** 1       
6 Year 2010  0.41 0.49 -0.08 -0.25 *** -0.31 *** -0.36 *** -0.33 *** 1      
7 Industry 43.63 18.85 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04  0.06  0.06 -0.08 1     
8 Firm Size^  0.08 1.17  0.08 -0.05  0.02 -0.03  0.06 -0.03  0.06 1    
9 Debt/Equity^  0.04 0.52  0.10  0.09 -0.07  0.03  0.05 -0.08  0.07  0.05 1   
10 Available Slack^ -0.01 0.90 -0.02 -0.05  0.05 -0.12  0.05  0.05 -0.03 -0.22 *** -0.38 *** 1  
11 CEO Age  54.72 6.30  0.07 -0.12  0.01 -0.12  0.02  0.14 * -0.20 **  0.08 -0.08  0.01 1 
12 CEO Tenure^  6.05 5.92  0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.03  0.03  0.07 -0.09 -0.10 -0.09  0.11  0.36*** 
13 Prior Performance -0.01 0.08  0.09  0.02 -0.01  0.03 -0.00  0.01 -0.01 -0.09 -0.23 ***  0.24 *** -0.01 
14 Proportion Long-
Term Compensation  
 0.80 0.19 -0.10  0.09  0.07 -0.12 -0.06  0.18 ** -0.07 -0.03 -0.11  0.01  0.07 
15 CEO Power – 
Chairman 
 0.59 0.49  0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06  0.04  0.08 -0.12  0.16  0.05 -0.06  0.30 *** 
16 CEO Power – 
Hierarchical^ 
-0.00 0.39  0.13 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01  0.12 -0.10 -0.05 -0.09 -0.12  0.21 ** 
17 CEO Power - 
Prestige 
 0.18 0.98 -0.01 -0.04  0.09 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.13   0.15 -0.05 -0.04  0.21 *** 
 
 
 Variable 12 13 14 15 16 17 
12 CEO Tenure^ 1      
13 Prior Performance  0.04 1     
14 Proportion Long-
Term Compensation  
 0.11  0.14 1    
15 CEO Power – 
Chairman 
 0.35 ***  0.03  0.10 1   
16 CEO Power – 
Hierarchical^ 
 0.09  0.02  0.39 ***  0.09 1  
17 CEO Power - 
Prestige 
 0.17 **  0.09  0.10  0.26 ***  0.07 1 
 
^:  variable is normalized through log transformation  
*: p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***: p<0.001
Table 4:  Logistic Regressions of Likelihood of Resolving an Accusation of Illegal Activity 
(Odds Ratios) 
Variable 
Control CEO Power Effect 
Hypothesis 
Model I Model II 
Intercept  3.08 (2.37)  7.06 (6.02) *  
Year 2006  0.92 (0.62)  1.04 (0.72)  
Year 2007  1.86 (1.13)  2.22 (1.41)  
Year 2008  1.06 (0.60)  1.13 (0.66)  
Year 2009  1.19 (0.69)  1.22 (0.72)  
Year 2010  0.88 (0.45)  0.91 (0.48)  
Industry  0.99 (0.01)  0.99 (0.01)  
Firm Size  1.17 (0.14)  1.26 (0.16) +  
Debt/Equity  1.76 (0.51) +  1.97 (0.59) *  
Available Slack  1.01 (0.17)  1.97 (0.59) *  
CEO Age  1.02 (0.03)  1.01 (0.03)  
CEO Tenure  1.12 (0.20)  1.20 (0.23)  
Prior Performance  46.67 (88.52) *  77.10 (150.27) *  
Proportion Long-Term 
Compensation  
 0.29 (0.22)  0.11 (0.10) *  
CEO Power – 
Chairman 
  0.83 (0.26) H1 (-), H2 (+) 
CEO Power – 
Hierarchical 
  3.45 (1.45) ** H3 (-), H4 (+) 
CEO Power - Prestige   0.88 (0.13) H5 (-) 
N 242 242  
c2 16.95 27.90 *  
Pseudo r2 0.05 0.08  
LR test compared to 
Model I 
 11.12 *  
 





In this paper, we asked when faced with an accusation of wrongdoing, how do powerful CEOs 
respond?  We employed cognitive framing theory, agency theory, and the theories of circulation 
and institutionalization of power to understand the rationales behind CEO responses to public 
accusations of illegal activity by the firm. We compared three sources of CEO power and found 
that only one, hierarchical power, demonstrated any noticeable effect.  Our results suggest that 
CEOs with hierarchical power were 3.5 times more likely to attempt to reduce uncertainty by 
resolving the accusation than leave the accusation unaddressed, either by accepting a conviction 
or an out-of-court settlement, suggesting that they treat allegations as a threat to their personal 
power.  In short, powerful CEOs prefer to “take their lumps” now, protect themselves from 
emergent threats to their power, and move on with managing the company instead of delaying 
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NEW BRUNSWICK MODEL OF SHARED RISK PENSION PLAN:  





The province of New Brunswick has introduced 
changes to the Pension Benefit Act that 
facilitates the conversion of Defined Benefit 
Plans to a shared Risk Plan. This paper 
highlights the implications of one of the key 
provisions ,career average pension, for 
recruitment retention and other aspects of human 
resource management in a university setting. 
 
 
The declining interest earnings, increased mortality and the subprime mortgage triggered collapse 
of the financial markets globally have increased the solvency risk of a large number of Defined 
Benefit (DB) pension funds. The debt rating agency DBRS in its review of 451 pension plans in 
Canada and USA found that their deficit was almost four hundred billions of dollars2. The 
problems of employer sponsored DB plans started attracting the attention of public at large due to 
some major corporate failures. For example, Nortel’s pension plan had a deficit of around two 
billion dollars and had an impact on the retirement income of a large number of employees. In 
New Brunswick the failure of the paper mill at the Town of Nackawic almost devastated the 
community. As reported in the community Decision making tool kit- Nackawic Case Study 
“Pensioners lost 35% of their retirement funds in order to share what was left with all former 
workers. This situation contributed to further hostility between the citizens of the area - even 
resulting in rifts between fathers and sons, and between brothers who had all worked for the mill 
together.”
3 Recently, even publicly funded pension funds are facing deficit challenges. The 
increasing deficit in the public servants’ pension plan started impacting the government’s debt 
capacity and credit rating. The Province of New Brunswick set up a task force with mandate to 
                                                          
1  I have benefited immensely from the discussions with the members of AEPP committee at the University 
of New Brunswick of which I am a member, plan actuaries and consultants and my colleagues at the 
Faculty of Business Administration UNB. My special thanks are due to Profs. Rob Austin, Vaughan 
Dickson, Lynn Haley,  Robert Maher, Basu  Sharma and Barbara Trenholm for their specific comments on 
an earlier version.. I am also thankful to the three anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments. . 
2 DBRS: Defined-benefit pension plans are DOOMED by The Canadian Press on Wednesday, August 22, 
2012 
3 http://www4.agr.gc.ca/AAFC-AAC/display-afficher.do?id=1238609114220&lang=eng 
review private pension plans and the mandate was later extended to publicly funded pension 
funds. Following the recommendations of the task force the government introduced changes to 
the Pension Benefits Act (1987) that paved the way for what is being called a “Shared Risk 
Pension Plan”(SRPP). - a hybrid between the defined benefit and defined contribution plan. The 
amendments to the Act and the accompanying regulations went into effect from July 1, 2012. Key 
features of the plan are available in the report produced by the Government of New Brunswick 
(2013). The New Brunswick model attracted a lot of both popular and professional media 
attention.[ see for example Simpson (2012) and Wright (2012)] The two key elements of the 
SRPP are a career average pension accrual as against best average in a typical defined benefit 
plan and a contingent  as against guaranteed adjustments for inflation.. The career average and its 
implication for human resource management is the focus of this paper and will be discussed in 
detail. Contingent indexing eliminated the guaranteed increase of pension for cost of living 
increases. Instead the plan focus on providing  a funding level sufficient to meet a target of at 
least 75% of the increase over a period of twenty years. The actual increase in the pension to 
adjust for the inflation is contingent on the funding position. Any increase provided in a given 
year forms part of the base for subsequent years. 
 
In addition to the two key elements affecting the benefits the SRPP provides for risk management 
tools and governance structure requirements. The risk management tools are aimed to achieve 
two goals. 
 
The first one tries to maintain the funding policy such that the probability of the fund being 
unable to pay the base benefit is less than 2.5% over a period of twenty years .The second goal is 
to provide for pension increase equal to at least 75% of increase in the consumer price index 
during the pre-retirement period and to at least 75% of the promised increase in the current plan 
for the post retirement period on an average over a period of twenty years.  
 
Over all the SRPP maintains the key element of a DB plan namely lifelong pension. However, the 
focus is providing sustainable base benefits and improving them based on the actual funding 
situation. A career average with or without enhancement is the key element to achieve 
sustainability and the focus of this paper is to identify any possible implications of the career 
average provision in SRPP on certain key areas of human resource management and industrial 
relations such as recruitment and retention, mid-career choices, salary structures and strike and 




In a typical DB plan the pension accrual is based on the best five years’ salary. In other words 
every year of service will accrue a pension equal to x percentage of average salary of best five 
consecutive years. The key operative words here are consecutive years implying continuous 
service. In the career average, on the other hand, pension accrued is a percentage of the respective 
year’s salary. In an enhanced career average the accrued pension every year is increased to 
compensate for a targeted level of inflation. The career average or enhanced career average is a 
fundamental and significant change in the pension plan that has a major impact on the retention. 
The conventional DB plan is conducive for retention of employees. In such a plan continuous 
service adds a lot to the accrued pension. An employee serving continuously for twenty years will 
accrue a larger pension than one who works for two ten years of service at different institutions 
even if the salaries were to be identical. If the accrual is say 2% of salary,  twenty years of 
continuous service, will result in an accrual of 40% of average salary of years 16-20. On the other 
hand, someone with two ten years of service will accrue a pension of 20% of average salary of 
years 6-10 and another 20% of average salary of years 16-20. Given that the  salaries are likely to 
be increasing over time in an academic setting, the pension for the first employee will be 
significantly larger. In the DB plan continuity of service has a high premium. An additional year 
of service  increases the pension benefit in two ways:(1)  By the value of the pension accrued for 
that year, and (2) By increasing the average salary and hence the pension accrued for past service. 
This premium on continuity is eliminated in the SRPP. Current year service or salary does not, 
under SRPP, have any impact on the pensions accrued in the past several years of service. The 
pension accrued over continuous twenty years will be the same as that over two ten year periods 
if the salaries are identical. In other words pension does not act as a tool of retention. In the DB 
moving or relocating has a negative impact on pension accrual if the employee does not move to 
another institution where the pension is transferable. SRPP on the other hand has eliminated the 
need for portability completely. 
 
The pension deterrent being neutralized, one may expect more relocation from New Brunswick 
universities than before. I conjecture that relocation will occur in two categories of academics. 
Apart from monetary aspect of pension and salary, job security provided by tenure is an important 
factor in relocation for academics. Among tenured faculty members those who could get a 
tenured job in another institution will be the ones  more likely to move than ones that need to 
work towards tenure in another institution. It is also well known that universities are reluctant to 
grant tenure on appointment unless the candidate’s performance has been extremely good. Highly 
achieving recently tenured faculty members may therefore be the prime candidates to move to 
Ontario and other western provinces (or for that matter other eastern provinces) where 
comparable salaries are higher. In fact according to the CAUT almanac the 2010-11 average 
salary of assistant professor in New Brunswick was $78461 as against the Canadian average of 
$89681. Manitoba was the only province that had a lower average. These young academics are 
the ones who have overcome the deterrent of job security by their performance and the pension 
deterrent has been eliminated by SRPP. Thus, an unintended consequence may be that New 
Brunswick is likely to lose highly qualified young faculty members to other provinces. For 
employees at the middle level the mobility is perhaps very limited as host institutions in general 
prefer not to hire a tenured faculty at the professorial level unless the appointment is for a funded 
chair or for an administrative position.  
 
The other group that may be motivated to relocate consists of faculty members that are a few 
years away from their planned retirement. Among this group those who have been performing 
well may have the ability to move but not with tenure. However, if they have only a few years 
prior to their planned retirement they can secure non tenured contractual positions for a few years. 
These are individuals who continue to be performing at a high level, mentor junior faculties, have 
research grants and graduate students. In the traditional DB scheme it is disadvantageous to leave 
towards the end of the career as the average salary will affect the pension accrued in prior years. 
In a SRPP conversion the average is frozen at the date of conversion and salary beyond that time 
will not impact the average. Those who were planning to move out of province post retirement 
due to family connections or other cultural reasons may accelerate their move if they can secure a 
term position. Anecdotal evidence indicate that moving towards Montreal, Ottawa, Greater 
Toronto and Vancouver after retirement is common among first generation immigrant academics 
due to the size of the cities and prevalence of sizable ethnic population in these localities making 
ethno cultural activities viable at the social level and the availability of consulting opportunities at 
the professional level. 
 
Another key provision in the SRPP that impact retention is that the contingent indexing is applied 
across board to the actives and the retirees from the effective date. By not grandfathering the 
index provision there is no special incentive to retire just prior to the implementation of SRPP. If 
grandfathering has been provided then pension consideration might have accelerated the decision 
of a large number of members that are closer to normal retirement age for pension purposes to 
retire prior to SRPP in order to have guaranteed indexation. Ideally a university would like a 
selective group of senior underachieving members retire as it would give the university  an 
opportunity to renew by  bringing  in new young faculty members who can be mentored by active 
senior members. The absence of a grandfathering provision under SRPP  prevents an exodus of 
senior members, but the career average provision facilitates  the mobility of high achieving senior  
members..   
 
Overall SRPP will result in an adverse selection problem for New Brunswick universities with 
DB plans. SRPP will motivate young high achievers to relocate, accelerate the retirement of 
senior high achieving members and will not provide  any incentive to retire for other  senior 
members that lack the mobility to relocate. The ease of mobility will have some other effects at a 
macro level. The ease of mobility reduces the transaction cost in the system and thus adds to 
efficiency. In the earlier example the host institutions can attract the talent that is relocating at a 
lower cost than before. The ease of mobility will also make certain organizational change 
processes easy as those who are resistant to changes can now move at a lower cost. 
The above discussions lead to the following proposition. 
Proposition 1 
Given other things constant the turnover of academic faculty in the SRP regime is expected to be 
higher than that under a DB regime. Further the higher turnover will be pronounced in two stages 




As alluded to earlier the average salaries of New Brunswick universities are not competitive. 
However, in the total compensation pension benefit is one of the key elements. The benefits and 
the contribution rate by employer and employees of Ontario Universities are provided in Table 1 
and 2.The DB plans of New Brunswick universities are comparable in structure. However, one 
cannot say the same about the contribution rates. In general, the employer contribution is more 
than the employee contributions in Ontario universities. Universities in Alberta and the 
University of New Brunswick are the only plans in the university setting with fifty / fifty 
contribution rates. 
 
[Place Table 1 and Table 2 here] 
 
The DB plans that are in deficit will have an amortized past service cost which increases the 
contribution required by the new employee for the benefit promised. In a conversion to SRPP 
from a DB the past deficits are to be eliminated and funded ratio is brought to be in excess of 
100%. This process adds additional burden to new recruits. The conditional indexing and career 
averaging reduces a substantial portion of liability. In spite of reduction in benefits the 
contribution is not expected to decrease due to conservative policies needed to ensure the viability 
of the plan. As the government report itself indicates, “For new employees and early career 
employees, there is greater certainty that their pension will be there when they need to collect it, 
though they will likely pay a marginally higher contribution” (see page 13 of the report). One can 
define the value of the pension plan to a member as the difference between the total (employer 
and employee) current service cost of benefits and the contribution of the member. As the current 
service cost represents the present value of the expected benefits, the excess of that over member 
contribution represents the value of benefit received from employer. By the very design SRPP in 
order to meet the risk management goal, requires a contribution in excess of the current service 
cost. If pension benefit has to be an attractive tool for recruitment the value to member has to be 
maximized. However, in a conversion to SRPP from DB career average provision and the 
contingent indexing reduces the value of the benefit to the employees. If the plan is running a 
deficit at the time of conversion the benefit reduction reduces the deficit by this contribution in 
kind from the employees and retirees with no matching contribution from  the employer  In other 
words the employer gains form the elimination of  the unamortized past service cost and the 
burden is entirely shifted to the active members and the retirees of the plan. The only way to 
increase the value of member benefit is for the employee to contribute more at least for a 
temporary period or provide upfront lump sum contributions to offset the unamortized past 
service cost obligations. This leads to the next proposition. 
Proposition 2  
Given other things constant adoption of SRPP will make universities in New Brunswick less 
competitive 
 
Strike and Lockouts 
 
The DB plans place emphasis on continuous service for pension calculations. Hence, a period of 
strike or lockout may amount to interruption of service. It is customary to have in the back to 
work protocol provisions to negate explicitly the discontinuity effect. Thus, in a DB situation cost 
of strike (lockout) extends beyond the loss of pay during that time to major reduction in future 
pensions. The employer, therefore, has a higher bargaining power as the employees need them to 
yield on the continuous service treatment. Under SRPP regime the continuity of service has no 
impact on the pension. The impact of continuity of service on other benefits like vacation pay 
etc., though important, do not have the level of impact as continuity of service has on pension 
earnings in a DB situation. Thus, SRPP has removed one major deterrent for strike and reduced 
the cost of lockout significantly. The SRPP, in my view, thus tilts the balance of power to 
employees. 
 
Mid-Career Temporary Administrative Positions 
 
In the university setting a significant amount of administrative positions such as department heads 
and assistant deans are filled by academics and are compensated by stipends that are not part of 
their base salary. Once they leave the position the stipends will not be paid. In the typical DB plan 
members that accept such position in the middle of the career will be contributing to the pension 
plan based on the extra stipends. However, that extra contribution may not have any impact on 
the pension they may accumulate at retirement. This is because the final average is likely to be 
more than mid-career salary with stipend. In other words, two individuals with identical salary 
structure - one with mid-career stipend and another without - will receive the same pension at 
retirement. Under SRPP ,on the other hand, pensionable salary at any point in time of the career 
will count towards final pension. Given other things constant I conjecture that under SRPP there 







The salary structure of academic institutions like universities is typically based on a career 
progression or seniority based structures. In such a scheme at the entry level the salaries are low 
and for every year of service a salary increase is provided other than the competitiveness 
adjustment and or inflation adjustment. In other words instead of working on the average salary 
throughout the career only adjusted for inflation, academics typically start with below average 
pay and end with above average pay towards the end of the career. The time based increase is 
typically called a Progress Through Rank (PTR) adjustment. In a DB Plan the best years’ average 
incorporates all the past PTR adjustments and the inflation adjustments on them. In a SRPP 
regime it is important that the PTR adjustments are included in the computation of the base 
benefit. If PTR adjustments are to be treated as ancillary benefits, then only a target  percentage 
of PTR ,contingent on the  funding level , may enter the base pension that is subject to inflation 
protection.. In such a scenario, the value of the pension benefit to the members will be 
significantly different from a typical DB plan. Since PTR adjustments are the same dollar amount 
across ranks, the impact will be more for the junior members because the PTR adjustment, as a 
proportion of their salary, will be much higher than that for a senior member. In universities 
where pension and wage negotiations are separate pension negotiators have to be aware of the 
impact of PTR adjustments and its impact on the pension accrual. 
 
Contract Academic Staff 
 
The SRPP regime provides opportunity for a contract academic staff who teaches a course or two 
in a year to be included in the pension scheme. In the DB plan, time of service in terms of years 
and continuity of service to calculate the best average pay are important. The SRPP accrual is 
based purely on salary earned in a year and whether the salary is earned through a continuous 
employment or not is irrelevant. The benefits are also based on salary and hence the time is not a 
factor. Universities over years have been using more and more contract academic staff. Unlike 
medical and other disability benefits that have complications in terms of the need for 
determination of time period when one is employed, for how long the coverage should last and 
the like the pension benefit is very easy to compute. Therefore, one may expect that there will be 
demand from bargaining units that represent contract academics, graduate teaching assistants and 
research assistants to demand pension benefits. Administratively though it will increase the 
number of members with small contribution and benefits thus increasing the cost of administering 






Even though it is not contemplated currently SRPP regime is easily amenable for added voluntary 
contribution from members to enhance her pension. This is because the benefit is easily related to 
the contribution. If, for example, the pension accrual is x% of salary and the total contribution by 
both parties put together is y% of salary then an extra contribution of $z will result in an accrual 
of $(z x/y).This is similar to situation where additional contribution is made due to administrative 
stipends except that there will not be an employer contribution. Along the similar lines  members 
that have left the plan but have not taken out the vested amount may be in a position to make 
voluntary contributions. These are not part of the current SRPP, but conceivable to be the future 
additions. The constraints for such developments may be from the ability to have the group 





In this paper I have argued that the SRPP regime is conducive for young academics to move to 
other provinces as it does not place any premium on continuous service. Further senior academics 
may accelerate their decision to retire and move to desired locations if they are capable of finding 
even non tenurable contract jobs. Furthermore, if universities convert to SRPP from a deficit DB 
plan the value of the pension benefit is likely to be very low for new recruits. Unless the 
universities are willing to provide additional unilateral funding upfront to the pension, as done by 
City of Fredericton that adopted SRPP, or plan for a temporary  increase in its contribution for a 
number of years, they will lose their competitiveness in the market for academics. The problem is 
exacerbated by the fact the salary structure in New Brunswick for academics ranks is almost at 
the bottom  among provinces. Of course this analysis is based on the effect of career average 
provision alone. The risk management aspects may mitigate some of these effects. I have also 
indicated possible future developments in terms of inclusion of contract academic staff and 
possibility of voluntary contributions. All of these issues will add new challenges to the human 






Table 1. Comparison of Ontario DB Plan Benefits 
 
















University of Toronto  
Faculty  3  1.5% / 2.0% same  With Spouse: 60% J&S 
Without Spouse: LG5  
75%  age 60 + 10 years  
Staff  3  1.6% / 2.0% same  With Spouse: 60% J&S 
Without Spouse: LG5  
75%  age 60 + 80 points  
University of 
Ottawa 
5  1.3% / 2.0% same  With Spouse: 60% J&S 
with G5 Without 
Spouse: LG5  
CPI < 3%: 100% up to 2% 
CPI ≥ 3%: CPI – 1 %  
age 60, or 90 points  
McMaster 
University 
(Salaried Plan)  
4  1.4% / 2.0% same  With Spouse: 50% J&S 
Without Spouse: LG7  
excess interest (threshold 
at 4.5%)  
80 or 85 points by 
staff group  
University of 
Waterloo  
3  1.4% / 2.0% same  LG10  100%  age 62  
Ryerson 
University  
5  1.35% / 2.0% 2.0%  With Spouse: 60% J&S 
Without Spouse: LG10  
100%  90 points, or age 60 + 
20 years  
University of Guelph  
Professional Plan  3  1.5% / 2.0% same  With Spouse: 60% J&S 
Without Spouse: LG5  
CPI – 2%  age 55 + 85 points  
Staff Plan  3  1.6% / 2.0% same  With Spouse: 60% J&S 
Without Spouse: LG5  




5  1.5% / 2.0% same  LG5  50% of excess interest 
(threshold at 6%) up to 
50% of CPI  
age 65  
 
 
















Trent University  
Faculty Plan  3  2.0% same  With Spouse: 60% J&S 
Without Spouse: LG10  
excess interest (threshold 
at 6.5%) up to 50% of CPI  
age 65  
Staff Plan  3  2.0% same  With Spouse: 60% J&S 
Without Spouse: LG10  
excess interest (threshold 
at 6.5%) up to 50% of CPI  
age 60 + 80 points  
OTPP  5  1.55% / 2.0% 2.0%  With Spouse: 50% J&S 
Without Spouse: LG10  
100% (pre-2010 benefits); 
50% (post-2009 benefits) 
plus top-up to 100% based 
on plan’s funded status  
85 points  
CAAT  5  1.3% / 2.0% 2.0%  With Spouse: 60% J&S 
Without Spouse: LG5  
75% (pre-2008 benefits)  85 points, or age 60 + 
20 years  
HOOPP  5  1.5% / 2.0% 2.0%  With Spouse: 60% J&S 
Without Spouse: LG15  
75% (pre-2006 benefits)  age 60, or age 55 + 
30 years  
OMERS  5  1.325% / 2.0% 2.0%  With Spouse: 66-2/3% 
J&S Without Spouse: 
ROC  
100%  age 55 + 30 years, or 
age 55 + 90 points  
PSPP  5  1.3% / 2.0% 2.0%  With Spouse: 50% J&S 
Without Spouse: ROC  
100%  90 points, or age 60 + 
20 years  
 
Source Table 6—Summary of Benefits for University DB Pension Plans and Public Sector Pension Plans 
Final Report of the Working Group on University Pension Plans  





Table 2. Comparison of Ontario DB Plan Contributions by Parties 
 











Automatic Indexing (% 




University of Toronto  
Faculty  3  1.5% / 2.0%  same  With Spouse: 60% J&S 
Without Spouse: LG5  
75%  age 60 + 10 years  
Staff  3  1.6% / 2.0%  same  With Spouse: 60% J&S 
Without Spouse: LG5  
75%  age 60 + 80 points  
University of 
Ottawa1  
5  1.3% / 2.0%  same  With Spouse: 60% J&S 
with G5 Without 
Spouse: LG5  
CPI < 3%: 100% up to 2% 
CPI ≥ 3%: CPI – 1 %  
age 60, or 90 points  
McMaster 
University 
(Salaried Plan)  
4  1.4% / 2.0%  same  With Spouse: 50% J&S 
Without Spouse: LG7  
excess interest (threshold 
at 4.5%)  
80 or 85 points by 
staff group  
University of 
Waterloo  
3  1.4% / 2.0%  same  LG10  100%  age 62  
Ryerson 
University  
5  1.35% / 2.0%  2.0%  With Spouse: 60% J&S 
Without Spouse: LG10  
100%  90 points, or age 60 + 
20 years  
University of Guelph  
Professional Plan  3  1.5% / 2.0%  same  With Spouse: 60% J&S 
Without Spouse: LG5  
CPI – 2%  age 55 + 85 points  
Staff Plan  3  1.6% / 2.0%  same  With Spouse: 60% J&S 
Without Spouse: LG5  




5  1.5% / 2.0%  same  LG5  50% of excess interest 
(threshold at 6%) up to 
50% of CPI  
age 65  
 
 











Automatic Indexing (% 




Trent University  
Faculty Plan  3  2.0%  same  With Spouse: 60% J&S 
Without Spouse: LG10  
excess interest (threshold 
at 6.5%) up to 50% of CPI  
age 65  
Staff Plan  3  2.0%  same  With Spouse: 60% J&S 
Without Spouse: LG10  
excess interest (threshold 
at 6.5%) up to 50% of CPI  
age 60 + 80 points  
OTPP  5  1.55% / 2.0%  2.0%  With Spouse: 50% J&S 
Without Spouse: LG10  
100% (pre-2010 benefits); 
50% (post-2009 benefits) 
plus top-up to 100% based 
on plan’s funded status  
85 points  
CAAT  5  1.3% / 2.0%  2.0%  With Spouse: 60% J&S 
Without Spouse: LG5  
75% (pre-2008 benefits)  85 points, or age 60 + 
20 years  
HOOPP  5  1.5% / 2.0%  2.0%  With Spouse: 60% J&S 
Without Spouse: LG15  
75% (pre-2006 benefits)  age 60, or age 55 + 
30 years  
OMERS  5  1.325% / 2.0%  2.0%  With Spouse: 66-2/3% 
J&S Without Spouse: 
ROC  
100%  age 55 + 30 years, or 
age 55 + 90 points  
PSPP  5  1.3% / 2.0%  2.0%  With Spouse: 50% J&S 
Without Spouse: ROC  
100%  90 points, or age 60 + 
20 years  
 
Source Table 6—Summary of Benefits for University DB Pension Plans and Public Sector Pension Plans 
Final Report of the Working Group on University Pension Plans  
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I DIDN’T KNOW THAT: A CROSS-CULTURAL COMPARISON OF FACEBOOK 
USERS’ PRIVACY LITERACY 
 
The ubiquity of social network sites and the extensive information shared on 
these sites raises many questions about privacy.  Despite the recognized im-
portance of knowledge in consumer decision making, privacy knowledge has not 
been widely investigated and cross-cultural comparisons of this kind have not 
been undertaken.  As such, the purpose of this paper is to explore and compare 
the privacy literacy of Facebook users in Canada and France in terms of subjec-
tive and objective privacy knowledge.  Contrary to expectations, no significant 
differences were revealed between privacy literacy across cultures, yet descrip-





Use of social network sites (SNS) has become ubiquitous.  Facebook is the most popular 
social network site in the world with over one billion users worldwide (Fowler, 2012).  Every 
day, users share more than 300 million photographs and click the ‘like’ button 2.7 billion times 
(Constine, 2012).  This type of computer mediated communication is changing the way individu-
als communicate, subsequently raising questions about how businesses can harness the power of 
social interaction with their customer base (Archer-Brown, Piercy and Joinson, 2013) and pro-
voking debate over privacy.  Indeed, “privacy has become one of the most contested social issues 
of the information age” (Vasalou et al, 2012, p. 3, from Strickland and Hunt, 2005). 
 
Generally, social network sites (SNS) are “web-based services that allow individuals to 
(1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other 
users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and 
those made by others within the system” (Boyd and Ellison, 2007, 211).  Personal information 
disclosure is a requisite part of SNS participation.  Depending upon the privacy controls offered 
by the SNS and one’s ability and choice to use such controls, the information shared can be 
viewed by SNS members’ connections, connections-of-connections, open to the public, collected 
and used by the SNS provider and/or its corporate clients and countless silent listeners (Krishna-
murthy and Wills, 2008; Stutzman et al, 2012; Bernstein et al, 2013).   
 
Social network sites would not succeed without information disclosure, but it is this very 
characteristic that makes participants susceptible to privacy risks.  Various claims made over the 
last decade cast speculation on whether individuals know enough about privacy to protect them-
selves in intensive information sharing environments (Cavoukian and Hamilton, 2002;  Solove, 
2006; Nissenbaum, 2010), yet few studies have attempted to measure privacy knowledge in order 
to assess whether these claims have merit.  Furthermore, as privacy is recognized to be culturally 
relative (Westin, 1967; Moore, 2003), a determination of privacy knowledge in different cultural 
contexts is warranted to substantiate claims from a cross-cultural perspective, yet no such com-
parisons were identified in the literature.  Thus, the overall objectives of this research were to in-
vestigate how much individuals knew about Facebook’s privacy policies and to identify whether 





Privacy Literacy  
 
There has been considerable research of late attempting to understand privacy concerns in 
online environments (i.e. Joinson et al, 2010; Xu et al, 2011; Midha, 2012), however, little re-
search has been undertaken to investigate the role knowledge plays in understanding privacy in 
these environments.  Since Nowak and Phelps asserted that attitudinal observations such as priva-
cy concerns are ‘only reliable and valid to the extent that consumers are knowledgeable and well-
informed’ about which they are concerned (Nowak and Phelps, 1992, 30), we maintain that un-
derstanding what one knows about privacy is essential to fully comprehend the nature of privacy 
in online environments.  Furthermore, as knowledge has been shown to provide decision making 
control (Ajzen and Driver, 1991; Armitage and Conner, 1999; Awad and Krishnan, 2006; Char-
trand, 2005) and affects individuals’ behaviour (Buchanan et al, 2007) it follows that privacy 
knowledge should ultimately be a predictor of information disclosure decisions in SNS.   
 
In the context of privacy, this knowledge has been referred to as ‘privacy literacy’, de-
fined by Langenderfer and Miyazaki (2009) as “the understanding that consumers have of the 
information landscape with which they interact and their responsibilities within that landscape” 
(p. 383).  As the self-disclosure of private information on SNS creates numerous instances where 
‘privacy leakage’ may occur (Krishnamurthy and Wills, 2008), privacy literacy becomes an in-
creasingly critical asset for consumers in an information landscape where the burden of privacy 
protection rests heavily in their hands (Langenderfer and Miyazaki, 2009; Nehf, 2007).   
 
Consumer knowledge literature discusses two types of knowledge - subjective knowledge 
and objective knowledge (Alhabeeb, 2007; Brucks, 1985; Park and Lessig, 1981; Spreng, Divine 
and Page, 1990; Sujan, 1985).  Subjective knowledge (SK) refers to the confidence one has in 
their knowledge about a subject, or what they think they know about something; whereas objec-
tive knowledge (OK) refers to the objective measurement of the accuracy of one’s knowledge.  
Clearly, knowledge confidence (SK) and accuracy (OK) are related concepts (Ellen, 1994; Carl-
son et al 2009, 2007; Moorman et al 2004; Park Mothersbaugh and Feick, 1994), but they have 
also been shown to be distinct constructs that impact consumer behaviour differently (Brucks 
1985; Carlson et al 2009; Park et al, 1994). 
 
Subjective knowledge.  Notwithstanding the attention placed upon understanding the 
roles of SK and OK in consumer behaviour (i.e. Carlson et al, 2009), only one explicit (Morrison, 
2013) and two implicit (Xu et al 2008; Lawler, 2012) measurements of SK were found within the 
privacy literature.  Although Xu et al (2008) did not report conclusions about SK, Lawler, Mol-
luzzo and Doshi (2012) and Morrison (2013) reported descriptive statistics indicating that confi-
dence in privacy knowledge was not high.  ‘Awareness’ has been mentioned in privacy investiga-
tions, but rather than being conceptualized as either SK or OK, this awareness referred to the sub-
jective value consumers placed upon corporate information transparency (Malhotra et al, 2004; 
Awad and Krishnan, 2006; Krasnova and Veltri; 2010) or subjective self-assessments of social 
awareness (Dinev and Hart, 2006).  In other instances, self-reported Internet experience, Internet 
literacy (Bellman et al, 2004; Dinev and Hart, 2006; Moscardelli and Divine, 2007) and perceived 
‘privacy self-efficacy’ (Rifon, LaRose and Lewis, 2007; Tow, Dell and Venable, 2010) have been 
linked to privacy related decisions online.  While these seemingly similar conceptualizations may 
be proxies for subjective knowledge, the association has not been conclusively determined.  As 
such, there is little information about SNS user subjective privacy knowledge available for com-
parison.    
 
Objective knowledge.  Nissenbaum (2010) has stated that individuals are “not fully 
aware that at certain critical junctures information is being gathered or recorded.  Nor do they 
fully grasp the implications of the information ecology in which they choose to act.” (p.105). In-
deed, several studies have articulated a sense that people remain unaware that their behaviour on 
SNS could be putting them at risk (Ofcom, 2008; Krishnamurthy and Wills, 2008).  Given the 
strong theoretical connection between knowledge and behaviour, it is surprising that there has not 
been more attention to an assessment of objective privacy knowledge.   
 
Studies within direct marketing have indicated that objective knowledge about marketing 
practices with privacy implications was low in most cases (Culnan, 1995; Foxman and Kilcoyne, 
1993; Graeff and Harmon, 2002; Nowak and Phelps, 1992; Milne and Rohm, 2000) excepting 
one (Dommeyer and Gross, 2003). In online contexts, OK about website privacy policies (Ac-
quisti and Grossklags, 2005; Hoofnagle and King, 2008; Turow et al 2005) and technical and le-
gal privacy protections (Acquisti and Grossklags, 2005) was similarly revealed to be low for U.S. 
respondents.  In fact, Hoofnagle et al (2010) concluded that the majority of Americans were ‘pri-
vacy illiterate’.  In Canada, Morrison (2013) revealed that objective knowledge about Canada’s 
privacy legislation (Personal Information and Protection of Electronic Documents Act, PIPEDA) 
was collectively low and Harris Decima reported that just three in ten Canadians were aware of a 
federal institution that helps protect the privacy of their personal information (Harris Decima, 
2011).  
 
Reasons for low objective privacy knowledge have been attributed to consumer neglect in 
reading privacy policies (BusinessWire, 2010; Lawler, Molluzzo and Doshi, 2012; Winkler, 
2001) or a failure to read them thoroughly (Office of National Statistics, 2011).  This is perhaps 
due to the length and complexity of many online privacy policies which likely requires patience 
most consumers do not have (Krashinsky and El Akkad, 2010).  As a result, many people agree to 
privacy policy terms without genuinely knowing to what they have consented.  To that end, Face-
book users have regularly reported poor understanding of that site’s privacy policies (Govani and 
Pashley, 2005; Gross and Acquisti, 2005; Acquisti and Gross, 2006) and erroneous assumptions 
(Ofcom, 2008) and clear misinterpretations (Turow, Hennessey and Bleakley, 2008) about the 
scope of privacy policies have been observed.  Second, most SNS users neglect to make use of 
available privacy settings (Govani and Pashley, 2005; Gjoka et al 2011).  And, even in instances 
where respondents claimed to understand the privacy policies of Facebook and make use of the 
privacy settings, researchers speculated that the weak criteria many use to accept ‘friends’ into 
their networks (which in turn allows information to be shared beyond one’s assumed control) fur-
ther signified poor privacy knowledge accuracy (OK) (Debatin et al, 2009).   
 
Calibration.  Calibration between what one thinks they know and what one accurately 
knows is an important consideration in consumer knowledge and critical to decision making be-
cause it allows consumers to cope with situations of incomplete information and errors (Alba and 
Hutchinson, 2000).  It is meant to represent the agreement between objective and subjective 
knowledge assessments of the validity of information, but does not refer to the accuracy of infor-
mation itself.  When there is lack of agreement between knowledge measures, a miscalibration is 
noted.  If confidence in knowledge is higher than knowledge accuracy, a consumer is referred to 
as overconfident; underconfidence refers to the opposite condition.  Empirical contexts are rarely 
expected to achieve a high level of calibration, and some degree of over-confidence or under-
confidence is more likely to occur.  The privacy literature has speculated an optimistic miscali-
bration of privacy knowledge might exist among SNS users (Boyd, 2007; Debatin et al 2009; Liv-
ingstone 2008; Youn 2009).  Morrison (2013) empirically detected a miscalibration of privacy 
knowledge among Canadian SNS users, but the direction of the miscalibration was neither con-




Hofstede (1980) defined culture as “the collective programming of the mind which dis-
tinguishes members of one group or category from people from another” (p.260).  Hofstede’s 
Cultural Value Indices demonstrate cultural differences globally based upon five dimensions – 
power distance, individualism, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity and long-term orientation 
(1980; 2001) and this particular framework has become a popular way of examining cross-
cultural differences (Kirkman, Lowe and Gibson, 2006). According to the most recent data com-
piled by the Hofstede Centre (Table 1), Canada and France exhibited key differences on certain 
dimensions of the cultural value index.  First, uncertainty avoidance (UAI) in France was particu-
larly strong (UAI = 86) and represented the strongest dimension in the scale meaning that the 
French culture is intolerant of unorthodox beliefs and behaviours.  In contrast, Canadians (UAI = 
48) tend to be more relaxed, less rule-oriented and less emotionally expressive.  The next greatest 
discrepancy in cultural value index measures pertained to the dimension of Power Distance (PDI).  
Whereas French culture (PDI = 68) is accepting of hierarchical social structures wherein power is 
unequally distributed and information flows are determined by power, Canadians (PDI = 39) val-
ue egalitarianism and have a greater expectation of transparency in information flows.  Although 
Masculinity scores for both countries were quite close (France MAS = 43; Canada MAS = 52), 
France was considered a moderately feminine culture valuing quality of life and support of the 
underdog rather than competition in the workplace whereas Canada was considered a moderately 
masculine society with strong standards of performance but reserved attitudes toward success and 
winning.  The Long-Term Orientation (LTO) dimension also exhibited differences between these 
two countries, but neither country had strong long-term outlooks.  Long-Term Orientation scores 
for France (LTO = 39) and Canada (LTO = 23) indicated both cultures held short-term orienta-
tions respectful of tradition, valued normative behaviours and focused upon the pursuit of abso-
lute truth and immediate gratification.  Canada (IDV = 80) and France (IDV = 71) were shown to 
be culturally similar on the individualism dimension, indicating that people in each country hold 
strong expectations that the responsibility to care for oneself and immediate family lies with the 
individual rather than society at large.  Indeed, in Canada, Individualism was noted to be the most 
prominent cultural value. 
 
Table 1. Hofstede Cultural Indices for Canada and France
1
 






Canada 39 80 48 52 23 
France 68 71 86 43 39 
World Avg2 55 43 64 50 n/a 
1 Hofstede Centre  2 In Veltri and Elgarah, 2009 
 
According to Vishwanath (2004) there are two schools of thought about how culture and 
online behaviour may be conceptualized – mediated effects and culturally mediated interaction.  
With mediated effects, the argument is that the medium alters cultures such that online participa-
tion leads to global electronic villages characterized by cooperation (i.e. Hongladarom, 1998; 
Shah et al, 2001; Rheingold, 2002) or real-world societal erosion as evidenced by declining civic 
engagement (i.e. Shah et al, 2001).  Also consistent with this perspective is the notion that altera-
tion could occur at the level of the medium.  As Qiu, Lin and Leung (2012) revealed, SNS users 
could switch their accustomed online behaviours to match those deemed appropriate in alternative 
online communities, thereby suggesting that the medium and participant group norms were im-
portant determinants of SNS behaviour and DeAndrea, Shaw and Levine (2010) surmised that 
Facebook might socialize self-expression.   
 
On the other hand, the culturally mediated perspective argues that the normative effects 
of culture constrain how an individual uses various media (i.e. Grace-Farfaglia et al, 2006).  This 
latter viewpoint has guided this research as there have been numerous examples wherein cross-
cultural differences in both online and privacy behaviours have been noted.  Specifically, Grace-
Farfaglia et al (2006) concluded that although there was a technological convergence among so-
cieties, a global cultural village was not observed.  Similarly, cross-cultural differences have been 
observed regarding the type of information disclosed on Facebook (Karl, Peluchette and Schlae-
gel, 2010; Auter and Elmrasy, 2012), privacy concerns in Facebook (Tsoi and Chen, 2011) and 
instances of deceptive behaviour in SNS (Lewis and George, 2008).  Interestingly, Marshall et al 
(2008) also revealed cross-cultural differences in the types of information disclosed, but it was in 
the opposite direction hypothesized.  The culturally relative nature of privacy has been well artic-
ulated (Westin, 1967; Moore, 2003).  And, in online environments, cross-cultural differences at 
the national level have been detected in the ways people perceive and respond to online privacy 
(Milberg et al, 1995; Dinev et al, 2006; Marshall et al, 2008; Cho, Rivera-Sánchez and Lim, 
2009).  Yet, some authors claim that cross-cultural privacy issues related to SNS have not re-
ceived adequate attention in the academic literature (Ur and Wang, 2013).  Indeed, the literature 
review conducted herein did not reveal any cross-cultural comparison of privacy literacy, sug-





The premise of this investigation is that privacy literacy about social network sites will be 
distinguished by national culture.  While no complete comparison of cross-cultural privacy litera-
cy was found, Harris, Van Hoye and Lievens (2003) did reveal differences in subjective Internet 
knowledge between Belgian and American respondents in a study pre-dating social network site 
dominance.  The paucity of research in this area provides little evidence upon which to substanti-
ate a hypothesis about whether France or Canada will have higher subjective knowledge, it is 
nonetheless hypothesized that: 
 
H1: There will be a significant difference in subjective knowledge between Canadian and French 
survey respondents.  
 
With respect to objective knowledge, it is expected that respondents from France will be 
likely to delegate the authority of protecting privacy to government given the protectionist stance 
traditionally adopted by government in that country (Warlaumont, 2010) and supported by the 
high power distance index for France (Hofstede Centre).  With these cultural orientations, there 
would be little need for French SNS users to necessarily possess a great deal of objective privacy 
knowledge as the belief would be that there would be adequate state controlled policies in place 
for individuals’ protection.  Conversely, Canada’s comparatively low power distance index in 
conjunction with the higher individualism index (Hofstede Centre), suggests Canadians should 
possess more objective knowledge about privacy.  Although Morrison (2013) revealed that objec-
tive knowledge about Canadian privacy legislation was low, Hofstede’s Canadian PDI and IDV 
cultural values suggest that the relative importance of information transparency and the need for 
Canadians to protect themselves rather than rely on government protection, might have had some-
thing to do with that finding.  As a result, it is expected that Canadians will be more proactive in 
independently seeking information about privacy on the SNS with which they interact and should 
therefore have higher objective knowledge than people in France.  Although, evidence suggests 
that objective privacy knowledge among Canadians may still not be high.  Thus, it is hypothe-
sized that: 
 
H2:  Canadians will have higher objective knowledge about privacy than their French counter-
parts. 
 
Since calibration reflects one kind of comparison between subjective and objective 
knowledge and cultural differences have been hypothesized for each of those measures, it follows 
that: 
 






An embedded mixed methods research design, appropriate for investigations requiring 
instrument development (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011), was employed in this research.  Ac-
cordingly, focus groups served as a supplemental qualitative strand embedded within a dominant 
quantitative cross-sectional survey design.  The focus group technique was utilized for the sole 
objective of survey development.  Objective knowledge has typically been measured via a series 
of true/false questions (i.e. Carlson, Bearden and Hardesty, 2007) about a subject of interest but 
as a result, scales of this kind do not translate among contexts.  As the only similar objective 
knowledge privacy measure (Morrison, 2012) identified by the researchers was created for the 
purposes of measuring consumer knowledge about Canadian privacy legislation, a new scale was 
required to assess objective knowledge about Facebook’s privacy policy.   
 
To develop this survey instrument, researchers crafted 29 statements from Facebook’s da-
ta use policy (aka privacy policy) that were either true or false. A small focus group of under-
graduate students discussed each statement in detail to assess statement clarity, comprehensibility 
and answerability.  Based on focus group feedback, the researchers independently selected items 
that should remain on the survey instrument.  Upon comparison, researchers had selected 18 
items in common and were thus retained.  Discussion among the researchers resulted in an addi-
tional 4 items being removed from the survey to avoid repetition.  A second focus group was then 
held with another group of students to re-assess the clarity of the remaining items and to pre-test 
the survey.  Once the survey instrument was finalized in English, professional translation services 
were obtained to complete an English to French translation of all text.  
 
A quota sampling technique was employed for data collection to capture responses from 
Facebook users in Canada and France according to published age distribution characteristics of 
the Facebook population in each country.  The services of Survey Sampling International (SSI), a 
professional data collection firm, were contracted to administer the survey online and ensure 200 
completed responses from Canada (in English) and 200 completed responses (in French) from 
France were collected from individuals ranging in age from 18-64.  SSI managed all correspond-
ence with the participants.  SSI provides incentives to its panel participants based on a points sys-
tem that may be redeemed for rewards.  The survey was hosted through Fluidsurveys.com and 
was conducted in July, 2013.  Once data collection was complete, data was cleaned and responses 




Subjective knowledge (SK).  The SK scale consisted of three items modified from Carl-
son, Bearden and Hardesty (2007) to reflect the context of privacy.  On a 7-point Likert scale, 
respondents rated their perceived subjective privacy knowledge to three questions: ‘Compared 
with most people you know, how would you rate your knowledge about how Facebook collects 
and manages your personal information?’ (1=One of the least knowledgeable to 7 = One of the 
most knowledgeable); ‘In general, I am quite knowledgeable about how Facebook collects and 
manages my personal information.’ (1 = Strongly Disagree to 7 = Strongly Agree); and ‘I am 
quite knowledgeable about how all the information I provide in my online social network is col-
lected and managed by Facebook.’ (1 = Strongly Disagree to 7 = Strongly Agree).  An SK score 
was computed as the average of the three subjective knowledge variables (min = 1, max = 7).  To 
prevent bias, SK items were administered before OK items.  The scale was determined to be in-
ternally consistent as Chronbach’s α (α = 0.852) exceeded the acceptable minimum of 0.7 (Nun-
nally, 1978).   
 
Objective knowledge (OK).  The OK measure was comprised of 14 True/False state-
ments pertaining to Facebook’s privacy policy.  Respondents were given the option to select one 
of three possible answers to each question -  true, false, or don’t know.  The scale was determined 
to be internally consistent as Chronbach’s α (α = 0.839) exceeded the recommended threshold of 
0.70  (Nunnally, 1978). A total OK score was computed by scoring correct answers as ‘1’ and 
incorrect or don’t know answers as ‘0’ and summing the results.  Thus, OK scores could poten-
tially range from 0 (none correct) to 14 (all correct). 
 
Calibration.  Calibration scores (CAL) were calculated by scoring OK responses to dis-
tinguish inaccurate answers. Since calibration is meant to reflect the difference between what one 
thinks they know and what one accurately knows, CAL was computed from the types of respons-
es provided to the OK scale where a correct answer signified perfect calibration with knowledge 
accuracy and confidence on that item and an inaccurate answer signified overconfidence.  Thus, 
to compute CAL, correct responses were assigned a value of 1, inaccurate answers were assigned 
a value of -1, and admissions of ignorance (‘don’t know’) were assigned a value of 0.   Thus, the 





The survey returned 288 responses from France and 265 from Canada.  Upon review and 
data cleaning, 199 responses from France and 198 responses from Canada were retained for anal-
ysis.  This represented a 69% and 75% completion rate for France and Canada, respectively. 
 
The demographic distribution, by sex, of the sample was 151 (38%) male, 237 (60%) fe-
male and 9 (2%) preferred not to answer.  Specifically, the gender distribution of the Canadian 
sample was 69 (35%) male, 124 (63%) female, and 5 (2%) preferred not to answer.  The French 
sample was 82 (41%) male, 113 (57%) female, and 4 (2%) preferred not to answer.  The gender 
distributions of survey respondents from each country were slightly more female than published 
Facebook membership distributions suggested where a 50/50 male/female split was noted in 
France and a 46% male to 54% female ratio was identified in Canada (Socialbakers, 2013a; 
2013b).   Table 2 displays the target distribution of the sample by age range, based upon Face-
book user age profiles (Socialbakers, 2013a; 2013b) along with the actual sample distribution 
achieved.  As shown, the youngest age range (18-24) was slightly under-represented whereas 
each of the older age groups were slightly over-represented according to reported distributions. 
 
Table 2.  Target and Actual Sample Distributions by Age and Country  
 
 




Actual Sample Distribution 
 
FB Canada FB France Canada France 
Age N % N % # % # % 
18 - 24 52 25.9 59 29.4 33 16.7 33 16.6 
25 - 34 56 28.1 61 30.6 57 28.8 66 33.2 
35 - 44 40 20.2 40 20.0 49 24.7 52 26.1 
45 - 54 31 15.7 26 12.9 35 17.7 31 15.6 
55 - 64 20 10.1 14 7.1 24 12.1 17 8.5 
 
200 100.0 200 100.0 198 100.0 199 100.0 
3 Socialbakers, 2013a; 2013b.  
 
 
Table 3 provides a summary of results to the privacy objective knowledge (OK) assess-
ment, pertaining to Facebook’s privacy policy.  What is immediately telling in these results is that 
only two questions achieved 50% correct and many questions resulted in an equal or greater per-
centage of respondents indicating they do not know the answer than who got the correct answer.  
Taken together these results suggest Facebook users’ knowledge of Facebook’s privacy policy is 
very low. 
  
Table 3: Privacy Objective Knowledge Summary by Question 
  
Combined Canada France 
Variable Description (Correct Answer) 
















The only data collected by Facebook about you is what you provide directly to 
Facebook, such as your profile details, status updates, and comments. (FALSE) 27.8 16.9 30.5 21.2 25.1 12.6 
OK 2 
When you delete your account Facebook deletes all information that they've 
collected about you. (FALSE) 52.1 29.0 58.1 28.3 46.2 29.6 
OK 3 Facebook owns all information it collects about you. (FALSE) 20.4 24.9 17.2 23.7 23.6 26.1 
OK 4 
Facebook provides guarantees about the accuracy and security of my personal 
information in their Data Use Policy (aka Privacy Policy). (FALSE) 22.7 31.7 25.3 33.3 20.1 30.2 
OK 5 
I can control whether or not public information on my Facebook Timeline may 
be made visible to third party search engines (ie. Google or Bing). (TRUE) 50.3 29.0 54 23.2 46.7 34.7 
OK 6 
Facebook controls, and is responsible for, all data collected about me through 
Facebook Apps that I use. (FALSE) 29.7 28.0 32.8 26.8 26.6 29.1 
OK 7 
Sometimes, Facebook Facebook advertisers post promoted news stories to time-
lines with your personal information.  When this happens, the advertisers are 
violating Facebook policy for use of your personal information. (FALSE) 22.4 43.3 22.2 43.9 22.6 42.7 
OK 8 
Only information you have marked as "Public" will be accessible to people oth-
er than your "Friends". (FALSE) 17.9 12.6 16.7 12.1 19.1 13.1 
OK 9 
When you set a post to display to "Friends" only your friends will ever be able 
to see the contents of that post. (FALSE) 19.4 11.4 20.2 11.1 18.6 11.6 
OK 10 
I can limit access to my Facebook profile name, profile picture, and cover photo 
in my Facebook Profile Privacy settings. (FALSE) 16.9 14.6 17.7 12.6 16.1 16.6 
OK 11 
Facebook Pages are always public, and so anything posted to the Page is also 
always public. (TRUE) 25.7 18.9 23.2 19.7 28.1 18.1 
OK 12 
If I want to prevent Friends from tagging me in a post or photo I can update my 
privacy settings in Facebook. (FALSE) 14.6 29.5 13.1 26.3 16.1 32.7 
OK 13 Once tagged by a Friend in a photo or post I cannot remove the tag. (FALSE) 46.6 24.7 53 22.7 40.2 26.6 
OK 14 
Regardless of your privacy settings, anyone who uses Facebook may tag you in 
a photo or post, even if they are not a Facebook Friend. (FALSE) 31.2 34.3 33.8 36.4 28.6 32.2 
Table 4 contains the descriptive results of the privacy knowledge scores for subjective 
privacy knowledge (SK), objective privacy knowledge (OK), and a calibrated objective privacy 
knowledge (CAL) score.  Recall that OK and CAL are based upon fourteen objective questions 
pertaining to Facebook’s privacy policy and SK was measured on a 7 point Likert scale.  SK was 
essentially neutral in Canada (SKCanada M = 3.98, SD = 1.42) and slightly lower in France (SKFrance 
M = 3.77, SD = 1.42).  Results partially support the second hypothesis that OK would be higher 
in Canada, although OK was notably low in both cultural contexts (OKFrance M = 3.78, SD = 2.56; 
OKCanada M = 4.18, SD = 2.41).  Descriptive statistics for CAL revealed an overall miscalibration 
of privacy knowledge (CALFrance M = -2.83, SD = 3.90; CALCanada M = -2.21, SD = 3.67).  
 
 
Table 4: Privacy Knowledge Descriptive Results 
 
 
Combined Canada France 
 
SK OK CAL SK OK CAL SK OK CAL 
N 393 397 397 197 198 198 196 199 199 
Mean 3.87 3.98 -2.52 3.98 4.18 -2.21 3.77 3.78 -2.83 
Std. Deviation 1.42 2.49 3.80 1.42 2.41 3.67 1.42 2.56 3.90 
Minimum 1 0 -10 1 0 -10 1 0 -10 
Maximum 7 12 10 7 12 10 7 11 9 
Theoretical Min 1 0 -14 1 0 -14 1 0 -14 
Theoretical Max 7 14 14 7 14 14 7 14 14 
 
To assess for differences in privacy literacy between Canada and France, an ANOVA, us-
ing SPSS v.20, was conducted for each of the three privacy knowledge measures.  Results are 
presented in Table 5.  As can be seen, the ANOVA assessment of the subjective knowledge score 
between countries resulted in a non-significant result (F(1, 391) = 2.13, p > 0.05, partial η2 = 
0.005), thus H1 was not supported.  Similarly, assessment of the objective knowledge score be-
tween countries resulted in a non-significant difference between cultures (F(1, 395) = 2.54, p > 
0.05, partial η2 = 0.006), thus H2 was rejected.  H3 was also rejected as the ANOVA assessment 
of the objective knowledge calibrated score between countries resulted in a non-significant result 
(F(1, 395) = 2.68, p > 0.05, partial η2 = 0.007). 
 
  







 Country (F ratio) 2.13 2.54 2.68 





Despite conclusions within the literature that cross-cultural differences influenced priva-
cy concerns and privacy behaviours (Milberg et al, 1995; Dinev et al, 2006; Marshall et al, 2008; 
Cho, Rivera-Sánchez and Lim, 2009), the same connection could not be made with privacy litera-
cy.  The results of this study clearly indicated there was not a significant difference between Fa-
cebook users’ privacy literacy in Canada and France and as a result, none of the hypotheses could 
be supported.  Specifically, there were no cross-cultural differences revealed in subjective 
knowledge, objective knowledge or calibration.  
 
Rather than the culturally-mediated interaction perspective of cultural influence used to 
frame this study and formulate hypotheses, these results might be suggesting that mediated effects 
may be taking place within the technological environment of Facebook similar to the behaviour 
modification observed by Qiu, Lin and Leung (2012) and DeAndrea, Shaw and Levine (2010).  
However, as the results only compared privacy literacy across nations, evidence of cultural con-
vergence consistent with expectations that a comprehensive global virtual community will 
emerge (i.e. Rheingold, 2002) has not been provided.  Therefore, care must be taken to not gener-
alize too broadly from these non-significant results.   
 
It is possible that the lack of cross-national difference evidenced in this study could be 
due to the similarities among certain cultural values within the two countries.  The comparison of 
Hofstede’s cultural value indices for the two countries presented in Table 1 identified that both 
Canada and France were quite close on the individuality dimension and both were more individu-
alistic nations than the world average (IDVCanada = 80; IDVFrance = 71; IDVWorld = 43).  This is an 
important consideration given Lewis and George’s (2008) finding that it was only the IDV cultur-
al value dimension that behaved as expected in their cross-cultural comparison of Koreans and 
Americans and Sondergaard’s (1994) conclusion that more significant cross-cultural differences 
were associated with the IDV dimension.  Thus, it is possible that the cultures of the selected na-
tions were not distinct enough to return differences in privacy literacy.  Therefore future cross-
cultural comparisons should endeavor to utilize samples from countries with dissimilar individu-
alism values.   
 
Likewise, it is also possible that the lack of cross-national privacy literacy difference 
could be explained by the similarities in the privacy regulatory environments of the two countries 
under investigation.  Although it was hypothesized that French respondents would have little need 
to possess great amounts of objective knowledge due to the nation’s cultural power distance value 
relative to Canada and the World, (PDIFrance = 68; PDICanada = 39; PDIWorld= 55) and the likely ex-
pectation by SNS users that the country’s protectionist policies (Warlaumont, 2010) would extend 
to the realms of social network sites and privacy, both countries have extensive privacy legisla-
tion that cover all information exchange interactions with businesses.  In Canada, the Personal 
Information and Protection of Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) is overseen by the Office of 
the Privacy Commissioner of Canada; in France the European Union Data Protection Directive 
(Directive 95/46) is overseen by the Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés 
(CNIL).  So, on one hand, Canada’s smaller power distance values might not be as important as 
the universal privacy legislation which could conceivably offer sufficient perceived privacy pro-
tection to SNS users and thus may minimize quests for objective knowledge.  Of course, given 
previous findings that objective knowledge of Canadian privacy legislation was also low (Morri-
son, 2013), it is unlikely that Canadians’ poor privacy literacy can be explained by confidence in 
the privacy regulatory environment acquired through objective knowledge about it.  Thus, future 
research should attempt to clarify whether cross-cultural differences in privacy literacy might be 
detected between nations with different regulatory environments and should also consider other 
factors related to one’s general confidence in the legal protections offered in their nations. 
  
Despite the lack of cross-cultural differences revealed in the results, there is compelling 
evidence provided herein that privacy literacy is poor.  From the descriptive results of the objec-
tive knowledge test (Table 3), we learned that in both Canada and France, respondents knew very 
little about the contents of Facebook’s privacy policy, thereby reinforcing speculation that most 
people do not know enough to protect themselves in technological environments (Cavoukian and 
Hamilton, 2002; Solove, 2006; Krishnamurthy and Wills, 2008; Nissenbaum, 2010) with empiri-
cal evidence.    From a consumer advocacy standpoint, this poor objective privacy knowledge is a 
discouraging finding especially in light of the overconfidence realized in the results from both 
countries.  When asked how much they think they know, respondents from each nation reported 
close to a neutral subjective knowledge, suggesting that they believed they knew enough about 
privacy on Facebook to get by.  However, calibrated scores of the objective knowledge test sug-
gested otherwise.  Clearly, respondents from each nation were more confident in their knowledge 
about Facebook’s privacy policy than their objective knowledge would suggest (CALFrance M = -
2.83, SD = 3.90; CALCanada M = -2.21, SD = 3.67).  
   
There are several implications of these findings to various stakeholder groups.  First, aca-
demic pursuits will be guided by the suggestions for future research identified in this discussion.  
In addition, future research should consider investigating what role poor privacy literacy has on 
information disclosure decisions on social network sites.  Second, governments should be inter-
ested to learn how little people actually know about their privacy in the technological environ-
ments in which they regularly interact.  As governments serve to protect its citizens, the collective 
evidence of poor privacy knowledge and the specific areas of privacy illiteracy identified herein 
may be used to inform education and training programs for the public.  The results also have im-
plications for businesses that operate social network sites and those that use them to engage cus-
tomers.  In one infamous example, Facebook was forced to eliminate ‘Beacon’ due to public out-
rage.  The Beacon service publicly broadcast purchases that Facebook members had made online 
with external retailers in the Facebook Newsfeed.  Although this practice did not contravene Fa-
cebook’s privacy policy, Facebook members were angered by the perceived privacy violation and 
perceived deception by the company.  As a result of the negative backlash, Facebook halted the 
Beacon service.  Where it is conceivable that consumer perception might have been different if 
Facebook users had been knowledgeable about Facebook’s privacy policy, it appears adequate 
privacy literacy might have prevented this problem and therefore SNS such as Facebook should 
consider ways to improve member’s privacy knowledge. Similarly, third parties that use Face-
book to connect with customers should be aware of the low levels of privacy literacy of members 
and seek ways to encourage improved privacy understanding so that they do not also engage in 
activities that are perceived to be inconsistent with privacy policies.  Therefore, to prevent future 
similar mishaps, Facebook and other social network sites should consider tactics that would en-
courage users to both read and understand privacy policies including addressing issues such as 





Some caution must be exercised in interpreting the results of this study due to a few im-
portant limitations associated with sampling, measurement and assumptions.  In terms of sam-
pling issues, there was likely some self-selection bias in the sample as a result of reliance upon 
panel participants incentivized through a points program.  In addition, there was an unknown bias 
as the sample was limited to Facebook users, but there are no indicators to compare whether Fa-
cebook privacy knowledge is representative of the general population and/or non-Facebook users. 
Attention should also be directed to the demographic distribution of the sample achieved.  De-
spite the quota approach, there were some minor deviations from the targeted population esti-
mates in that the sample was slightly underrepresented in the 18-24 year age range and was 
slightly more female than desired. Among the measurement limitations were the answers to the 
objective knowledge quiz - all but two of the fourteen items on the objective knowledge scale had 
the correct answer of False.  In addition, the Facebook privacy policy changes frequently so that 
what was true when the survey was deployed may not have been true in the past nor is it guaran-
teed to be true in the future.  It is also important to note that OK was measured exclusively for 
Facebook; however, privacy knowledge extends well beyond this context.   Furthermore, though 
a calibration measure was computed to provide insight into the consistency of privacy knowledge 
confidence and privacy knowledge accuracy measures, the calibration measure was not without 
limitations.  The calibration measure calculated herein was only capable of indicating situations 
of calibration and overconfident miscalibration, but the measure could not detect situations 
wherein there was underconfidence.  Furthermore, Hofstede’s Cultural Value Indices were not 
directly measured for survey respondents, thus cultural values were only assumed to be consistent 
with published index values.  Finally, a discriminant analysis would aid in further interpretation 
of cultural differences but was not undertaken in this study.  Thus, further analysis of this data 





 The objective of this research was to investigate whether cross-cultural differences in 
privacy literacy could be observed among Facebook users from Canada and France.  While re-
sults suggested there were no significant differences between cultures on measures of objective 
privacy knowledge, subjective privacy knowledge or calibration, interesting findings were re-
vealed with respect to privacy literacy.  Specifically, privacy literacy was concluded to be poor in 
both Canada and France as evidenced by poor objective knowledge and individuals’ overly opti-
mistic assessment of their privacy knowledge.  Thus, it was suggested that SNS participants do 
not likely have the requisite ability to protect themselves from privacy violations in these envi-
ronments.  The results also suggest implications for future academic inquiry and opportunities for 
both government and business to improve privacy literacy levels among the public.   
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Marketing practitioners and academicians have been talking a lot about customer 
engagement in recent years (Sprott et.al, 2009; Fournier, 2011).  By all accounts it is the 
newest and hottest “construct” in the field these days (Bolton, 2011).  But, what is it?  Is 
it a construct in and of itself?  Is it a model or set of relationships?  Is it some type of 
second (or third) order factor that subsumes a number of other constructs in the field? Or 
is it something else?  This paper will focus on the “something else” explanation for 
customer engagement.  Specifically, it will put forward that engagement might be little 
more than a specific type relationship between commitment and loyalty. 
 
The Nature of Customer Engagement 
The study of engagement in organizational settings is complicated because it 
appears to be a mish-mash of previously well studied concepts and relationships (Macey 
and Schneider, 2008).  In the organizational behavior literature, when employee 
engagement has been measured as a distinct construct, it has been highly correlated with 
other key constructs such as job satisfaction and commitment to the organization (Saks, 
2006).  However, a common view is that it is significantly rooted in employee attitudes 
about various aspects of the organization for which they work and that these attitudes 
drive important behaviours in the workplace. 
In the discipline of marketing, there is also a dominant view that customer 
engagement is ripe with both cognitive and attitudinal components (Sprott et.al, 2009; 
Brodie et.al, 2011).  Evaluative variables (such as customer satisfaction and service 
quality) are key in marketing scholarship because the field views these as being the 
ultimate drivers of major “loyalty-related” dependent variables (Zeithaml, Berry and 
Parasuraman, 1996). Over the past 20 years, the field of relationship marketing literature 
has examined the nature and connectedness of constructs that lie at the heart of effective 
relationships between consumers and marketing organizations (Morgan and Hunt, 1994; 
Bansal, Irving and Taylor, 2004).  In this field, we have a good understanding of the basic 
relationships (on loyalty related variables) of these constructs, but we only  have a basic  





Some take the view that customer engagement is mostly a behavioral issue (van 
Doorn et.al, 2010).  The behavioural element is that engaged consumers do a number of 
things in response to their engagement related thoughts and attitudes.  These behaviors 
may include such things as repurchase, positive word of mouth through customer 
referring, social media and/or blogging (van Doorn et.al, 2010).   For these researchers, 
customer action is key to engagement.  Very clearly, this is something that marketing 
practitioners might value because it would lead to positive outcomes for the organization.  
But it also raises the question as to how customer engagement differs from customer 
loyalty, particularly behavioural loyalty.   
Van Doorn et.al (2010) put forward a relatively complete model of customer 
engagement that links a number of significant antecedent states to key engagement 
behaviors to the key outcomes in which a marketing firm is interested.  At some level, 
such a recursive model might be more of a multi-order factor than a conceptual model.  
Such a holistic view of customer engagement implies that it has significant cognitive, 
affective and behavioural elements.  But it is problematic because everything in the 
model is conceivably related to (or at least correlated with) everything else.  This 
increases the probability that such a complicated model will be able to explain the 
behavioural variables of interest.  However, it also puts forward a significant, “so what?” 
Does this complicated model do a better job of explaining outcomes than stand-alone 
antecedent constructs that are well researched in the discipline? Simply put, does 
customer engagement really matter? 
At a marketing practitioner level, there is an appeal of the customer engagement 
philosophy.  It is obvious that engaged customers will be more loyal and support the 
company by completing a number of pro-social (from the marketer’s perspective) 
behaviours. Perhaps it is even easier to understand than variables such as customer 
delight and commitment.  Indeed, from their perspective, the focus on customer 
engagement might be the natural outgrowth of the relationship marketing era, where 
marketers have accepted the wisdom of building relationships with their customers (Rust 
et.al, 2010).  Yet, despite the vast quantity of research since Morgan and Hunt’s (1994) 
landmark piece in the area, we are still uncovering the limits and conditions under which 
it possible to build effective relationships with customers.  Although, it is increasingly 
clear that customer commitment is the core of effective marketing relationships (Morgan 
and Hunt, 1994; Bansal, Irving and Taylor, 2004), there are limits to the effectiveness of 
customer commitment.  There are situations where customer commitment is not enough 
and committed customers still engage in switching behavior or become less loyal over 
time.  At some basic level, marketers have looked to customer engagement to fill this 
gap.   This being said, the confusion over the nature of customer engagement in the 
broader domain of relationship marketing is somewhat reminiscent of an earlier 
discussion in the field about the nature of customer delight and it is worthwhile looking at 
the debate in this area of inquiry to help us understand the potential contribution of 







The Nature of Customer Delight 
Although researchers have been working with the concept of customer delight for 
some time, we first started paying attention to it as being something distinct from 
customer satisfaction about 20 years ago.  Formerly, researchers often used “delight” as 
an anchor in a semantic differential measure for many satisfaction type scales (Spreng 
and McKoy, 1996). Thus, it is fair to say that it was viewed as an element of an overall 
affective-type satisfaction judgment. However, the simple, yet important work of Jones 
and Sasser (1995) put forward that delight might be something different.    They argued 
that, for the purposes of creating true customer loyalty, mere satisfaction was not enough, 
organizations were required to completely satisfy their customers (Jones and Sasser, 
1995). In addition, they found that in many sectors there appeared to be some type of 
non-linear relationship between customer satisfaction and customer loyalty (Jones and 
Sasser, 1995).  Specifically, the finding was that in competitive market environments, far 
and away the highest levels of individual customer loyalty existed when the consumer 
reported that they were completely satisfied.  Figure 1. Shows the nature of this 
satisfaction loyalty relationship.  
 
Figure 1.
Customer Delight in Competitive Markets





Subsequently, the marketing literature has seen a significant discussion of the 
nature of customer delight and the non-linearity of the satisfaction-loyalty relationship 
(Oliver et. al, 1997; Rust and Oliver, 2000; Fullerton and Taylor, 2002; Finn, 2012).  In 
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this literature, there are two conflicting positions; the first being that customer delight is a 
construct and the second being that customer delight is a non-linear relationship that 
holds under certain conditions.  Those who take the view that it is a construct, put 
forward that delight is an affective state that it is distinctly different from satisfaction, 
although it may have some common antecedents and some similar effects on dependent 
variables of interest (Finn, 2012).   For others customer delight is a relationship between 
satisfaction and loyalty and the existence of a non-linear relationship between satisfaction 
and loyalty provides a simple theoretical explanation for findings which regularly exist in 
satisfaction research (Jones and Sasser, 1995; Fullerton and Taylor, 2002).  The 
resolution of this debate is very much an on-going process. 
 
The Nature of the Customer Commitment-Loyalty Relationship 
 However, this debate about the nature of customer delight raises an interesting 
question for those in the broad areas of relationship marketing and customer engagement.  
Although customer commitment has been a cornerstone of relationship marketing, we are 
still seeking to understand the nature and limits of customer commitment.  We understand 
that customer commitment is a complex construct with multiple dimensions (Gruen, 
Summers and Acito, 2000) and at the same time customers can be committed to multiple 
targets within a marketing relationship (Jones and Taylor, 2007).  We have some 
appreciation for how the components of customer commitment can both enhance and 
undermine marketing relationships (Fullerton, 2005).  We are also beginning to 
understand that there are limits to the role that customer commitment plays.  In particular, 
we have found that affective customer commitment is a powerful determinant of 
customer loyalty-like behaviours (Fullerton, 2005; Gruen, Summers and Acito, 2000; 
Bansal, Irving and Taylor, 2004).  Affective commitment is rooted in identification and 
attachment and nature of construct is that we (as customers) do business with 
organizations that we like and to which we are attached (Morgan and Hunt, 1994).  Yet, 
despite its power in explaining loyalty behaviours, it does not explain everything.   The 
recognition of the limits of existing theories of relationship marketing was one of the 
motivations for the investigation of the nature and effects of customer engagement.   
 In essence, if customer commitment is a central construct in explaining effective 
marketing relationships, why do committed customers sometimes defect, leave, switch, 
change their spending habits in terms of share of wallet?  One simple answer to this 
question is that they are not “engaged” with the company, organization or brand!  While 
others have examined the question as to whether customer engagement is a construct or 
holistic model (Brodie and Hollebeck, 2011; Sprott et. al, 2009), the question of whether 
it might have more to do with a non-linear shape of the affective commitment loyalty 
behavior relationship has yet to be discussed.   
There can be no question that the marketing discipline has borrowed extensively 
from the organization behavior discipline in building our knowledge base on the nature 
and consequences of customer commitment (Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Fullerton, 2005).  
Customer commitment is usually viewed as a key mediating construct in that it explains 
the effect of a number of important background variables [satisfaction, service quality, 
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trust] on key loyalty related variables [purchase behavior, word-of-mouth, relationship 
enhancement] (Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Bansal, Irving and Taylor, 2004; Fullerton, 
2011).   
Despite a significant body of work in the area of customer commitment, the 
existence of non-linear effects of various forms of commitment has been completely 
ignored.   In the study of employee commitment to the organization, there is some 
evidence that some components of organizational commitment may have non-linear 
effects on dependent variables of interest in certain situations (Luchack and Gellatley, 
2007).    Yet, the reality of customer relationships is that customers who report that they 
are affectively committed to their relational partner, still leave that partner.  One possible 
explanation for this is that other, previously uninvestigated constructs play a role in 
explaining the behaviour of consumers in the market place. Those who believe that 
customer engagement is a construct have proceeded on this path (Sprott et. al, 2009).  
Others have taken the view that there might be interactions between various forms of 
commitment that might limit the effectiveness of affective commitment in individual-
organization relationships (Fullerton, 2005).  This might hold promise for those who 
believe that customer engagement might be special case where high levels affective 
commitment produce powerful behaviours. 
 
What Might the Data Show?  
 Although commitment is a complex, multifaceted construct, most of the time 
when practitioners talk about the powerful positive impacts of customer commitment, 
they really mean “Affective Commitment”!  As discussed above, affective commitment is 
rooted a large number of positive cognitive and affective evaluations.  It is a powerful 
predictor of customer behaviours that are important to marketers (Fullerton, 2005). In an 
increasingly large body of literature on the effect of customer commitment, it always has 
a linear effect, regardless of the specific behavioral intention examined as the dependent 
variable.  Researchers have always assumed and found linearity in the affective-
commitment dependent variable relationship.  Yet, an examination of the data over 
multiple studies (see Fullerton, 2005; Fullerton 2011) demonstrates something a little 
different, as shown in Figures 2 & 3 below.  This might be an indicator of a slight, non-
linear effect of affective commitment on two key dependent variables of interest in 
marketing research in the academic and practitioner communities.   However, the big 
caveat in this analysis is that the non-linear effect does not reach statistical significance!  
However, it provides a basis for the view that customer engagement might not so much 
be a holistic model or construct as it is a relationship between product/service attitudes 



















Engagement in the Real World of Consumers 
Is it realistic that most organizations or brands can have a significant number of 
engaged consumers? Practitioners have high expectations for customer satisfaction and 
many organizations expect a large number of consumers (80%+) to report top-box scores 
on measures of customer satisfaction.  Manager and employee incentive compensation is 
frequently based on this and it indicates of the extent to which the central ideas of the 
customer delight movement (Jones and Sasser, 1995) have been accepted.  Increasingly, 
organizations also expect that large numbers of customers (80%+) will be willing to 
recommend their organization/brand to other consumers.  This is consistent with ideas 
that willing to recommend or advocacy represents a connection or attachment on the part 
of the consumer that is greater than mere satisfaction (Fullerton, 2011).  For marketing 
managers, the key aspect of customer delight is that consumers who report the highest 
levels of customer satisfaction also have exponentially higher levels of lifetime value.   
The same logic applies in terms of explaining why so many marketing managers have 
adopted net-promoter score as a key marketing metric (Reichheld, 2003).  Although some 
question the extent to which the net-promoter score does a good job of explaining firm 
specific performance results (Keiningham et.al, 2007).  
Apple (van Doorn et.al, 2010) and Harley-Davidson (Mollen and Wilson, 2010) 
are frequently put forward as examples of firms/brands that have significant levels of 
customer engagement.  What is it about these customers and these brands that make them 
prototypes of the customer engagement phenomenon?  The customers are satisfied 
(indeed delighted) with the products, they love the brands, they often rebuy products over 
several generations, they are strong advocates for the brand and they may undertake a 
wide range of “pro-social” behaviors on behalf of the brand!   Virtually any organization 
can have this going on to some degree.  But Apple and Harley-Davidson are special cases 
because of the quantity of their customers who are engaged.    
But at the core of these cases lies a simple phenomenon; customers are very 
satisfied (delighted) with the products and evaluate them very positively, consumers love 
and identify with the brands and they are prepared do a number of positive things for the 
organization in response to these thoughts and evaluations.  This type of chain is nothing 
more than Cognition-Affect-Behaviour consistency, which is a relatively old construct in 
the history of consumer behavior and social psychology (Bagozzi et.al, 1979). The 
suggestion is that when marketing scholars are conceptualizing customer engagement it 
exists as nothing more that this among a segment of the customer base.  In the case of 
Apple and Harley-Davidson, it might be a relatively large segment, and in other firms the 
segment of engaged consumers might be much smaller.  This might explain why it is 
difficult to detect the non-linear relationship between affective commitment and elements 
of behavioural loyalty.  The difficulty arises because of the relatively small numbers of 
consumers who report the highest levels of commitment and behavioural loyalty in 
consumer surveys.  A phenomenon is tough to detect when it is rare!  As many have 
noted, the data distribution assumptions and distribution requirements might make it 





For marketing academicians, we might ask whether or not customer engagement 
is a non-linear relationship between affective commitment and key loyalty behavior 
variables of interest.   Given the discourse about the nature of the customer delight 
phenomenon, this might be a worthwhile exercise.  In settings and sectors where it is 
known that firms have difficulty creating satisfied, committed and behaviourally loyal 
customers, it might be required to examine large customer data sets because it will be 
difficult to detect a slight non-linear relationship. 
For marketing practitioners, the challenge of creating engaged customers is to not 
focus on engagement.  Given the recent discussion about customer engagement,  for 
managers and practitioners, it may well be “old wine in a new bottle” (Brodie and 
Hollebeck, 2011) because the variables and issues are not new.  It would be easy to see 
how one might think of engagement as a repackaging of existing constructs. If there is a 
way for practitioners to get value from the term, “customer engagement”, it is for them to 
think of engagement as the state which exists in the market when consumers have high 
levels of delight, affective commitment, repurchase, customer referencing and other pro-
social behaviours. Share of wallet (a key marketing metric in many competitive markets) 
may well grow exponentially (Kumar et. al, 2010).  There is no question that creating that 
state in the market is significant for organizations and has always been (and continues to 
be) and continues to be a significant challenge!  It is difficult to move customers from 
being satisfied to being delighted.  It is difficult create brand attachment, identification 
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Benchmarking the Behaviour and Characteristics of Wine Tourists in an Emerging Wine 
Region1 
 
Exploratory research was undertaken to benchmark the profiles and preferences 
of regional wine tourists in Nova Scotia. This paper describes the consumer 
profiles of three wine tourist segments in the region: Wine Lovers; Wine 
Interested; and Curious Tourists. The data (n = 780) were collected over an 
eighteen-month period at wineries, winery events, farmers markets, and on the 
tour bus of a popular wine tour operator. Results provide evidence supporting the 
wine tourist typology found in the literature and give insights for tourism bodies 
as well as individual businesses. 
 
Introduction 
The past 25 years have seen steady growth in the production of wine in Nova Scotia (NS) 
and equally consistent improvement in the quality of the wines produced. There are currently 18 
wineries in the province, with at least 2 additional wineries expected to open within the next two 
years. Ongoing growth is anticipated: the province’s wine industry strategy projects an increase 
of vineyard acreage in the province from 400 to 1000 acres and a corresponding increase in 
industry revenue from $7.2 million to $23 million by 2020 (Winery Association of Nova Scotia, 
2009). The success of the industry  is demonstrated through national and international attention 
brought by award-winning wines: 28 awards at the 2009 All Canadian Wine Championships and 
14 awards at the 2009 International Tasters Guild Competition. Meanwhile, tourism is a 
significant driver of the NS economy in general ($1.3 billion in 2008) and of the Annapolis 
Valley in particular, with over $207 million in revenue and 3600 direct jobs in 2008 (Nova Scotia 
Ministry of Tourism, Culture, and Heritage, 2010). Furthermore, cuisine – including food, dining, 
wine, and agritourism – is one of NS’s core tourism experiences (Nova Scotia Tourism, Culture 
and Heritage). And there is further evidence of the quality of the Nova Scotia wine tourism 
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offering. In 2011, Le Caveau Restaurant (at Domaine de Grand Pré Winery) was named one of 
the world’s top ten winery restaurants by Wine Access. 
Nova Scotia is an emerging wine region, and wineries in the province are, by necessity, 
tourism businesses. As with other new wine regions, the marketing of products focuses on 
building local residents into loyal customers who then in turn further endorse and augment the 
region as a destination (Kolyesnikova, Dodd & Duhan 2008). Therefore, an understanding of the 
region’s wine tourists is a key success factor as wineries seek to develop product and experience 
offerings that will inspire re-purchase (re-visit) intent as well as intent to engage in word of 
mouth behaviour. Although some wineries in the region were previously making rudimentary 
estimates of customer characteristics, no systematic research had been done on wine consumers in 
Nova Scotia prior to this study. 
 
Wine tourism experts have emphasized the need for region-specific wine tourism 
research, asserting that consumer research, in particular, is not generalizable from one region to 
another: “…Charters and Ali-Knight (2002) admonished that wine tourist expectations are likely 
to vary from region to region. No one set of critical success factors will apply everywhere.” (Getz 
and Brown, 2006, 148). An indepth assessment of the market is necessary to create successful 
marketing communications for any emerging wine region; understanding consumer attitudes 
contributes significantly to the commercial success of new products (Kolyesnikova, Dodd & 
Duhan 2008). Moreover, legislation regarding the distribution and sale of wine differs by region, 
vastly changing the business and competitive environments in which wineries operate. For 
instance, Nova Scotia’s legislation makes it much more lucrative for wineries to sell directly to 
consumers at the farm gate, versus selling through Nova Scotia Liquor Commission stores. Thus, 
we cannot assume that wine tourism research conducted in other regions applies to Nova Scotia 
wine tourists and their desired experiences. 
 
Context 
Wine Tourism & Wine Tourists 
 
According to Hall (1996) wine tourism may comprise the visiting of vineyards, wineries, 
wine festivals and wine shows, where the important motivating factors for visitors are wine 
tasting and/or experiencing the attributes of a wine region. Charters and Ali-Knight (2002) define 
the wine tourism experience as encompassing many characteristics including a lifestyle 
experience, education, links to art, wine and food, tasting and cellar door sales, winery tours, 
incorporation with the tourism-destination image and a marketing opportunity. Getz and Brown 
(2006) declare wine tourism as “simultaneously a form of consumer behavior, a strategy by 
which destinations develop and market wine-related attractions and imagery, and a marketing 
opportunity for wineries to educate, and to sell their products, directly to consumers.” (p. 147). 
Clearly, wine tourism is a multi-faceted concept, and has not achieved a uniform approach or 
definition.  
 
Getz and Brown (2006) found three key attributes required for an attractive wine region 
(from a consumer perspective): core wine product (visitor friendly wineries, knowledgeable 
winery staff, wine festivals, familiar wineries); essential destination features (attractive scenery, 
 
pleasant climate, moderately-priced accommodation, easy to obtain information, well signposted 
wine trails); and related cultural experiences (unique accommodation with regional character, fine 
dining and gourmet restaurants, traditional wine villages). 
 
As Getz (1998 in Charters & Ali-Knight, 2002) explained, there are three perspectives to 
consider when approaching wine tourism: (1) destination marketing strategy; (2) consumer 
behaviour; and (3) opportunity for wineries to educate consumers and engage in direct sales. 
These perspectives are not discrete, therefore, investigation of one perspective informs the others. 
Wine tourists are also wine consumers in search of (lifestyle) product-related experiences; the 
motivations of wine tourists are considered an important aspect in the overall understanding of 
wine regions and wineries of the needs and expectations of their customers; (Alant and Bruwer, 
2004; Charters and Ali-Knight, 2002).  
 
The current study addresses an acknowledged gap in the literature by focusing on the 
consumer behaviour perspective: “Key researchers, in this emerging field of wine tourism, have 
commented on the lack of published research material available regarding the behaviour and 
characteristics of the winery visitor or the tourist.” (Charters & Ali-Knight, 2002, p. 311). Despite 
examining the consumer behaviour perspective, results of this research can be informative for 
destination marketing and the development of winery product and experience as well. For 
example, understanding the type of wine tourist, coupled with intention, may direct wineries to 
the provision of products and services that will satisfy – or delight – customers (Charters & Ali-
Knight, 2002). Furthermore, it is acknowledged that cooperation among destination marketing 
organizations, and others who promote wine tourism – including individual wineries – is a key 
success factor for wine tourism (Getz & Brown, 2006). Also of importance are the views 
expressed by destination marketers that every wine label acts as a promotional medium for the 
region where the wine was produced (Getz and Brown, 2006, p. 149). It is hoped that the results 
of this research will help to facilitate collaboration. 
 
A comprehensive profile of Nova Scotia wine tourists and potential wine tourists will 
enable understanding of the key influences in the selection of Nova Scotia wines and visitation to 
particular Nova Scotia wineries as well as the broader Nova Scotia wine region. By recruiting 
participants at farm markets as well as wineries, this research overcomes a shortcoming identified 
in previous wine tourism research:  “Most studies of wine tourists have covered only visitors to 
wineries, not wine consumers in general.” (Getz and Brown, 2006, p. 148). The profile advances 
the theoretical understanding of hedonic consumption while concurrently offering guidance to 
tourism operators as they plan and implement hedonic experiences aimed at enhancing customer 
value. In doing so, the fields of marketing, tourism, entrepreneurship, and rural development are 
effectively combined. 
The current investigation applied a previously developed wine tourism typology that sets 
out three types: visits of wine connoisseurs and buyers to specific vineyards for buying or 
scientific purposes (Wine Lovers); visits to vineyards in general, with the aim of understanding 
process of producing wine and/or wine tasting (Wine Interested) thereby developing long-term 
customer loyalty; and thirdly visits by way of scenic (wine) routes through wine producing areas 
linking different vineyards and wineries (Curious Tourists). Through the application of this 
typology, wine tourists in this emerging wine region can be effectively segmented. Such market 
 
segmentation is significant for wine tourism operators in terms of product development and 
marketing purposes (Mitchell et al., 2000; Williams & Kelly, 2001) as it provides an 
understanding of wine tourists and their behaviour.  
 
The Grape and Wine Industry in Nova Scotia 
Nova Scotia has a history of grape growing dating back over 400 years. However, 
commercial wine production – and wine tourism development – is a relatively new phenomenon. 
The industry has grown from one winery in 1980 to 18 wineries in 2013, with wine sales of $17.4 
million (2011) and wine tourism revenues of $35 million (2010). Despite its meteoric growth, 
Nova Scotia’s wine industry is marked by small-production wineries and relatively small (less 
than 10 acre) vineyards (average size is 7 acres). Of the province’s 94 farms growing grapes (in 
2011) only 10 have more than 10 acres of grapes. In total, the province has approximately 658 
acres under vine. Production has grown from 56 tonnes in 1987 to 1264 tonnes in 2011, a 23-fold 
increase. Thus, the region represents a small – but rapidly growing – share of Canada’s $1.2 
billion in revenue and employment related to wine tourism and the grape and wine industry’s 
national $6.8 billion economic impact (Frank, Rimerman +Co. LLP, 2013). 
It is commonly suggested that New- and Old-World wine regions are vastly different and 
that the consumers may differ by New/Old World as well (Charters & Ali-Knight, 2002). Nova 
Scotia, of course, is considered a New World wine region. However, the characteristics of this 
wine region may make Nova Scotia more similar to Old World regions such as southern Europe 
than new world regions such as Australia or Napa Valley (California). To illustrate: “The 
structure of the wine industry is substantially different in Europe, with much less concentration of 
capital, and – particularly in southern Europe – much more small-scale viticulture, often as part of 
a mixed farming set-up.” (Charters & Ali-Knight, 2002, p. 313). This blend of New and Old 
World characteristics sets Nova Scotia apart. Thus, it is crucial for region-specific research be 
undertaken to explicate the characteristics, motivations, and preferences of Nova Scotia wine 
tourists since they are likely to differ from those in other wine regions. 
 
Method 
Wine tourists and potential wine tourists were queried to determine the drivers of 
behaviour with regard to Nova Scotia wineries. This was accomplished by administering an 
interview based paper-and-pencil instrument – designed to probe opinions about Nova Scotia 
wine/wineries, visiting (and re-visiting) intentions, demographic information, and visitor motives 
– at strategic points throughout the province. Teams of two undergraduate student researchers 
administered the face to face survey, approximately five minutes in length. Data collections took 
place at participating Nova Scotia wineries and at farmers’ markets, with a focus on the Wolfville 
Farmers’ Market  (closest to the wine region) and farmers’ markets in the Halifax Regional 
Municipality (HRM). HRM is the most likely catchment area for day trips to Nova Scotia 
wineries; it is home to about 384,000 of the province’s 938,000 residents and is a reasonable day 
trip (60-90 minute drive) from the primary wine region (Annapolis Valley). 
 
Participants were asked to describe both wine interest (no interest, limited interest, 
interested, highly interested) and wine knowledge (no knowledge, limited knowledge, 
knowledgeable, highly knowledgeable). Consistent with previous research (c.f. Charters & Ali-
Knight, 2002; Hall, 1996), interest in wine was used to segment participants because 
segmentation by self-reported wine knowledge is problematic. Since Nova Scotia is a new wine 
region, its people are apt to have a lower level of overall wine knowledge than in regions where 
there has been time to develop a more knowledgeable consumer base. Furthermore, self-measures 
of knowledge might be skewed by personality characteristics such as self-confidence. As Charters 
& Ali-Knight explain, “The problem with knowledge is that it is only suggestive of the 
respondent’s motivation as a wine tourist, and is difficult to quantify. Visitors may be 
knowledgeable without being enthusiastic, and knowledge is probably less useful as an indicator 
of their activity levels as wine tourists and their relationship with the local tourism market than 
other psychographic indicators such as interest and attitudes.” (Charters & Ali-Knight, 2002, p. 
313). Charters and Ali-Knight (2002) further point out the sequential link between interest and 
motivation, and ultimately behaviour; offering additional support for the use of wine interest as a 
segmenting variable. 
First, descriptive statistics were employed. Then chi-square, z-tests, and ANOVA were 
used to identify significant differences among the groups. 
 
Results 
The results of this research provide an important benchmark for wine tourists in the new 
wine region and provide evidence that the wine consumer typology (c.f. Hall, 1996; Charters & 
Ali-Knight, 2002) applies to consumers in the region. It is anticipated that this research will be 
repeated as the region’s wine industry continues to grow and change. Nova Scotia is uniquely 
positioned as an emergent cool climate wine region whose growth is concurrent with the 
development of wine tourism as a research stream. Consequently, the current project develops a 
benchmark that will enable longitudinal study of the development of wine tourism in this new 
wine region. 
Seven hundred eighty (780) people were surveyed at wineries (February; August and 
September) during special events (Ice Wine Festival; high tourist season; and Fall Wine Festival, 
respectively) and at Halifax and Wolfville Farmers Markets. The sample represented 40% male 
and 60% female participants. Most of the participants were well educated, with over 90% having 
at least some post-secondary education; 27% had more than a Bachelor’s degree. Household 
income was reflective of the educational achievements of participants. Most of the participants 
(66%) were married or in common-law relationships.  
In general, the participants at both farm market and winery locations were interested in 
wine at some level (98%); only 2% indicated “no interest” in wine. Participants were largely from 
the Annapolis Valley wine region (37%) or the closest urban area, Halifax Regional Municipality 
(26%). Other parts of Nova Scotia (6%); the remainder of Atlantic Canada (3%); the rest of 
Canada (11%); USA (2%); and other International (1%) were also represented. 
 
Participants were segmented primarily by wine interest but wine knowledge
assessed) was also recorded
Table 1. Congruent with expectations 
identified as highly interested in wine 
than other groups,  (25, 762
which expressed concern around segmentation by self
considered for segmentation was interest in wine. Wine knowledge was considered for one subset 
(highly interested/highly knowledgeable) to provide comparison to previous studies (c.f., Charters 

























The typology developed by previous researchers (
1996) is relevant to Nova Scotia wine tourists, despite 
However, the member characteristics of each of these groups may differ by region.
self-report of wine interest, participants 
interested (52%); and curious tourist (12%). 
A description of the characteristics of category members follows
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 Valid n=754 of 780 total respondents for wine interest/wine knowledge questions.
. Results of a cross-tabulation on these two variables are found in 
– based on both previous research and intuition 
were more likely to self-assess as highly knowledgeable
) = 557.974, p = .000. To be consistent with previous research 
-reported wine know
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 Wine Lovers Wine Interested Curious Tourists 
Age 
19 – 24 years 11%a 14%a,b,c 22%a 
24 – 34 years 21%b 16%a,b,c 6%b 
35 – 44 years 9%a 14%c 9%a,b 
45 – 54 years 31%b 20%b 26%a 
55 – 64 years 17%a 25%a,c 23%a 
65 and over 10%a,b 10%a,b,c 13%a 
Gender 
Female 60%a 61%a 60%a 
Male 40%a 39%a 40%a 
Household Income 
Less than $25,000 11%a,b,c 12%a 10%a,b,c,d,e 
$25 000 - $44 999 6%c,d 11%a 16%d,e 
$45 000 - $64 999 15%b,d 19%a 14%a,b,c,d,e 
$65 000 - $99 999 19%a,b 17%a 22%c,e 
$100 000 - $149 999 22%a 16%a 14%a,b,c,d,e 
$150 000 plus 11%a 8%a 2%b 
Prefer not to answer 17%a,b,c,d 18%a 23%a,c,d,e 
Highest Level of Education Attained 
Less than Grade 9 0 a,b,c 0 a,b 0 a,b,c 
Some high school 0 a,b,c 1%a,b 3%c 
High school graduate 7%c 5%b 10%b,c 
Some postsecondary 9%b 14%a,b 25%c 
Postsecondary certificate or diploma 27%a,c 26%a,b 22%a,b 
Bachelor’s degree 26%a,b,c 28%a 21%a 
Above bachelor’s degree 30%a,c 27%a,b 18%a 
Marital Status 
Single 21%a 27%a 32%a 
Married/Common law 70%b 65%a 57%a 
Divorced 7%a,b 5%a 7%a 
Widowed 1%a,b 3%a 3%a 
Children in Household 
None 82%a 80%a,b 79%a 
One 7%a 11%b 8%b 
Two 8%a 6%b 10%a 
Three 2%a 1%a,b 1%a 
Four or more 0 a 1%a,b 1%a 
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 Each subscript letter denotes a subset of categories whose proportions do not differ significantly from 
each other at the .05 level. 
 
 
 Wine Lovers Wine Interested Curious Tourists 
Drinking wine for … 
Less than 1 year 2%a 2%a 19%a 
1-5 years 9%a 18%b 13%b 
5-10 years 24%b 19%c 14%b 
10-20 years 22%b 20%c 15%b 
More than 20 years 43%b 41%c 39%b 
    
Typical spending per bottle 
Up to $20 67%a 75%a 80%a 
$30 30%b 23%a 20%a 
$50 3%b 1%a None (0a) 
$100 0ab 0a None (0a) 
More than $100 0 0 None (0a) 
 
 
Wine Lover (31%) 
Wine lovers are enthusiasts and buyers who visit specific vineyards for buying or specific 
purposes. The wine lovers (ie. those who self-identified as highly interested) were experienced 
drinkers, having enjoyed drinking wine for 20+ (43%) or 10-19 years (47%). This group was well 
educated, with 30% having more than a Bachelor’s Degree. Most were married and travelling 
with spouse. The most frequent age range was 45-64 (48%) or 25-34 (21%); with the 19-24 and 
65+ age groups roughly equal (11% and 10%, respectively). For wine lovers, the wine and winery 
are sole motivations for the visit, with a strong interest in culture (romance and elegance) as a 
motivation for visiting. 
Previous research suggests gaining wine knowledge is a key driver for this group: “In 
summary, one could tentatively suggest that the entire ‘lifestyle package’ is particularly important 
for the ‘Wine Lovers’ – more so than the other segments. Food and gaining wine knowledge are 
key components of their motivation in making the visit.” (Charters & Ali-Knight, 2002, p. 315). 
Wine tourists in NS were equally interested in gaining wine knowledge. Not unexpectedly, in 
their quest for knowledge, members of this group are the most likely to visit a winery website and 
are somewhat influenced by expert ratings. Furthermore, tastings play an important role in their 
winery visits. However, they are least likely to attend an event or festival at a winery; this is 
likely because they do not need added incentive to visit wineries and prefer to visit at less buys 
times when they have more opportunities to interact with winemakers/owners/staff. Farmers 
market booths are a key information source for this group. 
Financially, wine lovers are important to wineries because they are willing to spend a bit 
more on a bottle of wine than the other groups: up to $20 (67%); $30 (30%); and $50 (3%). 
A subset of wine lovers who self-identify as highly knowledgeable was recognized by 
Charters and Ali-Knight (2002). This group was labeled wine connoisseurs: “Whilst the size of 
this group is small (3.3 percent) … Given that 60 percent of them are in professional or 
 
managerial occupations, and therefore considered to be high-yield tourists, the attention could 
well yield substantial benefits to the winery.” (Charters & Ali-Knight, 2002, p. 316). 
Connoisseurs represent 8% of the participants in the current study. Since this group represents a 
substantial opportunity for development – and many are apt to influence others (often referred to 
as market mavens) – they merit further study. Since the key determinant of membership in this 
category is wine knowledge, educational opportunities can move other wine lovers into this 
subset. 
 
Wine Interested (52%) 
Wine interesteds visit vineyards with the aim of understanding the process of producing 
wine and/or wine tasting. Like the wine lovers, the wine interested were experienced wine 
drinkers, with 41% having 20+ years of wine drinking experience. This is consistent with the 
dominant age range: 45% are ages 45-64. The other age ranges have roughly equal 
representation: 15% are 19-24; 16% are 25-34; and 10% are 65 and up. Most of the members of 
the wine interested category are travelling with a spouse (65%), but they are also the group most 
likely to be travelling with other family members. 
For the wine interested, wine is a pastime rather than a passion, thus they are motivated 
by other leisure activities. Wine is not the sole focus of travel; local/artisan foods are significant 
activities. However, learning about wine is also important. Members of the wine interested group 
are the most likely to attend a festival or event at a winery. People in this category are looking to 
enjoy wine by the glass, but some indicated that they “rarely drink wine.” Just the same, pairing 
food with wine is an important purchase influence. Restaurants are an important purchase 
influence for this group.  
Most of the members of this group spend modestly on wine: up to $20 per bottle (75%), 
however, since this group comprises over half of wine tourists, they are important to winery 
success despite their modest spending habits. 
Curious Tourist (12%) 
Curious tourists happen upon vineyards for reasons other than wine, such as enjoying a 
scenic route. Many curious tourists have been drinking wine for over 20 years (40%) but others 
are relatively new wine drinkers: 19% have been drinking wine for less than a year. Although 
57% of this group is married, singles were more common in this category than in the others. This 
group is the most likely to visit a winery with family. For curious tourists, the 45-64 age group 
dominates (49%); and – consistent with new wine drinkers – a further 22% of the category’s 
members are 19-24 years of age. The 25-34 age group represents 6% of this category; age 65 and 
up at 13%. Not surprisingly, this category is the most likely to have at least one child living at 
home. 
This group considers a winery visit a novelty experience; members may attend a festival 
or event. When visiting a winery, curious tourists are interested in art and architecture. Since 
opportunity seems to drive these tourists, expert ratings are not important influences of purchase. 
 
Proximity seems important to this group as more than expected live in the local (Annapolis 
Valley) area. In general, findings for this group mirror those of previous research: “This suggests 
that merely standing at the cellar door, tasting, has less appeal for them than a more active visit to 
the winery. Beyond that, and their desire to eat at a winery, it is hard to find any common 
motivational or educational ground, which distinguishes them…. It is also probably that they 
would not be wine tourists unless either a wine region was immediately proximate to them, or 
they happened to be visiting one for more general tourism purposes – a view broadly supported 
by the work of Hall and Macionis (1998).” (Charters & Ali-Knight, 2002, p. 316). Serendipity, 
rather than planning, brings the curious tourist to the cellar door. 
This group shops for wine on a very modest budget, with 78% spending $20 or less per 
bottle; group members do not purchase wines priced over $30. 
Common Characteristics 
Despite fitting well into the previously developed wine tourist typology, participants in 
this study had a number of characteristics in common. There was an overall high opinion of the 
quality of Nova Scotia wines, indicative of the growth and improvement across the industry. In 
general, enjoying local artisan foods was more influential in the wine tourism decision than 
restaurants. Appreciation for the rural setting was likewise an important factor in the decision to 
visit the wine region and its wineries. 
In this study, wine tourists were not obtaining information from winery brochures, visitor 
guides/visitor centres, travel/consumer shows, travel agents, newspapers or other (ie. non-winery) 
tourism websites. However, this is more likely to be a factor of where – and in what format – 
information is available than a reflection of consumer preferences. In the on-going quest to be 
market driven, future research might profitably be directed at identifying the formats and 
locations where the region’s wine tourists prefer to acquire information. 
None of the groups sought overnight packages as a reason to visit the region. This is 
consistent with the whereabouts of the sample, since most were local or within a reasonable 
radius for day trips (ie. HRM). Although this finding might provide discouraging for 
accommodation providers, it is not unlike the visitor profile in more developed wine regions. For 
instance, 67% of visitors to Napa, California are day trip visitors (Napa Visitor Industry, 2012 
Economic Impact Report). Thus, understanding day trip visitors to wine regions is a key success 
factor, underscoring the importance of the current study. 
 
Discussion & Managerial Implications 
The discussion and managerial implications of this research are intrinsically linked. 
Therefore, the two are addressed concurrently in the following section. Each of the three wine 




Wine lovers are interested in tasting and education. Thus, wineries should be sure to 
provide opportunities for both in order to satisfy this group. Since wine lovers gather information 
at farmers markets, wineries the purpose of their market booths as advertising and creating 
awareness. This change of perspective – especially given the influence and lack of price 
sensitivity of this group – might well encourage wineries to participate in farmers markets, 
whether or not they see an immediate return on investment on market days. Finally, wine lovers 
seek reasons to re-visit. Therefore, this group might appreciate offerings such as loyalty programs 
or wine clubs. Wine clubs might be especially appealing to the wine connoisseur subset, since 
wine club membership has been related to higher wine knowledge (Getz & Brown, 2006). 
Wine Interested 
The wine interested group is the most likely to be influenced by festivals and events, 
thus, the preferences of this group should be kept in mind during the event planning process. 
Since members of this group are not necessarily wine drinkers, other activities – such as 
education about wine and how to pair wine with food – should be integrated into events and these 
opportunities communicated through promotional materials. While in the wine region, this group 
is interested in pursuing other leisure activities, indulging in local/artisan foods, and eating at 
restaurants. Therefore, this group may be likely customers at a winery restaurant. Furthermore, 
development of packages and/or cross-promotion with providers of leisure activities in the region 
may be a useful strategy for attracting these consumers. 
Curious Tourist 
Since proximity is important for curious tourists, Nova Scotia wineries should look for 
members of this group in their own backyards. To illustrate this point, Annapolis Valley residents 
make up a large proportion of the members of this group in the current research. Clearly, this has 
implications for promotional efforts, which might profitably be geographically targeted. Curious 
tourists are often traveling as a millennial and parent mix. Since many (19%) have been drinking 
wine for less than a year, wineries have the opportunity to convert these new drinkers to loyal 
customers and help move them through the typology to the wine interested group and on to wine 
lover group. As the province continues to advance as a wine region, the development of scenic 
touring routes (i.e Wine Routes) will further capitalize the economic opportunities associated 
with this group of curious tourists. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
Limitations 
As with any study, this research has inherent limitations that must be acknowledged. 
Principle among them is the choice of venues for data collections. Participants who completed the 
survey at farmers markets are likely to be a friendly audience with an affinity for local products. 
Furthermore, participants at a particular winery may be more likely to report positive feelings 
 
toward the brand due to a recent interaction with the wine product and winery experience. Thus, 
the choice of locations may have had a polarizing influence on the data. This potential limitation 
can be mitigated by using similar data collection sites during subsequent research. This strategy 
will ensure that data are comparable across studies. 
Future Research 
As previously mentioned, this same study is expected to be revisited over time. Thus,   
longitudinal research can examine the development of wine tourism in this New World wine 
region over time. The results will be helpful, not only for the grape and wine industry in Nova 
Scotia, but also for a more thorough theoretical understanding of the organic growth of a wine 
region. To our knowledge, this sort of research program has not been undertaken elsewhere in the 
world. Future iterations of the study should strive to verify that the typology is appropriately 
applied to wine tourists/consumers in the region through the use of cluster analysis, confirmatory 
factor analysis, and other appropriate techniques for identifying groups.  
The development of a NS wine tourist profile – as described herein – forms one part of a 
three-pronged initiative. The other aspects of the research are: (1) a comprehensive study of NS 
winery websites and the elements that inspire virtual visitors to become real-life visitors 
(completed work funded by a Harrison McCain Foundation Emerging Scholar Award); and (2) a 
thorough investigation of visitors experiences at NS wineries, including desired elements of these 
encounters that may not currently be integrated. Some research has been conducted to explore 
motivations and decision making in a theoretical context, however the wine tourism product, or 
experience, has not yet been modeled (Getz and Brown, 2006). The investigation of visitor 
experiences at Nova Scotia wineries is currently underway. Student researchers administer the 
experience measurement instrument to wine tourists on Wolfville’s Magic Winery Bus. 
Passengers will have visited up to four local wineries during the tour. 
 
A more specific investigation of wine tourist motivations would also be informative. As 
Charters and Ali-Knight explain, “There are two things which the literature of wine tourism in the 
English-speaking world must encompass if it is to avoid to [sic] being one-dimensional. Wine 
tourism is rarely a discrete activity, but will probably be undertaking in conjunction with some or 
all of rural, eco-cultural or adventure tourism, and its participants are unlikely to separate the 
various tourism forms. Secondly, the wine tourists may come with various cultural paradigms, 
which might make them approach the processes with different expectations and requirements.” 
(Charters & Ali-Knight, 2002, p. 318). Motivation research could examine both the reasons for 
choosing a specific winery and the reasons for choosing to visit a wine region. 
Finally, it would be beneficial to explore the factors that influence level of wine interest 
and attendant membership in the wine tourist categories. A deeper understanding of these 
influences could help destination marketing organizations and wineries to shift consumers into 
higher involvement – and thus more lucrative – categories. For instance, how a winery might 
inspire a curious tourist who happens into the winery to become a wine interested or even a wine 
lover. It is anticipated that both involvement and customer loyalty may play a role. For instance, a 
customer who becomes loyal to a particular winery may experience higher involvement with the 
 
wine category, spurring higher interest and a thirst for knowledge. More members in the wine 
lover category should translate to a rosier bottom line for the region’s wineries. 
 
Conclusion 
This work provides support for the existence of different segments of wine tourists in our 
region (consistent with previous work by Charters and Ali-Knight (2002) and Hall (1996), among 
others) and evidence for the broad use of the typology that these authors developed. However, a 
word of caution is advised. Groups – or even couples – may represent more than one wine tourist 
type. It is important for tasting room staff and others responsible for the visitor experience to be 
cognizant that each visitor who comes through the door may have a different set of goals and 
expectations for the winery visit. Moreover, future research should more systematically 
investigate the structure of the typology, to ensure that it is appropriately applied to wine tourists 
in this emerging region. 
Across the wine tourist types, buying local was a significant motivator for choosing Nova 
Scotia wine. This finding reflects the popularity of the locavore movement within the province. 
Since legislation makes it difficult for Nova Scotia wineries to sell their product outside the 
province (even in the rest of Canada), this finding is heartening.  
There was a high content of wine lovers and wine interested in this study. It is imperative 
that local wineries meet the needs of these segments by continuing to provide high quality wines 
and excellent visitor experiences while interest is high. Wineries must avoid alienating the wine 
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